Chinese Taiwan's Ministry of Finance has officially launched an anti-dumping investigation into cold-rolled flat-rolled stainless steel products from Vietnam, prompting an optimistic outlook among upstream producers including Yusco and Tang Eng Iron Works. The probe follows a surge in Vietnamese imports redirected to Taiwan (Province of China) after South Korea imposed AD duties of 11.37–18.81% on Vietnamese stainless steel, with import volumes exceeding 36,000 tonnes in 2025 at prices undercutting local rates. Local producers have requested protective measures and retroactive duties, with preliminary decisions anticipated by late 2026. The proceedings and prospective retroactive tariffs are expected to deter cheap import surges, restore fair competition, and deliver significant trade benefits to Chinese Taiwan's upstream stainless steel industry.

Chinese Taiwan's Customs Administration under the Ministry of Finance has formally launched an anti-dumping investigation into certain cold-rolled flat-rolled stainless steel products imported from Vietnam, following a petition filed by Yusco and Tang Eng Iron Works. The investigative period covers July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026. The Ministry of Economic Affairs will assess potential industrial damage within 40 days of receiving the notification, while the Ministry of Finance reviews dumping margins. Products under investigation are cold-rolled stainless steel flat products in coils or sheets with thickness of 0.05–6.10mm, nickel content of 5–20%, chromium content of 15–25%, manganese content up to 3%, and aluminum content up to 0.5%, excluding coated or plated products. Officials noted that surging import volumes priced below domestic production costs have caused severe market share losses and financial strain for local producers.

Yusco renewed an anti-dumping investigation petition in early July targeting Vietnamese 304 cold-rolled stainless steel, driven by surging import volumes. Customs data showed imports reaching approximately 6,200 tonnes in June and 6,000 tonnes in July, a 168% YoY surge, with cumulative imports for the first seven months of the year hitting 23,200 tonnes. Although formal case registration remains pending, Chinese Taiwan's Customs Administration has scheduled a preliminary hearing for September 14 due to heavy administrative workloads. Importers have expressed concern over potential retroactive AD duties affecting existing unfulfilled contracts. Yusco and Tang Eng previously filed a similar petition in October 2025 before temporarily withdrawing it; renewed import pressure and sluggish local demand have prompted the latest regulatory action to safeguard fair competition.

Data Notes Sulphur : HS codes 25030000 (sulphur of all kinds, excluding sublimed, precipitated and colloidal sulphur) + 28020000 (sublimed or precipitated sulphur) Sulphuric acid : HS code 28070010 (sulphuric acid with H₂SO₄ content >80% by weight) Total volumes : Sulphur imports in H1 2026 reached 1.8481 million tonnes (1,848,104,145 kg), down 29.4% from H1 2025 (2.6191 million tonnes). Sulphuric acid imports totaled 560,600 tonnes (560,640,243.7 kg). Values : Total sulphur import value was approximately USD 1.270 billion , with an average price of USD 687/tonne . Sulphuric acid imports totaled about USD 111 million , averaging USD 199/tonne . 1. Sulphur: Volumes Shrink by Nearly 30%; Prices Stable Early Then Surge 1.1 Monthly Import Volume and Price Trends Trend commentary : Jan–Apr : Prices traded in a narrow range of USD 540–556/t , remaining broadly stable. January volume reached 0.3781 million tonnes (second-highest in H1), February fell 43.5% MoM to 0.2137 million tonnes due to the Lunar New Year holiday, March rebounded to 0.3744 million tonnes, and April eased to 0.2673 million tonnes. Global sulphur supply was ample during this period, and Indonesian buying remained steady. May–Jun : Prices turned sharply upward. May averaged USD 798/t , up 46.4% MoM; June surged further to USD 1,108/t , a gain of USD 563/t (+103%) from April's trough. This rally was driven by concentrated HPAL project restocking, recovering international phosphate fertiliser demand, and sharply reduced Middle Eastern supplies to Indonesia. June showed a "volume-price simultaneous rise" pattern (vol. +21.2%, price +38.8%), indicating buying appetite persisted despite high prices. 