Asian stainless steel prices held stable for a third consecutive week, with Chinese Taiwan's export quotes unchanged and Chinese export offers rebounding to steady levels after a brief dip earlier in the month. Raw material trends diverged, LME nickel prices softened while Indonesian NPI gained ground; Chinese domestic ferronickel stabilized and stainless steel futures posted a weekly gain. Trading activity remains quiet during the traditional off-season, though consumption levels are running ahead of the same period last year. A recent Middle East peace accord helped nickel prices bounce back, pointing to a firm short-term market trend.

The global stainless steel market navigated a series of sharp sentiment. The opening weeks saw Indonesia's mill closures and price hikes push the cost narrative to its highest point of the year, before a combination of easing geopolitical tensions triggered the first price reduction since December 2025. The month's defining characteristic was similar to April's. What differentiated May was the sharply higher amplitude of both the policy signals and the emotional swings that accompanied them.

Indonesia has officially activated one of the most structurally significant commodity trade reforms in its recent history. On May 20, 2026, President Prabowo Subianto signed Government Regulation (PP) No.24/2026 on the Governance of Strategic Natural Resource Commodity Exports (State Gazette No.58, Supplementary State Gazette No.7178), which took effect on June 1, 2026 per Article 10. The regulation designates Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI) as the mandatory sole export intermediary for all shipments of coal, palm oil, and ferro alloys. No Indonesian producer in these categories can sell directly to a foreign buyer anymore. Every transaction must legally pass through DSI first. The constitutional grounding is explicit. The preamble invokes Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which establishes that natural resources are controlled by the state and must be used for the greatest possible benefit of the Indonesian people ( sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat ). The regulation's explanatory notes go further, stating that "so long as the state possesses the capital, technology, and management capability to manage Strategic SDA Commodities, the state should undertake direct management," and that doing so ensures "all results and profits will become state revenue bringing more optimal benefits for the welfare and prosperity of the people." This is framed not as a technical trade regulation but as a matter of constitutional duty. The explanatory notes to Article 7 explicitly name the five digital systems through which DSI will exercise oversight: CEISA (Customs Excise Information System and Automation), SINSW (Indonesia National Single Window), INATRADE (Trade Information System), SiMoDIS (Integrated Foreign Exchange Monitoring System), and MOMS (Minerba Online Monitoring System). Real-time visibility across all five platforms forms the enforcement backbone of the entire reform. On June 9, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia and DSI COO Dony Oskaria offered three key reassurances at a press conference to calm investor sentiment. Oskaria confirmed that existing B2B contracts and Letters of Credit will continue to be honored during the transition period, provided DSI's monitoring system confirms that pricing is fair and transparent. Bahlil categorically denied market rumors of a "profit-sharing" mechanism in the minerals sector, stating that this concept applies only to oil and gas and that Minerba rules remain unchanged. He also committed to aligning RKAB mining quotas with smelting capacity and promised quota relaxations during periods of highly favorable global prices. June 8th DPR RI Coordination Hearing: What Bahlil and Dony Oskaria Actually Said The Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia / DPR RI) convened a coordination hearing to align the new natural resource export governance policy between Danantara's Investment Management Agency (BPI Danantara) and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Kementerian ESDM). The session featured Minister Bahlil Lahadalia representing ESDM and DSI COO Dony Oskaria representing BPI Danantara. Oskaria opened by clarifying the precise scope of DSI's mandate in its initial phase. He confirmed that DSI's primary and immediate purpose is to halt under-invoicing and transfer pricing — not to disrupt physical commodity flows. He gave explicit assurance that existing B2B sales contracts and Letters of Credit will continue to be honored and executed normally during the transition period, with one condition: DSI's digital monitoring system must determine that the declared pricing is fair and reflects genuine market values. Any contract where declared prices are flagged as suspiciously below market will be subject to DSI scrutiny, but standard commercially negotiated contracts should proceed without interruption. Bahlil addressed three distinct concerns that had been circulating in the market. First and most urgently, he