Amid sustained demand growth, India plans to build a strategic reserve of critical minerals including lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earths. The stockpile will be sized to cover six months of domestic consumption, aiming to guard against risks of global supply disruptions and sharp raw material price volatility. Led by India’s Ministry of Mines and Ministry of Heavy Industries, the reserve covers key raw materials essential for new energy vehicles, energy storage and the electronics sector, fields where India currently relies heavily on imports. At present, the United States, China, South Korea and other countries have already established strategic reserve systems for critical minerals.

According to Hydro's official website, Hydro's adjusted EBITDA for the first quarter of 2026 was NOK 8.668 billion, lower than NOK 9.516 billion in the same period last year. This was mainly due to lower raw material costs, higher metal prices, and increased sales of alumina and metals, but this was partially offset by lower alumina prices, a stronger NOK, and lower electricity generation. Hydro's profitability was strong this quarter, with adjusted earnings per share increasing to NOK 2.07 in the first quarter of 2026, compared to NOK 1.63 in the first quarter of 2025. The upstream business segment continued to operate strongly in the first quarter.

Global Aluminum Market Review – April: Divergent Domestic & Overseas Trends and Marked Spot Structure Disparities The global aluminum market in April featured a core pattern of strength overseas and weakness domestically with diverging trends. The main Shanghai aluminum contract retreated from highs amid fluctuations, while LME aluminum maintained firm momentum supported by low inventories and geopolitical factors, with both markets seeing mild corrections toward month-end. Market drivers this month centered on macro policies, geopolitical conflicts, supply-demand fundamentals and inventory structures, with movements of key indicators further highlighting supply-demand imbalances between domestic and overseas aluminum markets. I. April Aluminum Price Review: Linked Movements with Distinct Strength Differentials Shanghai aluminum and LME aluminum shared similar price rhythms in April, both fluctuating higher initially before retreating. However, notable gaps emerged in upward momentum and correction ranges, with overseas aluminum prices significantly outperforming domestic counterparts. The average Shanghai-LME aluminum ratio dropped from 7.36 in March to 7.03 in April, reflecting stronger overseas aluminum pricing relative to Shanghai aluminum. The main Shanghai aluminum contract trended upward early in the month before softening overall, declining from elevated levels through range-bound trading. It opened lower at RMB 24,715 per ton at the start of the month and consolidated. Driven by escalating Middle East geopolitical tensions and rising LME aluminum prices, it surged to a monthly peak of RMB 25,675 per ton in mid-April. In late April, amid continuous domestic inventory accumulation, weaker-than-expected downstream demand, and risk-averse capital outflows ahead of the May Day holiday, prices corrected steadily. Closing at RMB 24,430 per ton on April 30, the contract recorded a monthly trading range of nearly RMB 1,360 per ton. LME March aluminum traded firmly with mild late-month declines. Opening at USD 3,459 per ton, it climbed to a monthly high of USD 3,672 per ton in mid-April, underpinned by overseas supply disruptions from geopolitical frictions and sustained inventory destocking. Prices edged down later due to fluctuating US-Iran negotiations, hawkish macro sentiment and profit-taking at high levels, settling at USD 3,476 per ton at month-end with a slight monthly loss. Overall, LME aluminum vastly outperformed domestic Shanghai aluminum. In terms of price drivers, geopolitics served as a shared upward catalyst for global aluminum prices, with production cuts and supply disruptions in the Middle East continuously boosting market risk aversion. Price divergence stemmed from dual disparities in macro policies and fundamentals: elevated domestic inventories and sluggish demand consistently capped aluminum price rebounds, while tight overseas inventories and strained spot supplies provided robust support for LME aluminum. II. Key Inventory Indicators: Divergent Inventory Movements and Contrasting Supply-Demand Landscapes As a core gauge of aluminum market supply and demand, domestic and overseas inventory trends diverged sharply in April, directly shaping the relative strength of regional aluminum prices. Domestic aluminum inventories kept rising and stood at a multi-year seasonal high. Social inventories maintained an upward trend throughout April, hitting 1.465 million tons in mid-month, the highest seasonal level in five years. A clear imbalance emerged between rigid supply release and lackluster downstream demand during the traditional peak "Silver April" period, leading to persistent spot market loosening. SHFE warehouse stocks expanded from 420,000 tons at the start of the month to 450,000 tons at month-end. Elevated warehouse stock levels further confirmed ample domestic spot supply, weighing continuously on aluminum prices. Overseas LME aluminum inventories declined steadily to a 20-year low. Total LME aluminum inventories fell from 410,000 tons to 370,000 tons in April, extending months of destocking to historic lows. Noticeable structural divergence persisted in inventory composition: Russian aluminum accounted for approximately 92% of total LME stocks in March, resulting in low market-circulating inventories and increasingly tight physical spot supply, which acted as the fundamental pillar for strong LME aluminum prices. In summary, April’s global aluminum market was governed by contrasting core dynamics: low overseas inventories, geopolitical disruptions and hawkish Federal Reserve policies on the overseas front, versus high domestic inventories, weak real demand and stable growth expectations domestically. This drove pronounced market divergence. Affected by intertwined internal and external factors, the main Shanghai aluminum contract corrected downwards from highs, while LME aluminum remained in a firm trading range, backed by historically low inventories, a tight spot balance and geopolitical risk premiums.