1.2 Major Source Countries: Saudi Arabia Leads, Canada Emerges Strong Key observations : The six Middle Eastern countries (Saudi, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman) together supplied about 0.9824 million tonnes , accounting for 53.2% — still the largest regional block, but down sharply from 2.0999 million tonnes in H1 2025, a 53.2% decline . Canada saw its share jump from ~8.5% in H1 2025 (0.2219 million tonnes) to 17.7% , with volumes rising 47.6% year-on-year (from 0.2219 to 0.3275 million tonnes), becoming the second-largest source. Canadian high-purity solid sulphur performs well in nickel smelting applications. UAE, Qatar and Kuwait averaged only USD 541–557/t, significantly lower than Saudi (USD 754/t) and Canada (USD 773/t). 1.3 Major Destination Ports: Three Nickel Parks Absorb Over 80% The three major nickel-industrial parks – WEDA, MOROWALI and OBI ISLAND – together imported 1.5333 million tonnes, accounting for 83.0% of Indonesia's total sulphur imports. These parks are the core hubs for downstream nickel processing (HPAL and RKEF with integrated sulphuric acid/fertiliser units), making sulphur import demand heavily concentrated in the nickel sector. WEDA alone accounts for 38.2% of national imports, the largest single destination. GRESIK (0.1518 million tonnes, 8.2%) mainly receives Qatari, Kuwaiti and Indian sulphur, serving industrial zones in eastern Java. Tanjung Priok, as Jakarta's main port, handles only 0.0624 million tonnes (3.4%), serving traditional chemical and fertiliser industries on Java. 1.4 Year-on-Year Decline Breakdown: Middle East Six Net Decrease of 1.1175 Million Tonnes In H1 2025, the six Middle Eastern countries exported a total of 2.0999 million tonnes of sulphur to Indonesia, falling to 0.9824 million tonnes in H1 2026, a net decrease of 1.1175 million tonnes (-53.2%) . Changes by country: Note: Bahrain was the only Middle Eastern country to increase exports to Indonesia, though from a small base (0.02→0.0442 million tonnes), with limited impact on the overall picture. Main reasons for the decline : ① International sulphur prices had been strengthening from late 2025 through June 2026, prompting Middle Eastern suppliers to divert cargoes to higher-paying markets like India, China and North Africa; ② Some newly built sulphur-burning acid plants in Indonesia came on stream, partially replacing imported sulphur. Increases from Canada (+0.1056 million tonnes) and the Philippines (+0.02 million tonnes) covered only about 11% of the shortfall. 2. Sulphuric Acid: Imports Rise Against the Trend; South Korea Becomes Largest Source 2.1 Monthly Import Volume and Price Trends Trend commentary : January : Volume was 0.0270 million tonnes at USD 141/t, the low point for H1. Feb–Apr : Volumes climbed steadily to a half-year peak of 0.1735 million tonnes in April, while prices rose from USD 143 to 182/t. The commissioning of new HPAL projects unleashed rigid demand. May : Volumes plummeted 68% (to 0.0553 million tonnes), yet prices surged to USD 241/t as multiple Japanese and South Korean smelters entered annual maintenance, tightening acid export availability. June : Volumes rebounded to 0.1112 million tonnes and prices soared to USD 309/t , up 119% from January. This record high was driven by a confluence of cost-push from sulphur (averaging USD 1,108/t), persistent Japanese/Korean maintenance, and panic-buying by Indonesian smelters. 2.2 Major Source Countries: South Korea Ranks First, China and Japan Follow The three East Asian suppliers (South Korea, China and Japan) together delivered 0.5239 million tonnes, or 93.4% of total sulphuric acid imports – concentration even higher than previously reported. South Korea ranked first with 0.2065 million tonnes (36.8%), up 0.025 million tonnes from previous data; China rose to second with 0.1821 million tonnes (32.5%), up 0.0274 million tonnes; Japan imported 0.1353 million tonnes (24.1%), down 0.0281 million tonnes. Acid's corrosive nature limits shipping distances (typically <3,000 nautical miles), so regional proximity gives Asian neighbours a dominant role. India's high average of USD 380/t reflects specialised high-purity or fuming acid grades in small volumes. Taiwan's low average of USD 134.0/t is a price trough, benefiting from its developed refinery by-product acid and short-haul freight advantages. 2.3 Major Destination Ports: OBI ISLAND Takes Half the Market OBI ISLAND alone accounts for 50.0% (0.2802 million tonnes) of all acid imports, as it hosts multiple Chinese- and Korean-backed nickel-cobalt HPAL projects with enormous demand for finished acid. The top three ports (OBI+BAHUDOPI+WEDA) together represent 76.2% , up significantly from the previous 57.5%, indicating further concentration of acid imports to major ports – narrowing the gap with sulphur's 83.0% port concentration. 