categorically denied rumors of a "gross split" profit-sharing mechanism being introduced into the minerals sector. He stated directly that gross split calculations exist only in the oil and gas sector and that there are "absolutely no changes" to the existing rules governing the minerals and coal (Minerba) space. This denial was significant because the rumor alone had been enough to cause investors to reconsider capital commitments to Indonesian smelting projects. Second, Bahlil acknowledged the domestic ore supply squeeze that has been tightening around Indonesian smelters, and committed to aligning RKAB mining quotas with downstream smelter capacity. He promised "measured relaxations" of production limits during periods when global commodity prices are highly favorable, signaling that the government has no interest in strangling the smelting industry it has spent years building. Third, on the broader question of investment security, Bahlil framed DSI as a value-capture mechanism rather than a market interference tool — the government wants more of the revenue that Indonesian commodities generate to stay in Indonesia, not to reduce the volume of those commodities being exported. What the Regulation Actually Says: Key Articles Reading PP No.24/2026 directly, several provisions carry commercial implications beyond what the market has fully absorbed. Article 3(1) establishes the core mandate: strategic commodities may only be exported by the BUMN Ekspor, acting either as owner or as sole intermediary. The word hanya ("only") in the Indonesian text is unconditional. Article 3(2) goes further: the selling price of Strategic SDA Commodities is determined by the BUMN Ekspor. This is not a transparency or monitoring function — DSI holds formal pricing authority over every export transaction. Article 3(4) confirms that DSI may charge a margin at a reasonable level in accordance with prevailing regulations, meaning DSI is legally entitled to a fee for its intermediary role. The combination of state-determined selling price and a state-imposed margin on every nickel and ferro alloy export has not yet been fully digested by the market. Article 4(2) contains the most important exemption in the regulation. DSI's mandatory intermediary role can be waived for business operators who hold contracts or agreements with the government that include provisions on at minimum: investment, divestment, and domestic processing and/or refining. Exemptions are decided in a coordination meeting chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. For the nickel sector, this is a critical provision, any smelter with an existing government contract containing these three elements has a legal pathway to apply for exemption from DSI routing entirely. Article 7 governs the full transition timeline. It states that from June 1 through no later than December 31, 2026, exports must go through BUMN Ekspor. Within three months of the effective date — meaning by approximately September 1, 2026 — a formal inter-ministerial evaluation must take place. Based on that evaluation, the Coordinating Minister has the authority to set a new deadline that is either earlier or later than originally planned, provided it remains before December 31. This is a genuine two-way valve: if the transition is going well, implementation can be accelerated; if problems emerge, the government can extend the timeline. Article 7(e) further provides that if the transition completes ahead of any applicable deadline, the full DSI-only rules apply from that earlier date immediately. Article 8 addresses existing contracts: all sales contracts signed before June 1, 2026 that remain valid are subject to evaluation by the BUMN Ekspor. DSI holds formal authority to assess every pre-existing long-term purchase agreement, including those between Indonesian smelters and their Chinese offtake partners. Critical Dates and Deadlines: The Full Regulatory Calendar May 20, 2026 — PP No.24/2026 signed by President Prabowo Subianto. June 1, 2026 — Regulation takes effect. Phase 1 begins. CEISA 4.0 mandatory DSI reporting pop-up activated. Pre-June 1 sales contracts enter DSI evaluation period under Article 8. By ~September 1, 2026 — Mandatory inter-ministerial evaluation of the transition (Article 7b). This review is a legal obligation, not optional. Its outcome determines the pace of everything that follows: the Coordinating Minister may accelerate, maintain, or extend the timeline to any date before December 31. September 1, 2026 — Phase 1.5 begins (unless the evaluation resets the timeline). PEB Box 6 changes to BUMN Ekspor (DSI). QQ document format begins. Companies act as DSI's legal agents. December 31, 2026 — The hard outer ceiling (Article 7a). After this date, no transitional exceptions remain. Only DSI may export, unconditionally. The Coordinating Minister cannot extend beyond this date. January 1, 2027 (or earlier if accelerated) — Phase 2 full implementation. DSI is the sole legal exporter. DSI drafts all contracts and L/Cs, handles all customs clearance, and reports DHE directly to Bank Indonesia via SiMoDIS. The NPI Classification