Recently, geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East has emerged, bringing a certain degree of impact to the overall overseas PV market. Below, we provide an in-depth analysis of the current Middle East PV market from various perspectives:

LONDON, March 3 (Reuters) - Gold's appeal as it draws support from the widening conflict in the Middle East is expected to ​remain intact even if some investors have favoured the dollar as their preferred safe haven, traders and analysts said.

February 2026 coincided with the Chinese New Year holiday. Affected by holiday factors, production pace across core segments of China’s sodium-ion battery industry generally slowed, showing an “off-season reset” trend. From cathodes, anodes, and electrolyte to battery cells and end-users, production across all segments declined MoM to varying degrees, while YoY still maintained a certain degree of growth resilience.

As of now, the FOB price of Indonesian MHP nickel was $15,549/mt Ni, and the FOB price of Indonesian MHP cobalt was $49,819/mt Co. MHP payables (against the SMM battery-grade nickel sulphate index) were 85-86, and the MHP cobalt element payable indicator (against SMM refined cobalt (Rotterdam warehouse)) was 91. The FOB price of Indonesian high-grade nickel matte was $15,910/mt Ni.

Against this backdrop, the value of energy storage and grid infrastructure becomes particularly prominent. If conflict persists, the core objective of energy systems will shift from cost optimization to systemic resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and storage possess an insurance-like function; their value becomes more visible under extreme conditions. Even if elevated raw material prices increase project costs, higher policy priority may provide long-term support.

In times of peace, oil and gas are cost variables; in a war context, traditional energy becomes a security variable. The escalation of conflict in the Middle East at the end of February led to a high opening for oil prices on the first trading day of March. During peacetime, energy prices fluctuate around the supply-demand gap, with the market focusing on production, inventory, and cost curves. However, in a war environment, the market first trades not on production but on deliverability. Whether key shipping routes are open, whether insurance costs soar, and whether sanctions spread, all quickly translate into risk premiums. As a result, oil prices exhibit high fluctuations, even if actual supply has not significantly decreased, as prices are pushed up by delivery uncertainties. Energy thus transforms from a commodity into a strategic resource. As an analyst in the new energy sector, I believe that this change does not simply benefit new energy. Rising oil prices reinforce the logic of electrification, making EVs and renewable energy more economically attractive. However, the macroeconomic uncertainty brought about by war may also dampen consumer and investment confidence. If high oil prices drive inflation and slow growth, overall demand for cars and industry will slow down, and new energy will not be immune. Therefore, the investment logic for new energy is no longer unidirectional, but depends on the balance between substitution effects and macroeconomic contraction effects. A deeper change lies in the fact that capital is beginning to re-evaluate energy security. The traditional oil and gas system is highly dependent on cross-border transportation and continuous fuel supply, with its vulnerabilities lying in shipping and geopolitics. In contrast, wind and PV do not require continuous fuel input during operation, and energy storage can enhance the stability of the power system, giving new energy strategic value in a war environment. They are not only low-carbon tools but also a path to reducing external dependence. The security attributes of new energy are thus being revalued. However, it must be recognized that this security attribute is not absolute. The manufacturing of new energy is highly dependent on critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, with their mining and processing concentrated and heavily reliant on transportation. If upstream resource policies tighten or logistics are disrupted, risks will also propagate through the industry chain. Therefore, the security of new energy is operational security, not supply security. This means that future investment logic will shift from simply pursuing the lowest cost to focusing on supply chain control capabilities and regional diversification. In a war environment, the allocation of risk premiums by capital changes. Transportation premiums, geopolitical premiums, and supply chain concentration premiums all rise. The volatility of traditional energy intensifies; new energy generation assets gain a security bonus; and critical minerals and midstream processing capabilities become new strategic nodes. Efficiency is no longer the sole criterion, with redundancy and controllability becoming important components of the valuation system. Deglobalization and supply chain restructuring may push up the cost center of the industry, but they also enhance the strategic position of assets. In this context, the value of energy storage and power grid assets stands out. If conflicts persist, the core goal of the energy system will shift from cost optimization to system resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and energy storage have insurance-like attributes, and their value becomes more evident in extreme scenarios. Even if high raw material prices increase project costs, an elevated policy priority may still provide long-term support. Over the past five to ten years, the narrative of the energy transition has largely focused on new energy as a tool for decarbonization to ensure sustainable development of the planet. However, geopolitical tensions in the last two to three years have redefined new energy as part of the energy security framework. Within new energy, it is not just the power generation assets that are being repriced, but also energy storage and the power grid. 1) In a war environment, the core issue of the energy system shifts from efficiency to resilience During peacetime, the goal of the energy system is to maximize efficiency: lowest cost, highest utilization rate, and optimal allocation. Cross-border trade and centralized power generation have made the global energy structure highly globalized and scaled. War exposes the vulnerabilities of such a system. Maritime transport routes, natural gas pipelines, tanker insurance, key ports, and large power plants can all become risk nodes. At this point, the system's priority is no longer efficiency but resilience – the ability to maintain basic operational capacity under shocks. Energy storage and the power grid are at the core of a resilient system. 2) Energy storage: from an arbitrage tool to system insurance In normal circumstances, the value of energy storage mainly comes from electricity arbitrage, ancillary services, and peak load regulation, with its return on investment depending on fluctuations in electricity prices and policy subsidies. However, in a wartime context, the value of energy storage is redefined. It is no longer merely an economic optimization tool but a guarantee of power system stability. Energy storage can provide emergency support during fuel supply disruptions or grid shocks, preventing the power system from collapsing due to a single point of failure. This means that energy storage assets have insurance-like attributes. When system risks rise, capital's risk appetite for these assets increases. Even if high raw material prices drive up project costs, there may still be stronger policy support because of the rising strategic value. The valuation logic of energy storage thus transitions from "IRR-driven" to "system safety premium." 3) Power grid: an undervalued strategic hub The impact of war on the energy system often first manifests in the transmission and distribution network. Centralized energy structures rely on a few key periods, and once damaged, the impact is widespread. Therefore, power grid upgrades and digitalization have become the focus of secure investments. Enhancements in smart grids, regional interconnections, grid redundancy, and distributed access capabilities can significantly strengthen the system's resilience to shocks. The investment logic for power grid assets becomes clearer in a wartime context: it is not only infrastructure but also the backbone of national energy security. In the long term, power grid upgrades will be a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of new energy. The fluctuations in new energy generation require more robust transmission, distribution, and dispatching capabilities. When risk environments rise, countries are more inclined to accelerate grid construction to reduce dependence on external energy. 4) Distributed Energy and Microgrids: The Strategic Significance of Decentralization While centralized energy systems are efficient, they are also highly vulnerable. Although distributed PV, community energy storage, and microgrids are relatively small in scale, they possess the capability for independent operation. In a war context, distributed energy has two advantages: first, it reduces the risk of single-point failures; second, it decreases reliance on cross-border fuel transportation. The strategic value of such assets is being re-evaluated in high-risk environments. 5) Deep Changes in Investment Logic The rising value of energy storage and power grids means that new energy investments no longer solely revolve around installation growth and cost reduction, but rather around system security and supply chain control. Key changes include: a. Capital is more focused on localized manufacturing and supply chain diversification; b. The weight of security in investment decisions has increased; c. The cost center may shift upward in stages, but the strategic premium has risen. The valuation system of the new energy industry is transitioning from a growth premium to a strategic premium. What opportunities and risks does geopolitics bring to China's new energy industry? 1) China's Energy Security Structure: From Import Dependence to Electrification Advantage China has long been one of the world's largest crude oil importers, with persistent energy security issues. In a wartime environment, oil price fluctuations and transportation risks increase, directly affecting energy costs and macro expectations. However, unlike before, China has established the most complete new energy manufacturing system globally. The high integration of the PV, wind, energy storage, battery, and EV industry chains gives China a manufacturing and scale advantage during the energy transition. In a war context, this advantage is beginning to translate into security attributes: an increase in electrification means a reduction in dependence on external fuels; an increase in new energy installations means a more resilient energy structure. Thus, China's new energy system has the potential for alternative security. 