3. Joint Analysis of Sulphur and Sulphuric Acid: Volume-Price Co-movement and Structural Divergence 3.1 Overall Volume and Price Elasticity Comparison Price transmission and elasticity divergence : Sulphur jumped by USD 568/t from January (540) to June (1,108), a 105% gain, while acid rose 119% over the same period. Acid shows slightly higher price elasticity because its own supply-demand fundamentals are tighter (Korean/Japanese maintenance, rigid Indonesian demand) and its spot market is smaller, making it more vulnerable to marginal changes. The sulphur-to-acid volume ratio fell from 14:1 in January to a range of 2.0–3.6:1 from February to June, reflecting Indonesia's dynamic balancing act between importing sulphur for captive acid production and directly importing finished acid. When sulphur is expensive (e.g., USD 1,108/t in June), some smelters prefer to buy finished acid to avoid operating acid plants, supporting June's acid volume rebound. 3.2 Supply Pattern Comparison Sulphur sources are more diversified (Middle East, North America, Southeast Asia), while acid supply is heavily concentrated in nearby East Asia – a consequence of their trade characteristics: sulphur can be shipped long-haul (Capesize/Panamax), whereas acid is constrained by corrosion and shipping costs, limiting its trade radius. Acid port concentration (76.2%) and sulphur port concentration (83.0%) have converged significantly – the gap narrowing from 25.5 percentage points to just 6.8 percentage points – indicating that the geographic concentration of demand for the two products is increasingly aligned. 3.3 Structural Changes from 2025 to 2026 Core conclusion : Indonesia's sulphur imports fell in volume but rose in value, with Middle Eastern suppliers retreating sharply and Canada filling the gap. Sulphuric acid imports increased in both volume and price, with direct acid imports becoming an important channel to compensate for domestic acid-making capacity, and its price gains substantially outpacing sulphur's. 3.4 Outlook for H2 2026 Sulphur : The June price of USD 1,108/t is at a historical high, and expectations for H2 currently point to continued high-level volatility. Full-year imports are estimated at 3.6–3.8 million tonnes, down about 20% year-on-year. Sulphuric acid : After the maintenance season in Korea and Japan, supply may recover, but multiple HPAL projects on OBI Island and in WEDA are still ramping up. Monthly import volumes are expected to remain at 100,000–120,000 tonnes in H2, with prices oscillating at elevated levels of USD 260–330/t. Shifting supply patterns : Canada is on track to overtake Saudi Arabia as Indonesia's largest sulphur supplier by 2027. Chinese sulphuric acid exports to Indonesia also have room to grow, especially from integrated refining-petrochemical complexes on China's east and south coasts.

H1 2026 sulfur imports fell by 771,000 mt YoY, a decline of nearly 30%. Combined imports from the four Middle Eastern countries (UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) dropped by 1.52 million mt, a decrease of 62%. Canada emerged as a new major source, with imports rising from 172,000 mt to 328,000 mt (+90%), making it the second-largest origin. The average price in June surged to $885/mt, forming a pattern of “volume decline and price increase”.

The United Kingdom's anti-dumping duty on certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating from China and Russia expired on August 5, 2026, according to a notice from the UK's Integrated Online Tariff service. The expiry removes a trade-defence measure that had applied to imports of these products, potentially opening the door to renewed import flows from the two origins absent a review or extension. The move stands in contrast to the European Union's parallel tightening of steel trade defences during the same period, highlighting a divergence in post-Brexit UK trade policy from the EU's approach on certain product lines. No announcement of a renewal investigation was noted alongside the expiry notice. UK steel producers and downstream buyers are expected to monitor import volumes in the products' categories in the coming months for any material shift. The development is procedural in nature but carries commercial significance for UK cold-rolled coil market participants.

