On August 14, LG Group and NVIDIA signed a strategic cooperation memorandum of understanding in California, USA, covering three major industries: robotics, AI factories, and mobility. The two parties will jointly advance industry standards for the artificial intelligence era. In robotics, LG Group plans to launch a bipedal humanoid robot based on NVIDIA Isaac GR00T in the first quarter of 2027, powered by LG Energy Solution batteries. In AI factories, based on the NVIDIA DSX architecture, the company plans to establish an AI factory reference site in the first half of 2027, and complete an 80MW AI computing facility in Cheonan, South Chungcheong Province, South Korea, in the first half of 2028. The project will integrate LG Electronics cooling solutions and LG Energy Solution battery solutions, providing computational infrastructure for the iteration of physical AI and humanoid robot foundation models. In the mobility sector, the two parties will leverage the NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion platform to develop AI vehicle computing platforms, complemented by LG Energy Solution battery solutions.

Lithium Royalty Corp's acquisition of a 1.5% Goulamina royalty gives Western capital revenue linked exposure to Mali's flagship spodumene project without operating risk. But the royalty's 500,000-tonne annual volume cap sits almost exactly at Goulamina's current Phase I capacity, meaning any upside from Ganfeng's planned Phase II expansion largely bypasses the royalty holder. Lithium Royalty Corp (LRC) has entered into a definitive agreement to acquire a 1.5% Trailing Product Sales Fee (TPSF) royalty on Ganfeng Lithium's Goulamina project in Mali, purchased from Leo Lithium for A$40 million (approximately $27 million). The deal extends LRC's battery metals footprint beyond direct mine ownership, adding to an existing royalty on Ganfeng's Mariana brine project in Argentina within a broader 37-royalty portfolio. 1. Royalty Structure Caps Volume, Extends Duration : LRC's royalty entitles it to quarterly payments over a 20-year term, with the cashflow window running through August 2045. Early monetisation is confirmed: Leo Lithium received a first quarterly payment of $574,748 in Q3 2025. Crucially, payable volume is capped at 500,000 tonnes per year of spodumene a ceiling that limits LRC's exposure if Goulamina's output scales materially beyond current design capacity. 2. Production Volume and Ramp-Up Sit Close to the Cap: Goulamina's Phase I nameplate capacity is 506,000 tonnes per year of spodumene concentrate just above LRC's payable cap, meaning the royalty already captures close to its practical maximum at present output. Ganfeng has publicly indicated intent to pursue a Phase II expansion that would materially exceed current capacity, though a confirmed timeline and design capacity have not been disclosed. Any such expansion would leave royalty-linked cashflow structurally unchanged given the fixed cap. 3. Supply Status Remains Consistent Since First Shipment: Goulamina has shipped concentrate consistently since commencing exports in June 2025, with output sold under offtake arrangements to Chinese buyers holding controlling stakes in the project. 4. Logistics Add a Distinct Risk Layer : Concentrate is trucked approximately 1,000km from Goulamina to the port of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, the primary export corridor, with San Pedro and Dakar serving as secondary routes. This overland logistics profile differs materially from Zimbabwe's rail-based Beira and Durban corridors, introducing distinct cost and timing exposure for Mali-origin material. Corridor Mode Distance Role Goulamina → Abidjan Overland truck ≈1,000 km Primary export route Goulamina → San Pedro Overland truck Secondary corridor Alternate loading port Goulamina → Dakar Overland truck Secondary corridor Alternate loading port 5. Ownership Structure Ties Returns to Policy Environment : Ganfeng holds 65% of Goulamina, with Mali's government holding the remaining 35% following the country's revised mining code. This ownership split ties royalty performance not only to production economics but to Mali's evolving fiscal and regulatory stance toward foreign-operated mining assets. SMM View: The royalty cap sitting almost exactly at Phase I capacity is the structural detail worth flagging for African lithium coverage: LRC gains near-full exposure to current output but stands to capture little of the incremental upside if and when Phase II lifts capacity beyond current design levels. This positions the deal as a disciplined, lower-risk way to gain Mali spodumene exposure, but one whose real return profile is bounded well below the project's potential growth trajectory. For SMM's ongoing tracker, the more actionable signals are confirmation of Ganfeng's Phase II timeline and specifications, and whether Abidjan-corridor logistics face the kind of congestion already constraining Zimbabwean concentrate flows either of which could reshape the volume and margin assumptions underlying this and future royalty-style deals in the region.

