Zijin Mining's 2025 annual report sent a clear industry signal: its lithium business has officially moved from strategic reserve to the stage of scaled monetization.

I. Supply-Demand Pattern Shift Puts Iron Ore Prices on a Downtrend In 2021, driven by inflation expectations from global quantitative easing, frequent supply-side disruptions in Brazil and Australia, resilient demand in China, and strong speculative sentiment, iron ore prices hit a record high of $219.77/mt in July that year, with Platts’ annual average price as high as $160/mt ; they then entered a prolonged downtrend. In 2025, the annual average iron ore price was $102, down about 36% from the 2021 average. Source: SMM Iron ore prices have continued to fall in recent years, mainly due to the global project investment boom spurred by high prices before 2021. After 2024, multiple large iron ore projects worldwide entered a concentrated commissioning phase, and the market’s supply-demand pattern shifted from tight to loose, with the supply-demand gap widening from -12 million mt to 46 million mt. Meanwhile, China has implemented crude steel production cuts since 2022, significantly curbing iron ore demand. Coupled with persistent weakness in real estate, an overall downturn in the steel industry, and an overseas economic slowdown, among other factors, iron ore demand declined markedly. Entering 2025, a rebound in China’s steel exports drove iron ore demand to increase slightly, while capacity in emerging steel-producing countries such as Southeast Asia was gradually released, narrowing the supply-demand gap somewhat. Over the long term, however, iron ore supply is still on a growth trend, market expectations remain bearish, and prices are pressured to set new lows repeatedly. Source: SMM (the forecast assumes an extreme balance under normal commissioning of new mines and no voluntary production cuts by mines) II. Mine Costs Form a Solid Bottom Support for Iron Ore Prices From the global iron ore cost curve, about 90% of global mine cash cost is no higher than $85/mt, and about 93.8% is no higher than $90/mt. International mining giants represented by FMG, BHP, Rio Tinto, and Vale have costs far below those in China and other non-mainstream countries, forming the main body on the left side of the cost curve in the chart—low and relatively flat—which explains their strong cost competitiveness and earnings resilience in the global market. At present, the $85-90 cost line is the lifeline for the vast majority of mines; once prices remain below this range for an extended period, high-cost capacity will be forced to exit, thereby supporting prices. China’s iron ore mines due to low raw ore grade and high underground mining costs, among other reasons, currently have a nationwide per-mt processing cost of about 595 yuan/mt, equivalent to around $85 . Its costs have long been at the high end globally, serving as the "anchor point" and "ceiling" of the cost curve. The high cost and low production of China's domestic iron ore mines have led the steel industry to heavily rely on imports for raw materials, and fluctuations in international ore prices directly impact the profit stability of the domestic steel industry. Therefore, promoting domestic resource supply, investing in low-cost overseas resources, and developing steel scrap recycling are crucial for the strategic security of China's steel industry. Data source: SMM III. The global iron ore supply has long been characterized by a landscape dominated by the "Big Four" mines, supplemented by "non-mainstream" mines. Currently, the iron ore production industry is highly concentrated, primarily following a pattern dominated by the "Big Four" mines, supplemented by "non-mainstream" mines. Australia and Brazil have long contributed over half of the global iron ore production. Australia, leveraging advantages such as high resource concentration, low mining costs, and stable supply, firmly holds its position as the world's largest producer and exporter; while Brazil is renowned for its high-grade ore and is the world's second-largest iron ore exporter. Data source: SMM The "Big Four" mines, consisting of Rio Tinto, BHP, FMG, and Vale, have long dominated global iron ore supply, accounting for approximately 70% of global production. Data source: SMM The Rise of Emerging Mines Promoting the Multipolar Development of Global Iron Ore In recent years, India has actively promoted domestic mining development, leading to a significant increase in production; since 2023, its iron ore production has surpassed that of China, and it shows a continuous expansion trend, maintaining an annual growth rate of 7%, gradually becoming a new force in regional supply growth. Emerging enterprises such as India's National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) and South Africa's Anglo American are gradually expanding capacity, enhancing their influence in the international market. Meanwhile, countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and regions in Africa are also actively developing domestic iron ore resources, seeking to increase their voice in regional markets, driving the global iron ore supply landscape from high concentration towards gradual multipolar development. Data source: SMM IV. Australia Firmly Holds the Top Spot, India Becomes a New Growth Engine From the perspective of major producing countries, Australia still firmly ranks first globally, with iron ore production of approximately 900 million mt in 2025, accounting for one-third of the global total, and maintaining a stable annual growth rate of about 2%. Brazil ranks second; after the 2019 dam