2) Energy Storage and Power Grid: China's Most Strategic Assets If the war becomes protracted, the core of the energy system will no longer be power generation capacity itself, but system stability. China's layout in energy storage and power grid gives it a relative advantage at this stage. In terms of energy storage, China possesses the world's largest battery manufacturing capacity and cost advantages. Under the logic of energy security, energy storage is no longer solely about economics, but has become an important tool for ensuring the stability and emergency response capability of the power system. At the policy level, there may be an emphasis on increasing the proportion of energy storage in the power system. Regarding the power grid, China has developed the world's largest ultra-high voltage transmission network and grid construction capabilities. The increased redundancy and interconnectivity of the grid help to absorb more new energy installations while enhancing the system's resilience against shocks. In a high-risk environment, investment in the grid may accelerate. This means that, under the security logic, China's energy storage and power grid assets have structural strategic premiums. 3) Critical Minerals and Supply Chain: Advantages and Risks Coexist China has advantages in the new energy manufacturing sector, but still relies on overseas layouts for upstream resources. The supply chains for critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt are highly internationalized, and wars or geopolitical risks may amplify policy and logistics uncertainties. For China's new energy industry chain, the real challenge lies not in the manufacturing end, but in the stability and cost fluctuations of the resource end. The trend of supply chain deglobalization may push up the cost center, compressing profit margins. The core of future competition will shift from scale expansion to resource control capabilities and the diversification of global layouts. 4) New Energy Vehicles: China's Structural Advantages and Short-term Fluctuations The impact of the war environment on new energy vehicles also has a dual nature. On one hand, rising oil prices reinforce the economic advantages of EVs. In a context of high oil prices, the cost advantages of using EVs become even more evident, which is conducive to increasing the penetration rate among end-users. China has the world's largest EV capacity and supply chain system, with scale and cost advantages. On the other hand, high oil prices may suppress consumer confidence through inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty. If the war continues for a long time, global economic growth may slow down, putting overall car demand under pressure. Although new energy vehicles have a substitution logic, they cannot be completely independent of the macro cycle. Therefore, the short-term performance of China's new energy vehicle industry will depend on the relative strength of the substitution effect and macroeconomic drag. 5) Long-term Structure: Re-stratification of Strategic Assets In the era of energy security, the competitiveness of China's new energy system will be more reflected in three aspects: First, manufacturing scale and cost control capabilities; Second, the system support capacity of the power grid and energy storage; Third, the diversification of upstream resources and supply chain layout. War has accelerated the stratification of the global energy system. Traditional energy bears higher fluctuation risks; new energy power generation and power grid assets gain a safety premium; critical minerals become the focal point of geopolitical competition. For China, the new energy industry is no longer just an engine for growth but also a part of the energy security system. The investment logic will shift from pure growth rate and subsidies to strategic position and supply chain stability. Overall, as energy transitions from a cost variable to a security variable, the strategic value of China's new energy system rises, but it also faces higher supply chain risks and global competitive pressures. Energy storage and the power grid are becoming the core of system stability; new energy vehicles benefit under the substitution logic, but one must be wary of macro cycles; critical minerals will determine the cost center and industrial profit margins. In an era where war reshapes the energy order, stability is more important than growth. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le 13916526348

[SMM Analysis: What Impact Does the Middle East Situation Have on the Recycled Copper Raw Materials Market?] Recent turbulence in the Middle East has once again rattled global commodity markets. However, zooming in on the recycled copper raw materials segment, the market has remained remarkably calm. This article examines the trade structure and supply-demand dynamics to explain why the Middle East situation has, in practice, a relatively limited impact on Asia's scrap copper market.

