West Africa's largest lithium processing plant has officially commenced operations in Nigeria's Nasarawa State. The facility has a designed processing capacity of 6,000 tonnes of lithium ore per day, equivalent to around 30,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually. The project is operated by Diamond Energy Group, with Jiuling Lithium and Tianhua New Energy each holding a 50% stake.

Core View The main theme of lithium ore prices in H1 2026 was a sharp rally followed by a correction, rather than a one-way upward shift in the price center. The SMM spodumene concentrate index price (SC6, CIF China) started the year at around USD 2,000/t in January, briefly fell to USD 1,875/t in early February, then followed lithium carbonate prices higher and reached the year-to-date high of USD 2,780–2,840/t in mid-May, before retreating to the USD 2,385–2,480/t range in June. This trajectory almost fully mirrored lithium carbonate prices. Lithium carbonate spot prices started the year at around RMB 130,000/t, rose above RMB 200,000/t in May, and then pulled back to RMB 160,000–180,000/t in June. Lithium ore did not experience an independent rally throughout the period. It was pulled upward by lithium carbonate pricing via the futures market and then corrected as lithium carbonate prices peaked. Therefore, the starting point for understanding lithium ore prices in H1 is not resource-side supply and demand, but lithium carbonate pricing and market sentiment. One common misinterpretation needs to be corrected first: the strength in lithium ore prices in H1 was not the result of “tight effective supply pushing the price center higher.” The real drivers were the resonance of front-loaded demand, supply disruption expectations, and futures-driven sentiment. Front-loaded demand was triggered by export tax rebate adjustments; supply disruption expectations came from the repeated delays in Jianxiawo’s restart and Zimbabwe’s lithium concentrate export ban. When warehouse receipts accumulated and macro headwinds were released in May, and when Jianxiawo’s restart expectation materialized in June, prices corrected accordingly. After that, prices rebounded again as demand expectations improved. 1. Lithium Ore Followed Lithium Carbonate, While Spodumene-Based Conversion Margins Stayed Negative Throughout H1 The clearest evidence of the lithium ore pricing mechanism in H1 was not how much ore prices rose, but the fact that spot conversion margins for producing lithium carbonate from externally procured spodumene concentrate were negative for most of the period. The ore-salt margin inversion was structural and persistent in H1, rather than a short-lived squeeze on processing margins. The cause of this inversion directly points to the reversal of the pricing mechanism. Ore prices are no longer determined by a cost-plus model from the upstream side, which then determines lithium salt prices. Instead, lithium carbonate has become the pricing anchor, and ore prices are reverse-priced through the futures market. In early January, when lithium carbonate prices rallied on front-loaded demand and sentiment, ore prices were pushed higher at the same time. However, downstream lithium salt demand could not fully absorb the higher cost, and processing margins were squeezed into negative territory. In April, under the reality of ore-salt inversion and limited hedging opportunities, lithium salt producers relying on externally procured ore saw their ability to accept high-priced ore weaken significantly. For overseas miners, this means their realized selling prices are increasingly anchored by the profitability of China’s refining sector. This is not a narrative assumption, but a mechanism that can be verified month by month through spot margin data. The financialization of pricing was also visible in market transactions. When prices fell at the end of May, lithium salt producers became more active in pricing ore purchases. In June, the basis for new cargoes strengthened. Pricing based on futures quotation plus premium or discount has become the mainstream transaction model. Lithium salt producers tend to use pricing windows during price corrections to lock in ore supply. Whoever holds the pricing right controls the settlement timing, and in H1’s highly volatile two-way lithium carbonate market, this directly led to margin differentiation among different lithium salt producers. 2. The Three Drivers of the Rally and the Triggers of the Correction Front-loaded demand — export tax rebate adjustment. In January 2026, the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration clarified that the VAT export rebate rate for lithium battery products would be reduced from 9% to 6% from April 1, and fully removed from January 1, 2027. This policy directly stimulated downstream players to concentrate export shipments and inventory preparation before April, significantly front-loading demand into H1, especially supporting demand for energy storage and ternary-related materials. This was the most important demand-side catalyst in H1 and the one most easily overlooked by the “weak recovery” narrative. Supply disruption expectations — Jianxiawo and Zimbabwe. After Jianxiawo’s mining permit expired and production was halted in August 2025, its restart timeline was repeatedly pushed back in H1, continuously providing room for both bullish and bearish speculation in the market. Now that Jianxiawo’s restart has been confirmed, the largest bearish factor has been priced in, and the market’s focus has shifted back to whether demand can outperform expectations. In Zimbabwe, the lithium concentrate export ban at the beginning of the year disrupted shipment expectations. Positive progress was reported in late March, and by mid-May, Chinese-funded mining companies in Zimbabwe had completed export procedures and restarted shipments, easing the previous short-term tightness in African cargo arrivals. SMM expects the first batch of cargoes to arrive in China in mid-to-late July. Correction triggers — warehouse receipts, macro factors, and the materialization of restart expectations. After lithium carbonate prices rose above RMB 200,000/t in May, exchange warehouse receipts continued to accumulate and hit new highs, while concerns over off-balance-sheet inventory increased. Together with macro pressure from expectations of further Fed rate hikes, prices peaked and corrected in late May. On June 17, the approval of Jianxiawo’s land use application materialized, and clearer restart expectations further weighed on both ore and salt prices. By late June, according to SMM monthly production schedules, July demand showed resilience despite the seasonal lull, with both power and energy storage cell production schedules increasing month on month. Monthly lithium carbonate consumption remained at a high level, which restored some market confidence and pushed lithium prices higher again. 3. Supply-Side Reality: Imports Weakened Month on Month, but Cumulative Imports Still Increased; Australia Remained Dominant From January to May, spodumene imports showed a combination of weaker month-on-month momentum and continued year-on-year cumulative growth. On a monthly basis, imports reached 758,000 physical tonnes in April, down 9.5% month on month, and 680,800 tonnes in May, down 10.2% month on month. However, total spodumene imports in January–May reached around 3.66 million tonnes, up approximately 25% year on year. By origin, Australia remained the dominant source. China imported around 1.585 million tonnes from Australia in January–May, although May imports from Australia were around 330,000 tonnes, down approximately 15.2% year on year. The share of African supply continued to rise. On the shipment side, lithium concentrate shipments from Port Hedland to China showed clear quarter-end volume acceleration, with March shipments reaching around 122,000 tonnes, up 64.3% month on month. The marginal changes in overseas mines were concentrated in restarts and offtake agreements. Core Lithium restarted its Finniss project on May 20 and plans to ship the first batch of concentrate in Q4. Mineral Resources also restarted Bald Hill, with first spodumene output expected in July. These restart volumes are limited and will not change the short-term supply structure, but they reinforce the expectation of new supply materializing in H2 2026 and H1 2027. On the domestic side, SMM’s domestic sample mines produced 160,690 tonnes LCE in January–June. The restart of Jiangxi lepidolite mines was constrained by permitting procedures, environmental protection, profitability, and other factors, and did not fully ramp up in H1. 