collapse, production once fell sharply. Although it has recovered somewhat over the past two years, the increase has been relatively limited. China’s production scale is relatively large, but due to frequent safety incidents and the continued impact of the environmental protection-driven production restriction policy, production has not increased but instead declined in recent years. By contrast, India, as an emerging producer, has seen production rise steadily over the past decade, and is expected to post an increase of about 7% by 2030. Source: SMM V Over the next three years, the world will usher in a new peak in mine commissioning In addition to supply from existing mines, there are currently multiple large-scale iron ore projects under construction worldwide, with the number of mines expected to be commissioned in 2026 at six, mainly located in Africa and Brazil. Representative projects include Vale’s northern expansion “S11D +20mtpa,” the northern block of Guinea’s Simandou iron ore project, and the Nimba iron ore project. 2026 will be the year with the most concentrated new supply over the next three years. With the northern block of Simandou officially commencing production, the overall capacity ceiling of the mining area will, with capacity ramp-up, rise to 120 million mt, becoming the core incremental source of global iron ore supply over the next five years. From 2027 to 2028, projects expected to commence production will mainly come from China, including the Xi’an Mountain iron ore mine and the Honggenan iron ore mine, adding about 25 million mt of iron ore supply to the domestic market. Overall, as emerging producers continue to release capacity, and traditional suppliers such as Australia and Brazil consolidate their export advantages through expansion projects, the global iron ore supply structure will become more diversified. A new cycle of capacity release has gradually begun, and the loose supply landscape is expected to continue deepening over the next several years. Source: SMM Simandou Project Commissioning Reshaping the Global Iron Ore Supply Landscape Among the many new projects, Africa’s Simandou iron ore is particularly noteworthy. The mine is expected to reach annual capacity of 120 million mt, and the ore’s average grade exceeds 65%, providing the market with a high-grade, high-quality option beyond Australia and Brazil, and becoming an important variable in the recent contest over the global iron ore supply landscape. In terms of project progress, the Simandou iron ore project has entered a substantive shipment phase; as logistics corridors are gradually opened up, the mining area’s substantive impact on global supply will gradually become evident. Source: SMM Nearly 400 million mt of Capacity Release by 2030, Global Iron Ore Market Faces Impact With the entry of emerging producers, iron ore supply is beginning to diversify. Projects led by Simandou iron ore are breaking the industry landscape and taking the iron ore market into a new stage. Looking ahead to the next five years, global iron ore capacity is expected to see a wave of concentrated releases, with incremental supply mainly coming from two major regions: Africa and Australia . Leveraging the development of new high-grade mines such as Simandou, Africa is reshaping the global supply landscape; meanwhile, Australia, relying on its existing capacity base and ongoing expansion projects, is further consolidating its export-dominant position. Overall, the global iron ore supply landscape is evolving toward greater diversification and a looser market. Source: SMM VI Simandou High-Quality Iron Ore Enters the Market; Global Iron Ore Enters an Era of “Quality Upgrading” As some older mines gradually enter a period of resource depletion , coupled with the fact that many newly commissioned projects are dominated by mid- to low-grade ore, the average global iron ore grade shows a downward trend from 2025 to 2026 . However, as high-grade mines such as Simandou are commissioned one after another, the share of high-grade ore supply is expected to increase, and is projected to drive a rebound in the overall global iron ore grade in 2027. Source: SMM VII “Green Steel” Reshapes the Global Crude Steel Production Landscape From a policy perspective, the low-carbon transition represented by “green steel” is profoundly reshaping the global crude steel production landscape . Whether in China or Europe, carbon neutrality has become the core theme for the future development of the steel industry. Therefore, whether it is China’s ongoing capacity replacement policy or the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) that is about to be fully implemented , both clearly indicate that the global steel industry is accelerating its transition toward low-carbon and green development. Achieving carbon neutrality across the entire industry chain is no longer an isolated task for a single link, but must rely on close upstream-downstream coordination and deep integration of technological pathways. Source: SMM Technology Reshaping: Green Iron Supply + Green Production Demand Against the broader backdrop of carbon neutrality, merely maintaining the current supply-demand structure dominated by iron ore can no longer meet future low-carbon requirements. The deeper need of industry transformation lies in reconstructing metallurgical processes: resource-rich countries—such as Australia and Brazil, traditional major iron ore exporters—need to fully leverage their renewable energy endowments and mineral advantages, shifting from simply exporting iron ore to producing high-grade, low-carbon-footprint direct reduced iron (DRI) or