NBS data showed that in February, the manufacturing PMI was 49.0%, down 0.3 percentage points from the previous month, indicating a pullback in the manufacturing sector’s prosperity level. In February, the non-manufacturing business activity index was 49.5%, up 0.1 percentage points from the previous month, indicating an improvement in the non-manufacturing sector’s prosperity level. In February, the composite PMI output index was 49.5%, down 0.3 percentage points from the previous month, indicating that overall production and business activities of enterprises in China slowed down from the previous month. Huo Lihui, Chief Statistician of the NBS Service Sector Survey Center, interpreted China’s PMI for February 2026. Performance of China’s PMI in February 2026 I. Performance of China’s Manufacturing PMI In February, the manufacturing PMI was 49.0%, down 0.3 percentage points from the previous month, indicating a pullback in the manufacturing sector’s prosperity level. By enterprise size, the PMI for large enterprises was 51.5%, up 1.2 percentage points from the previous month and above the threshold; the PMIs for medium- and small-sized enterprises were 47.5% and 44.8%, down 1.2 and 2.6 percentage points from the previous month, respectively, and below the threshold. By sub-index, among the five sub-indices that make up the manufacturing PMI, the production index, new orders index, raw material inventory index, employment index, and supplier delivery time index were all below the threshold. The production index was 49.6%, down 1.0 percentage points from the previous month, indicating that manufacturing production activities slowed down. The new orders index was 48.6%, down 0.6 percentage points from the previous month, indicating a decline in the prosperity of market demand in the manufacturing sector. The raw material inventory index was 47.5%, up 0.1 percentage points from the previous month, indicating that the decline in inventories of major raw materials in the manufacturing sector narrowed slightly. The employment index was 48.0%, down 0.1 percentage points from the previous month, indicating a slight pullback in the employment prosperity of manufacturing enterprises. The supplier delivery time index was 49.1%, down 1.0 percentage points from the previous month, indicating that delivery times of raw material suppliers in the manufacturing sector slowed compared with the previous month. II. Performance of China’s Non-Manufacturing PMI In February, the non-manufacturing business activity index was 49.5%, up 0.1 percentage points from the previous month, indicating an improvement in the non-manufacturing sector’s prosperity level. By industry, the construction business activity index was 48.2%, down 0.6 percentage points from the previous month; the services business activity index was 49.7%, up 0.2 percentage points from the previous month. From the perspective of service industries, the business activity indices for industries such as accommodation, catering, and culture/sports/entertainment were all in a high prosperity range above 60.0%; the business activity indices for industries such as capital market services and real estate were all below the threshold. The new orders index was 45.2%, down 0.9 percentage points MoM, indicating a pull back in non-manufacturing market demand. By industry, the new orders index for the construction industry was 42.2%, up 2.1 percentage points MoM; the new orders index for the services industry was 45.7%, down 1.4 percentage points MoM. The input prices index was 50.9%, up 0.9 percentage points MoM, indicating an overall increase in the price level of inputs used by non-manufacturing enterprises for business operations. By industry, the input prices index for the construction industry was 49.1%, down 2.9 percentage points MoM; the input prices index for the services industry was 51.2%, up 1.5 percentage points MoM. The selling price index was 48.8%, unchanged from the previous month and still below the threshold, indicating that the overall level of non-manufacturing selling prices was lower than in the previous month. By industry, the selling price index for the construction industry was 47.6%, down 0.6 percentage points MoM; the selling price index for the services industry was 49.0%, up 0.1 percentage points MoM. The employment index was 46.0%, down 0.1 percentage points MoM, indicating a slight pull back in the employment prosperity of non-manufacturing enterprises. By industry, the employment index for the construction industry was 42.5%, up 1.4 percentage points MoM; the employment index for the services industry was 46.6%, down 0.4 percentage points MoM. The business activity expectations index was 55.0%, down 1.0 percentage point MoM and still in a relatively high prosperity range, indicating that non-manufacturing enterprises remained confident in market development. By industry, the business activity expectations index for the construction industry was 50.9%, up 1.1 percentage points MoM; the business activity expectations index for the services industry was 55.8%, down 1.3 percentage points MoM. III. Performance of China’s Composite PMI Output Index In February, the composite PMI output index was 49.5%, down 0.3 percentage points MoM, indicating that overall production and business activities of enterprises in China slowed down compared with the previous month. In February, the manufacturing PMI pulled back, while the non-manufacturing business activity index rebounded slightly. —Huo Lihui, Chief Statistician of the NBS Service Survey Center, interprets China’s PMI for February 2026 On March 4, 