With this expansion, CMR expects its recycling capacity to exceed 700,000 tonnes per year by FY27.

Valterra Platinum’s first half of 2026 was shaped more by market prices than by production growth. Earnings increased fourfold to R33.4 billion, while metal production from its mines rose only modestly. The difference was driven by stronger PGM prices and the release of previously processed metal from the company’s pipeline. Amandelbult’s recovery was a major contributor to the improvement, while China became a significantly larger market.

August 4, 2026 The world's central banks acquired a net 288.9 tonnes of gold in the second quarter of 2026 – the highest figure ever recorded for a second quarter. What makes this remarkable is the timing: the buying took place during a quarter in which the gold price fell by around 16 per cent. Anyone reading the World Gold Council's figures closely, however, will find a second and considerably more awkward story. The "Gold Demand Trends" report published by the World Gold Council (WGC) on 30 July delivers what may be the most important message of the summer for precious metals investors. While private investors exited gold ETFs during the second quarter and jewellery demand buckled under high prices, official institutions bought with rare conviction. At a net 288.9 tonnes, purchases were roughly 62 per cent above the year-earlier figure of 177.9 tonnes. The contrast with price action could hardly be sharper. The second quarter was gold's weakest since 2013; from the record high of USD 5,598 set in January, the metal has since given up considerable ground and currently trades at around USD 4,050. Central banks evidently did not read that weakness as a warning signal, but as an opportunity. Poland and China Lead the Buyers' List The single largest buyer was the National Bank of Poland with 51 tonnes. Warsaw is thereby continuing a course that brings the country close to its self-imposed target of 700 tonnes of gold reserves. In second place comes the People's Bank of China with 33 tonnes – its largest quarterly addition since late 2023, and a signal that Beijing is accelerating its diversification strategy again after a quieter phase. Behind these two sits a broad field of smaller buyers: Uzbekistan with 16 tonnes, Kazakhstan with 15 tonnes, and the central banks of Jordan and the Czech Republic with around 6 tonnes each. This breadth matters more for interpretation than the headline figure does. A record quarter carried by a single large buyer would be fragile. When demand is spread across numerous institutions from different regions and with different motivations, that points to a structural trend rather than a one-off effect. Russia Stands on the Other Side Not every central bank was buying. The Bank of Russia was the quarter's largest seller at 22 tonnes. The reason is understood to be pressure on the federal budget – here gold simply serves as a liquidity reserve to be drawn upon to plug deficits. Türkiye was also on the selling side once again, though at just 4 tonnes it was markedly more restrained than in the first quarter. These sales are central to any sound interpretation. They show that a portion of official gold movements has nothing to do with strategic conviction and everything to do with fiscal constraints. Anyone reading central bank purchases as a blanket vote of confidence in gold is making it too easy for themselves – and the same applies to anyone reading central bank sales as a blanket loss of faith. The Awkward Part: A Revision That Changes the Half-Year Picture This is where matters become interesting for attentive investors. Alongside the record second-quarter figure, Metals Focus – the World Gold Council's data provider – has sharply revised its estimate for the first quarter downwards: from an original 244 tonnes to just 57 tonnes. That is no cosmetic adjustment but a revision of more than three quarters, and it changes the overall picture considerably. Taken together, central bank demand for the first half of 2026 amounts to roughly 345 tonnes – the weakest half-year figure since 2022. Viewed soberly, then, the record quarter was primarily a catch-up movement following an exceptionally weak start to the year. For assessment purposes this means both statements are true at the same time. The second quarter was a record. The first half-year was weak. Anyone citing only one of the two figures is telling