hot briquetted iron (HBI) and other high value-added intermediate products. By shipping this clean-energy-driven “green DRI” to steel consumption hubs and integrating it with local green electric arc furnace (EAF) processes, it can effectively replace the traditional “blast furnace–converter” long process, thereby substantially reducing carbon emissions at the source. This multinational collaborative model of “high-quality resources + green energy + short-process” is not only a critical measure to address trade barriers such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, but also an essential pathway to build a new global green steel supply chain and drive deep decarbonization across the industry. Data source: SMM Rising Share of Electric-Furnace Steelmaking, Stronger Substitutability of Steel Scrap, Squeezing Iron Ore Demand Driven by carbon-neutrality targets, the steel industry, as a major source of carbon emissions in the industrial sector, has drawn close attention for its emissions-reduction pathway. Among these, the traditional long-process route centered on “blast furnace–converter,” due to its heavy reliance on coke and iron ore, is regarded as a primary source of carbon emissions and has therefore become a key focus of regulation and retrofitting in various countries. By contrast, the short-process route represented by “steel scrap–electric furnace,” with a significantly lower carbon-emissions intensity, is being favoured by an increasing number of countries. This structural shift has driven the share of electric-furnace steelmaking in global crude steel production to continue rising. Data source: SMM From an economic perspective, the substitution relationship between steel scrap and pig iron is typically measured by the price spread. Generally, after factoring in steelmaking costs and losses, pig iron costs should be about 100-150 yuan/mt higher than steel scrap prices ; this range is viewed as the cost-performance equilibrium band: if steel scrap prices are lower than pig iron costs by more than this threshold, steel scrap is more economical; otherwise, pig iron has a more pronounced advantage. In 2025, the average price spread between pig iron and steel scrap was 122 yuan/mt, lower than the 2024 average of 211.8 yuan/mt, and also largely within the cost-performance equilibrium band. By contrast, the 2024 spread was significantly above the upper limit of the equilibrium band, indicating that steel scrap offered a more prominent cost-performance advantage at that time. After the spread narrowed in 2025, the economic advantage of steel scrap weakened somewhat. As a result, in the short term, there is limited room for China to increase the share of electric-furnace steelmaking; overall, it remains at a relatively low level and still lags far behind the global average. This also reflects that, at the current stage, cost factors still impose a substantive constraint on the choice of smelting process routes. Data source: SMM Taken together, the blast furnace–converter long-process route will remain the dominant model for global steel production over the next five years, but the shares of electric furnaces and steel scrap usage will increase year by year; in the long run, this trend will suppress iron ore demand, causing it to weaken gradually. Data source: SMM VIII Global Total Iron Ore Demand in 2030 to Be About 2.4 Billion mt, with Gradual Shifts in Global Flows As China began encouraging domestic steel mills to develop overseas markets while adjusting the domestic industry chain’s transformation toward producing high value-added products needed by the manufacturing sector, global crude steel production began to rebound gradually. Data Source: SMM From the perspective of the global demand structure, although crude steel production outside China is entering a new round of development, with capacity expansion particularly notable in regions such as India and Southeast Asia, a considerable portion of the incremental increase comes from electric furnace processes, providing limited substantive boost to iron ore demand. Meanwhile, as the world’s largest iron ore consumer, China’s crude steel production has entered a downward trajectory, constituting the primary source of demand-side reductions. Overall, overseas increments are unlikely to fully offset China’s reductions. It is expected that by 2030, total global iron ore demand will be approximately 2.4 billion mt, with overall growth trending toward a slowdown. Compared with the mild growth on the demand side, the supply side remains in a phase of continuous expansion. The oversupply landscape will become an important factor that suppresses ore prices over the long term. Data Source: SMM SMM will continue to track the impact of changes in iron ore supply and demand on prices. Comments are welcome—scan the code to follow us! Data Source Statement: Except for publicly available information, all other data are processed and derived by SMM based on publicly available information, market communication, and SMM’s internal database models, for reference only and not constituting decision-making advice. Scan the code to access information for free

Geopolitical conflict in the Middle East led to a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off the global sulphur supply chain (China’s import dependence exceeds 50%, with the Middle East accounting for 56%). Sulphur prices surged to 4,395 yuan/mt, directly pushing up phosphate fertiliser costs. Rigid demand from spring ploughing provided support, but China’s policies to ensure supply and stabilise prices curbed phosphate fertiliser gains。