2026, the NBS Service Survey Center and the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing released China’s PMI. In this regard, Huo Lihui, Chief Statistician of the Service Industry Survey Center of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), provided an interpretation. In February, affected by factors such as the Chinese New Year holiday, the manufacturing PMI was 49.0, down 0.3 percentage points MoM; the non-manufacturing business activity index was 49.5, up 0.1 percentage points MoM; and the composite PMI output index was 49.5, down 0.3 percentage points MoM. I. The Manufacturing PMI Pulled Back In February, the manufacturing PMI was 49.0, with the prosperity level down from the previous month. Judging from historical data, the PMI in the month that includes the Chinese New Year mostly shows some fluctuations. In particular, this year’s Chinese New Year holiday was extended and fell entirely in mid-to-late February, which had some impact on enterprises’ production and operations, and overall market activity in manufacturing declined. (1) Both supply and demand slowed down. The production index and the new orders index were 49.6 and 48.6, down 1.0 and 0.6 percentage points MoM, respectively, indicating a pullback in manufacturing production and market demand. By industry, the production index and new orders index for industries such as agricultural and sideline food processing and computers, communications and electronic equipment were both above the critical point, with supply and demand prosperity remaining in expansion; in industries such as textiles, apparel and accessories and automobiles, both indices remained below the critical point, with weak market activity. (2) The PMI for large enterprises continued to expand. The PMI for large enterprises was 51.5, up 1.2 percentage points MoM, with production and operations remaining in expansion; small and medium-sized enterprises were more affected by the Chinese New Year holiday, with PMIs of 47.5 and 44.8 this month, down 1.2 and 2.6 percentage points MoM, respectively, and their prosperity levels pulled back. (3) Growth momentum in high-tech manufacturing continued to emerge. The high-tech manufacturing PMI was 51.5, remaining in expansion territory and significantly higher than the overall manufacturing level, indicating a favorable development trend in related industries; the consumer goods industry PMI was 48.8, up 0.5 percentage points MoM, with a rebound in the prosperity level; the PMIs for equipment manufacturing and high energy-consuming industries were 49.8 and 47.8, down 0.3 and 0.1 percentage points MoM, respectively, with their prosperity levels pulling back. (4) Enterprise expectations improved. The index of expectations for production and business activities was 53.2, up 0.6 percentage points MoM, indicating that manufacturing enterprises’ confidence in market development after the Chinese New Year strengthened. By industry, the index of expectations for production and business activities in industries such as general equipment and railway, ship, aerospace and aviation equipment was above 56.0, in a relatively high prosperity range, and related enterprises were more optimistic about near-term industry development. II. Non-Manufacturing Business Activity Index Edged Up Slightly In February, the non-manufacturing business activity index stood at 49.5%, up 0.1 percentage point from the previous month, indicating some improvement in the overall prosperity level of the non-manufacturing sector. (I) The service sector’s prosperity level rebounded. The service sector business activity index was 49.7%, up 0.2 percentage point from the previous month. By industry, driven by the Chinese New Year holiday effect, business volumes grew relatively quickly in industries related to residents’ travel and consumption; among them, the business activity indices for accommodation, catering, and culture, sports and entertainment all remained in the high-prosperity range above 60.0%, while those for retail and air transport rose to above 52.0%. Meanwhile, the business activity indices for capital market services and real estate remained at low levels, with subdued market activity. From the perspective of market expectations, the service sector business activity expectations index was 55.8%, remaining in a relatively high-prosperity range, indicating that service sector enterprises remained optimistic about near-term market developments. (II) The construction sector’s prosperity level declined. Affected by factors such as employees of enterprises returning to their hometowns in large numbers during the Chinese New Year holiday and the suspension of construction at some projects, the construction sector business activity index fell to 48.2%, down 0.6 percentage point from the previous month, and the construction sector’s prosperity level continued to pull back. From the perspective of market expectations, the construction sector business activity expectations index was 50.9%, up 1.1 percentage points from the previous month, returning above the threshold, indicating that construction sector enterprises’ confidence in future industry development had somewhat recovered. III. Composite PMI Output Index Pulled Back In February, the composite PMI output index was 49.5%, down 0.3 percentage point from the previous month, indicating that overall production and business activities of enterprises in China slowed down somewhat MoM. The manufacturing production index and the non-manufacturing business activity index, which make up the composite PMI output index, were 49.6% and 49.5%, respectively.

