Over the next decade (2026-2035), the combined market share of the three traditional major lithium producers Australia, China and Chile is expected to keep declining as emerging suppliers scale up, with Zimbabwe and Argentina identified as the key sources of new supply. Zimbabwe, in particular, is likely to lead a new round of African lithium expansion, according to a latest research report. Strong H1 momentum, supported by storage demand. China's battery-grade lithium carbonate spot price stood at around 153,950 yuan/mt (approx. USD 21,500/mt) on August 17, after a rally of more than 130% from the June 2025 low of 58,400 yuan/mt. The 2026 forecast for China lithium carbonate has been revised up to USD 20,100/t and lithium hydroxide monohydrate to USD 19,600/t, reflecting that H1 momentum. Prices are expected to ease in H2 as smelter maintenance ends and supply returns, but storage demand is limiting the downside market balances now point to month-on-month destocking through H2 2026, with some analysts projecting the year's price peak in late Q3/early Q4. From ore exporter to processor enforced by policy. Zimbabwe’s rise is no longer just a forecast. On February 25, 2026, Zimbabwe's mining ministry banned all exports of lithium raw ore and concentrates with immediate effect, forcing miners to build local processing capacity. Zimbabwe's output was expected to reach ~200,000 t LCE in 2026 (up over 15% year on year), equal to ~10% of global primary lithium supply and ~17% of global spodumene supply before the ban; the restriction is estimated to affect around 12,000 t LCE of monthly supply. Key projects include: 1) Huayou Cobalt's Arcadia ~70,000-80,000 t LCE of mine output expected in 2026, with its 50,000 t/yr lithium sulphate plant commissioned in Q1 2026 and now ramping up; 2) Sinomine's Bikita ~60,000-70,000 t LCE expected in 2026, with a 30,000 t/yr lithium sulphate plant slated for 2027; 3) Chengxin's Sabi Star (~35,000 t LCE) and Yahua's Kamativi (~50,000 t LCE) rounding out a Chinese-invested project portfolio totaling roughly 230,000 t LCE. 4) In 2025, Zimbabwe shipped over 1.2 million tonnes of spodumene to China about 15% of China's total imports making it a supply source Beijing's supply chain cannot easily replace. 2026 is the last investment peak of this cycle global lithium supply is projected to rise ~30% year on year to over 2.1 million t LCE in 2026, concentrated in China and Africa (Africa alone adding ~140,000 t to reach ~380,000 t LCE). Chinese output hit 970,000 t of lithium carbonate in 2025, with new additions this year from Qinghai/Tibet salt lakes, Sichuan spodumene and Jianxiawo's expected restart in H2. Australia shipped 158,000 t of spodumene to China in the week of August 10-16 alone. But few new projects are lined up beyond 2027 a key reason sentiment has flipped from glut to deficit: Morgan Stanley now forecasts an 80,000 t LCE global deficit for 2026, UBS sees a 22,000 t shortfall, versus a 61,000 t surplus in 2025. EVs slow, storage takes the wheel. Global lithium demand growth is expected to slow to 5.8% in 2026 (from 18.5% in 2025), with passenger EV sales growth falling to 3.9% (vs 22.8% in 2025 and 24% in 2024) as China's trade-in subsidies end and the US IRA rollback bites. Energy storage is now the core demand pillar: storage-sector lithium demand is forecast to jump ~55-74% in 2026, lifting its share of total lithium demand from 23% to ~31%. LFP batteries account for over 90% of battery storage applications and more than half of global EV battery installations; China's LFP cell makers reported hot August orders with output up ~5% month on month. China's NEV penetration hit 58.5% in June above 50% for the third straight month. Battery manufacturing investment in China grew 23% in January-July 2026. Risks. Lithium remains in a "tug-of-war" between supply-release concerns and storage-driven demand support, with risks skewed to the downside: a sustained price recovery could trigger rapid restarts (curtailed capacity covering 750,000+ t of concentrate sits near a ~USD 1,200/t restart cost line), sodium-ion substitution becomes economic if cell prices stay above ~0.4 yuan/Wh, and rising energy costs plus a potential sulfur shortage could squeeze miners' margins. Longer term, battery chemistry innovation and recycling could cut lithium intensity and expand secondary supply reshaping the opportunity window for emerging producers like Zimbabwe. SMM View: Zimbabwe's February export ban has turned the "move down the value chain" story from intention into policy reality Chinese invested projects at Arcadia and Bikita are now the country's only guaranteed export channels via lithium sulphate, and the roughly 12,000 t LCE/month of disrupted supply was a direct catalyst in this year's price rally above 150,000 yuan/mt. The report's core thesis a declining share for Australia, China and Chile, with Africa gaining is being validated in real time, Africa adds ~140,000 t LCE of supply in 2026, the largest increment after China. But Zimbabwe's ramp-up pace, its ability to keep sulphate exports flowing, and downstream pricing power remain the key variables determining whether it can fully deliver on its market-share ambitions