In times of peace, oil and gas are cost variables; in a war context, traditional energy becomes a security variable. The escalation of conflict in the Middle East at the end of February led to a high opening for oil prices on the first trading day of March. During peacetime, energy prices fluctuate around the supply-demand gap, with the market focusing on production, inventory, and cost curves. However, in a war environment, the market first trades not on production but on deliverability. Whether key shipping routes are open, whether insurance costs soar, and whether sanctions spread, all quickly translate into risk premiums. As a result, oil prices exhibit high fluctuations, even if actual supply has not significantly decreased, as prices are pushed up by delivery uncertainties. Energy thus transforms from a commodity into a strategic resource. As an analyst in the new energy sector, I believe that this change does not simply benefit new energy. Rising oil prices reinforce the logic of electrification, making EVs and renewable energy more economically attractive. However, the macroeconomic uncertainty brought about by war may also dampen consumer and investment confidence. If high oil prices drive inflation and slow growth, overall demand for cars and industry will slow down, and new energy will not be immune. Therefore, the investment logic for new energy is no longer unidirectional, but depends on the balance between substitution effects and macroeconomic contraction effects. A deeper change lies in the fact that capital is beginning to re-evaluate energy security. The traditional oil and gas system is highly dependent on cross-border transportation and continuous fuel supply, with its vulnerabilities lying in shipping and geopolitics. In contrast, wind and PV do not require continuous fuel input during operation, and energy storage can enhance the stability of the power system, giving new energy strategic value in a war environment. They are not only low-carbon tools but also a path to reducing external dependence. The security attributes of new energy are thus being revalued. However, it must be recognized that this security attribute is not absolute. The manufacturing of new energy is highly dependent on critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, with their mining and processing concentrated and heavily reliant on transportation. If upstream resource policies tighten or logistics are disrupted, risks will also propagate through the industry chain. Therefore, the security of new energy is operational security, not supply security. This means that future investment logic will shift from simply pursuing the lowest cost to focusing on supply chain control capabilities and regional diversification. In a war environment, the allocation of risk premiums by capital changes. Transportation premiums, geopolitical premiums, and supply chain concentration premiums all rise. The volatility of traditional energy intensifies; new energy generation assets gain a security bonus; and critical minerals and midstream processing capabilities become new strategic nodes. Efficiency is no longer the sole criterion, with redundancy and controllability becoming important components of the valuation system. Deglobalization and supply chain restructuring may push up the cost center of the industry, but they also enhance the strategic position of assets. In this context, the value of energy storage and power grid assets stands out. If conflicts persist, the core goal of the energy system will shift from cost optimization to system resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and energy storage have insurance-like attributes, and their value becomes more evident in extreme scenarios. Even if high raw material prices increase project costs, an elevated policy priority may still provide long-term support. Over the past five to ten years, the narrative of the energy transition has largely focused on new energy as a tool for decarbonization to ensure sustainable development of the planet. However, geopolitical tensions in the last two to three years have redefined new energy as part of the energy security framework. Within new energy, it is not just the power generation assets that are being repriced, but also energy storage and the power grid. 1) In a war environment, the core issue of the energy system shifts from efficiency to resilience During peacetime, the goal of the energy system is to maximize efficiency: lowest cost, highest utilization rate, and optimal allocation. Cross-border trade and centralized power generation have made the global energy structure highly globalized and scaled. War exposes the vulnerabilities of such a system. Maritime transport routes, natural gas pipelines, tanker insurance, key ports, and large power plants can all become risk nodes. At this point, the system's priority is no longer efficiency but resilience – the ability to maintain basic operational capacity under shocks. Energy storage and the power grid are at the core of a resilient system. 2) Energy storage: from an arbitrage tool to system insurance In normal circumstances, the value of energy storage mainly comes from electricity arbitrage, ancillary services, and peak load regulation, with its return on investment depending on fluctuations in electricity prices and policy subsidies. However, in a wartime context, the value of energy storage is redefined. It is no longer merely an economic optimization tool but a guarantee of power system stability. Energy storage can provide emergency support during fuel supply disruptions or grid shocks, preventing the power system from collapsing due to a single point of failure. This means that energy storage assets have insurance-like attributes. When system risks rise, capital's risk appetite for these assets increases. Even if high raw material prices drive up project costs, there may still be stronger policy support because of the rising strategic value. The valuation logic of energy storage thus transitions from "IRR-driven" to "system safety premium." 