Crisis The inclusion of ferro alloys has created the most significant market confusion, centered on a single unresolved technical problem: where Nickel Pig Iron sits relative to the regulated ferro-nickel HS code. Ferronickel (FeNi) is a mature, refined iron-nickel alloy produced through capital-intensive smelting, typically containing 20–40% nickel . It is a direct feedstock for stainless steel production and commands a meaningful price premium. Nickel Pig Iron (NPI) was developed in China in the mid-2000s as a low-cost alternative, produced via the simpler Rotary Kiln-Electric Furnace (RKEF) process using laterite ore. Indonesian RKEF-line NPI consistently produces at 10–14% Ni — a structural result of the process and the ore body, not a product specification smelters can adjust. NPI trades at a significant discount to FeNi, and any trader or stainless steel mill can distinguish the two products immediately. The problem is that Indonesia's customs classification framework cannot reliably tell them apart. Both products can fall under HS 7202.60 (ferro-nickel), and Indonesian NPI smelters have historically declared under that code without issue. Under Permendag No.12/2026, HS 7202.60.00 is now DIATUR (Regulated) — triggered when Ni content reaches ≥ 8% . The Ministry of Trade chose this as the demarcation: refined FeNi at 20–40% Ni would clearly exceed it, while NPI was assumed to fall below it and escape the regulation. That assumption fails entirely. Standard Indonesian RKEF output runs 10–12% Ni; higher-grade lines reach 12–14% Ni. There is no commercially significant NPI stream below 8% Ni under normal operating conditions. The threshold sits below average grade Indonesia actually produces, meaning every Indonesian NPI shipment technically triggers under the regulated classification, capturing precisely the product the government intended to exempt. Internal Rakortek documents confirm the Coordinating Minister directed that NPI should not be captured. The discussion slides acknowledge the collision and propose corrective steps: set a threshold above actual RKEF NPI norms, issue binding technical definitions for NPI, and align classification consistently across HS 7201 (pig iron), 7202.60 (ferro-nickel), and 7502.20 (nickel alloys). None of that supplemental guidance has been published yet. Strategic Outlook: The September Evaluation Is the Pivot Point The most important thing to understand about PP No.24/2026's near-term trajectory is that the regulation has deliberately built in a recalibration mechanism — and that mechanism has not been priced into most market participants' planning. Article 7(b) and 7(c) together create a genuine two-way valve. The September evaluation is a legally mandated inter-ministerial review that gives the Coordinating Minister real authority to reset the timeline in either direction. If the first three months reveal that DSI is not operationally ready, and the Rakortek checklists, which showed nearly every DSI readiness item as incomplete as of May 25, suggest that risk is real — the Coordinating Minister can formally extend the transition and push the QQ phase and beyond to a later date before December 31. Equally, if the reporting data flowing through CEISA, SiMoDIS, and MOMS shows that compliance is working smoothly and DSI is ready, the same evaluation could authorize an accelerated Phase 2 arrival, potentially as early as October or November 2026. What is not negotiable is the December 31, 2026 ceiling. Articles 7(a) and 7(d) together make clear that this is the absolute outer boundary of the Coordinating Minister's authority. Regardless of what the evaluation finds, the transition cannot be extended beyond December 31. After that date, except for legally approved exemptions, DSI is the sole legal exporter and no amount of industry pressure or operational unreadiness changes that. The Article 4(2) exemption pathway remains the most immediately actionable provision for smelters with qualifying government contracts. Any agreement containing investment, divestment, and domestic processing provisions should be reviewed against that exemption criteria now. Engaging the Coordinating Minister's coordination meeting process before the September evaluation is concluded is far preferable to doing so afterward. On NPI, the plain text of Permendag No.12/2026 as it stands today classifies Indonesian NPI as regulated. Smelters should not wait for the Ministry of Trade's supplemental guidance before beginning compliance preparation. Seeking an advance product classification ruling, exploring the Article 4(2) exemption if applicable, and building DSI integration workflows in parallel remains the most prudent path. The December 31 deadline, or whatever earlier date the post-evaluation acceleration may set, is not the end of the story. It is the point at which the entire B2B architecture of Indonesian strategic commodity exports permanently and irreversibly changes. SMM Analysis makes no representations as to the official legal interpretation of any regulation cited. Stakeholders should seek formal legal counsel for all compliance decisions.