Sinomine Resource Group's Zimbabwe unit, Masingo Lithium Technology, has obtained EIA approval for its 100,000 t/y lithium sulfate plant at Bikita, moving the project into full construction with contractors China Railway No. 9 Group and Shandong Dadi now on site. Completion is targeted for mid-2027. The clearance formalizes a plan first disclosed in September 2024 and reaffirmed via Sinomine's RMB 5.2 billion ($764 million) fundraising in May 2026, rather than signaling new capital commitment. Bikita becomes Zimbabwe's third Chinese-backed lithium sulfate project, joining Huayou's 50,000 t/y Arcadia plant commissioned July 2026, running near 60% of capacity as of late July and Yahua's Kamativi facility construction started February 2026, capacity undisclosed. Combined announced capacity across all three approaches 200,000+ t/y once complete, ahead of Zimbabwe's January 2027 concentrate export ban. SMM View: Arcadia's slower than nameplate ramp is the key benchmark here if Bikita follows a similar curve at double the capacity, full-rate output likely slips into 2028 despite a mid-2027 completion date. With all three plants now past groundbreaking, Zimbabwe's beneficiation push has shifted from policy to physical build out, the next signal to watch is how strictly the export ban is enforced against each plant's actual commissioning timeline, not just its announced one.

Zimbabwe exported US$782 million worth of lithium products in the first half of 2026, representing a 230% year on year increase from US$237 million in H1 2025, according to Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube during the country's mid-year budget review. Lithium accounted for approximately 12% of Zimbabwe's total mineral export revenue, ranking behind only gold and platinum group metals (PGMs), further strengthening its position as one of the country's key export commodities. The government expects lithium's contribution to increase further following the April 2026 commissioning of Zimbabwe's first lithium sulphate plant, marking a significant step in the country's strategy to move up the battery materials value chain. Zimbabwe continues to require foreign investors, particularly Chinese mining companies, to expand downstream processing capacity within the country. As part of its beneficiation policy, Zimbabwe plans to ban lithium concentrate exports from January 2027, encouraging producers to export higher-value processed lithium products instead. According to the Ministry of Finance, 2026 lithium production is forecast at 2.14 million metric tons, slightly below the 2.2 million metric tons produced in 2025. Earlier this year, Zimbabwe temporarily suspended lithium concentrate exports in February, citing irregularities and leakages in export activities. Official data also showed Zimbabwe exported 1.13 million metric tons of lithium products in 2025, suggesting inventories have accumulated at several mining operations as export restrictions and processing capacity continue to evolve. Zimbabwe's lithium sector remains dominated by major Chinese investors, including Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Sinomine Resource Group, Chengxin Lithium Group, Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group, and Tsingshan Holding Group, all of which have invested heavily in Zimbabwe's mining and downstream lithium processing projects. SMM Analysis: Zimbabwe is accelerating its transition from a lithium concentrate exporter to a battery materials producer through export restrictions and mandatory local beneficiation. While near-term concentrate exports may remain constrained, expanding domestic conversion capacity is expected to increase exports of higher-value lithium chemicals, reinforcing Zimbabwe's strategic role in the global EV battery supply chain.

The first half of 2026 is already in the past. At the start of H2, industry chain enterprises have begun to release their H1 2026 performance forecasts collectively. Notably, against the backdrop of a significantly higher YoY lithium price center, stable demand in the NEV industry, and a continuously booming energy storage sector, most enterprises in the lithium industry chain expect varying degrees of performance improvement. SMM has compiled the performance forecast situations of some enterprises in the industry chain, as follows:

On 22 July 2026, Zimbabwe’s state-owned Mutapa Energy Resources released the JORC-compliant resource estimate for the Sandawana lithium project: Block A totals 39.9 million tonnes at 1.39% Li₂O, with an exceptional 72% classified as Measured. Block A accounts for only 30% of the lease area; the remaining 70% remains unexplored, and the company targets upgrading the total resource to 90 million tonnes. The Zimbabwean government has banned concentrate exports effective 1 January 2027 with no extension granted, forcing miners to accelerate local processing. Sandawana’s processing plan is still at the feasibility stage, lagging behind peers such as Huayou Cobalt (already in production), Sinomine and Yahua (under construction). Chinese capital is deeply involved: Huayou and Tsingshan are building a US$270 million concentrator under a BOT model, while Mutapa has secured an additional US$300 million in funding (including Chinese investors). SMM believes the high Measured proportion gives the project strong “bankability”, but the mismatch between resources and processing capacity, combined with the export ban countdown, makes the next six months decisive for the project’s success. I. JORC Resource: Nearly 40 Mt with 72% Measured On 22 July 2026, Zimbabwe’s state-owned lithium enterprise, Mutapa Energy Resources (MER), officially released the JORC (Joint Ore Reserves Committee)-compliant resource estimate for the Sandawana lithium mine. The report shows that Block A contains a total mineral resource of 39.9 million tonnes at an average grade of 1.39% Li₂O – of which Measured Resource is approximately 28.6 million tonnes, accounting for 72% ; Indicated Resource is 2.7 million tonnes (6.8%); and Inferred Resource is 8.5 million tonnes (21.3%). This proportion of Measured Resource is extremely rare in Zimbabwe’s mining industry. At the Harare press conference, Mutapa Energy CEO Innocent Rukweza stated: “To our knowledge, we are the first mine in Zimbabwe