3) Power grid: an undervalued strategic hub The impact of war on the energy system often first manifests in the transmission and distribution network. Centralized energy structures rely on a few key periods, and once damaged, the impact is widespread. Therefore, power grid upgrades and digitalization have become the focus of secure investments. Enhancements in smart grids, regional interconnections, grid redundancy, and distributed access capabilities can significantly strengthen the system's resilience to shocks. The investment logic for power grid assets becomes clearer in a wartime context: it is not only infrastructure but also the backbone of national energy security. In the long term, power grid upgrades will be a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of new energy. The fluctuations in new energy generation require more robust transmission, distribution, and dispatching capabilities. When risk environments rise, countries are more inclined to accelerate grid construction to reduce dependence on external energy. 4) Distributed Energy and Microgrids: The Strategic Significance of Decentralization While centralized energy systems are efficient, they are also highly vulnerable. Although distributed PV, community energy storage, and microgrids are relatively small in scale, they possess the capability for independent operation. In a war context, distributed energy has two advantages: first, it reduces the risk of single-point failures; second, it decreases reliance on cross-border fuel transportation. The strategic value of such assets is being re-evaluated in high-risk environments. 5) Deep Changes in Investment Logic The rising value of energy storage and power grids means that new energy investments no longer solely revolve around installation growth and cost reduction, but rather around system security and supply chain control. Key changes include: a. Capital is more focused on localized manufacturing and supply chain diversification; b. The weight of security in investment decisions has increased; c. The cost center may shift upward in stages, but the strategic premium has risen. The valuation system of the new energy industry is transitioning from a growth premium to a strategic premium. What opportunities and risks does geopolitics bring to China's new energy industry? 1) China's Energy Security Structure: From Import Dependence to Electrification Advantage China has long been one of the world's largest crude oil importers, with persistent energy security issues. In a wartime environment, oil price fluctuations and transportation risks increase, directly affecting energy costs and macro expectations. However, unlike before, China has established the most complete new energy manufacturing system globally. The high integration of the PV, wind, energy storage, battery, and EV industry chains gives China a manufacturing and scale advantage during the energy transition. In a war context, this advantage is beginning to translate into security attributes: an increase in electrification means a reduction in dependence on external fuels; an increase in new energy installations means a more resilient energy structure. Thus, China's new energy system has the potential for alternative security. 2) Energy Storage and Power Grid: China's Most Strategic Assets If the war becomes protracted, the core of the energy system will no longer be power generation capacity itself, but system stability. China's layout in energy storage and power grid gives it a relative advantage at this stage. In terms of energy storage, China possesses the world's largest battery manufacturing capacity and cost advantages. Under the logic of energy security, energy storage is no longer solely about economics, but has become an important tool for ensuring the stability and emergency response capability of the power system. At the policy level, there may be an emphasis on increasing the proportion of energy storage in the power system. Regarding the power grid, China has developed the world's largest ultra-high voltage transmission network and grid construction capabilities. The increased redundancy and interconnectivity of the grid help to absorb more new energy installations while enhancing the system's resilience against shocks. In a high-risk environment, investment in the grid may accelerate. This means that, under the security logic, China's energy storage and power grid assets have structural strategic premiums. 3) Critical Minerals and Supply Chain: Advantages and Risks Coexist China has advantages in the new energy manufacturing sector, but still relies on overseas layouts for upstream resources. The supply chains for critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt are highly internationalized, and wars or geopolitical risks may amplify policy and logistics uncertainties. For China's new energy industry chain, the real challenge lies not in the manufacturing end, but in the stability and cost fluctuations of the resource end. The trend of supply chain deglobalization may push up the cost center, compressing profit margins. The core of future competition will shift from scale expansion to resource control capabilities and the diversification of global layouts. 