Philippine ore quotes flat MoM, market awaits new pricing window This week, nickel ore prices in the Philippine market were basically stable compared to last week. CIF China quotes: Ni 1.3% at $49-52/wmt, 1.4% at $57-60, and 1.5% at $65-67; quotes for shipment to Indonesia were 1.3% at around $48-50 and 1.4% at around $56-58. No obvious loosening or upward adjustment was seen across grades for either CIF China or CIF Indonesia quotes, with miners tending towards conservative quotation intentions. Supply side, Philippine shipments were relatively ample overall this week, with no noticeable tightening in market cargo supply. Mines maintained normal loading pace, and no major weather disruptions interfered with the supply chain. Market participants generally expect new rounds of price announcements in the coming weeks, and the near-term ore price direction awaits clearer signals from these pricing markers before further assessment. Demand side, large smelters in China and Indonesia jointly pushed for lower prices, leveraging ample inventory. Shipping volumes to Indonesia were somewhat lower than last month, with buyers clearly dominating price negotiations. As of June 5, nickel ore inventory at Chinese ports reached 5.36 million mt, up 110,000 mt MoM, equivalent to approximately 42,100 mt Ni in metal content; Indonesian smelter inventory continued to accumulate simultaneously. Rising inventory levels at both locations indicate that the demand side is unlikely to provide effective support in the near term. Divergence between sellers and buyers was significant, and the price center edged lower amid a tug-of-war between cost support and weak demand, with overall market sentiment subdued. Continued pushback on raw material prices by smelters caused the price center for nickel ore CIF to shift further downwards, providing extremely weak support for Philippine ore FOB prices. Indonesian nickel ore market: Indonesian ore prices under downward pressure, persistently low grades constrain supply quality This week, Indonesian nickel ore market prices came under downward pressure overall, with the official reference price recording a slight correction, as cost tug-of-war across the industry chain persisted. Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) officially released the HMA for the first half of June 2026: nickel price at $18,799.29/mt (down $50 from $18,849.29/mt in the second half of May 2026); cobalt price at $55,851.43/mt; iron ore price at $1.58/mt; chrome ore price at $6.37/mt. Based on SMM's internal calculation model, simulations for saprolite ore (Fe 20%, Cr 1%, Co 0.05%) show theoretical HPM prices for all grades slightly lower from the previous period. The theoretical HPM price for Ni 1.6% grade was approximately $70.75/wmt (down $0.08 MoM), and for Ni 1.2% grade was approximately $49.84/wmt (down $0.10 MoM). In terms of transaction prices, this week, delivery-to-factory prices for 1.6% grade saprolite ore were quoted at $73.8–78.8/wmt, down MoM, representing a premium range of +$3 to +$8/mt over the theoretical HPM price of $70.75/wmt. The premium narrowed significantly from earlier highs, reflecting the combined impact of sustained smelter pushback on prices and ample supply, and significantly squeezing miners' profit margins. This week, actual spot prices for 1.2% grade limonite ore were around $28–33/wmt, representing a discount of approximately $17–22 against the theoretical HPM calculated price of $49.84/wmt, with the discount depth remaining severe. Despite the slight adjustment in the HMA reference price, spot limonite ore prices failed to follow at all, heavily constrained by low downstream HPAL capacity utilization rates and tight sulphuric acid supply, with a serious disconnect between the two. Supply side, domestic ore supply in Indonesia improved this week, with overall supply relatively loose. However, ore grades remained