with a Measured Resource representing 72% of the total resource. Most mines are far below this level, while we have exceeded 50%, which makes the resource ‘bankable’.” Even more noteworthy is that this 39.9 million tonnes resource is derived only from Block A, which covers just 30% of the entire 3,800-hectare mining lease. Blocks B and C – together accounting for 70% of the lease area – remain largely unexplored. Rukweza made it clear that the company aims to increase the total resource from the current nearly 40 million tonnes to 90 million tonnes . To achieve the above exploration results, Mutapa Energy completed 103,000 metres of drilling and collected and tested 33,000 samples over the past 11 months, at a total cost of US$24 million . The company has already mined approximately 2 million tonnes of ore from Sandawana and is constructing a concentrator with an annual processing capacity of 3 million tonnes . II. From Abandoned Emerald Mine to National Lithium Strategic Pillar Sandawana is not a greenfield project. Its mining history dates back to 1955 , when it was renowned for high-quality emerald (green beryl) production and operated for about 40 years. In 2010, operations were suspended due to working capital shortages and depletion of emerald resources. The mine’s “second life” began with Zimbabwe’s national strategic shift. As the global energy transition accelerated, lithium rose from a niche mineral to “white petroleum”. The Zimbabwean government incorporated lithium development into its national strategy, and Sandawana was repositioned as a lithium and tantalum project, placed under Mutapa Energy Resources, which is owned by the Mutapa Investment Fund. In 2025 , the former operating entity Kuvimba Mining House announced a US$270 million investment to build a lithium concentrator at Sandawana, with construction planned to start in the third quarter of 2025 and commissioning targeted for early 2027. In February 2026 , the Mutapa Investment Fund restructured Kuvimba into several specialised entities, and Mutapa Energy Minerals formally took over Sandawana, with Innocent Rukweza appointed as CEO. This restructuring marked Sandawana’s upgrade from a “legacy asset” to a flagship project of Zimbabwe’s national lithium strategy. III. Lithium Sulphate Strategy: A Chaser under Policy Pressure Sandawana’s processing roadmap is clear and urgent: concentrate → lithium sulphate → lithium carbonate . Zimbabwe’s government has progressively tightened lithium controls: in 2022 it banned unprocessed raw ore exports; in June 2025 it announced a ban on lithium concentrate exports effective 1 January 2027 ; in February 2026 it temporarily suspended all concentrate exports, later granting conditional soft relief via quotas while imposing an additional 10%–16% tax on concentrate exports and requiring written commitments from companies to build lithium sulphate plants before 2027. The government has explicitly ruled out any extension and will enforce the ban as scheduled. This policy imposes enormous time pressure on all lithium miners in Zimbabwe. In June 2026 , Rukweza, in his capacity as chairman of the Zimbabwe Lithium Producers’ Association, submitted an appeal to the government on behalf of the industry, requesting a postponement of the ban to March or June 2027 . In his remarks, he stated candidly: “We are not trying to avoid our beneficiation obligations; we are sincerely asking for time to complete the projects we have already started.” He revealed that among the seven major lithium producers, only Huayou Cobalt’s lithium sulphate plant has been completed, commissioned and has achieved product shipments ; Sinomine’s Bikita Minerals and Yahua’s Kamativi lithium mine are still under construction. Sandawana’s processing scheme, by contrast, remains at the feasibility study stage . In other words, Sandawana is far ahead on resources but a chaser on processing. The company has committed approximately US$1.45 billion to local processing facilities, but the time window is narrowing. IV. Chinese Capital: Deep Integration from Financing to Construction Long before the investment landed, Chinese companies were already deeply embedded in Sandawana’s development chain. In September 2024 , Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan Holding Group reached a cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe’s state-owned Kuvimba Mining House (the predecessor of Mutapa Energy Resources). Under the agreement, the Chinese partners do not hold direct equity in Sandawana, but participate under a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model – the partners will operate the processing plant for at least 5 years after commissioning, during which they will recover construction costs and earn operating profits, after which all assets and titles will be transferred to the Zimbabwean state free of charge . In February 2026 , Mutapa Energy Resources CEO Rukweza officially confirmed that the Sandawana concentrator would be built in cooperation with Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan under this BOT framework. The facility involves an investment of US$270 million , with an annual processing capacity of 600,000 tonnes of ore, targeting commissioning in early 2027. Dinson Holdings , as Tsingshan’s core investment platform in Zimbabwe, though not directly involved in the Sandawana project cooperation, operates an ore processing facility with an annual capacity of 1 million tonnes through its subsidiary Gwanda Lithium . Before Sandawana’s own concentrator is completed, some ore from Sandawana has been shipped to Gwanda for processing. Dinson has accumulated total investments of approximately US$900 million in Zimbabwe, covering ferrochrome smelting, coke, steel and lithium