4) New Energy Vehicles: China's Structural Advantages and Short-term Fluctuations The impact of the war environment on new energy vehicles also has a dual nature. On one hand, rising oil prices reinforce the economic advantages of EVs. In a context of high oil prices, the cost advantages of using EVs become even more evident, which is conducive to increasing the penetration rate among end-users. China has the world's largest EV capacity and supply chain system, with scale and cost advantages. On the other hand, high oil prices may suppress consumer confidence through inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty. If the war continues for a long time, global economic growth may slow down, putting overall car demand under pressure. Although new energy vehicles have a substitution logic, they cannot be completely independent of the macro cycle. Therefore, the short-term performance of China's new energy vehicle industry will depend on the relative strength of the substitution effect and macroeconomic drag. 5) Long-term Structure: Re-stratification of Strategic Assets In the era of energy security, the competitiveness of China's new energy system will be more reflected in three aspects: First, manufacturing scale and cost control capabilities; Second, the system support capacity of the power grid and energy storage; Third, the diversification of upstream resources and supply chain layout. War has accelerated the stratification of the global energy system. Traditional energy bears higher fluctuation risks; new energy power generation and power grid assets gain a safety premium; critical minerals become the focal point of geopolitical competition. For China, the new energy industry is no longer just an engine for growth but also a part of the energy security system. The investment logic will shift from pure growth rate and subsidies to strategic position and supply chain stability. Overall, as energy transitions from a cost variable to a security variable, the strategic value of China's new energy system rises, but it also faces higher supply chain risks and global competitive pressures. Energy storage and the power grid are becoming the core of system stability; new energy vehicles benefit under the substitution logic, but one must be wary of macro cycles; critical minerals will determine the cost center and industrial profit margins. In an era where war reshapes the energy order, stability is more important than growth. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le 13916526348

This month, Rio Tinto stated during its earnings conference call that with all its owned projects progressing as planned, the company's lithium production capacity is expected to reach 200,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually by 2028. The increase will primarily stem from the Fenix project, the expansion of Sal de Vida, and the commissioning of the Rincon and Nemaska projects. By that time, total output will exceed three times the 57,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate production achieved in 2025. Rio Tinto previously announced its entry into the ranks of major lithium producers upon acquiring Arcadium, with plans to increase capacity to over 200,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually by 2028. The company has now confirmed its focus on achieving this target, positioning lithium as a “significant” component within its business structure. Expansion Projects: The mechanical portion of the 10,000-ton-per-year expansion at Fenix, one of the Argentine salt lake projects, has been completed, with commissioning progress reaching 60%. The mechanical vapor recompression unit has been put into operation to support the planned first production run. The first production from the expanded capacity remains on track to commence in the second half of 2026. At the new Sal de Vida project in Argentina, with an annual capacity of 15,000 metric tons, the mechanical works have been completed and commissioning is 40% complete. Production is expected to commence in the second half of 2026, projected to increase Rio Tinto's lithium output to 61,000–64,000 metric tons LCE in 2026. Regarding future projects: The Rincon project in Argentina, with an annual capacity of 60,000 metric tons, is progressing smoothly with its initial 3,000-metric-ton-per-year plant. It is expected to reach full capacity by year-end. The 57,000-metric-ton expansion plant has completed commissioning and is currently being started up, with first production planned for 2028. It will reach full production after a three-year ramp-up period. The mine has an estimated 40-year lifespan, with operating costs positioned in the top quartile of the industry cost curve. The Nemaska project in Canada features an integrated lithium hydroxide production line with a designed capacity of 28,000 metric tons per year. The mine's engineering design is complete, with construction progress at 60%. The lithium hydroxide refinery is scheduled to commence commissioning in 2026 and achieve first production in 2028. For the Whabouchi and Galaxy mines, strategic business and capital discipline reviews are underway with Canadian partners to determine the development of one of these mines. A decision is expected in the first half of 2026 to secure an integrated spodumene supply solution for the lithium hydroxide plant by 2028. In Chile, Rio Tinto anticipates closing agreements signed with state-owned mining companies Codelco and Enami in the first half of 2026. Rio Tinto has been selected as the private partner to develop Chile's two largest undeveloped lithium resources, with projects advancing upon agreement completion.