4. Migration of Long-Term Pricing Mechanisms: Floor Price Plus Pricing Optionality Has Become the Norm The long-term spodumene offtake agreements signed intensively in H1 provide direct contractual evidence of the financialization of ore pricing. In February, Pilbara Minerals signed a two-year offtake agreement with Tianhua New Energy, setting a floor price of USD 1,000/t, with no price ceiling, together with a USD 100 million interest-free prepayment. In the same period, Pilbara also signed a long-term agreement with Canmax. Yahua Group signed an offtake agreement with Brazil’s MGLIT, also with a minimum price of USD 1,000/t on a 6% basis. Liontown and Tianhua agreed on supply for 2027–2028, priced against a spodumene index. The common feature is a structure of USD 1,000/t floor price plus index or pricing optionality, with downside protection but no upside cap. The pricing benchmark is migrating from fixed website-based long-term pricing toward index-based and futures-linked pricing. This confirms that ore pricing is shifting from traditional long-term contracts to a more financialized structure of “floor price + pricing optionality + premium/discount.” This provides a contractual basis for assessing pricing transmission lags and distortions, and is also a key point for overseas investors to understand how China’s pricing system is penetrating upstream resources. 5. H2 Outlook H1 2026 provides a very clear methodological lesson for H2: lithium ore prices will not move independently from lithium carbonate. The core pricing variables for ore are not the nominal size of global lithium resources, but the dynamic matching among lithium carbonate futures, spot conversion margins for lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, domestic mine restart progress, African cargo arrival schedules, lithium salt producers’ feedstock inventories, and downstream material production schedules. In H1, lithium salt conversion margins remained negative for an extended period, yet ore prices did not fall quickly. Instead, they rose together with lithium carbonate prices under the influence of downstream restocking and supply disruption expectations. This shows that the H1 rally was not an independent strengthening of upstream fundamentals, but a synchronized industry-chain movement driven by front-loaded demand, delayed supply realization, and amplified futures sentiment. For H2 lithium ore analysis, the first step is to distinguish between “no shortage in total resources” and “short-term tightness in effective ore supply.” From a global resource perspective, Australia, Africa, Brazil, South American brines, and Chinese domestic mines all have incremental supply expectations, so there is no absolute shortage of resources. However, from the perspective of Chinese lithium salt production, what truly affects lithium carbonate supply is ore that can be purchased in time, arrive steadily, meet grade requirements, have controllable impurities, and match existing processing lines. If ore is locked in long-term contracts, still in transit, concentrated in trader inventories, or if high prices reduce lithium salt producers’ willingness to purchase, its contribution to short-term lithium salt supply will be weakened. Therefore, H2 analysis should not simply focus on mine output. It should track port inventories, traders’ saleable inventories, in-plant inventories at lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, vessel schedules, and long-term contract lock-up structures. On the domestic supply side, Jianxiawo is the core variable driving H2 market expectations, but its impact should not be simplified as “restart equals immediate supply.” After the mine was suspended, the market treated it as the key anchor for marginal domestic lepidolite supply. The real question in H2 is not the single event of whether it restarts, but whether the restarted volume becomes freely tradable ore. If the output is mainly consumed within CATL’s integrated system, the impact on the spot ore market and externally procured ore salt producers will be limited. Only if the output enters the spot market will it directly pressure ore prices and conversion margins. At the same time, the suspension and restart timeline of other Jiangxi lepidolite mines also needs to be incorporated into the framework. Previous public reports indicated that some mines in Yichun may first exhaust their annual mining quota during the license renewal process and then enter a production halt for license renewal. If these mines continue to be affected by permitting, environmental protection, safety, or profitability factors in H2, the supply elasticity of domestic lepidolite will be weaker than nominal capacity suggests. Conversely, if Jianxiawo and other Yichun mines move forward with restarts or license renewals in Q3–Q4, the marginal contribution of domestic ore to lithium carbonate supply will increase significantly and put pressure on high ore prices. In other words, domestic ore supply in H2 should not be treated as a single variable. It is jointly determined by Jianxiawo, other Yichun mines, and the operating rates of Jiangxi lepidolite-based lithium salt producers. For overseas ore, African supply remains one of the largest sources of H2 supply elasticity. In H1, the disruptions in Africa were more about policy, shipment, and arrival timing rather than the disappearance of resources. If shipments from Zimbabwe and other regions recover and previously delayed cargoes arrive in China in a concentrated manner, feedstock availability for lithium salt producers will improve and the bargaining power of ore sellers will weaken. However, if policy disruption, logistics cycles, grade volatility, or financing pressure cause arrivals to remain inconsistent, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore may still be unable to raise operating rates quickly even if margin repair expectations improve. Australian supply is relatively stable, but a large portion is locked under long-term contracts, limiting its marginal adjustment impact on the spot market. Brazilian and other emerging resources are more important for medium- and long-term expectations, while their short-term impact on Chinese lithium salt production depends on arrival timing and quality stability. Demand is the key factor determining downside support for ore prices. In H2, power batteries and energy storage will enter the traditional peak season, and the expansion and ramp-up of cell and material producers will continue to lift lithium salt consumption. In particular, lithium iron phosphate output, supported by energy storage and commercial vehicle demand, is expected to remain high and provide sustained demand for lithium carbonate. Although ternary materials are growing more slowly than LFP, they may still see periodic restocking driven by certain overseas and high-end power battery demand. If material producers’ expansion is realized smoothly, lithium salt producers will need to maintain high operating rates to meet long-term contract deliveries and spot orders, which will in turn support rigid ore procurement demand. Conversely, if terminal orders fail to absorb the expansion of materials, material producers may enter a destocking cycle, and lithium salt producers’ ore procurement will quickly weaken, causing ore prices to come under pressure earlier. Therefore, H2 lithium ore prices can be divided into four scenarios. Base case: margins gradually rebalance, and ore prices fluctuate at high levels before edging lower. Jianxiawo’s restart expectation materializes, but actual mining and beneficiation ramp-up is gradual. African cargo arrivals recover but do not form a concentrated shock. Power battery and energy storage production schedules remain high, while material producers’ expansion is gradually realized. In this scenario, lithium carbonate prices remain volatile at high levels, the margin inversion of externally procured ore salt producers slowly improves, and lithium ore prices follow lithium carbonate lower but do not collapse. The profits that were excessively concentrated in upstream resources and futures expectations in H1 begin to gradually flow back toward midstream refining. Correction scenario: supply materializes in a concentrated manner, and profits quickly flow back to midstream refining. If Jianxiawo ramps up faster than expected and part of its output enters the spot market; if other Yichun mines progress faster than expected in license renewals; if African ore arrives in China in a concentrated way; and if lithium carbonate warehouse receipts and futures market pressure intensify, ore prices will face stronger downside pressure. The transmission chain would be: lithium carbonate futures turn bearish → lithium salt producers become more cautious in procurement → rigid demand for externally procured ore slows → traders release saleable inventories → ore prices correct quickly. In this scenario, profits do not disappear; they shift quickly from upstream resources back to midstream refining, and overseas miners’ realized prices also come under pressure. The key is not the nominal restart volume of Jianxiawo, but whether the restarted