processing, forming a critical pillar for Tsingshan’s lithium operations in the country. In addition, Sinomine Resource Group, Chengxin Lithium Group and Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group are among the Chinese companies that have invested in Zimbabwe’s lithium sector. Chinese capital’s presence in Zimbabwe’s lithium industry has extended from pure investment to full-chain cooperation covering technology, engineering, construction and off-take agreements. SMM Perspectives The release of Sandawana’s JORC resource has landmark significance on three levels: First, the “certainty” value of resource quality. A Measured Resource proportion of 72% is exceptionally rare in African mining projects. This means geological risk has been substantially compressed, giving the project clear “bankability”. Against the backdrop of global lithium prices falling from their 2022 peak of approximately US$86,000/tonne to the current level of about US$14,000/tonne, capital is placing a higher premium on “certainty” – Sandawana’s high Measured proportion precisely meets that demand. Second, the urgency of the time window. The 1 January 2027 concentrate export ban is now on a countdown. Sandawana’s resource is “in place”, but its processing capacity remains at the “feasibility study” stage. Huayou Cobalt is already in production, while Sinomine and Yahua are under construction – Sandawana clearly lags behind its peers on the processing front. Whether the US$300 million funding can translate into rapid processing facility construction will determine whether this “Zimbabwe’s largest undeveloped lithium asset” can complete its value realisation before the ban takes effect. Third, the game of Zimbabwe’s “resource nationalism”. From the 2022 raw ore ban to the 2027 concentrate ban, Zimbabwe is advancing along a clear path: “ban raw ore → restrict concentrate → mandate lithium sulphate”. The objective is clear: to keep higher value-added links of the lithium value chain within the country. But for Sandawana, this means a stark choice between “selling concentrate” and “building a lithium sulphate plant” – and time is not on its side. Sandawana possesses Zimbabwe’s highest-quality lithium resource endowment and carries the nation’s ambition to transform from a resource exporter into a battery materials producer. But whether the “quality” of its resources can translate into the “quantity” of processing capacity depends on a three-way race among capital, technology and policy. The US$300 million has arrived, the US$270 million concentrator is under construction, but the feasibility study for the lithium sulphate plant has only just begun. When the clock strikes January 2027, will Sandawana be an “exemption” or a “restricted party” under the concentrate export ban? The answer will be revealed in the next six months. Sources: Mutapa Energy Resources, SMM, publicly available information

Price Trends In the first half of 2026, domestic lithium hydroxide prices followed a trajectory of "surge – high-level volatility – softening decline," with the price center first rising and then falling amid the interplay of multiple factors. January: Prices surged sharply. Concentrated maintenance shutdowns at major lithium salt producers tightened spot supply. Combined with persistently rising costs of lithium carbonate and lithium ore, lithium salt producers held firm on pricing, pushing the monthly average price up by 65% month-on-month. Although ternary material manufacturers maintained just-in-time procurement and remained cautious on spot orders, and some import flows returned due to domestic-international price spreads, the phase of supply shortages and cost support still drove prices to a high level. February: Prices fluctuated at high levels with thinning trading. Macro sentiment drove overall lithium prices downward, but producers' firm pricing stance persisted. Downstream ternary manufacturers, having ample inventories and some entering maintenance, saw eased raw material shortages, with procurement mostly based on monthly average prices. During the Chinese New Year holiday, transportation of lithium hydroxide, classified as hazardous chemicals, stalled, leading to a seasonal quiet period; post-holiday restocking demand was tepid, limiting upside momentum, and prices oscillated widely throughout the month. March: Gains narrowed notably. Cell manufacturers' offtake fell short of expectations, and new orders for ternary materials were limited. Additionally, increased customer-supplied materials in mid-month sharply reduced spot demand, leading to subdued trading and an upward price channel that stalled. The monthly average price rose only 3.4% month-on-month. April: First down then up. In the first half, limited new ternary orders and scarce spot demand put mild pressure on prices; in the second half, pre-holiday stocking and new orders drove increased inquiries from ternary producers, while sharp rises in lithium carbonate and ore prices pulled lithium hydroxide higher. The monthly average price rose 2.73% month-on-month. May: Rose then fell. In the first half, positive demand expectations and supply-side disruptions lifted lithium carbonate and ore prices, pulling lithium hydroxide higher in tandem; in the second half, sentiment turned weaker, with more trades settled via negotiation between traders and material mills. As ternary demand trends became clearer, upstream producers softened their price support, prompting a modest pullback. The monthly average price reached RMB 174,000/ton, up 13.6% month-on-month. June: Prices fell notably, with range-bound volatility intensifying. Frequent supply disruptions on the lithium resource side amplified market volatility significantly, prompting holders to adopt