Over the past few days, the Indonesian nickel market has reacted to the government’s announcement of a restricted 2026 RKAB production quota, set at approximately 260–270 million tons. This reduction has sent shockwaves through the industry, sparking widespread concern among both operational and upcoming smelters. Stakeholders are increasingly worried that these tightened supply levels will be insufficient to sustain their long-term production requirements. For the first one, The Indonesian Nickel Miners Association (APNI) has stated that the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) has agreed to consider revisions to the 2026 Work Plan and Budget (RKAB) starting in July. It is believed that the RKAB revisions could increase nickel production quotas by 25% to 30%. According to APNI, the domestic smelter demand based on the capacity is around 380-400 million tons, With the existing RKAB quota at 270 million tons and projected imports from the Philippines at 23 million tons, this 30% adjustment is critical to meeting the national ore deficit. This potential for more quota provides some relief to the market, but there is a second, more pressing issue to consider Another media also stated that The Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) has set a conservative nickel ore production target of 209.08 million tons for 2026, a figure notably lower than the approved RKAB quota of 260–270 million tons. According to Siti Sumilah Rita Susilawati of the Directorate General of Minerals and Coal, this strategic reduction is intended to preserve national reserves and stabilize global commodity prices As a result, the sudden perception of even deeper quota cuts has fueled confusion across the Indonesian market, which might further intensifying the pressure from already spiking nickel ore prices. I. Indonesia’s Calculated Nickel Ore Demand in 2026 According to SMM’s latest calculations, the total nickel ore requirement for 2026, which includes the demand from NPI, FeNi, Nickel Matte, and MHP, is estimated at approximately 334 million tons, based on the production estimates of smelter's current condition. This sharp increase is primarily driven by the rapid expansion of MHP production, which utilizes higher volumes of limonite ore. This surge in consumption has intensified the pressure on smelters to secure significantly higher mining quotas. II. Current Update and Understanding The Quota Revision? According to current understanding from the Regulation of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Number 17 of 2025, citing the 11 th Article Regarding the Amendment of Work Approved Quotas in ESDM, it is stated that: Article 11 (1) Holders of an IUP (Mining Business License) for the Exploration stage, holders of an IUPK (Special Mining Business License) for the Exploration stage, holders of an IUP for the Production Operation stage, holders of an IUPK for the Production Operation stage, or holders of an IUPK as a Continuation of Contract/Agreement Operations may submit one (1) application for an amendment to the Exploration stage RKAB or the Production Operation stage RKAB in each current year. (2) The application for the RKAB Amendment as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted after the holders of the Exploration stage IUP, Exploration stage IUPK, Production Operation stage IUP, Production Operation stage IUPK, or IUPK as a Continuation of Contract/Agreement Operations have submitted periodic reports up to the second quarter or no later than July 31st of the current year. SMM observes that RKAB revisions and amendments are standard procedure, as seen in both 2024 and 2025. This year, however, the submission window for revisions is expected to open after June, with a final deadline of July 31st. While the ESDM has not clarified whether the 260–270 million ton target already accounts for these mid-year adjustments, it remains highly likely that these revisions will be sufficient to meet domestic smelter demand. Another Potential Cuts? According to SMM’s further communication with ESDM, the predicted quota for 2026 still remains on 260-270 million tons estimate. Since the further production cuts rumor by ESDM is not in an official setting announcement, it is hereby confirmed that the quota approved of 2026 will not be lower than ESDM’s initial estimate of 260-270 million tons. From SMM's understanding, the target number to be lower than the quota is merely just an estimate of the production target, not necessarily reflecting the actual production numbers. III. Nickel Ore Supply and Demand Given the government’s push to tighten annual quotas, SMM expects this year’s revisions