persistently low, with mainstream circulated grades in the market around 1.45%–1.50% Ni range. High-grade saprolite ore (≥1.6%) remained a scarce resource, and some smelters faced difficulties supplementing high-grade ore sources, compelling increased blending operations with lower grades. According to the latest BMKG maritime meteorological data, weather conditions in the Morowali waters were good this week, with wave heights of 0.4–0.5 meters (low waves) and stable winds, leaving vessel operations unaffected; weather turned somewhat adverse in the East Halmahera waters, experiencing light rain, northeast winds at 9–10 knots, and wave heights reaching 1.4–2.0 meters (moderate waves), with BMKG issuing a wave alert, requiring heightened attention to shipping operations; the Obi waters also experienced light rain, southeast winds at 13–14 knots, and wave heights of 1.3–1.6 meters (moderate waves), with BMKG also issuing a wave height alert, somewhat impacting ore shipment efficiency. Demand side, overall raw ore inventory at smelters remained at relatively sufficient levels. SMM data shows that in May, the nickel ore inventory coverage index for pyrometallurgy smelters was about 2 months, and the cycle inventory index for HPAL hydrometallurgy plants was about 1.7 months, leaving little appetite for near-term restocking and a clear inclination to push for lower ore prices. In the limonite ore market, the tight supply of sulphuric acid had yet to fundamentally improve, with pressure on MHP production persisting. Operating rates at some hydrometallurgy producers remained low, and purchasing prices for limonite ore came under pressure. Policy level, Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs confirmed at a meeting yesterday that the DSI ferroalloy export takeover mechanism would formally enter a transition period starting June 1, 2026 (through August), with full implementation required by January 1, 2027, at the latest. The minister confirmed at the meeting the HS codes for ferroalloys included in the takeover scope. Given that nearly all Indonesian NPI exports are declared under HS code 7202.60.00, and this code has been confirmed as included within the DSI takeover scope, NPI is highly likely to be covered by the DSI export takeover. The complete official regulatory text has yet to be officially released, and final confirmation remains subject to official announcement. However, Chinese-invested smelters should begin assessing the potential impact of the transition period on export logistics and compliance costs. In addition, while reiterating its commitment to honoring existing valid long-term contract commercial credit, the government will strictly investigate contracts suspected of "low-price customs declarations." Relevant authorities will soon commence consultations with major industry associations to close loopholes causing tax revenue losses from low pricing. According to markets outside China, Harita Nickel's PT Trimegah Bangun Persada has taken the lead in submitting a ferronickel export report through the DSI "single window" system. CEO Roy Arman Arfandy stated that the export process has been operating normally since June 2, progressing relatively smoothly overall.

PT Trimegah Bangun Persada (NCKL), known as Harita Nickel, has begun reporting ferronickel exports through PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI) as required under the Phase 1 iron alloy single-window export policy. CEO Roy Arman Arfandy said the government has provided a reporting format and application system, with implementation starting June 2. He noted that export operations are proceeding normally with no issues so far, though shipments are not daily and depend on vessel schedules. Harita's ferronickel export capacity is approximately twice that of its HPAL hydrometallurgy nickel output, though the company has not disclosed absolute figures.