a cautious stance and quote prices in line with market conditions. Upstream producers adjusted prices flexibly, while traders maintained a high discount (over RMB 15,000/ton against the lithium carbonate futures main contract). On the demand side, total ternary material demand remained weak month-on-month, but within the RMB 135,000–145,000/ton range, downstream buyers showed strong willingness to stockpile on dips, providing some bottom support and exacerbating range-bound fluctuations. The monthly average price fell 11.52% month-on-month. Looking at the price trends, the correlation between lithium hydroxide prices and lithium carbonate futures prices has strengthened over the past six months. This is partly because upstream producers use a "lithium carbonate price × discount factor" formula as a floor price in their pricing. On the other hand, traders capitalize on the price spreads between domestic and overseas lithium hydroxide and between hydroxide and carbonate, by importing lithium hydroxide and pricing their sales with reference to lithium carbonate futures, further reinforcing this price linkage. Production In the first half of 2026, domestic total lithium hydroxide output reached 172,000 tons, up 21% year-on-year, driven by relatively robust downstream demand, with notable incremental growth. By output structure, the refining segment contributed the most, accounting for about 88%. Within this, the gradual ramp-up of new production lines at leading companies added some volume, while other enterprises maintained steady output backed by downstream orders, resulting in an 18% year-on-year increase for the overall refining segment. For the causticization segment, most active producers sustained stable operations, and the industry CR5 reached 72% in the first half, indicating a persistently high market concentration. From the capacity utilization perspective, although some capacity has been switched to lithium carbonate production, the operating rate for the lithium hydroxide industry has consistently lingered below 50% over the past six months, reflecting an ongoing overcapacity trend. Costs and margins: For the refining segment, lithium ore feedstock remained relatively tight in the first half of 2026, with ore prices staying elevated and closely correlated with lithium carbonate prices, providing strong cost support for lithium hydroxide. As a result, non‑integrated producers faced notable pressure on the sales side, and their product discount prices did not decline further, which in turn provided marginal support for profit margins at current price levels. For the causticization segment, the supply of salt‑lake‑based lithium salts has increased over the past six months, making causticization feedstock relatively ample. The linkage between actual procurement costs and industrial‑grade carbonate quotes has weakened, which has alleviated cost pressures for enterprises that purchase lithium carbonate externally, leading to actual profitability in the causticization segment being better than theoretical estimates. Import and Export The import‑export landscape has seen a notable reversal. On the export front, since the second half of 2025, some overseas ternary material producers have shifted to entrusting domestic tolling processors, resulting in products that would have been exported being delivered domestically instead, effectively suppressing export volumes. At the same time, overseas demand for ternary materials has remained persistently weak, reducing foreign buyers' appetite for Chinese lithium hydroxide. This, combined with the gradual ramp‑up of overseas local production lines, has collectively kept export volumes at low levels over the past six months. On the import side, weak overseas demand, high accumulated inventories, and arbitrage opportunities have driven import volumes to remain relatively elevated, further reinforcing the net import trend. Supply‑Demand Balance and Inventory The surge in import data made most months in the first half of the year oversupplied. However, from the perspective of directly usable lithium hydroxide products, the market as a whole remained in a relatively tight balance, providing effective support for upstream price control. As for inventory, current lithium hydroxide stock levels have improved significantly compared with the same period last year. This is mainly attributable to two factors: first, part of the inventory has been absorbed into the market by being converted into lithium carbonate; second, active producers have flexibly adjusted their output pace, keeping current inventory days at around one month. Future Outlook Looking ahead, although the LFP route continues to squeeze the ternary route, ternary materials currently have no rival in the high‑nickel segment. In addition, the cost advantages of 6‑series materials offer more possibilities for the ternary route. Based on end‑user production schedules, ternary power demand in the second half of 2026 is expected to maintain a sound performance, growing by approximately 36% compared with the first half. This will drive a roughly 7% sequential increase in ternary material output in the second half. As ternary materials continue to move toward higher nickel content, this brings an incremental demand trend for lithium hydroxide. Meanwhile, considering that most lithium hydroxide production lines have flexible switching or carbonation purification capabilities, lithium hydroxide output is projected to grow by about 6% sequentially. Coupled with a modest recovery in overseas ternary demand, the supply‑demand balance for lithium hydroxide is expected to remain tight through 2026–2027. In terms of price, under a market structure with highly concentrated supply, lithium hydroxide