to land at approximately 20%, a more conservative number. Furthermore, nickel ore imports from the Philippines are unlikely to see significant growth compared to 2025, with estimates holding at approximately 19 million tons. This stagnant growth is due to the heavy concentration of Philippine exports to China, coupled with limited domestic mining capacity and a lack of new mining companies . After factoring in import volumes from the Philippines, the nickel ore market is likely to remain in a tight supply-demand balance, especially with potential hurdles like the rainy season slowing down mining operations. Nonetheless, this scenario is much more realistic than the alternative: a massive 50+ million ton deficit that would occur if the total quota were strictly capped at 270 million tons. IV. Conclusion Overall, the signal for significant quota cuts at the start of the year has already triggered a sharp rally in nickel ore prices, which could be seen from the substantial rise in premiums, largely driven by quota reductions at major mining companies and persistent uncertainty among small-to-mid-scale operators. Looking ahead, if the government maintains these restricted levels and fails to approve adequate supplemental quotas, domestic ore prices are poised for further upward momentum, potentially intensifying the cost burden on the downstream smelting sector.

[SMM Analysis] Persian Gulf Shutdown? The Impact of the U.S.-Iran Conflict on Global Steel Trade On February 28, 2026, the conflict between the United States and Iran escalated into a full-scale outbreak, causing a sudden spike in Middle Eastern geopolitical tensions. As a global chokepoint for energy and bulk commodity maritime transport, the Strait of Hormuz has seen shipping disrupted and routes tightened, directly impacting the nerves of the global supply chain. This "Golden Waterway" is not only a lifeline for oil but also a critical strategic corridor for the global steel import and export trade . Once passage is restricted, it will deliver a comprehensive shock to the international steel trade landscape. Amidst the turmoil of war, what disruptions and restructuring will the global steel trade face? SMM's latest research provides an in-depth analysis. In the short term, the U.S.-Iran conflict poses a risk of stalling steel imports and exports in the Persian Gulf region, putting pressure on China's steel exports. Multiple disruptions along Gulf shipping routes have caused significant delays in exporters' orders. According to SMM research, the current Middle East situation has disrupted multiple ports in the Gulf region. Bahrain has suspended port activities, including pilotage services. Jebel Ali Port has halted all operations due to a fire caused by intercepting airstrike debris. Qatar's Ras Laffan and Messaid ports remain operational but with reduced traffic, GPS signal interference, and the government closure of its airspace. Similarly, new orders and shipments for Chinese exporters have also been significantly hindered. Data Source:SMM Impact Assessment of Core Ports within the Strait of Hormuz Should a physical blockade occur at this strategic chokepoint, the five most directly affected key inner-bay ports experiencing “instant logistics paralysis” would be: Port of Bandar Abbas, Port of Khomeini, Port of Jebel Ali, Port of Khalifa, and King Abdullah Port. Simultaneously, a Strait blockade would threaten to disrupt approximately 10% of global seaborne steel trade (primarily semi-finished products and specialty ores) . Iran's production of direct reduced iron (DRI) also holds significant weight in global supply; any disruption could drive up costs for electric arc furnace steelmaking in the Middle East. Data Source: SMM Ferrous Metal Shipping After the blockade, will goods become completely impossible to transport? While maritime routes will indeed come to a near standstill, the flow of goods won't cease entirely. It will simply become extremely costly, slow, and require complex overland transshipment. For instance, strategic alternative ports outside the strait include Sohar Port, Chabahar Port, and Gwadar Port. Data Source: Compiled by SMM based on publicly available information Trade Chokehold Triggered by Insurance Withdrawals Equally severe as the strait blockade is the withdrawal of war risk insurance. Marine insurers Skuld and Gard have announced they will cancel war risk coverage due to escalating tensions in the Middle East. Local feedback from the UAE indicates most insurers refuse to underwrite war risk insurance for the Red Sea. This means traders must bear multiple uncontrollable factors and assume all consequences, which