ore is internally consumed or enters the spot market, and whether downstream material inventories can absorb the additional lithium salt supply. Support scenario: effective ore supply remains tight, and profits stay upstream. If Jianxiawo’s actual output is later than market expectations, if license renewals or environmental factors continue to suppress the supply elasticity of other Yichun mines, if African arrivals remain inconsistent, and if peak-season energy storage and power battery production schedules continue to exceed expectations, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore will still face the situation of “orders and capacity available, but feedstock either expensive or unstable.” In this case, negative conversion margins will force some marginal lithium salt producers to reduce operating rates. The contraction of effective lithium carbonate supply will support lithium salt prices; and once salt prices stabilize, ore prices will also gain support. The persistent margin inversion in H1 has already shown that losses are not simply bearish. They act as an automatic stabilizer for the industry chain: they force some marginal refining capacity to shut down, reduce lithium salt supply, and thereby support prices in reverse. Upside scenario: effective ore shortage transmits into lithium salt supply contraction, driving ore prices higher again. If H2 sees the combination of stronger-than-expected demand, weaker-than-expected domestic ore realization, and inconsistent overseas arrivals, lithium ore prices could still rise further. Specifically, if energy storage demand remains highly robust and power batteries enter the traditional peak season with further upward revisions to cell and material production schedules, especially as new LFP capacity continues to ramp up, monthly lithium carbonate consumption will continue to rise. At the same time, if Jianxiawo’s restart is slower than expected, or if output after the restart is mainly consumed within the integrated system with limited spot supply, and if other Jiangxi lepidolite mines are temporarily halted due to license renewal, environmental protection, safety, or profitability factors, domestic ore supply elasticity will fall short of nominal expectations. If African ore arrivals are also inconsistent due to shipment schedules, policy disruptions, grade volatility, or financing issues, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore will face difficulties replenishing feedstock. Under this scenario, ore is no longer merely a variable reverse-priced by lithium carbonate. It begins to constrain lithium salt supply in reverse. The transmission chain would be: downstream material and cell production schedules are revised upward → lithium carbonate spot destocking accelerates → lithium salt producers increase operating rates to fulfill orders → demand for processable ore rises → domestic ore and overseas arrivals fail to ramp up simultaneously → feedstock inventories at externally procured ore salt producers decline → some marginal producers cut output because they cannot secure suitable ore or because margins remain deeply negative → effective lithium carbonate supply contracts → lithium carbonate spot and futures prices strengthen again → lithium ore prices follow lithium carbonate upward. In this case, ore price increases are not driven by independent upstream strength. They are re-priced upward by lithium carbonate after insufficient effective ore supply starts to restrict lithium salt output. In this upside scenario, spot conversion margins for externally procured ore may remain negative or even widen further. On the surface, negative margins should pressure ore prices. But under the combination of strong demand, strong lithium salt prices, and tight ore supply, negative margins can instead become a price-supporting mechanism. On one hand, they force some high-cost externally procured ore producers to suspend operations, reducing lithium carbonate supply. On the other hand, producers with long-term delivery obligations, customer orders, or futures hedging needs still have to keep buying ore, further consuming saleable ore supply. The end result is that industry-chain profits remain concentrated upstream, lithium salt producers’ margin recovery is delayed, and the ore price center may move further upward. Overall, the core issue for the H2 lithium ore market is not whether there is too much or too little ore, but whether ore can be converted into lithium carbonate supply in time. The correct analytical framework should cover six variables: the strength of power battery and energy storage production schedules, inventory cycles at material and cell producers, lithium carbonate spot and futures pricing, the depth of margin inversion for lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, the actual restart and distribution path of Jianxiawo and other Yichun mines, and changes in African arrivals and traders’ saleable inventories. Lithium ore is not the starting point of the industry-chain cycle. It is the result of reverse pricing by lithium carbonate supply-demand fundamentals, refining margins, and the futures market. Only when ore starts to restrict lithium salt producers’ operating rates, or when new ore supply begins to materially increase lithium carbonate supply, will lithium ore shift from a price-following variable to a supply-demand-leading variable. SMM New Energy Analyst: Lesley Yang yangle@smm.cn +61 0451581533

[SMM Cobalt Lithium Morning Meeting Minutes: This week, overall sentiment in the industry chain recovered, as a rebound in upstream raw material prices drove some material prices higher. Lithium carbonate, LFP, and separator segments performed strongly. Downstream production schedules stayed high, with demand from energy storage, commercial vehicles, and power batteries still providing support. However, acceptance of high prices was limited, and actual transactions were mostly based on essential needs. Cobalt salts, nickel salts, and ternary cathode precursors remained in the doldrums, with a strong wait-and-see sentiment prevailing in the market. Overall, short-term prices may continue to drift higher, but attention still needs to be paid to raw material arrivals, the sustainability of restocking, and the realization of end-use demand going forward.]

This week, spot lithium carbonate prices bottomed out and consolidated higher. The futures market was strong, with the most-traded 2609 contract rebounding sharply from 145,300-154,700 yuan/mt at the start of the week to 162,200-167,800 yuan/mt. The mid-week high touched 167,800 yuan/mt, and the weekly gain was about 8.4%. Market sentiment diverged significantly between upstream and downstream players. Upstream lithium chemical plants continued to hold prices firm and hold back from selling, with low willingness to sell below 170,000 yuan/mt. Some enterprises, supported by costs, maintained the intention to keep prices high. Downstream material plants had largely completed their month-end stockpiling for the next month. As prices consolidated higher, purchases were mainly need-based, restocking was cautious, and acceptance of high-priced cargoes remained low. Overall, market inquiries and actual transactions were relatively stable and quiet, with the spot-futures price spread strengthening slightly. Supply-side output fell sharply, strengthening expectations of supply contraction. Lithium carbonate production fell sharply this week, mainly because the circulation of spodumene and lepidolite raw materials in the market was relatively tight, while some lithium chemical plants had maintenance plans, leading to a sharp drop in spodumene-based output. Salt lake-based and recycling-based output maintained steady gains. Multiple bullish factors on the supply side converged to drive the price rebound. First, raw material supply tightened, with spot circulation of spodumene concentrates tightening, coupled with maintenance plans at some lithium chemical plants, strengthening expectations of near-term supply contraction. Second, signs of a phased decline in imports emerged: Chile’s lithium carbonate exports to China fell 40.8% MoM in May, and domestic import arrivals are expected to decline subsequently. On the demand side, downstream production schedules in July showed significant growth and remained high. The domestic lithium carbonate supply-demand balance is expected to show a large destocking pattern in July. Looking ahead, near-term lithium carbonate prices may hold up well and consolidate, but upside room should be viewed with caution. Near-term lithium prices are expected to consolidate in the 160,000-170,000 yuan/mt range. It is recommended to focus on the progress of mine license renewal in Jiangxi, the pace of port arrivals of lithium ore from Zimbabwe, changes in downstream acceptance of high prices, and the extent of warrant retreat from high levels.