In the second quarter, domestic lithium carbonate prices experienced a V-shaped rebound and then traded in a high-range volatile pattern. The market maintained a tight balance between supply disruptions and resilient demand, with price sensitivity notably heightened. I. Market Performance: Wide Fluctuations with Rising Price Sensitivity In April, prices first fell then rose: early in the month, geopolitical disturbances in the Middle East dragged battery-grade lithium carbonate down to 155,500 yuan/ton; by mid-to-late April, Zimbabwe’s export ban, mining permit renewals in Jiangxi, and rising costs pushed prices back up, ending the month at 177,000 yuan/ton. The monthly average price rose 6% month-on-month. In May, prices trended upward with a monthly average increase of 12%, and the futures main contract briefly broke through RMB 200,000/ton, as time mismatches between supply and demand persisted. In June, record-high import volumes and GFEX stocks remaining at 50,000 tons, combined with fully priced-in demand expectations, pulled the price center lower. Downstream buyers accumulated large inventories at levels below 160,000 yuan/ton. II. Policy Environment: Dual Drivers from Mandatory Recycling Rules and Rigid Energy Storage Targets On April 1, the Interim Measures for the Management of Recycling and Comprehensive Utilization of Waste Power Batteries from New Energy Vehicles took effect, mandating "integrated vehicle-battery scrap page" and requiring a lithium recovery rate of no less than 85%. This shifts recycling from "encouragement and guidance" to "mandatory compliance," boosting long-term resource circularity. On June 25, the 15th Five-Year Plan for the Construction of a New Energy System set a target of 300 GW of new energy storage installed capacity by 2030, representing over 120% cumulative growth in five years. This elevates energy storage from "optional" to "essential," providing rigid support for lithium demand. III. Supply Side: Steady Release with Structural Disruptions Domestic production maintained a stable pace in Q2, with salt lake ramp-ups and recycling additions pushing monthly output above 107,000 tons and edging higher. External disruptions such as Zimbabwe’s export ban did not significantly impact production, as companies held ample raw material inventories. The inventory pattern shifted from "demand-driven destocking" to "structural volatility underprice bargaining". A declining proportion of long-term contracts exacerbated spot-market fluctuations, with upstream producers firm on prices and downstream buyers cautious in procurement, while traders became the primary buffer. The market entered a high-price-sensitivity tight-balance state. Conclusions In Q2, lithium carbonate prices first rose then corrected, supported by supply disruptions and high production schedules, while record imports and warehouse receipt pressure weighed on June prices. On the policy front, new recycling rules and energy storage targets provide medium-to-long-term support. Supply growth remained relatively stable but with frequent disturbances, and upstream-downstream bargaining deepened. In the short term, the market remains in a high-level tight balance.

India's steel market presented a mixed picture in July, with domestic consumption continuing to outpace production while exports rebounded sharply, nearly matching imports for the month. However, strong import volumes earlier in the fiscal year kept the country a net importer through April-July.

A four-tier minimum import price regime, downstream tariffs and onshoring incentives will take effect on December 4, 2026, widening the gap between US and Asian solar prices. On August 6, US President Donald Trump signed a proclamation setting out import adjustment measures following the Section 232 investigation into polysilicon and its derivatives. The measures will take effect at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on December 4, 2026, and cover polysilicon, silicon ingots and wafers, solar cells and modules. Unlike a conventional tariff increase, the new framework combines minimum import prices, or MIPs, with additional tariffs on downstream products and incentives for domestic investment. SMM believes the policy should not be read as a blanket 15% tariff on every product in the polysilicon value chain. Its central objective is to rebuild the US solar pricing system through a combination of price floors, cumulative tariffs and conditional relief. Low-priced imports will face a substantially greater constraint than products already trading at higher prices. The impact is also expected to move progressively through the supply chain, from polysilicon and wafers to cells and finished modules. Four price floors introduced; the 15% tariff mainly applies downstream According to the White House proclamation and its annexes, the United States has established minimum import prices of $21/kg for polysilicon, $100/kg for silicon ingots and wafers, $0.22/W for solar cells and $0.38/W for solar modules. An important distinction applies to raw polysilicon. The material is covered by the MIP program, but the 15% additional ad valorem duty set out in paragraph 4 of the proclamation applies to silicon ingots, wafers and downstream derivatives. It would therefore be inaccurate to state that every product across the polysilicon value chain is subject to a