According to customs data, China imported 6,835 tonnes of lithium hydroxide in March 2026, up 66% month-on-month and double year-on-year. Of this, 2,927 tonnes came from Indonesia, accounting for about 48% of total imports, while approximately another 40% came from Australia and South Korea. During the same period, China exported 3,143 tonnes of lithium hydroxide, up 20% month-on-month but down 26% year-on-year. In terms of exports, 2,059 tonnes went to South Korea and 278 tonnes to Japan. Since 2025, the combined effect of diverging domestic and overseas demand and continued overseas supply of lithium salts has caused excess lithium hydroxide to flow one‑directionally into the Chinese market. From the fourth quarter of 2025, domestic imports of lithium hydroxide remained at persistently high levels, while exports continued to weaken. Entering the first quarter of 2026, total imports exceeded 16,000 tonnes, while total exports were less than 8,000 tonnes, resulting in net imports of more than 8,000 tonnes — a complete reversal of the trade pattern characterised by "shrinking exports and surging imports". In terms of major import sources, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia accounted for a significant share. The key reason is that both domestic demand and prices are more favourable than overseas markets: In the third quarter of 2025, driven by expectations of subsidy policy reduction in 2026 and bullish sentiment on raw material prices, demand for ternary cathode materials remained strong in the fourth quarter. While overseas lithium hydroxide production lines maintained relatively stable output, downstream demand fell short of expectations, leading to rising inventory pressure among overseas holders – who had a strong incentive to destock towards the end of the year. Price increases for lithium hydroxide overseas lagged behind those in China, creating a profitable import arbitrage window. Coupled with the anticipated launch of lithium hydroxide futures in 2026, the number of trading participants involved in lithium hydroxide imports increased significantly. Given the long negotiation cycles and relatively stable supply channels with overseas suppliers, lithium hydroxide from Japan, South Korea and Australia has continued to flow into China. However, it is worth noting that although the continuous increase in import volumes has made lithium hydroxide more readily available for trading in China from Q4 2025 to Q1 2026, the quality of the lithium hydroxide flowing into the country is uneven due to the relatively customized production requirements of ternary cathode materials. As a result, there is a certain lag before it actually reaches material manufacturers. Looking ahead, as long‑term orders are steadily delivered, import volumes are expected to remain relatively high, while the potential for export growth is likely to remain limited.

According to the World Bank’s April 2026 Commodity Markets Outlook, nickel prices are projected to rise 12% year on year in 2026 and a further 3% in 2027, as global consumption growth is expected to outpace supply expansion. The report said that although new nickel processing capacity will continue to come online in Indonesia, tighter upstream ore availability is likely to constrain utilization rates and keep the market tight. It also noted that further disruptions to sulfur exports from Middle East producers could become an additional upside risk for nickel prices.

Aperam reported adjusted EBITDA of €90 million in the first quarter of 2026, up 34% from the previous quarter, which the company described as its strongest opening quarter in three years. The result came despite continued headwinds from geopolitical instability and energy price volatility across its European and South American markets.

Vale reported first-quarter net revenue of $9.26 billion, up 14% year on year, though slightly below analysts’ forecast of $9.37 billion. The company said higher sales volumes across its key products, including iron ore, copper, and nickel, were among the main drivers of revenue growth. The figures suggest a clear recovery in Vale’s core business revenue as commodity prices improved.