an incomplete story – and in the coverage of recent days, usually only the first has been on offer. What the Statistics Do Not Show A further point deserves attention: a substantial share of central bank purchases is never officially reported. Since 2022 the WGC has consistently identified a high proportion of unreported buying – the gap between estimated total demand and the purchases institutions actually disclose. The reported data underlying the report were, moreover, only captured up to 24 July; later disclosures may lead to further revisions. Investors should draw the right conclusion from this. Central bank demand is real and it is significant – but the published quarterly figures are estimates carrying a considerable margin of error, not exact measurements. An investment decision built on a single quarterly number rests on shifting ground. The Outlook Remains Constructive For all these caveats, the structural direction is unambiguous. The WGC's own survey of reserve managers shows that a large majority of the institutions polled expect global gold reserves to rise over the coming twelve months. Around three quarters also anticipate that their dollar holdings will decline over the next five years. This is where the real substance of the story lies. Central banks do not operate in quarters but in decades. Their gold purchases are not a timing signal for short-term price movements – anyone who bought in April on the basis of central bank demand is sitting on losses today. They are, however, an indicator of how institutional actors assess the long-term role of the US dollar and the case for hedging against geopolitical risk. For the 2026 full year, the World Gold Council expects another strong year of official demand, albeit below the 2025 level. Supply should grow only modestly: high prices and healthy producer margins support mine output, but operational constraints and long project lead times limit the pace. What the gold market did in the first half of 2026 was, above all, to change its buyer. Investors taking a long-term view in this phase will find remarkably patient company in the world's central banks. Source： https://goldinvest.de/en/central-banks-buy-record-amount-of-gold-in-the-very-quarter-prices-fell

European hot-rolled coil supply is set to tighten as revised EU import quotas and CBAM-related costs reduce the availability of imported material, while improving mill order books encourage domestic producers to restart idled capacity, ArcelorMittal said in its second-quarter 2026 results.

ArcelorMittal, the world's second-largest steelmaker, reported second-quarter core EBITDA of US$2.06 billion, beating the market consensus of US$2.01 billion by approximately US$50 million (+2.5%). The company expects European steel shipments to remain stable or edge higher in the third quarter, defying the usual seasonal slowdown. Supported by tighter EU import measures and rising steel prices, ArcelorMittal has restarted three blast furnaces and said it has further production flexibility if demand continues to improve. European crude steel production also increased by around 11% from the first quarter. Firmer steel prices and blast furnace restarts indicate continued improvement in European steelmaking activity, providing near-term support for seaborne metallurgical coal and coke demand. While the current recovery is not yet sufficient to shift the global supply-demand balance, further production restarts across Europe could strengthen support for international metallurgical coal prices.

Vedanta Limited released its first quarterly results following the effective May 1, 2026 demerger on July 30. Its continuing operations—primarily zinc, copper, ferrochrome and related businesses—reported revenue of ₹23,456 crore for the quarter ended June 30, up 51% year on year. EBITDA reached ₹8,469 crore, up 98%, and profit after tax rose 152% to ₹5,294 crore, both record highs for the continuing business. Quarterly EBITDA margin was about 57%, up 985 basis points year on year, while return on capital employed reached 29%. Cash and cash equivalents stood at ₹19,992 crore against net debt of ₹8,299 crore, lowering net debt-to-EBITDA to 0.3x. The demerger unlocked more than ₹71,000 crore of combined market capitalization during the quarter. The supplied information did not disclose zinc-specific production, costs, concentrate supply or sales; these remain key items to monitor.