prices are primarily determined by the supply‑demand dynamics of its own industrial chain and closely track lithium ore and lithium salt price trends. Prices are currently oscillating in a range above RMB 150,000/ton. Futures Developments As for lithium hydroxide futures, there has been a flurry of related developments in the second quarter. The Guangzhou Futures Exchange (GFEX) and the Lithium Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association have both explicitly stated that they will continue to strengthen cooperation and jointly advance the listing of lithium hydroxide and other lithium‑chain futures products. The征求意见稿 of Guangzhou's "15th Five‑Year Plan" for finance also clearly supports GFEX in listing new‑energy futures such as lithium hydroxide. On the industrial side, companies have moved swiftly to follow up. In June, Yahua Group, Shengxin Lithium Energy, and Tianqi Lithium all announced their intention to apply to GFEX for designated delivery factory warehouse status for lithium hydroxide. In addition, Milkyway's shareholders' meeting approved a proposal for its subsidiary to apply to become a designated delivery warehouse for battery‑grade lithium hydroxide at GFEX. According to media reports, lithium salt producers (Ganfeng Lithium, Tianqi Lithium, Yahua Group, etc.) have already positioned themselves in the factory‑warehouse system. However, due to the high‑risk storage requirements of lithium hydroxide—such as strong corrosiveness, exothermic reaction with water, and the need for inert gas protection—no logistics‑focused player had previously entered this category. On the market front, some traders have already made early arrangements in anticipation of futures listing, and the number of merchants participating in lithium hydroxide import trade has noticeably increased. In summary, preparations for the listing of lithium hydroxide futures are progressing in an orderly manner, with positive official signals and accelerating industrial infrastructure development.

On the evening of July 6, Yahua Group released its performance forecast for the first half of 2026, expecting a net profit of 1.1 billion yuan to 1.3 billion yuan, representing a year-on-year increase of 710.17% to 857.48%. Yahua Group stated that in the first half of this year, lithium salt market prices continued to rise, and both sales volume and average selling prices of its lithium salt products increased, significantly boosting its main business revenue. At the same time, the company continuously deepens its full-chain production and operation management, strengthens the balance among mining, production, and sales, optimizes production efficiency, and strictly controls production costs, leading to an improvement in profitability.

Core View The main theme of lithium ore prices in H1 2026 was a sharp rally followed by a correction, rather than a one-way upward shift in the price center. The SMM spodumene concentrate index price (SC6, CIF China) started the year at around USD 2,000/t in January, briefly fell to USD 1,875/t in early February, then followed lithium carbonate prices higher and reached the year-to-date high of USD 2,780–2,840/t in mid-May, before retreating to the USD 2,385–2,480/t range in June. This trajectory almost fully mirrored lithium carbonate prices. Lithium carbonate spot prices started the year at around RMB 130,000/t, rose above RMB 200,000/t in May, and then pulled back to RMB 160,000–180,000/t in June. Lithium ore did not experience an independent rally throughout the period. It was pulled upward by lithium carbonate pricing via the futures market and then corrected as lithium carbonate prices peaked. Therefore, the starting point for understanding lithium ore prices in H1 is not resource-side supply and demand, but lithium carbonate pricing and market sentiment. One common misinterpretation needs to be corrected first: the strength in lithium ore prices in H1 was not the result of “tight effective supply pushing the price center higher.” The real drivers were the resonance of front-loaded demand, supply disruption expectations, and futures-driven sentiment. Front-loaded demand was triggered by export tax rebate adjustments; supply disruption expectations came from the repeated delays in Jianxiawo’s restart and Zimbabwe’s lithium concentrate export ban. When warehouse receipts accumulated and macro headwinds were released in May, and when Jianxiawo’s restart expectation materialized in June, prices corrected accordingly. After that, prices rebounded again as demand expectations improved. 1. Lithium Ore Followed Lithium Carbonate, While Spodumene-Based Conversion Margins Stayed Negative Throughout H1 The clearest evidence of the lithium ore pricing mechanism in H1 was not how much ore prices rose, but the fact that spot conversion margins for producing lithium carbonate from externally procured spodumene concentrate were negative for most of the period. The ore-salt margin inversion was structural and persistent in H1, rather than a short-lived squeeze on processing margins. The cause of this inversion directly points to the reversal of the pricing mechanism. Ore prices are no longer determined by a cost-plus model from the upstream side, which then determines lithium salt prices. Instead, lithium carbonate has become the pricing anchor, and ore prices are reverse-priced through the futures market. In early January, when lithium carbonate prices rallied on front-loaded demand and sentiment, ore prices were pushed higher at the same time. However, downstream lithium salt demand could not fully absorb the higher cost, and processing margins were squeezed into negative territory. In April, under the reality of ore-salt inversion and limited hedging opportunities, lithium