Zimbabwe's Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube revealed during the World Economic Forum in Dalian that the country is actively considering using its abundant mineral resources as collateral through "resource‑linked debt instruments" to finance road and railway construction projects in cooperation with China. This model aims to leverage future revenue from natural resources as loan guarantees to address the huge funding gap for infrastructure development. Ncube said Zimbabwe has held preliminary discussions with China Railway Group regarding such financing arrangements. He told reporters: "We have discussed resource‑linked debt instruments and hope to use them in the future to support infrastructure development, particularly in the road and railway sectors." Under the envisaged plan, Zimbabwe would assess project costs, toll revenue potential, and the return cycle of required resource investments to determine the scale of resource collateral and the repayment path. As Africa's largest lithium producer, Zimbabwe possesses rich mineral resources, but years of economic mismanagement and political instability have left its infrastructure severely lagging. The African Development Bank estimates that the country needs approximately US$34 billion to modernise its transport and logistics network. The proposed resource‑for‑infrastructure plan resembles the model of the US$7 billion Sicomines copper‑cobalt joint venture in the Democratic Republic of Congo with Chinese companies. As early as September 2025, Zimbabwe's President, during a meeting in Beijing with senior executives of China Railway Group, promoted a railway rehabilitation cooperation plan totalling US$533 million. The project is to be implemented by Chuantie International, a subsidiary of China Railway Group with extensive experience in African projects. The scope of work includes repair and reinforcement of existing lines and bridges, modernisation of signal systems, procurement of 17 locomotives and 209 freight wagons, construction of five new stations, and the key trunk line connecting Beitbridge and Harare – a strategic corridor leading directly to South Africa, which is vital to Zimbabwe's foreign trade. Currently, the project's financing method and formal signing date are still under final negotiation. Zimbabwe's railway network was built during the colonial era and carried up to 12 million tonnes of freight annually in the 1990s. However, decades of underinvestment, equipment obsolescence, and foreign exchange shortages have caused the railway infrastructure to deteriorate continuously. Current annual freight volume has fallen to less than 3 million tonnes – only 15% of its historical peak. Many lines are overgrown with weeds, and a large number of locomotives and rolling stock have been taken out of service, directly weakening the capacity to transport bulk commodities such as lithium, chrome ore, and coal to the ports of Mozambique and South Africa. Consequently, Chinese mining enterprises operating in Zimbabwe – including Tsingshan Holding Group, Sinosteel Corporation, and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt – all face export bottlenecks for their products. The decline of the railway system has forced a large volume of freight onto roads, leading to a surge in heavy trucks, which in turn exacerbates road congestion, traffic accidents, and pavement damage, forming a vicious cycle. In response, the National Railways of Zimbabwe has incorporated this railway rehabilitation into a broader modernisation framework and has engaged in cooperation with 11 private enterprises. Among them, South Africa's Grindrod, through its subsidiary Beitbridge‑Bulawayo Railway Company, has already deployed three locomotives and 150 freight wagons to alleviate current transport pressures. At the same time, Zimbabwe is exploring collaboration with the University of Zimbabwe to leverage the university's innovation centre for localised railway technology R&D and talent training, building capacity for long‑term operations. Analysts point out that if this railway rehabilitation is successfully implemented, it will not only fully restore Zimbabwe's deteriorated railway network, but also provide critical logistics support for the country's US$12 billion mining target, while further deepening the strategic presence of Chinese enterprises in Zimbabwe's mining and infrastructure sectors. According to market dynamics, in recent years – and especially since the beginning of this year – lithium ore shipments from Zimbabwe have been persistently delayed at ports, with insufficient inland transport capacity being one of the main bottlenecks hindering smooth cargo arrivals. As the relevant logistics system upgrades are put into effect, this situation is expected to be significantly alleviated, and the transport efficiency of lithium materials will be notably improved, thereby injecting solid momentum into the stabilisation of global lithium supply. Sources: Mining.com , Azure Track Rail, and SMM

As the core production area for lepidolite in China, Yichun in Jiangxi Province has drawn significant industry attention for its special compliance rectification of lithium mines. Amid an uncertain outlook, two other publicly listed firms decided to "partner up" and consolidate their resources. On the evening of June 22, Canmax and Yongxing Materials simultaneously disclosed that Canmax's holding subsidiary, Yichun Shengyuan Lithium Co., Ltd. ("Shengyuan Lithium"), signed an Equity Increase and Cooperation Agreement with Yongxing Materials' holding subsidiary, Yifeng County Huaqiao Yongtuo Mining Co., Ltd. ("Huaqiao Yongtuo"), and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Yifeng County Huaqiao Mining Co., Ltd. ("Huaqiao Mining"). Under the agreement, Shengyuan Lithium will use the porcelain clay (lithium-bearing) ore from the Jinzifeng-Zuojiali mining area in Fengxin County and Yifeng County, Jiangxi Province ("Jinzifeng Mine"), which it holds, to increase its capital in Huaqiao Mining. According to the announcement, Shengyuan Lithium will contribute the Jinzifeng Mine, valued at 2.692 billion yuan, to Huaqiao Mining, subscribing to 200 million yuan of newly added registered capital in exchange for a 50% equity stake in Huaqiao Mining upon completion. The 200 million yuan will be recorded as Huaqiao Mining's registered capital, and the remaining 2.492 billion yuan will be recorded as its capital reserve. Of this, the registered capital and capital reserve contributed by Shengyuan Lithium will be exclusively owned by Shengyuan Lithium, while all shareholder equity of Huaqiao Mining existing prior to Shengyuan Lithium fulfilling its capital contribution obligations will be exclusively owned by Huaqiao Yongtuo. After the capital increase, Huaqiao Mining's registered capital will grow from 200 million yuan to 400 million yuan, with Huaqiao Yongtuo and Shengyuan Lithium each holding a 50% stake. Huaqiao Mining will simultaneously hold the mining permits for both the Huashan Mine and the Jinzifeng Mine. Huaqiao Mining will then apply to the relevant authorities to merge the mining rights for the Jinzifeng Mine and Huashan Mine into a new single mining right. Using this new right as the vehicle, it will apply for a safety production permit and other required procedures for production and construction at an annual mining capacity of 18 million mt, with Huaqiao Mining subsequently taking unified charge of all ore extraction. Regarding ore extraction, the announcement specifies that it will be organized uniformly by Huaqiao Mining. In principle, mined ore from within the original Jinzifeng Mine boundary will be sold to Shengyuan Lithium or its designated third party, while ore from within the original Huashan Mine boundary will be sold to Huaqiao Yongtuo or its designated third party. Regarding the management of the future consolidated mines, the announcement states that Huaqiao Mining will be managed and operated through separate divisions for Huashan Mine and Jinzifeng Mine. Shareholders, the board of directors, and management shall respect historical practices and adopt lawful and compliant management, dividend distribution, and sales models to minimize the impact of differing ore resource endowments between Jinzifeng Mine and Huashan Mine on the investment returns of both shareholders and subsequent beneficiation revenues. On the mining right consolidation, both publicly listed firms note that Huashan Mine and Jinzifeng Mine are adjacent. Under relevant laws and regulations, a safe production setback distance must be established between adjacent mines during mining operations. Both parties believe the consolidation aligns with the national policy direction of intensive development of strategic mineral resources. On one hand, integrating the two adjacent mining areas of Jinzifeng Mine and Huashan Mine will allow coordinated development planning and safety production control, optimize the overall mining layout, strengthen the mine safety management system, and ensure long-term compliant and stable operations. On the other hand, the mine consolidation is expected to fully release the mineral resource potential within the mining area, increase total recoverable resources and the comprehensive utilization rate of mineral resources, thereby achieving scientific, standardized, and efficient resource development. It is worth noting, however, that the effectiveness of the agreement between Yongxing Materials and Canmax remains subject to two conditions. First, the transaction must be approved by the competent authorities of all parties involved. Second, the primary mineral types of both Jinzifeng Mine and Huashan Mine must be changed to "lithium ore." As the "Asian Lithium Capital," Yichun saw many mines in earlier years extract lepidolite under porcelain clay mining certificates, leading to long-standing issues such as certificate-mineral mismatches, extensive mining, ecological pollution, underpayment of taxes and fees, and non-compliant approval levels. In July 2025, the new Mineral Resources Law designated lithium as an independent strategic mineral at the national level, setting a lithium ore recognition threshold of 0.4% Li₂O, elevating lithium mine approval authority, and significantly increasing resource taxes. In July 2025, the Yichun Natural Resources Bureau issued a notice identifying that eight lithium-related mining rights, including Jianxiawo, had problems such as circumventing higher-level approval authority and handling procedures beyond their mandate. It required the preparation of mineral type change reserve verification reports to be completed by the end of September that year. The newly disclosed mining rights evaluation reports from Canmax and Yongxing Materials indicate that work such as reserve verification and development plan formulation for the Jinzifeng Mine and Huashan Mine has been completed, an application to change the main mineral type has been submitted, and the Ministry of Natural Resources accepted it on March 12, 2026. The main mineral type is expected to be changed to lithium ore. In its 2025 annual report, Yongxing Materials also noted that Huaqiao Mining needs to change the mining types on its mining license, and therefore must pay the mining rights transfer proceeds for the lithium ore resources that have historically been exploited at the Huashan Mine but not yet compensated through paid disposal. As of the end of 2025, Huaqiao Mining had accrued 144 million yuan in mining rights transfer proceeds payable. However, both evaluation reports emphasize that "this evaluation is based on the proposed change of the main mineral type to lithium ore, and the final outcome is subject to approval by the Ministry of Natural Resources and the issuance of a new mining permit." The reports also caution, "If the change is not approved, the evaluation results will become invalid."