uniform additional 15% tariff. Rates also vary by origin. For products from European Union member states, Japan, South Korea, Chinese Taipei, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the combined Column 1 general duty and Section 232 duty is set at 15%. Products from the United Kingdom are subject to a 10% Section 232 additional duty. Other origins are generally subject to a 15% additional duty, which may be applied alongside anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and other applicable charges unless otherwise specified. The measures establish a new import-protection framework following the expiry of the Section 201 safeguard in February 2026. Compared with the previous safeguard, the Section 232 regime has a much broader reach. It places silicon ingots and wafers within the additional tariff framework and introduces price floors at four stages from raw material to finished module. Customs enforcement turns the MIP into a binding threshold The MIP is not simply a reference quotation. When entering goods, importers may submit documentation showing that the first arm's-length transaction price in the United States is no lower than the prescribed threshold. They may also document that the transaction is being executed under a fixed-term contract with fixed terms signed before August 6, 2026. If documentation is submitted but the entered value remains below the MIP, US Customs and Border Protection may impose a specific duty equal to the gap between the declared price and the price floor. If the required documentation is not submitted, the importer may face a specific duty equal to the full MIP. For silicon ingots, wafers, cells and modules, the relevant ad valorem tariff may then be added on top of that amount. The effective barrier could therefore be considerably higher than the headline 15%. For a module from a generally applicable origin, a first arm's-length US transaction price of $0.38/W would still need to absorb the 15% additional tariff and any other applicable duties. If the transaction price is below $0.38/W, the importer could also face a specific duty that fills the gap to the MIP. For suppliers that previously competed primarily on price, the MIP may have a greater commercial effect than the ad valorem tariff itself. The proclamation also provides for strict enforcement. Materially false supporting documents could result in the importer and its affiliates being permanently barred from importing covered products. The Department of Commerce will monitor abnormal stockpiling before December 4 and may coordinate with Customs to restrict subsequent imports where companies are found to have accelerated shipments or built excessive inventories. The nearly four-month transition period should therefore not be interpreted as an unrestricted stockbuilding window. US price floors sit far above current Asian supply-chain prices As of August 6, SMM assessed average prices for n-type recycled feedstock and n-type dense polysilicon in China at RMB 32.95/kg and RMB 32.15/kg, respectively. Both had fallen by approximately 12.7% and 13.1% from April 1. Using an exchange rate of RMB 6.7483 per US dollar, the two prices were equivalent to approximately $4.88/kg and $4.76/kg. They were 76.7% and 77.3% below the US polysilicon MIP of $21/kg. Put differently, the US price floor is approximately 4.3-4.4 times the current Chinese spot price for n-type polysilicon. The gap is even wider downstream. SMM assessed G12R TOPCon modules at a China port FOB average of $0.1055/W. The US module MIP of $0.38/W is about 3.6 times that level. SMM's China port FOB assessment for G12R TOPCon cells stood at $0.0395/W, making the US cell MIP of $0.22/W approximately 5.6 times the Chinese export price. These comparisons do not represent identical trade terms. China port FOB prices exclude ocean freight, insurance, customs clearance, distribution and financing costs incurred after the product leaves China, and they are not equivalent to the first arm's-length transaction price in the United States. Even so, the scale of the gap shows that the policy is not a marginal adjustment to import pricing. It is an attempt to establish a protected US price curve that is materially detached from Asian spot levels. According to SMM research, average quotations for US-made white-backsheet modules were recently around $0.31/W. Southeast Asian modules delivered duty paid to the United States were quoted at approximately $0.27/W, while Indian non-DCR modules were around $0.14/W. On a nominal-price basis, the $0.38/W module MIP is approximately 22.6% above the US-made module quotation. Once applicable Section 232 duties are added, the cost gap between imported and domestically produced modules could widen further, strengthening the relative competitiveness and pricing power of US manufacturers. US solar assets continue to expand despite lower module imports The ultimate cost impact of the new tariffs and price floors will depend on the pace and structure of US solar deployment. EIA data show that cumulative operating solar net summer capacity increased from 138.3 GW at the end of 2023 to 175.3 GW at the end of 2024 and 209.3 GW at the end of 2025. By the end of May 2026, it had reached 222.7 GW, a net increase of approximately 13.4 GW from year-end 2025. Solar generation also continued to grow. In 2025, US utility-scale solar