Amid a market characterized by a supply-demand mismatch, lithium carbonate prices have repeatedly hit new lows. On May 29, the most-traded lithium carbonate futures contract fell below the important threshold of 60,000 yuan/mt, closing at 58,860 yuan/mt. As lithium carbonate prices continue to decline, the hedging demand of industrial enterprises has gradually increased. On May 26, Salt Lake Potash Co., Ltd. announced that it planned to carry out lithium carbonate futures hedging operations to reduce the impact of lithium carbonate price fluctuations on the company's production and operation and effectively hedge against market risks.

SMM Alumina Morning Comment on May 23 Futures Market: Overnight, the most-traded alumina 2509 futures contract opened at 3,191 yuan/mt, with a high of 3,228 yuan/mt, a low of 3,153 yuan/mt, and closed at 3,199 yuan/mt, down 30 yuan/mt or 0.94%, with open interest at 393,000 lots. Spot Alumina: On Thursday, inquiries revealed that 3,000 mt of alumina were traded in Guizhou at a transaction price of 3,230 yuan/mt. Ore: As of May 22, the SMM imported bauxite index was reported at $72.14/mt, up $0.94/mt from the previous trading day, mainly due to some Guinea bauxite transactions with prices rising to $74/mt. The SMM Guinea bauxite CIF average price was reported at $72/mt, up $2/mt from the previous trading day. The SMM Australian low-temperature bauxite CIF average price was reported at $70/mt, unchanged from the previous trading day. The SMM Australian high-temperature bauxite CIF average price was reported at $65/mt, unchanged from the previous trading day. Industry News: Weekly Alumina Production Dynamics: According to SMM data, as of Thursday this week, the total installed capacity of metallurgical-grade alumina in China was 109.22 million mt/year, with a total operating capacity of 85.21 million mt/year. The national weekly alumina operating rate rebounded by 0.99 percentage points WoW to 78.01%, mainly due to the end of maintenance and production cuts at some enterprises, leading to a rebound in operating capacity. Alumina Port Inventory: According to SMM statistics on May 22, the total alumina inventory at domestic ports was 30,000 mt, down 8,000 mt from the previous week. Basis Report: According to SMM data, on May 22, the SMM alumina index was at a discount of 102.43 yuan/mt against the latest transaction price of the most-traded contract at 11:30. Warrant Report: On May 22, the total registered alumina warrants decreased by 9,895 mt from the previous trading day to 163,600 mt. The total registered alumina warrants in the Shandong region remained unchanged from the previous trading day at 601 mt. The total registered alumina warrants in the Henan region remained unchanged from the previous trading day at 3,001 mt. The total registered alumina warrants in the Guangxi region decreased by 1,201 mt from the previous trading day to 81.05 million mt (Note: There seems to be a unit error here; it should likely be 8,105 mt instead of 81.05 million mt, but the original text is translated as is). The total registered alumina warrants in the Gansu region remained unchanged from the previous trading day at 6,306 mt. The total registered alumina warrants in the Xinjiang region decreased by 8,694 mt from the previous trading day to 145,600 mt. Overseas Market: As of May 22, 2025, the FOB Western Australia alumina price was $370/mt, with an ocean freight rate of $21.40/mt. The USD/CNY exchange rate selling price was around 7.22. This price translates to an external selling price of approximately 3,274 yuan/mt at major domestic ports, which is 146 yuan/mt higher than the domestic alumina price. The alumina import window remained closed. Summary: This week, some enterprises in north China underwent maintenance, while some alumina refineries in south China completed maintenance, leading to a rebound in operating capacity. Overall, the national alumina operating capacity increased by 1.09 million mt WoW this week. In the near future, some new alumina enterprises are expected to undergo maintenance, while some enterprises are anticipated to complete maintenance and resume operating capacity. On the whole, the operating capacity is expected to continue to rebound slightly. Affected by the supply-side disruptions in the bauxite market, bauxite ore prices have risen, and the cost support for alumina is expected to strengthen. Coupled with the fact that the short-term fundamentals have not shifted to a surplus situation, there is still upward momentum in prices. However, with the repair of supply, the alumina price increase may encounter resistance, and in the short term, the alumina price is expected to hold up well. [The information provided is for reference only. This article does not constitute direct advice for investment research decisions. Clients should make cautious decisions and should not rely on this as a substitute for independent judgment. Any decisions made by clients are unrelated to SMM.]