Chinese Taiwan's upstream stainless steel mills raised June domestic prices, marking a seventh consecutive monthly increase. Benchmark 304 hot-rolled and cold-rolled coils rose NT$2000/ton, bringing the cumulative seven-month gain to NT$25,500/ton. The adjustment was driven by rising raw material costs and upcoming summer electricity rates, with higher molybdenum prices and a firmer May LME nickel average offsetting slight declines in Chinese ferrochrome and ferronickel. Asian cold-rolled coil export prices also rose USD120/ton over the past month, providing additional support. Despite cautious, need-based downstream procurement, markets expect stable to slightly higher near-term prices amid firm global markets and supply reductions in China.

The Forum Industri Nikel Indonesia (FINI) has formally requested government clarification on the scope of ferro alloy products that will be required to export through PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI), Indonesia's newly established single-window export body. FINI Chairman Arif Perdana Kusumah said the industry is still awaiting an official commodity list, with the key open question being whether the mandatory DSI routing applies only to ferronickel (FeNi) or also to nickel pig iron (NPI). Ferronickel, a nickel-iron alloy with typical nickel content of 20-40%, is a key feedstock for stainless steel. The uncertainty adds to operational planning challenges for NPI producers as the DSI framework takes shape.

Indonesia is restricting new investment in nickel smelters producing intermediate products — including nickel pig iron, ferronickel, nickel matte, and mixed hydroxide precipitate — as the government seeks to redirect the industry toward battery materials and green industrial products, according to Rudy Salahuddin, Secretary of the Ministry of Investment and Downstreaming. The remarks were made at a discussion in Jakarta on May 25 focused on advancing equitable value-added growth in Indonesia's nickel downstream sector.

Nickel Ore " Indonesia Officially Issues Presidential Decree Requiring Designated State-Owned Enterprises to Monopolize Strategic Resource Exports Starting This June " 1. Price Dynamics and HMA Revisions The Indonesian nickel ore price remained stable this week. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) has officially released the Nickel Mineral Benchmark Price (HMA) for the second half of May 2026. Nickel HMA: $18,849.3/dmt (up $1047.15 or 5.88% from $17,802.14 in early May). Cobalt HMA: $55,854/dmt. Iron Ore HMA: $1.58/dmt. Chrome Ore HMA: $6.37/dmt. Current port-delivered prices for 1.6% grade pyrometallurgical ore (saprolite) stand at $77.8-80.8/wmt. In contrast, 1.2% grade hydrometallurgical ore (limonite) is priced at approximately $28-33/wm.. 2. Supply-Demand Fundamentals and Weather Impacts For pyrometallurgical ore, unseasonal, abnormally heavy rainfall in the Central and South Sulawesi regions (Morowali and surrounding mining areas) has severely disrupted land transportation and barge transshipment. A series of micro-earthquakes (reaching up to magnitude M$1.9$) that occurred near Morowali between May 17 and 18 further exacerbated this impact. The combination of highly saturated soil moisture and minor crustal tremors has significantly increased the risk of landslides and slope instability, forcing mines to slow down their extraction and heavy-truck transportation pace for safety reasons. Therefore, even though the approval rate of regulatory quotas (RKAB) has reached approximately 90%, the spot supply of high-grade ore remains tight. To cope with exorbitant costs and tight supply, smelters are actively adopting cost-reduction strategies. These include blending low-grade ores into raw materials to lower the overall grade, promoting a unified premium pricing model of "HPM + USD $7–$10/wmt," and implementing standardized benchmarks for the chemical specifications of pyrometallurgical ore (Cobalt 0.05%, Iron 20%, Chrome 1%) to eliminate additional premiums for individual ore components. Meanwhile, the hydrometallurgical nickel ore market continues to suffer a severe disconnect from official pricing. The price of low-grade hydrometallurgical ore is under severe pressure and has completely failed to follow the upward trend of the new HPM. This price depression is primarily driven by the dual contraction of smelter operating rates and immediate raw material demand, with the core trigger being a potential production cut in Mixed Hydroxide Precipitate (MHP) caused by a sulfuric acid supply shortage in May. Against a backdrop of relatively stable inventory levels, MHP refineries are leveraging this low-capacity operating environment to aggressively suppress procurement bids, causing hydrometallurgical ore prices to continue hovering at low levels. 