generation reached approximately 296 TWh, up 34% year on year, while small-scale solar generation rose 11% to around 93 TWh. Combined output was approximately 389 TWh. The data indicate that the operating asset base and actual solar generation continued to expand even as finished-module imports declined. The cost effect of Section 232 therefore cannot be assessed from short-term import movements alone. If US solar capacity continues to grow while domestic wafer and cell projects ramp more slowly than module assembly, the import price thresholds will be more readily passed through to module and project costs. If construction slows because of financing, permitting or interconnection constraints, the policy may instead be reflected mainly in greater pricing power for domestic manufacturers rather than an immediate physical shortage. Module imports fell 39%, while cell imports rose 57% USITC data reveal a clear structural shift in the US solar supply chain. In 2024, the United States imported 54.3 GW of crystalline-silicon modules and 13.89 GW of crystalline-silicon cells. In 2025, module imports fell 39.2% year on year to approximately 33.0 GW. Cell imports, aggregated from country-level data, rose 57.1% to about 21.82 GW. The divergence between declining module imports and rising cell imports shows how the expansion of US module assembly is changing the import mix. A growing portion of demand is being met through imported cells assembled into modules in the United States rather than through direct imports of finished modules. This shift does not mean that the US solar manufacturing chain has achieved full localization. On the contrary, it highlights cells as the most important import-dependent link at this stage. Import volumes and newly installed capacity cannot be matched on a watt-for-watt basis because of inventory changes, manufacturing lead times and differences in statistical scope. Nonetheless, the opposite direction of cell and module imports in 2025 clearly indicates that the United States is moving from a finished-module import model toward one in which imported cells support domestic module manufacturing. The next stage of localization may extend further upstream into wafers and polysilicon. The US Department of Energy has also noted that cells, wafers and polysilicon require more capital and generally have longer design, permitting, construction and ramp-up cycles than module assembly. The rise in cell imports to 21.82 GW in 2025 provides trade-data evidence that rapid module-capacity growth has not yet reduced US reliance on foreign cells. Against this backdrop, the $0.22/W cell MIP and the additional 15% tariff will have two effects. They may protect domestic cell projects and create more room for upstream investment, but they could also raise production costs for US module plants that still depend on imported cells before domestic cell capacity is fully available. Whether companies can obtain relief under the onshoring program, and whether US cell projects begin production and ramp on schedule, will determine whether the measure functions primarily as protection for domestic manufacturing or becomes an upstream cost squeeze on downstream module producers. Import origins have shifted, but Section 232 narrows the scope for rerouting Indonesia supplied 13.34 GW, or 40.4%, of US crystalline-silicon module imports in 2025. Laos supplied 5.48 GW, or 16.6%. Together, the two countries accounted for 57.0% of the total. Imports from Vietnam, India, Thailand and Malaysia reached approximately 3.39 GW, 3.08 GW, 2.88 GW and 2.17 GW, respectively. Cell imports were even more concentrated. In 2025, the United States imported approximately 6.47 GW of cells from Indonesia, 4.53 GW from Laos, 3.65 GW from Malaysia, 3.30 GW from South Korea and 3.02 GW from Thailand. The five largest origins accounted for 96.1% of the total, while Indonesia and Laos together represented around 50.5%. Country-level data show that US module sourcing has moved beyond the four Southeast Asian countries traditionally targeted by trade cases and has diversified toward Indonesia, Laos, India, Ethiopia and the Philippines. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations focused on named countries, the Section 232 MIPs cover products from a broad range of origins. This will substantially reduce the ability of suppliers to preserve low-cost access to the US market simply by changing the location of module assembly or cell exports. US solar manufacturing stocks rose, but the benefit differs by company US-listed solar manufacturing stocks responded quickly after the policy announcement. Public market data show that First Solar rose as much as approximately 8% in after-hours trading, while T1 Energy gained as much as 6.3%. The reaction reflects investor expectations that the domestic manufacturing premium will widen. First Solar uses cadmium telluride thin-film technology and does not rely on the crystalline-silicon polysilicon chain. Its main benefit would come from improved relative competitiveness if imported crystalline-silicon modules become more expensive. However, the cell and module tariff lines listed in the annex cover both crystalline-silicon products and other photovoltaic products. Whether imported thin-film modules fall within the final measures will depend on customs classification and implementation guidance. First