Around June 24, 2026, import and export data for products related to the cobalt and lithium battery industry chain for May were released. The data shows that spodumene imports in May continued to pull back from April, reaching 681,000 mt in physical content, down 10% MoM, equivalent to approximately 66,000 mt of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE). On the lithium carbonate import side, China imported 37,555 mt of lithium carbonate in May, up 15% MoM and up 78% YoY. Cumulative imports of lithium carbonate from January to May reached 153,000 mt, up 53% YoY year-to-date... SMM has consolidated the import and export situation of battery materials, as follows: Upstream Lithium Concentrates Customs data indicates that spodumene imports in May continued to pull back from April, reaching 681,000 mt in physical content. By source country, port arrivals of Australian ore returned to relatively normal levels, with arrivals exceeding 330,000 mt this month, down 6% MoM; shipments from Zimbabwe that were loaded earlier arrived at 63,800 mt this month, down 41% MoM; exports from South Africa and Nigeria from April to May were relatively stable, with port arrivals ranging from 90,000 to 110,000 mt per month. Arrivals from Mali were low this month, at only 38,000 mt, which increased MoM but have not returned to relatively high levels. Additionally, after SMM screening, it can be seen that the incoming ore for the month was equivalent to 66,000 mt of LCE. Lithium concentrates accounted for 81% of the incoming ore, with the trend rising MoM compared to the previous month. Source: China Customs, compiled by SMM > [SMM Analysis] China's spodumene imports reached 681,000 mt in physical content in May 2026, down 10% MoM, equivalent to approximately 66,000 mt of LCE On the spot quotation for spodumene concentrates (CIF China), according to SMM spot quotes, the spot quotation for spodumene concentrates (CIF China) in May showed a trend of rising first and then falling. As of May 29, the spot quotation for spodumene concentrates (CIF China) was around $2,571/mt, up $31/mt from $2,540/mt at month-end April, an increase of 1.22%. > Click to view SMM's spot quotes for new energy products In May, enterprises that purchase spodumene externally for lithium extraction still hovered near the break-even line. At the beginning of the month, lithium carbonate prices rebounded, but spodumene concentrates followed suit and at one point rose more than salt prices, leading to continued losses. In the first half of May, lithium carbonate prices further rose, and non-integrated enterprises might briefly achieve slim profits on the spot; after mid-month, ore prices fluctuated at highs while lithium carbonate pulled back, causing enterprises to fall back into losses, which lasted until month-end. Enterprises that purchase lepidolite externally for lithium extraction continued to see stable profits in May. Although lepidolite concentrate prices fluctuated at highs due to tight supply, their increase was smaller than the rise in lithium carbonate, leaving profit margins for the smelting end. May 12: Yichun Mining auctioned 5,700 mt of 2% lepidolite concentrate at a transaction price of 5,760 yuan/mt, reflecting the tight balance at the ore end. As of June 24, spodumene concentrate (CIF China) spot prices remained at $2,291/mt. Lithium Carbonate According to customs data, China imported 37,555 mt of lithium carbonate in May, up 15% MoM and up 78% YoY. Of this, 24,522 mt came from Chile (65% of total imports), 11,422 mt from Argentina (30%), and 1,023 mt from Indonesia (3%). From January to May, China’s cumulative lithium carbonate imports reached 153,000 mt, up 53% YoY. In May, China exported 201 mt of lithium carbonate, down 46% MoM and down 30% YoY. Cumulative exports from January to May totaled 2,087 mt, up 1% YoY. China imported 12,107 mt of lithium sulfate in May, down 33% MoM but up 53% YoY. Cumulative imports from January to May reached 71,000 mt, up 105% YoY. According to SMM spot price data, spot lithium carbonate prices in May also showed a pattern of rising first and then falling. As of May 29, spot lithium carbonate prices stood at 177,500 yuan/mt, up 500 yuan/mt from 177,000 yuan/mt on April 30, an increase of 0.28%. 》Click to view SMM New Energy product spot prices Looking back at the May lithium carbonate market, according to SMM, spot lithium carbonate prices in China fluctuated upward with a notable rise in the price center, and the average monthly price rose 12% MoM. From the fundamental side, supply-side disruptions continued to fester, while on the demand side, production schedules for downstream cathode materials and battery cells remained at high levels. The June production schedule is expected to accelerate further, and the supply-demand time mismatch remains unresolved. Upstream lithium chemical plants maintained firm prices and held back from selling throughout the month. The downstream showed divergence: some enterprises restocked on dips, but most had limited acceptance of high prices and mainly made just-in-time procurement, leaving actual transactions relatively sluggish. In May, spot battery-grade lithium carbonate prices kept rising amid fluctuations, with a notable gain at month-end compared to the start of the month. The most-traded futures contract briefly broke through the 200,000 yuan/mt mark during the month. As of June 24, spot battery-grade lithium carbonate prices were quoted at 154,000-161,000 yuan/mt, averaging 157,500 yuan/mt. According to SMM, entering June, the lithium carbonate market saw a clear tug-of-war between longs and shorts, with the price center shifting significantly lower than in May. On the supply side, disruptions such as declining exports from Chile and license renewals for mines in Jiangxi provided bottom support for lithium carbonate prices. However, pressure from high warrant levels and expectations of Zimbabwean ore arrivals capped the upside for prices. Downstream material plants maintain a dip-buying strategy amid falling lithium carbonate prices, with stronger willingness to restock when prices hit psychological levels but lacking momentum to chase rallies. Upstream lithium chemical plants, on the other hand, still hold sentiment to hold prices firm. Currently, the tug-of-war between longs and shorts intensifies. In the future, close attention should be paid to the warrant inflection point, the arrival pace of Zimbabwe lithium ore, and the extent to which downstream production schedules materialize. Spot lithium carbonate quotes are expected to remain in the doldrums in the near term. Lithium Hydroxide According to customs data, in May 2026, China imported 3,932 mt of lithium hydroxide, down 41% MoM and up nearly fourfold YoY. Among them, imports from South Korea amounted to 2,029 mt, accounting for 51% of total imports; from Indonesia were 360 mt, marking a notable pullback; from Australia and Chile were 1,204 mt, making up 30%. In May, China exported 3,549 mt of lithium hydroxide, down 