3. SMM Internal Estimates The new pricing formula has led to increased price divergence and amplified volatility, particularly influenced by higher associated cobalt content in certain ores. SMM calculations show that the new HPM for 1.2% grade limonite is approximately $49.95, significantly higher than current market assessments. The new HPM for 1.6% grade saprolite is $70.83; the inclusion of higher cobalt content in the new formula has markedly amplified price fluctuations. While actual market transaction prices currently remain above this benchmark, the gap is steadily narrowing. 4. Regulatory Quotas (RKAB) and Market Outlook According to the ESDM, RKAB approvals for 2026 have reached approximately 90%. SMM statistics indicate that the total approved quota for Indonesian nickel ore stands at roughly 240 million wmt. The macroeconomic and policy focus of the market has recently shifted, primarily concentrating on the following two major export and contract regulatory policies: DSI's Full Takeover of the Export Mechanism: The Indonesian government has confirmed that starting January 1, 2027, DSI will fully take over the export business of coal, palm oil, and ferroalloys. This policy will facilitate a smooth transition of the export mechanism in two phases. Since ferroalloys (including ferronickel, NPI, etc.) fall within the scope of this takeover, the market is closely evaluating the impact of this transition period on the export logistics and compliance costs of Chinese-funded smelters. Crackdown on Under-Invoiced Long-Term Contracts: The Indonesian government emphasized that it will honor existing, valid long-term export contracts to maintain commercial credit. However, at the same time, the government will strictly investigate and punish long-term contracts suspected of "under-invoicing" (low-price customs declarations). It is reported that relevant Indonesian departments will soon hold consultations with major industry associations to ensure a smooth policy transition while plugging loopholes that lead to tax revenue losses from underpricing. Nickel Pig Iron " Supply-Demand Price Gap Widens; Short-Term Prices to Fluctuate within a Range " The average price of SMM 10-12% NPI average price fell by RMB 5.7 per nickel unit week-on-week to RMB 1140.3 per nickel unit (ex-works, tax included), while the Indonesia NPI FOB index dipped by USD 1.37 USD per nickel unit to an average of USD 146.52 per nickel unit. Downstream purchasing sentiment dropped even more visibly, intensifying the divide in market mindsets between buyers and sellers. On the supply side, existing NPI production cutbacks, coupled with recent disruptions from Indonesian export policy updates, have gradually tightened spot availability. Consequently, upstream producers are holding back cargo to defend their asking prices, generally keeping their offers firm. Sellers only slightly softened their quotes under the weight of weak futures markets, and their willingness to offload cargo at lower price levels remains low. This expectation of tighter market supply provides a solid floor for prices. On the demand side, pressure remains acute. The stainless steel market lacks upward momentum, forcing steel mills to adopt a highly cautious procurement stance centered strictly around hand-to-mouth restocking. Furthermore, as the price-to-performance advantage of stainless steel scrap expands, downstream buyers are pushing hard for discounts. Target buying prices remain heavily clustered between RMB 1,120 and 1,130/mtu, leaving a massive spread against upstream asking prices that makes reconciling the two sides very difficult. Market Outlook: While expectations of tightening supply will support spot prices, the weak futures market and competitive pricing from alternative raw materials will continue to cap upside gains. Accordingly, high-nickel pig iron prices are expected to exhibit a high-level, range-bound volatile trend next week.

SMM data shows that overseas stainless steel prices saw their first correction after six months of gains during May 18–22. Indonesia’s leading mills cut FOB 300 series stainless steel by USD30/mt, then kept prices stable through out the week. Policy-driven supply concerns from Indonesia and IWIP NPI cuts pushed LME nickel above USD 18,800/mt. The market focus shifted from price weakness to cost support, while demand remained resistant to high prices.