Solar's share-price response is therefore better understood as a revaluation of its US manufacturing advantage rather than a direct benefit from lower polysilicon costs. T1 Energy operates module manufacturing capacity in the United States and is developing domestic cell capacity. Its US manufacturing position stands to benefit from a higher import threshold for finished modules. Before its domestic cell lines are fully ramped, however, the cell MIP could also raise input costs. The company's net benefit will depend on the pace of its US cell buildout and whether it can secure Section 232 relief for qualifying equipment and covered products under an approved onshoring plan. For domestic polysilicon producers such as Hemlock Semiconductor and Wacker's US operations, the $21/kg MIP offers more direct price protection. For integrated manufacturers such as Qcells, which is building wafer, cell and module capacity in the United States, the framework could narrow the cost gap between domestic production and Asian imports. US manufacturers gain protection, but project costs face upward pressure In the short term, some existing contracts and in-transit orders may retain transitional treatment before December 4, and US importers may accelerate the delivery of compliant orders. The anti-stockpiling provisions will limit excessive front-loading, however, creating a distinction between the earlier delivery of normal orders and restricted abnormal inventory accumulation. Over the medium term, the $0.38/W module MIP, together with additional tariffs, will significantly narrow the low-cost advantage of imported crystalline-silicon modules. US module manufacturers should gain greater pricing flexibility and improved order visibility, while developers face higher capital expenditure and levelized electricity costs. Projects already under pressure from the phase-down of federal incentives, interconnection queues or financing costs may need to recalculate returns or delay procurement. The scale of the impact will also depend on the structure of US demand. If solar deployment maintains its current growth trend and domestic capacity can cover the required power classes and delivery specifications, lower imports may be partly replaced by domestic supply and inventories. If demand from data centers and utility-scale projects shifts more rapidly toward higher-power and higher-efficiency products while US wafer and cell capacity ramps more slowly than expected, the supply gap could amplify price increases and project-delay risks. Direct exports from China may face limited incremental impact, but third-country supply chains face greater pressure Chinese solar products already face US anti-dumping and countervailing duties, forced-labor enforcement, country-of-origin scrutiny and other trade restrictions. The incremental effect of the new Section 232 measures on direct exports from China may therefore be smaller than the size of the MIPs alone suggests. The new measures are broad in both tariff classification and origin, however. Producing wafers, cells or modules in Southeast Asia, India or other third countries will no longer provide the same scope to secure US market access through low prices alone. Companies that rely on imported cells for US module assembly, or that plan to expand in third countries to serve the US market, will face higher costs and compliance pressure. As the US price threshold rises, some modules originally intended for the United States may be redirected to Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and other Asia-Pacific markets, intensifying competition for orders in those regions. Chinese companies will need to go beyond changing export destinations. They should reassess US investment, supply-chain traceability, tariff classification, related-party pricing and contract structures with local customers. Onshoring relief creates an investment route, but the threshold is high The proclamation authorizes the Department of Commerce to establish an onshoring incentive program. Companies that commit to building, refurbishing or expanding US capacity for polysilicon, silicon ingots, wafers or cells, and begin construction by January 20, 2029, may submit a company-level onshoring plan. During construction, approved companies may import necessary production equipment and covered products at a volume linked by Commerce to the scale of the new investment without paying the applicable Section 232 duties. The framework does not close the US market entirely. Instead, it seeks to tie import relief to domestic capital expenditure. The policy may accelerate investment decisions in US wafer and cell production, but effective supply will still depend on construction schedules, equipment delivery, skilled labor, energy costs and downstream orders. If a company fails to meet its commitments, the relief may be withdrawn. Fraud or misrepresentation could also result in retroactive revocation. Outlook: trade protection will interact with the expiry of project tax credits SMM believes the Section 232 measures upgrade US solar trade protection from country-specific anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions into a price-management system spanning the value chain and multiple origins. The central constraint is not the nominal 15% rate alone, but the combined barrier created by MIPs, additional