Scrap tightening and a major nickel-cobalt producer's output cut pushed SHFE stainless steel to levels not seen since 2023 — yet physical demand remains conspicuously absent heading into the May Day break

I. Resource Endowment: World's Second-Largest Reserves and Development Potential As a core holder of global rare earth resources, Brazil boasts proven reserves of 21-25 million tonnes, accounting for 23% of the global total—second only to China. This positions Brazil with the potential to reshape the global rare earth supply landscape. Its deposits are primarily ion-adsorption types, widely distributed across states like Minas Gerais and Goiás. Representative projects include: Colossus Mine : With reserves of 493 million tonnes and an average grade of 0.251%, it is currently Brazil's largest disclosed ion-type rare earth project. Caldeira Rare Earth Project : Holding 1.5 billion tonnes at a 0.2413% grade, it offers significant scale and commercial viability. Tiros Titanium Rare Earth Project : Though smaller in reserve size (5.5 million tonnes), it stands out with a high average grade of 0.400%, making it one of the highest-grade projects in the country. Notably, Brazilian rare earths often coexist with niobium, tantalum, and titanium. This nature adds complexity to processing but also opens avenues for comprehensive value recovery. II. Industry Status: Shifting from "Raw Material Export" to "Domestic Processing" Historically, Brazil's rare earth sector has been characterized by a "high reserves, low output" paradox. In 2024, national production was a mere 20 tonnes, a stark contrast to the global annual output of nearly 400,000 tonnes. The core bottleneck has been the lack of mid- and downstream capabilities in separation and refining. However, this is rapidly changing due to strategic national adjustments. (I) Policy Drivers: Mandating Domestic Processing for a Closed-Loop Chain The Brazilian government has designated rare earths as "strategic minerals." Under the National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals (PNMCE, Bill PL 4.443/2025), at least 80% of critical strategic minerals must be processed domestically, effectively banning raw ore exports. This policy aims to break the passive cycle of "mining-exporting raw materials-importing high-value products" and drive the construction of a full domestic value chain "from mine to magnet." (II) Project Implementation: From Lab to Industrialization In 2026, Brazil's rare earth development took a substantive leap: MagBras Initiative : Led by CIT SENAI in Minas Gerais and coordinated by FIESC in Santa Catarina, this project united 28 companies and research bodies to deliver the first 20kg of rare earth carbonate. This marked Brazil's first autonomous, full-process production from mining to chemical compound. LabFabITr Facility : Located in Lagoa Santa, Minas Gerais, this is the Southern Hemisphere's first lab-factory dedicated to rare earth magnet and alloy R&D, providing crucial technical support for local permanent magnet manufacturing. III. Capital and Geopolitics: The $2.17 Billion Investment Gamble Between 2025 and 2029, Brazil's rare earth sector is poised for $2.17 billion in investment—a 49% surge compared to the 2024-2028 forecast. This makes it the fastest-growing segment in Brazil's mining investment portfolio. This capital influx is underpinned by the geopolitical logic of global supply chain restructuring: (I) External Demand: A "Diversified Option" Amidst US-China Tensions As competition between the US and China intensifies, Brazil's strategic value as a "non-Chinese" supplier has skyrocketed. Its policy of "global openness" avoids picking sides while leveraging domestic processing mandates to attract technology transfer—requiring foreign investors to build local processing capabilities rather than just extracting ore. (II) Internal Drive: From "Resource Nationalism" to "Technological Autonomy" Brazil's strategy transcends simple resource protection; it is an upgrade centered on "technological autonomy." For instance, MagBras targets permanent magnet manufacturing—a sector currently monopolized by China, Japan, and Germany. Success would position Brazil among the few nations mastering the "ore-to-magnet" value chain, directly integrating into the core supply chains of EVs, wind energy, and industrial robotics. IV. Challenges and Outlook: Technology, Cost, and Global Competition Despite the upside, three core challenges remain: (I) Technological Barriers Rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing are high-threshold sectors. Brazil currently relies on international partnerships (e.g., European technical support for LabFabITr) to bridge this gap. (II) Cost Pressures Brazil's low-grade ion-adsorption ores entail higher beneficiation costs compared to some high-grade Chinese deposits. Additionally, the capital and operational expenditures for domestic processing could impact international price competitiveness. (III) Global Competition With Australia, the US, and various African nations also accelerating their rare earth developments, Brazil must carve out differentiated advantages in technology, cost efficiency, and policy stability to secure its market share. V. Conclusion: Leaping from "Resource Holder" to "Supply Chain Player" Brazil's rare earth transition represents a strategic leap from a "resource exporter" to a "technology-driven industrial player." While its 21 million tonnes of reserves provide the foundation, the true value lies in its policy-driven, capital-intensive push to build a complete industrial chain. If initiatives like MagBras achieve commercial success, Brazil is on track to become the "third pole" in the global rare earth supply chain by 2030, reshaping trade dynamics and offering a new paradigm for resource-based economies worldwide.

In April 2026, China's secondary lead production showed a pattern of MoM rebound and YoY decline. Monthly secondary lead production was up 12.72% MoM and down 24.61% YoY; secondary refined lead production was up 8.7% MoM and down 33.14% YoY significantly.