The champagne corks in Brussels may have popped too soon. On January 14, 2026, the European Commission released a soaring press statement celebrating the official entry of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) into its "Definitive Regime." In the official narrative, this was a triumph of digitalization: over 10,000 customs declarations verified in real-time, with the system running as smooth as silk. However, if we shift the lens from the desks of Brussels to the customs brokers in Hamburg, the steel traders in Rotterdam, and the customs officials currently drowning in paperwork across the continent, a starkly different picture emerges. What we are witnessing is a carefully whitewashed administrative "cardiac arrest." Forensic-level investigation into the first seven weeks of 2026 reveals that the landing of CBAM is far from the glitz claimed by officials. On the contrary, plagued by suspected low-level data errors, catastrophic approval backlogs, and teetering temporary patches, the mechanism is currently mired in a dual crisis of legality and operations. I. The Absurd "Default Values": When Taiwan’s Stainless Steel "Became" Indonesian Coal If one were to find a single representative footnote for this chaos, the "Default Value Controversy" would be the undisputed choice. For importers unable to obtain precise carbon emission data from upstream factories, the EU’s official "default values" are a lifeline. This was supposed to be a baseline derived from rigorous scientific calculation. Yet, in the 2,400-page document released on December 31, 2025, mere hours before the new rules took effect, industry experts witnessed a jaw-dropping scene. This is not merely a margin of error; it looks more like a metallurgical farce. Industry bodies have pointed out that when the Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD) established the carbon emission default values for stainless steel from the Taiwan region, the data tables contained suspected structural errors, bearing traces of a "copy-paste" job from Indonesian data structures. The consequence? In the physical world, processing a steel slab into a precision tube requires significant electricity, meaning the finished product should logically have higher emissions than the semi-finished one. Yet, in the table published by the EU, industry players have flagged phenomena where "Taiwanese semi-finished stainless steel allegedly emits more than the finished product," vehemently questioning its rationality. In metallurgy, this is impossible; in a bureaucratic Excel sheet, it became legal reference. More fatally, Taiwan’s stainless steel industry relies primarily on Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF) and scrap recycling, resulting in a relatively low carbon footprint. In contrast, the Indonesian stainless steel industry is highly dependent on Nickel Pig Iron (NPI) and coal-fired power, yielding extremely high emissions. This suspected "slip of the hand" by the EU is akin to forcefully assigning the calorie count of a rich braised pork belly to a light garden salad. This has directly resulted in European buyers of Taiwanese stainless steel facing artificially inflated financial costs. II. A 27% Pass Rate: The 15,000-Strong Army Blocked at the Gate If data controversies are "soft tissue damage," the backlog in administrative approval is a fatal "compound fracture." The core rule of the CBAM definitive stage is simple: without "authorized declarant" status, you cannot import. This means every company wishing to ship a screw or an aluminum sheet into Europe must first secure an "entry ticket." The reality is brutal. According to the Commission’s official press release, by January 7, over 12,000 operators across the EU had submitted applications, with just over 4,100 approved (a pass rate of roughly 34%). However, industry estimates suggest that by late February, applications swelled to approximately 15,000, causing the pass rate to slide to around 27%. Where did the massive remainder go? They are stuck in the overwhelmed approval systems of National Competent Authorities (NCAs). In Germany, due to the deluge of applications, logistics giant DSV issued a public notice stating it could not support clients with CBAM authorization and registration, bluntly forcing thousands of SMEs to crash into the complex reporting system like headless flies. In France, the labyrinthine digital authentication process has turned the application into a maze only a hacker could navigate. To prevent European ports from paralysis, the EU was forced to administer a "painkiller": Customs Code Y238. This is a temporary "hall pass" allowing companies that applied before March 31 but have not yet been approved to keep goods moving for now. But make no mistake, this merely lengthens the fuse on the bomb. III. The Strategy of Silence and the Risk of "Retroactive Reckoning" Faced with industry skepticism, Brussels seems to have chosen the oldest PR strategy: silence. Although industry giants like the Gerber Group issued detailed technical warnings as early as January 9, pointing out the absurdity of the Taiwan/Indonesia data, the industry notes that as of late February, no official "Corrigendum" has been issued to legally revise the default values. The updated Excel version released on February 13 merely added a disclaimer: "information only." This rigid attitude transfers all risk to the enterprises. For companies currently relying on the Y238 temporary arrangement, the real danger is not "whether goods are released," but "whether they will be retroactively penalized." Competent authorities have publicly warned that if an authorization application is ultimately rejected, member states can, under Article 26 (2)/(2a) of the CBAM Regulation, retroactively penalize goods imported during the waiting period. Such fines can, in certain cases, reach 3 to 5 times the standard penalty. In other words, this is not a procedural flaw; it is a compliance risk that could land directly on cash flows and balance sheets. Conclusion: Who Pays the Price for Hubris? CBAM was supposed to be the crown jewel of the EU’s climate ambition, a lighthouse for global green trade. But the opening scene of 2026 makes it look more like an unfinished Tower of Babel. From the "data ghosts" haunting the industry to the severely backlogged approval channels, this "hard landing" exposes a chasm between regulatory ambition and administrative capability. For European importers, every day now is an exercise in navigating through fog. They are forced to calculate not just carbon emissions, but the cost of policy uncertainty. And for the European Commission, if it cannot step out of this arrogant "silence" and clarify these glaring operational controversies, what CBAM loses will be more than just data accuracy; it will be the trust of its global trading partners.