36% MoM and down 36% YoY, with 2,799 mt going to South Korea and 608 mt to Japan. Battery Materials LFP In May 2026, China's LFP exports reached 7,625.4 mt, up 29.3% MoM from April and up 710.0% YoY from May last year, setting a new monthly high for the year. On the pricing front, total export value in May was $62.6062 million, with an average unit price of roughly $8,210/mt, equivalent to about 55,951 yuan/mt, up around 6.9% from the April average. In terms of export destinations, there was a notable shift in May: exports to the US were the highest at 3,014.7 mt, leaping to first place; Thailand ranked second with 2,030.6 mt; exports to Malaysia totaled about 886 mt, ranking third; Japan and Vietnam recorded 620 mt and 420 mt, respectively. Compared with April, exports to Vietnam and Thailand increased significantly, while those to Poland and Canada declined. The overall export center shifted towards Southeast Asia and the US, which is closely related to the locations of battery cell manufacturers' clients. Overall, overseas demand remains robust. China's total LFP exports kept increasing, achieving multiple-fold growth YoY. In the future, as overseas battery capacity gradually comes onstream, China's LFP exports are expected to stay high. LiPF6 According to China customs data, in May 2026, China's cumulative exports of LiPF6 were approximately 1,500 mt, up about 72.8% MoM, while cumulative imports of LiPF6 were about 53.5 mt. On the export front, in May 2026, China's LiPF6 exports were about 1,500 mt, up about 72.8% MoM from April and up about 15.5% YoY. Specifically, this month, LiPF6 was mainly exported to South Korea, Poland, Malaysia, Japan, and other countries. Exports to Poland were 451.88 mt, up about 33.89% MoM; exports to South Korea were 591.006 mt, up about 622.47% MoM; exports to Japan were 109.8 mt, down about 42.62% MoM; and exports to the US were 77.4 mt, down about 24.05% MoM. Overall, overseas procurement volume for LiPF6 recovered somewhat in May. Artificial Graphite In May 2026, China's artificial graphite imports were 980 mt, up 29.5% MoM but down 21.8% YoY. In terms of the average import price, in May 2026, the average import price of China's artificial graphite stood at 60,148 yuan/mt, down 20.8% MoM but up 37.3% YoY. In May 2026, China's artificial graphite exports were 50,038 mt, up 9.03% MoM but down 4% YoY. In terms of the average export price, in May 2026, the average export price of China's artificial graphite stood at 7,729 yuan/mt, down 16.12% MoM and down 12.91% YoY. Looking at the overall export data, while total artificial graphite exports recorded MoM growth in May, the combined shipments of the top five exporting provinces in China registered a 19% MoM pullback. Performance by province diverged significantly, with two provinces seeing their exports down sharply 40% MoM, another province posting an MoM decline approaching 30%, and major production regions showing marked export weakness. Flake Graphite In May 2026, China's flake graphite imports were 5,944 mt, up 87% MoM and up 22% YoY. Data source: China Customs, SMM In May 2026, China's flake graphite exports were 7,641 mt, up 87% MoM but down 12% YoY. The significant 87% MoM rise in flake graphite exports in this period was mainly driven by the low base effect stemming from the delayed delivery of export orders in April. Affected by earlier logistics delays, production schedule postponements, and other factors, export shipments in April were at a relatively low level, and previously backlogged export orders were concentrated for customs declaration and shipment in May, driving a sharp MoM increase in export volumes this month. Phosphate Ore In May 2026, China's phosphate ore imports stood at 131,000 mt, down 36.4% MoM, with an average price of $93/mt, down slightly 2.6% MoM. Import sources were highly concentrated in Egypt (128 kt, accounting for 97.7%), while shipments from Peru and Jordan were interrupted. Exports stood at 32 kt, up 189.6% MoM, with Hubei resuming exports of 21 kt. The Egyptian government halted new export contracts in mid-May, intensifying supply uncertainty going forward, which may further pressure import costs. The provincial mix shifted dramatically as Hubei imports fell to zero and Guangxi reclaimed the top spot. Characteristics of China’s phosphate ore import market in May: First, total volume pulled back significantly, with imports down more than one-third MoM; second, sources were highly concentrated, with Egypt alone accounting for as much as 97.7%, while shipments from Peru and Jordan were interrupted; third, the provincial mix shifted dramatically, as Hubei imports fell to zero and Guangxi reclaimed the top spot. The Egyptian government announced in mid-May that it would stop signing new phosphate ore export contracts. The uncertainty surrounding Egyptian cargo supply will rise markedly in the coming months, potentially pushing import costs higher and exacerbating tight supply. At the same time, the recovery in exports from Hubei and Guizhou reflects a rebalancing of the regional supply-demand pattern for domestic phosphate ore. Cobalt Cobalt Hydrometallurgy Intermediate Products In May 2026, China’s imports of cobalt hydrometallurgy intermediate products were approximately 2,584 mt in physical content, up 107% MoM and down 95% YoY. Imports from the DRC were approximately 2,066 mt in physical content, up 119% MoM and down 96% YoY. The average import price of cobalt hydrometallurgy intermediate products in China in May 2026 was $16,607/mt in physical content, down 3.37% MoM. Reports indicate that some Chinese-invested miners have gradually increased chartered shipments since May, with several leading miners progressively resuming shipments from June onward. Port arrivals of intermediate products are expected to slowly pick up in the coming months and are likely to achieve bulk arrival volumes after August. Unwrought Cobalt In May 2026, China’s imports of unwrought cobalt were approximately 673 mt, down 50% MoM and up 3% YoY. In May, the top three sources by refined cobalt import volume were Indonesia (211 mt), Madagascar (93 mt), and Canada (85 mt). The sharp MoM decline in imports was mainly due to the depletion of low-priced cobalt raw materials previously accumulated outside China, while newly imported cobalt plates and cobalt briquettes were priced higher than other domestic cobalt raw materials, reducing smelters’ willingness to purchase for dissolution. The average import price of unwrought cobalt in China in May 2026 was $54,557/mt, up 3.48% MoM. Cumulative imports in January-May 2026 totaled 6,589 mt, up 120% YoY. Exports, in May 2026 China's unwrought cobalt exports were approximately 370 mt, up 70% MoM and down 88% YoY. By destination, exports to the Netherlands surged to 205 mt in May, up 791% MoM. Average export price, the average export price of China's unwrought cobalt in May 2026 was $53,403/mt, down 2.17% MoM. Cumulative exports in January-May 2026 totaled 2,161 mt, down 79% YoY.