duties, existing trade remedies and strict certification and enforcement. In the short term, the US market may see faster delivery under existing contracts, higher domestic module quotations and contract renegotiations by developers. The medium-term impact will depend on three variables: how the Department of Commerce defines eligibility and relief volumes under the onshoring program; whether US wafer and cell capacity comes online on schedule; and whether trading partners such as the EU, Japan and South Korea adopt MIP systems that the United States regards as substantially equivalent, potentially triggering tariff adjustments. The Section 232 measures must also be considered alongside the termination schedule for US clean electricity tax credits. Under the current rules, solar projects that begin construction after July 4, 2026 and enter service after December 31, 2027 will generally no longer qualify for the Section 45Y clean electricity production tax credit or the Section 48E clean electricity investment tax credit. Projects that satisfied the applicable construction-start requirements before July 5, 2026 may still seek transitional eligibility under the physical-work and continuity rules. The entire US solar market will not lose tax credits at the end of 2027; the deadline primarily constrains new projects that did not begin construction within the transition window. This schedule could bring demand forward. From the second half of 2026 through 2027, some developers may accelerate equipment orders, construction and grid connection to complete projects before the tax-credit deadline. If the Section 232 MIPs take effect at the same time, concentrated procurement and higher import costs could reinforce each other, lifting domestic module quotations and equipment budgets. From 2028, project performance is likely to diverge more sharply. Projects with transitional eligibility, long-term power purchase agreements or demand support from high-load customers such as data centers may continue. Projects that cannot claim the 45Y or 48E credits and are highly sensitive to equipment costs may renegotiate contracts, reduce scale or delay development. If the imported-module MIP remains at $0.38/W while domestic production costs have not fallen materially, the loss of project-side tax credits and elevated equipment prices will create a double squeeze on project economics. Section 45X should be distinguished from Section 48E. The Section 45X advanced manufacturing production credit does not end in 2028. Under current IRS rules, qualifying modules, cells, wafers and polysilicon remain eligible for the full manufacturing credit through the end of 2029. The credit then falls to 75% in 2030, 50% in 2031 and 25% in 2032 before ending after December 31, 2032 for the relevant components. The result could be a policy mismatch in 2028-2029: some demand-side projects will lose federal tax credits while manufacturers retain the full production incentive. The Section 232 MIPs may therefore serve not only as trade protection, but also as a mechanism supporting domestic manufacturing margins before and during the Section 45X phase-down. If domestic capacity comes online rapidly with 45X support while project deployment slows following the termination of 45Y and 48E eligibility, US manufacturing capacity could grow faster than project demand. Conversely, if data-center load growth, power shortages and state procurement programs continue to support installations, the Section 232 price threshold may help domestic producers maintain higher selling prices as 45X support declines. The central tension in the US solar market will consequently shift from competition between imports and domestic manufacturing toward whether the pace of manufacturing expansion can match installation demand without federal project-level tax credits. For the global solar market, the United States is likely to develop an increasingly distinct domestic price system that is further decoupled from the low-cost Asian supply chain. US manufacturers will receive greater protection, but project development costs and supply-chain complexity will also increase. Competition will increasingly center on domestic capacity, technology, supply-chain traceability and policy eligibility rather than module price alone. SMM will continue to track implementation guidance from the US Department of Commerce and Customs and Border Protection, adjustments to the minimum import prices, approvals under the onshoring program, and the subsequent impact on polysilicon, wafer, cell and module prices and company shipments. Written by: Ryan Tey Tze Yang | SMM PV Analyst +60 127179370 | ryan.tey@metal.com

Industry operators in Taiwan, China noted a sharp contrast between recent mill price increases and weak underlying market conditions. Overall demand has remained sluggish since late June, with weekly transactions dropping to single-digit coil volumes throughout July as buyers retreated despite lower prices. Although major upstream mills announced upward price adjustments, dealers remain hesitant to enter the market. Market participants indicated that future trading prices and dealer engagement will depend heavily on actual factory pricing and direct negotiations. Surging import volumes are also being closely monitored, as they could challenge domestic price stability efforts by local steel mills.