will significantly impact new orders. Summary: The Hormuz Crisis's “Hedging Effect” on China's Steel Market Leads to Short-Term Export Pressure Short-Term Negative Impact (Suppression of Demand and Logistics): The sudden halt in Gulf shipping routes will cause China's total exports to Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to plummet dramatically. Export disruptions may even force resources to flow back into the domestic market, intensifying supply pressure and exerting downward pressure on steel prices. Data Source: SMM, GACC Mid-term outlook: As a major steel supplier, Iran's halted exports will trigger tightening supply of steel billets in Southeast and South Asia. From Construction to Industry: Iran's Steel Export Structure Transformation and the Peak Era Dominated by “Billet” According to data released by the Iranian Steel Producers Association (ISPA), 2025 marked the “peak era” for Iran's steel exports, with its export structure exhibiting an extremely aggressive trend: ① Absolute Dominance of Semi-Finished Products: From March to December 2025, Iran's billet exports reached 4.58 million tons (+37.7% YoY), while slab exports hit 1.54 million tons (+44.6% YoY). This confirms the earlier observation that the current strait blockade will trigger significant “slab panic” among downstream steel mills in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. ② Structural Leap in Flat Products: Finished flat product exports surged from 307,000 tons in the same period last year to 1.03 million tons. Notably, the significant increase in hot-rolled coil (867,000 tons) and coated steel (up 76.7% YoY) indicates Iran's gradual transition from a “construction steel supplier” to an “industrial raw material supplier.” ③ Weakness and contraction in long products: In contrast, exports of finished long products (rebar, wire rod) declined by 9.9%, while structural steel exports plummeted by 27.7%. This trend of “reducing long products while increasing flat products” has, against the backdrop of stalled infrastructure projects, actually heightened the risk of inventory buildup for finished goods. Data Source: ISPA Mid-term positive factors: Cost and substitution support Iran's steel export shortfall of nearly 11 million tons will trigger regional supply tightness, forcing some Southeast Asian and South Asian buyers to shift procurement to China, creating “substitution-driven incremental demand.” Simultaneously, rising crude oil prices may push up costs across the entire industrial chain, providing bottom-up support for steel prices. Although logistics disruptions and project suspensions will suppress export performance in the short term, the reshuffling of the global supply landscape is expected to partially offset the negative impact. Chinese steel may play a key role in filling the global gap. Long-term outlook: Iran's ceasefire may temporarily impact the global steel market Hoarding effect under blockade: Iran's sharply rising mill and port inventory pressures According to the latest global steel statistics report released by the World Steel Association (WSA), Iran's cumulative crude steel production reached 31.8 million tons in 2025, marking a year-on-year increase of approximately 1.4% compared to 2024 and solidifying its position as the world's tenth-largest steel producer. In December 2025, Iran's monthly crude steel output hit 3 million tons, a significant year-on-year increase of 16.2%. This indicates that Iranian steel mills were operating at peak capacity just before the conflict erupted. In January 2026, its crude steel output reached approximately 2.6 million tons, marking a 15.1% year-on-year increase. Against the backdrop of a 6.5% year-on-year decline in global crude steel production during January, Iran demonstrated an “independent trend.” According to SMM research, the high production levels from earlier periods have led to severe inventory backlogs at domestic steel mills. The logistics blockade that began in late February prevented the full shipment of steel produced during this high-output phase out of the Persian Gulf. Consequently, ports and mill warehouses are now stockpiling large quantities of slabs and billets originally intended for export. Once the situation eases, this “low-priced inventory” could flood the market at dumping prices. However, considering Iran's post-ceasefire reconstruction needs and the actual release of these supplies, SMM will continue to monitor developments closely. Copyright and Intellectual Property Statement: This report is independently created or compiled by SMM Information & Technology Co., Ltd. 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