This week, spot lithium carbonate prices followed a stable-then-dropping trajectory, fluctuating downward. The futures market was weak, with the most-traded 2609 contract price range edging down from 172,600-177,900 yuan/mt at the start of the week to 160,100-172,500 yuan/mt, hitting a mid-week low of 160,100 yuan/mt. The weekly decline was around 6.6%, open interest rose then fell, and market sentiment soured. Market transactions featured "active trading on dips, a wait-and-see approach on rebounds," with downstream dip-buying willingness relatively strong. On the upstream lithium chemical plant side, quotes remained relatively firm, with a pronounced mindset of holding prices firm and holding back from selling. Some enterprises showed low willingness to sell below 170,000 yuan/mt and some adopted a deferred pricing model for shipments. On the downstream material plant side, as prices fluctuated downward, dip-buying willingness was relatively strong. They maintained a strategy of just-in-time restocking and need-based purchases, but with prices yet to stabilize, general willingness to stockpile on a large scale was weak, and most maintained operations at safe inventory levels. Overall, market inquiry sentiment was moderate, actual transactions were mainly just-in-time, and activity picked up compared to the earlier period. Supply-side production edged down slightly, and industry chain inventories showed divergence. Lithium carbonate production edged down this week, with spodumene-based production basically stable. Despite some new capacity continuing steady production ramp-up, some lithium chemical plants saw output edge down due to raw material supply fluctuations. Other raw material-based operations remained stable. Looking at inventory changes: upstream lithium chemical plants saw an overall destocking trend this week, driven by increased long-term contract orders and some restocking demand from traders. Downstream material plants continued their strategy of dip-buying and need-based purchasing, keeping inventories at safe levels. Traders, driven by downstream just-in-time procurement, had some restocking demand, and overall inventory levels remained basically flat. Looking ahead, short-term lithium carbonate prices are expected to remain in the doldrums. Continued attention should be paid to key points such as the warrant inflection point, the arrival pace of lithium ore from Zimbabwe, and the actual fulfillment of downstream production schedules.

On June 9, a fire broke out at Greenbushes Chemical-Grade Beneficiation Plant 3 (CGP3). The fire was quickly extinguished with no casualties, CGP1 and CGP2 continued normal operations, and IGO confirmed the next day that its FY2026 concentrate guidance of 1.375 million to 1.425 million mt remained unchanged. CGP4 is planned to commence in 2027. Judging solely by the announcement, this was a well-handled operational incident. However, the location of the fire warrants closer attention: CGP3 is not existing capacity but incremental capacity being ramped up at the far left of the global cost curve – with a total investment of about AUD 880 million, designed to add approximately 500,000 mt/year of concentrate capacity, and which only achieved first feed in December 2025 and was originally expected to reach full production by mid-this year. The damage assessment is still ongoing, repair costs and timetable are yet to be quantified, and the so-called "guidance maintained" is based only on information from the initial stage of the incident. What merits tracking going forward is not the guidance itself, but whether the timing of reaching full production will be delayed. At the world's lowest-cost mine, a new production line has had a minor incident – should the market be concerned? Today, I aim to break down and clarify this mechanism by analyzing the role of Australian ore in the lithium price formation. Note: Clarification on the timeline for CGP3 reaching full production. At its FY26 Q2 results briefing in late January 2026, IGO stated that CGP3 achieved first feed in December 2025 and that ramp-up to nominal capacity would take approximately five months. Some English transcripts recorded management's remarks as "completing ramp-up before the end of the calendar year" (end of the calendar year). However, based on the timing of first feed, five months corresponds to mid-2026, i.e., before the end of the Australian financial year (FY26), which is consistent with the company's previously disclosed guidance of "reaching full production in mid-2026." The transcript likely mistook "end of the financial year" for "end of the calendar year." This article adopts the "mid-2026 full production" timeline. This timing implies that the June 9 CGP3 fire occurred a few weeks before the originally scheduled full production, and the actual impact will be confirmed in IGO's Q4 report (expected in late July). Greenbushes: A Benchmark at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes' most fundamental advantage lies first in its ore grade. It is one of the world's largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines in production, with raw ore grade roughly double the industry average. For spodumene mines, grade directly determines mining and processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrates, Greenbushes needs to process significantly less raw ore than typical mines, giving it natural cost advantages in mining, beneficiation, energy consumption, and tailings management. Building on its high-grade ore, Greenbushes also benefits from economies of scale. The mine site now hosts multiple beneficiation plants with a combined nominal processing capacity of approximately 6.5 million mt/year, supporting a maximum lithium concentrate capacity of up to 1.5 million mt; once CGP3 has fully ramped up, it will add roughly 500,000 mt of additional concentrate capacity. With the mine life further extended to 2045, Greenbushes not only possesses low-cost advantages but also strong long-term supply capability. This is why Greenbushes has demonstrated significant resilience during the lithium price downturn. From 2024 to 2025, as lithium prices continued to pull back, many high-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced pressure to suspend or cut production, yet Greenbushes maintained relatively sound profitability and continued to advance the CGP3 expansion. It represents not the industry's average cost, but the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium ore cost curve. Therefore, Greenbushes serves as a useful benchmark for observing the industry bottom. When lithium prices fall, high-cost capacity exits first, while low-cost capacity continues to produce. The closer prices move to Greenbushes' cost range, the fewer marginal units of capacity can sustain normal operations in the market, and the nearer supply exits are to completion. Greenbushes Has the Largest Production, but Limited Free-Float Volume Although Greenbushes has a very large production scale, relatively little of its concentrates can enter the spot market directly. Greenbushes is operated by Talison Lithium, whose shareholders include TLEA and Albemarle, with TLEA jointly held by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. The spodumene concentrates produced at the mine are primarily allocated under shareholder offtake arrangements, flowing to lithium chemical production lines within the shareholder systems of Tianqi, Albemarle, and others, and are not normally offered for direct sale to the market. Viewed through the framework of [Resources – Designed Capacity – Actual Production – Saleable Volume – Available Spot Volume], Greenbushes is a very typical case. Its actual production ranks among the world's largest, but since most of its concentrates are locked up within its shareholder system, the volume truly available for market-based transactions is relatively limited. This also means Greenbushes' influence on market prices is mostly indirect. On one hand, it defines the scale of global low-cost lithium resource supply, which has an important impact on the lithium chemical cost curve; on the other, its operating costs, offtake pricing, and expansion pace also serve as key references for long-term lithium ore contract negotiations and price assessments. By contrast, what really influences spot lithium ore prices in the short term are typically the marginal resources not fully locked up by shareholder offtake agreements and needing to find buyers on the market. These include some Australian mines, African lithium ore, and saleable cargo held by traders. Therefore, while the addition of approximately 500,000 mt of concentrate capacity at Greenbushes will alter medium and long-term supply-demand expectations, its short-term impact on the spot market may not be particularly pronounced. In contrast, the suspension or resumption of a marginal mine with an annual output of over 100,000 mt that primarily sells on the open market could rapidly influence spot quotes and market sentiment. It is well known that short-term prices are not entirely determined by total output; rather, they depend more on the volume of material freely available for trading in the market. For example, lithium carbonate's price elasticity hinges more on the current available volume in the market. The mine with the largest output does not necessarily hold the most direct pricing power in the spot market; what truly dictates short-term marginal prices are typically resources that are available, negotiable, and require immediate transaction. However, shareholder offtake does not mean such concentrates are completely isolated from the market. When smelters within the frameworks of shareholders like Tianqi and Albemarle reduce their operating rates, or when some smelting lines operate erratically, concentrates originally intended for internal consumption may indirectly enter the market through toll processing, resales, or inventory adjustments. These cargoes are usually not publicly tallied but affect the actual circulating volume in the lithium ore market. Their tracking requires assessment by combining shareholder smelter operating rates, concentrate inventory, toll processing arrangements, and import flows. In analyzing Australian ore supply, such shadow spot cargoes are often harder to observe than a mine's nominal production, yet can significantly influence the market during specific phases. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: Transmission Direction Reversed Once Within a Year The price transmission relationship between Australian ore concentrates (SC6, CIF China) and China's lithium chemicals has completed a full round trip over the past year. In H1 2025, ore prices followed the downtrend. In Q1, Australian mines aggressively cut costs but did not reduce production, showing a strong willingness to sell. SC6 fell all the way to around $620/mt, and the lower concentrate prices, in turn, pressured lithium chemicals downward, forming a spiral. The market's concern at the time was: When would mines finally be willing to cut? The situation reversed starting at the end of Q3. The announcement of Yichun's plan to cancel 27 mining rights, along with the suspension at Jianxiawo, tightened expectations for domestic resource supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first, and SC6 followed with an uptrend that proved even more elastic—by December, the average price had already returned to around $1,300/mt. Formula pricing, linked to lithium chemical prices, allowed the mining side to capture the bulk of the upside gains, while the tolling margins of Chinese smelters were instead compressed. Meanwhile, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana project reflect that lithium chemical conversion in Australia continues to face high hurdles in terms of cost control, production ramp-up, and operational stability. TLEA's Kwinana lithium hydroxide plant was fully impaired in mid-2025, with the second-phase construction halted, and IGO has clearly shifted its priority to mining. The role of Australian ore in the industry chain has been refixed as a supplier of concentrates, and the linkage between SC6 and Chinese lithium chemical prices will only tighten going forward, not decouple. The implied smelting margin—calculated by multiplying SC6 by the processing coefficient and comparing it to spot lithium chemical prices—has turned negative, meaning Chinese smelters using externally purchased ore are losing cash. Either ore prices must pull back or lithium chemical prices must rise; one of the two is inevitable. This indicator is the most powerful gauge of whether mines or lithium chemicals hold more pricing power. Australian Mine Production Resumptions: Price Breaks Through the Ceiling The key words for Australian ore in 2024-2025 were market exits, while in 2026 they have become revivals. Lithium prices have been climbing steadily since the beginning of the year, with futures prices once surpassing 200,000 yuan/mt, triggering a series of production resumptions in May and June: Project Action Timing Notes Bald Hill (MinRes) Resumed production after an 18-month shutdown Announced in May, first concentrates expected in Jul Restart cost approximately A$20 million Ngungaju Plant (PLS) Restart Planned for Jul Resuming roughly 200,000 mt/year Finniss (Core Lithium) FID approved, financing secured Targeting first ore in Q3 Financing approximately $205 million Kathleen Valley (Liontown) Evaluating expansion In progress — Mt Cattlin (Rio Tinto) Remains shut down From Mar 2025 to present Restart conditions not yet clarified Looking at these cases together, the real threshold for resuming production is more complex than simply having prices exceed cash costs. Bald Hill took only about two months from announcement to first ore because it had maintained a production-ready state throughout the shutdown, and MinRes's own mining services division could internally mobilize all operations—mining, crushing, and transport—without needing to wait for external contractors. Assets of this type are the quickest-responding supply when prices rise. Finniss, by contrast, was an entirely different situation: it first sold inventory to Glencore in exchange for liquidity, then cobbled together three financing instruments—convertible bonds, debt, and a share placement—before reaching FID. For mines with fragile balance sheets, resuming production is not an operational decision but a financing event; what low-price cycles destroy is not resources, but financing capacity. The market consequences of the resumption wave are already visible. Lithium carbonate hit a two-year high of 200,500 yuan/mt on May 13, then pulled back to the 160,000–170,000 yuan range in June, partly because the market saw resumption supply coming back. The logic is straightforward: when prices rise, idle capacity resumes production, supply expectations increase, and prices pull back. That list of idle capacity in Australia, when sorted, essentially forms the supply curve above lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and this wave of production resumptions are actually two sides of the same market: disruption to the incremental supply at the far left of the cost curve is bullish, while idle capacity at the right end accelerating its return is bearish. Looking at lithium prices this year from the resource perspective, equilibrium is being sought between these two forces. Lithium prices in 2026 are expected to fluctuate more frequently, but one-sided market moves will be shorter. After prices rise, what truly caps the height of the rally is the speed at which idle capacity re-enters the market. Projects under care and maintenance or on standby, such as Bald Hill, Finniss, and Ngungaju, essentially constitute elastic supply above lithium prices. When lithium prices return above the cash costs of these projects and stay there long enough, mines have the incentive to resume production. But production resumptions do not happen instantly. From the announcement of a restart to the rehiring of personnel, equipment maintenance, resumption of mining and processing, inventory buildup, and finally, the entry of concentrates into the market, it typically takes from two months to several quarters. This time lag is the window during which supply disruptions can drive prices higher. The suspension at Jianxiawo and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes were able to affect market sentiment not because of a sudden global shortage of lithium resources, but because of a reduction in short-term available supply while idle capacity had yet to return. Compared to the previous cycle, it is worth noting that the window for risk premiums arising from resource-side disruptions is shortening. A growing number of mines are opting for care and maintenance rather than permanent closure; mining service companies, traders, and downstream enterprises are also participating in restart financing and offtake arrangements. As long as prices return above the break-even line, some idle capacity can resume more quickly. This means that in the future, lithium prices may still rise rapidly following supply disruptions, but the duration and height of one-sided market moves will be more easily constrained by production resumption expectations. Prices may not necessarily become more stable, but supply feedback could be faster. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le

Spot lithium carbonate prices continued to decline this week. The futures market performed weakly, with the price range of the most-traded LC2609 contract fluctuating downward from 178,000-182,100 yuan/mt at the beginning of the week to 157,600-167,600 yuan/mt, hitting a mid-week low of 157,600 yuan/mt, with a weekly decline of approximately 10.7%. Overall open interest decreased, and market sentiment was bearish. Market transactions exhibited a divergent pattern of "upstream holding prices firm and holding back from selling, downstream dip-buying," while actual transactions maintained a certain level of activity. Upstream lithium chemical plants showed a passive attitude toward spot order shipments, with sentiment to hold prices firm and hold back from selling still prevailing. Only some enterprises that had hedged at higher levels earlier were able to close a small number of spot orders with downstream buyers or traders. On the downstream material plants side, June production schedules stayed high with demand continuing to grow. Supported by rigid demand, some enterprises maintained dip-buying and stockpiling for rigid needs. As prices continued to fall, some enterprises adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude, with purchase willingness and target prices adjusted downward in tandem. Overall, market inquiries and actual transactions maintained a certain level of activity. Supply side, production increased, and industry chain inventory changes diverged significantly. Lithium carbonate production increased this week, mainly due to the successive production resumptions of spodumene processing lines that had previously undergone maintenance. The recycling segment and salt lake segment maintained stable production, while the lepidolite segment experienced minor production fluctuations due to raw material supply issues. In terms of inventory changes: upstream lithium chemical plants saw slight destocking this week as long-term contract orders were delivered in a concentrated manner at the beginning of the month, coupled with some resumed production lines not yet operating at full capacity; downstream material plants saw inventory buildup as long-term contracts and customer-supplied materials arrived successively at the beginning of the month, combined with dip-buying spot orders; traders saw destocking as downstream buyers purchased as needed. Looking ahead, spot lithium carbonate prices are expected to maintain an in the doldrums pattern in the short term, but downside room is limited. Supply side, the pace of Zimbabwean lithium ore arrivals at ports and the progress of production resumptions at Jiangxi mines are key variables going forward. Demand side, downstream production schedules in June stay high, and rigid demand support persists. Short-term lithium prices are expected to maintain a fluctuating trend. It is recommended to closely monitor warrant inflection points, the pace of Zimbabwean lithium ore arrivals at ports, and the actual fulfillment of downstream production schedules.