Last week, polysilicon futures prices showed a rebound trend, closing higher for two consecutive trading days. On May 9, the most-traded PS2506 polysilicon futures contract closed at 38,175 yuan/mt, with a daily increase of 5.7%. Li Xiangying, an analyst at Guosen Futures, believes that the recent rise in polysilicon futures prices is a correction of the previous oversold conditions. "The polysilicon futures prices were previously oversold, falling below the cash cost line of enterprises and trading at a significant discount to spot quotes," Li explained. The spot quote for polysilicon is around 37,000 yuan/mt for mixed-grade material, while the delivery brand for polysilicon futures is higher-quality dense material. Although the supply and demand situation for polysilicon has not improved, there is upward momentum after the oversold prices. "The time period for the market-oriented reform of new energy electricity prices is approaching, and the rapid contraction of end-user order demand has triggered expectations of negative feedback in the industry," said Wang Yanqing, an analyst at China Securities Futures. The fundamental situation of polysilicon remains weak, leading to the previous decline in futures prices below the cash cost line of mainstream enterprises. Therefore, the current futures prices have some correction momentum. From the perspective of the industry's cost curve, Zheng Feifan, an analyst of non-ferrous metals and new materials at CITIC Futures Research Institute, introduced that at the beginning of 2024, the cash cost line for the most advanced 1.5 million mt of capacity in the industry was around 42,000 yuan/mt, mainly from several leading manufacturers. With technological progress and a decline in raw material prices, by the end of 2024, the cash cost line for the most advanced 1.5 million mt of capacity in the industry had fallen to around 38,000 yuan/mt. In 2025, polysilicon production processes are expected to continue to be optimized, with costs potentially falling further, and the cash cost line is expected to drop to 33,000-34,000 yuan/mt. In addition, the registration of polysilicon warrants is still in its early stages, and the quality requirements for delivery brands are high. The deliverable resources in the market are relatively concentrated, with spot and warrant factors supporting near-month prices, resulting in a "backwardation structure" in the futures market. As the delivery time for the PS2506 contract approaches, the market is also watching whether the futures market can alleviate the high inventory pressure in the spot market. According to SMM data, as of the week ending May 9, the social inventory of polysilicon was 257,000 mt, down 1.9% WoW, but still at a high level. "When the absolute price falls below the key level of 35,000 yuan/mt, the market believes it has fallen below the industry's average theoretical cash cost, which may indirectly affect the speed at which spot inventory is transferred to the futures market," said Liu Yixian, an analyst at Hongze Research. Currently, downstream demand for polysilicon is low, and the market is showing an active destocking pattern. From the perspective of the supply-demand gap in the production schedule for "polysilicon-wafers," although polysilicon is currently in a slow destocking phase, inventory levels in the polysilicon segment remain high, with spot cargo still being sold at a volume discount. From a fundamental perspective, domestic polysilicon production remained at a low level of 95,000 mt in April. Zheng Feifan believes that polysilicon companies are currently operating at a loss overall, and supply is expected to remain tight in May. However, the market still has some concerns about production resumptions at major plants during the rainy season. On the demand side, production scheduling for solar cells and modules remained high in March and April, driving a rebound in the operating rate of silicon wafers. However, crystal pulling enterprises mainly focused on digesting inventories, resulting in relatively limited procurement of polysilicon. The PV "installation rush" in May may come to an end. Looking ahead, Li Xiangying stated that the current fundamental situation for polysilicon remains unfavorable, with little improvement expected in the short-term weakness of demand. The trend in spot prices will depend more on supply-side adjustments to the operating rate. "Futures price trends follow changes in supply and demand, as well as cost conditions in the spot market." Li Xiangying believes that, in the absence of significant changes in the supply-demand pattern, polysilicon spot prices are likely to continue fluctuating around the cost line. "From the current market trading logic, polysilicon futures prices may have short-term rebound momentum, with potential expectations for production cuts also providing support to the futures market." Wang Yanqing cautioned that overall polysilicon inventories remain high, and there is significant downward pressure on prices from downstream buyers, leading to sluggish spot transactions. Under the negative feedback from the industry chain, the upside room for polysilicon prices is limited.

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