salt producers relying on externally procured ore saw their ability to accept high-priced ore weaken significantly. For overseas miners, this means their realized selling prices are increasingly anchored by the profitability of China’s refining sector. This is not a narrative assumption, but a mechanism that can be verified month by month through spot margin data. The financialization of pricing was also visible in market transactions. When prices fell at the end of May, lithium salt producers became more active in pricing ore purchases. In June, the basis for new cargoes strengthened. Pricing based on futures quotation plus premium or discount has become the mainstream transaction model. Lithium salt producers tend to use pricing windows during price corrections to lock in ore supply. Whoever holds the pricing right controls the settlement timing, and in H1’s highly volatile two-way lithium carbonate market, this directly led to margin differentiation among different lithium salt producers. 2. The Three Drivers of the Rally and the Triggers of the Correction Front-loaded demand — export tax rebate adjustment. In January 2026, the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration clarified that the VAT export rebate rate for lithium battery products would be reduced from 9% to 6% from April 1, and fully removed from January 1, 2027. This policy directly stimulated downstream players to concentrate export shipments and inventory preparation before April, significantly front-loading demand into H1, especially supporting demand for energy storage and ternary-related materials. This was the most important demand-side catalyst in H1 and the one most easily overlooked by the “weak recovery” narrative. Supply disruption expectations — Jianxiawo and Zimbabwe. After Jianxiawo’s mining permit expired and production was halted in August 2025, its restart timeline was repeatedly pushed back in H1, continuously providing room for both bullish and bearish speculation in the market. Now that Jianxiawo’s restart has been confirmed, the largest bearish factor has been priced in, and the market’s focus has shifted back to whether demand can outperform expectations. In Zimbabwe, the lithium concentrate export ban at the beginning of the year disrupted shipment expectations. Positive progress was reported in late March, and by mid-May, Chinese-funded mining companies in Zimbabwe had completed export procedures and restarted shipments, easing the previous short-term tightness in African cargo arrivals. SMM expects the first batch of cargoes to arrive in China in mid-to-late July. Correction triggers — warehouse receipts, macro factors, and the materialization of restart expectations. After lithium carbonate prices rose above RMB 200,000/t in May, exchange warehouse receipts continued to accumulate and hit new highs, while concerns over off-balance-sheet inventory increased. Together with macro pressure from expectations of further Fed rate hikes, prices peaked and corrected in late May. On June 17, the approval of Jianxiawo’s land use application materialized, and clearer restart expectations further weighed on both ore and salt prices. By late June, according to SMM monthly production schedules, July demand showed resilience despite the seasonal lull, with both power and energy storage cell production schedules increasing month on month. Monthly lithium carbonate consumption remained at a high level, which restored some market confidence and pushed lithium prices higher again. 3. Supply-Side Reality: Imports Weakened Month on Month, but Cumulative Imports Still Increased; Australia Remained Dominant From January to May, spodumene imports showed a combination of weaker month-on-month momentum and continued year-on-year cumulative growth. On a monthly basis, imports reached 758,000 physical tonnes in April, down 9.5% month on month, and 680,800 tonnes in May, down 10.2% month on month. However, total spodumene imports in January–May reached around 3.66 million tonnes, up approximately 25% year on year. By origin, Australia remained the dominant source. China imported around 1.585 million tonnes from Australia in January–May, although May imports from Australia were around 330,000 tonnes, down approximately 15.2% year on year. The share of African supply continued to rise. On the shipment side, lithium concentrate shipments from Port Hedland to China showed clear quarter-end volume acceleration, with March shipments reaching around 122,000 tonnes, up 64.3% month on month. The marginal changes in overseas mines were concentrated in restarts and offtake agreements. Core Lithium restarted its Finniss project on May 20 and plans to ship the first batch of concentrate in Q4. Mineral Resources also restarted Bald Hill, with first spodumene output expected in July. These restart volumes are limited and will not change the short-term supply structure, but they reinforce the expectation of new supply materializing in H2 2026 and H1 2027. On the domestic side, SMM’s domestic sample mines produced 160,690 tonnes LCE in January–June. The restart of Jiangxi lepidolite mines was constrained by permitting procedures, environmental protection, profitability, and other factors, and did not fully ramp up in H1. 