During the Chinese New Year break, LME zinc's price center first declined and then rose. The 40-day moving average consistently supported the daily candlestick of LME zinc. After opening, the price center of LME zinc pulled back, hitting a low of $3,253/mt before rebounding steadily. Overall, the price center recovered, and as of Friday's close, LME zinc settled at $3,378/mt, up $35.5/mt for the week, a gain of 1.06%.

The Indonesian aluminum market remained stable during the 2026 Chinese New Year, with production unaffected and bauxite prices holding at USD 28–32 FOB amid RKAB uncertainty. Alumina prices also stayed steady at USD 308 FOB due to feedstock stability and a seasonal lull in Chinese buying activity.

Indonesia's 2026 nickel production might potentially face a severe supply crunch as the government’s 270 million tonne RKAB quota ceiling falls significantly short of the 343 million tonnes required by surging downstream projects. With major mines like Weda Bay facing drastic 71% cuts and administrative bottlenecks paralyzing sales, the market remains in a high-tension deficit, pinning its hopes on a potential July quota revision to stabilize the industry.

[SMM Analysis: The "Key Anchor Point" in Great Power Rivalry: The US "Treasury Plan" and the Resource Reshuffle in Latin America] As the second phase of the Mirador copper mine project in Ecuador, developed by a Chinese enterprise, remains stuck in a "built but awaiting approval" deadlock, ten thousand kilometers away in Washington, the US Export-Import Bank, together with the President, is announcing a historic supply chain security initiative called the "Treasury Plan." In the pause and the start, a global covert battle over critical minerals such as copper, lithium, cobalt, and gallium is moving from behind the scenes to the forefront.

[SMM Analysis: Key Anchor in Great Power Rivalry: The U.S. "Project Vault" and the Changing Resource Landscape in Latin America] While the second phase of Chinese company's Mirador copper mine in Ecuador remains mired in a 'completed but awaiting approval' deadlock, 10,000 kilometers away in Washington, the President, alongside the Export-Import Bank of the United States, is announcing a historic supply chain security initiative named 'Project Vault.'

According to SMM, Indonesian laterite nickel ore RKAB approval quotas in January-May totalled 217.6 million wmt, with 92 applications approved.

According to public data, as of February 26, 2024, Indonesia has approved a quota of 145 million wet tons of nickel ore (for 2024)...

According to public data, Indonesia has approved a quota of 145 million wet tons of nickel ore (for next three year), and it is understood that before that, the quota for nickel ore was approved once a year.

[SMM Stainless Steel Daily Review] SS Futures Weakened on Last Trading Day Before Holiday, Stainless Steel Spot Prices Remain Stable Awaiting Post-Holiday Resumption SMM, February 13: SS futures continued to decline and probe lower. On the last trading day before the Chinese New Year holiday, nonferrous metals futures collectively came under pressure and fell, with SS futures also weakening in sync, ultimately closing at 13,860 yuan/mt. In the spot market, despite the volatility in SS futures and rising high-grade NPI prices ahead of the holiday, most spot traders had already entered the holiday period, logistics and transportation were suspended, transactions were sparse, and prices maintained a stable trend, with the market quietly awaiting the post-holiday resumption. The most-traded SS futures contract pulled back. At 10:30 a.m., the SS2604 contract was quoted at 13,765 yuan/mt, down 315 yuan/mt from the previous trading day. In Wuxi, the spot premiums/discounts for 304/2B were in the range of 405-605 yuan/mt. In the spot market, the average price for cold-rolled 201/2B coil in Wuxi was reported at 8,500 yuan/mt; for cold-rolled mill-edge 304/2B coil, the average price in Wuxi was 14,100 yuan/mt, while in Foshan it was 14,050 yuan/mt; in Wuxi, the price for cold-rolled 316L/2B coil was 26,600 yuan/mt, and in Foshan it was also 26,600 yuan/mt; for hot-rolled 316L/NO.1 coil, the price in Wuxi was reported at 25,750 yuan/mt; in both Wuxi and Foshan, the price for cold-rolled 430/2B coil was 7,800 yuan/mt. On the futures side, driven by weakening macro influences and narrowing fluctuations in nonferrous metals futures, the market showed a relatively stable and fluctuating trend at the beginning of the week, with trading activity experiencing a pullback. As the Chinese New Year holiday approached, market participants considered avoiding holiday risks, coupled with earlier...