Following the start of the definitive phase of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in 2026, differences in country-specific default values , default production routes and corresponding benchmarks have begun to translate into significantly different theoretical certificate exposures for unwrought aluminium. SMM analysed EU-27 imports of unwrought aluminium under HS/CN 7601 from non-EU origins and matched the trade data with the 2026 default value, default production route and CBAM benchmark assigned to each origin. The theoretical unit certificate exposure in this analysis is calculated as: 2026 theoretical unit certificate exposure = 2026 default value − benchmark × 97.5% × cross-sectoral correction factor The cross-sectoral correction factor, or CSCF, is provisionally assumed to be 1. The calculation does not deduct any qualifying carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin. The results therefore indicate the relative CBAM exposure of different origins under the default-value scenario. They do not represent the final number of certificates that EU importers will be required to surrender or the final monetary cost. EU-27 unwrought aluminium imports rose 7.0% in 2025 According to SMM calculations, EU-27 imports of unwrought aluminium under HS/CN 7601 from non-EU origins reached approximately 7.63 million tonnes in 2025 , up from 7.13 million tonnes in 2024. This represented an increase of about 502,200 tonnes, or 7.0% year on year . Of the 2025 total, approximately 4.56 million tonnes originated from countries subject to CBAM, accounting for 59.7% of total imports. Imports from CBAM-exempt origins, including Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, amounted to approximately 3.05 million tonnes , representing around 40.0% of the total. A further 25,800 tonnes were recorded without a specified origin and were excluded from the country-level exposure ranking. Applying the 2026 default values and benchmarks to the 2025 trade structure produces an estimated theoretical certificate exposure of approximately 4.09 million tCO₂e for imports from CBAM-covered origins. The trade-weighted average unit exposure was approximately 0.898 tCO₂e per tonne of product . As 2025 remained within the CBAM transitional period, these figures are scenario-based estimates using 2025 trade volumes and the 2026 calculation rules. They do not represent actual certificate obligations for 2025. Primary aluminium route accounted for more than 99% of theoretical exposure The primary aluminium route dominated both CBAM-covered import volumes and theoretical certificate exposure. In 2025, imports assigned to the primary aluminium route totalled approximately 4.46 million tonnes , accounting for 97.8% of imports from CBAM-covered origins. Their theoretical certificate exposure reached approximately 4.06 million tCO₂e , representing 99.3% of the total exposure. The trade-weighted average unit exposure for the primary aluminium route was approximately 0.912 tCO₂e per tonne of product . By comparison, imports assigned to the secondary aluminium route amounted to approximately 99,500 tonnes, or 2.2% of CBAM-covered imports. Their theoretical certificate exposure was approximately 30,600 tCO₂e, with an average unit exposure of around 0.307 tCO₂e per tonne . The gap between the two routes reflects differences in both country default values and the applicable benchmarks. For HS/CN 7601, the benchmark used for the primary aluminium route is 1.423 tCO₂e per tonne , compared with 0.091 tCO₂e per tonne for the secondary aluminium route. This means that, under a default-value declaration scenario, the theoretical CBAM exposure of EU-27 unwrought aluminium imports remains highly concentrated in primary aluminium supply. Mozambique recorded the highest unit exposure, with China also ranking near the top The results show a clear divergence in theoretical unit exposure among origin countries. Mozambique recorded the highest unit exposure among major origins with a country-specific default value, at approximately 2.130 tCO₂e per tonne of product . China followed at approximately 1.913 tCO₂e per tonne , placing it among the origins with the highest default-value-based unit exposure. South Africa recorded an estimated unit exposure of approximately 1.207 tCO₂e per tonne , followed by Russia at 0.989 tCO₂e and Canada at 0.769 tCO₂e. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, India, the United Kingdom, Egypt and Kazakhstan share similar default values under the primary aluminium route, resulting in unit exposure of approximately 0.670 tCO₂e per tonne . Australia, Brazil, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States recorded unit exposure of approximately 0.483 tCO₂e per tonne . Origins assigned to the secondary aluminium route generally recorded approximately 0.307 tCO₂e per tonne . A high unit exposure does not necessarily mean that an origin faces the greatest aggregate impact. Total exposure also depends on the volume of trade with the EU-27. China illustrates this distinction. EU-27 imports of HS/CN 7601 products from China reached approximately 12,400 tonnes in 2025 , up 24.3% year on year. This corresponded to theoretical certificate exposure of about 23,700 tCO₂e . China therefore ranked near the top on a unit basis, but its comparatively limited shipment volume to the EU-27 kept its aggregate exposure well below that of Mozambique, Canada and several major Gulf suppliers. Mozambique’s total theoretical exposure reached 1.34 million tCO₂e After incorporating 2025 import volumes, Mozambique emerged as the origin with the highest aggregate theoretical certificate exposure. EU-27 imports from Mozambique reached approximately 628,000 tonnes in 2025 , up 17.5% year on year. Based on unit exposure of 2.130 tCO₂e per tonne, its total theoretical exposure was approximately 1.34 million tCO₂e . Mozambique alone accounted for 32.7% of the theoretical exposure associated with CBAM-covered origins. However, the above total exposure is a static estimate based on 2025 trade volumes. Power supply constraints may limit Mozambique’s aluminium smelting capacity and output in 2026–2027, potentially reducing its exports to the EU. As a result, its actual near-term aggregate CBAM exposure may not reach the theoretical level estimated using 2025 trade volumes. Canada supplied approximately 682,800 tonnes to the EU-27 in 2025. Although its unit exposure was considerably lower than Mozambique’s, its larger trade volume lifted its aggregate theoretical exposure to approximately 524,800 tCO₂e , equivalent to 12.8% of the total. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and South Africa recorded theoretical total exposures of approximately 350,900 tCO₂e, 329,300 tCO₂e, 322,200 tCO₂e and 263,600 tCO₂e, respectively. Mozambique, Canada, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and South Africa together accounted for approximately 76.4% of total theoretical certificate exposure. Mozambique’s position was driven by the combination of a high unit default-value exposure and substantial trade volume. Canada’s unit exposure was not among the very highest, but its large and rapidly increasing export volume significantly amplified its aggregate impact. Four-quadrant analysis places China in the “high intensity, low trade volume” category A four-quadrant analysis using 2025 EU-27 import volume on the horizontal axis and 2026 theoretical unit certificate exposure on the vertical axis provides a clearer view of the combined influence of carbon intensity and trade scale. The core high-exposure quadrant includes Mozambique, Canada, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, South Africa, India and the United Kingdom. These origins combine comparatively large trade volumes with relatively high unit exposure and are the main contributors to aggregate CBAM exposure for EU-27 unwrought aluminium imports. China is the most prominent origin in the high intensity, low trade volume quadrant . Its theoretical unit exposure of approximately 1.913 tCO₂e per tonne is second only to Mozambique, but its current export volume to the EU-27 remains comparatively limited. Ukraine and South Korea are among the origins in the trade-volume-driven quadrant . Both are assigned to the secondary aluminium route and have relatively low unit exposure, but their larger trade volumes increase their aggregate exposure compared with other secondary-route origins. Vietnam, Morocco, Serbia, Bolivia and Mexico are among the origins in the low-exposure quadrant , reflecting both lower unit exposure and limited trade volumes. For Vietnam, HS/CN 7601 unwrought aluminium is assigned to the secondary aluminium default route, resulting in theoretical unit certificate exposure of approximately 0.307 tCO₂e per tonne in 2026, significantly below that of most origins assigned to the primary aluminium route. EU-27 imports from Vietnam amounted to approximately 7,100 tonnes in 2025, down around 27.1% year on year, corresponding to theoretical total certificate exposure of about 2,200 tCO₂e. Vietnam’s overall CBAM exposure therefore remains relatively limited at present. However, should its exports to the EU expand in the future, access to and verification of actual emissions data will remain an important factor affecting the relative competitiveness of Vietnamese products. The quadrant thresholds are analytical dividing lines based on the median values of CBAM-covered origins with actual trade. They do not represent regulatory thresholds set by the EU. Theoretical exposure reached approximately 642,400 tCO₂e in Q1 2026 In the first quarter of 2026, EU-27 imports of unwrought aluminium under HS/CN 7601 from non-EU origins reached approximately 1.52 million tonnes , with a total import value of around €4.36 billion . The average import value was approximately €2,873 per tonne . Imports from CBAM-covered origins amounted to approximately 782,800 tonnes , accounting for 51.6% of total imports. Imports from CBAM-exempt origins reached around 733,000 tonnes, or 48.4%. Based on the 2026 default values and benchmarks, imports from CBAM-covered origins generated theoretical certificate exposure of approximately 642,400 tCO₂e during the quarter. Mozambique remained the largest contributor, with theoretical exposure of around 150,500 tCO₂e. Canada followed with approximately 86,800 tCO₂e, the United Arab Emirates with 82,100 tCO₂e, Bahrain with 63,400 tCO₂e and South Africa with 56,200 tCO₂e. As the analysis does not include Q1 2025 comparison data, no year-on-year conclusion has been drawn for Q1 2026 import volumes or exposure. The quarterly figures are used primarily to illustrate the origin structure during the initial stage of the definitive CBAM period. Access to and verification of actual emissions data could become an important competitiveness factor Country default values are fallback parameters applied when producers are unable to provide actual emissions data that meet EU requirements. They do not necessarily reflect the actual carbon intensity of a specific producer or shipment. For origins with relatively high default-value exposure, including China, Mozambique, South Africa and Russia, producers whose actual embedded emissions are materially lower than the applicable country default value could reduce the certificate exposure faced by EU importers by establishing robust emissions-monitoring systems and providing complete, verified emissions data. Conversely, where suppliers are unable to provide emissions information that is complete, traceable and compliant with EU requirements, importers may have to rely on the relevant country default value. A higher default value could consequently affect supplier selection, purchase negotiations and long-term contract arrangements. The final number of certificates to be surrendered will also depend on actual embedded emissions, production-route classification, data verification and any qualifying carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin. The actual CBAM cost will additionally depend on the CBAM certificate price, which is linked to EU Emissions Trading System allowance prices. The theoretical certificate exposure calculated in this analysis should therefore not be interpreted directly as either the final certificate obligation or the final CBAM cost. Overall, the impact of CBAM on trade in HS/CN 7601 unwrought aluminium will not be determined by country default values alone. Unit certificate exposure, trade scale, actual emissions and the availability of reliable carbon data will jointly shape the competitive position of different origins and producers in the EU market. As the definitive phase progresses, differences in low-carbon production capability, emissions-data management and verification capacity are likely to become increasingly visible in procurement decisions, export competitiveness and trade flows. Data note: The trade scope covers EU-27 imports of unwrought aluminium under HS/CN 7601 from non-EU origins. CBAM-exempt origins, including Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, are included in total import statistics but excluded from theoretical certificate exposure. Origins without a country-specific default value are assigned the applicable value for “Other Countries and Territories.” Unspecified origins are excluded from the country ranking. Theoretical exposure does not deduct qualifying carbon prices paid in third countries. Source: EU-27 import data, EU CBAM default values and benchmarks; compiled by SMM.

Japan’s aluminium scrap imports from the European Union in the first quarter (Q1) of 2026 have reported an almost 90 per cent year-on-year surge.In Q1 2026, Japan imported a total of 35,794 tonnes of aluminium scrap, of which 3,613 tonnes or 10.09 per cent, was imported from the EU.Comparing the Q1 volume over the years, a rising streak can be noted in Japan’s aluminium scrap imports from the EU: Q1 2026 – 3,613 tonnes, rising 89 per cent Y-o-Y from the 1,902 tonnes in Q1 2025 Q1 2025 – 1,902 tonnes, rising 40 per cent Y-o-Y from the 1,357 tonnes in Q1 2024 Concurrently, the annual shipment volume from the EU to Japan has witnessed a sharp Y-o-Y surge to 9,346 tonnes in 2025 from 5,815 tonnes in 2024. According to the data recorded in the International Trade Administration (ITA), the Q1 import value of Japan’s aluminium scrap from the EU is worth USD 3.26 million, marking a Y-o-Y gain of 45.54 per cent from USD 2.24 million recorded in Q1 2025. Hence, Japan’s aluminium scrap imports from the EU in Q1 2026 have risen Y-o-Y despite an almost 50 per cent hike in the pricing segment.