4. Migration of Long-Term Pricing Mechanisms: Floor Price Plus Pricing Optionality Has Become the Norm The long-term spodumene offtake agreements signed intensively in H1 provide direct contractual evidence of the financialization of ore pricing. In February, Pilbara Minerals signed a two-year offtake agreement with Tianhua New Energy, setting a floor price of USD 1,000/t, with no price ceiling, together with a USD 100 million interest-free prepayment. In the same period, Pilbara also signed a long-term agreement with Canmax. Yahua Group signed an offtake agreement with Brazil’s MGLIT, also with a minimum price of USD 1,000/t on a 6% basis. Liontown and Tianhua agreed on supply for 2027–2028, priced against a spodumene index. The common feature is a structure of USD 1,000/t floor price plus index or pricing optionality, with downside protection but no upside cap. The pricing benchmark is migrating from fixed website-based long-term pricing toward index-based and futures-linked pricing. This confirms that ore pricing is shifting from traditional long-term contracts to a more financialized structure of “floor price + pricing optionality + premium/discount.” This provides a contractual basis for assessing pricing transmission lags and distortions, and is also a key point for overseas investors to understand how China’s pricing system is penetrating upstream resources. 5. H2 Outlook H1 2026 provides a very clear methodological lesson for H2: lithium ore prices will not move independently from lithium carbonate. The core pricing variables for ore are not the nominal size of global lithium resources, but the dynamic matching among lithium carbonate futures, spot conversion margins for lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, domestic mine restart progress, African cargo arrival schedules, lithium salt producers’ feedstock inventories, and downstream material production schedules. In H1, lithium salt conversion margins remained negative for an extended period, yet ore prices did not fall quickly. Instead, they rose together with lithium carbonate prices under the influence of downstream restocking and supply disruption expectations. This shows that the H1 rally was not an independent strengthening of upstream fundamentals, but a synchronized industry-chain movement driven by front-loaded demand, delayed supply realization, and amplified futures sentiment. For H2 lithium ore analysis, the first step is to distinguish between “no shortage in total resources” and “short-term tightness in effective ore supply.” From a global resource perspective, Australia, Africa, Brazil, South American brines, and Chinese domestic mines all have incremental supply expectations, so there is no absolute shortage of resources. However, from the perspective of Chinese lithium salt production, what truly affects lithium carbonate supply is ore that can be purchased in time, arrive steadily, meet grade requirements, have controllable impurities, and match existing processing lines. If ore is locked in long-term contracts, still in transit, concentrated in trader inventories, or if high prices reduce lithium salt producers’ willingness to purchase, its contribution to short-term lithium salt supply will be weakened. Therefore, H2 analysis should not simply focus on mine output. It should track port inventories, traders’ saleable inventories, in-plant inventories at lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, vessel schedules, and long-term contract lock-up structures. On the domestic supply side, Jianxiawo is the core variable driving H2 market expectations, but its impact should not be simplified as “restart equals immediate supply.” After the mine was suspended, the market treated it as the key anchor for marginal domestic lepidolite supply. The real question in H2 is not the single event of whether it restarts, but whether the restarted volume becomes freely tradable ore. If the output is mainly consumed within CATL’s integrated system, the impact on the spot ore market and externally procured ore salt producers will be limited. Only if the output enters the spot market will it directly pressure ore prices and conversion margins. At the same time, the suspension and restart timeline of other Jiangxi lepidolite mines also needs to be incorporated into the framework. Previous public reports indicated that some mines in Yichun may first exhaust their annual mining quota during the license renewal process and then enter a production halt for license renewal. If these mines continue to be affected by permitting, environmental protection, safety, or profitability factors in H2, the supply elasticity of domestic lepidolite will be weaker than nominal capacity suggests. Conversely, if Jianxiawo and other Yichun mines move forward with restarts or license renewals in Q3–Q4, the marginal contribution of domestic ore to lithium carbonate supply will increase significantly and put pressure on high ore prices. In other words, domestic ore supply in H2 should not be treated as a single variable. It is jointly determined by Jianxiawo, other Yichun mines, and the operating rates of Jiangxi lepidolite-based lithium salt producers. For overseas ore, African supply remains one of the largest sources of H2 supply elasticity. In H1, the disruptions in Africa were more about policy, shipment, and arrival timing rather than the disappearance of resources. If shipments from Zimbabwe and other regions recover and previously delayed cargoes arrive in China in a concentrated manner, feedstock availability for lithium salt producers will improve and the bargaining power of ore sellers will weaken. However, if policy disruption, logistics cycles, grade volatility, or financing pressure cause arrivals to remain inconsistent, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore may still be unable to raise operating rates quickly even if margin repair expectations improve. Australian supply is relatively stable, but a large portion is locked under long-term contracts, limiting its marginal adjustment impact on the spot market. Brazilian and other emerging resources are more important for medium- and long-term expectations, while their short-term impact on Chinese lithium salt production depends on arrival timing and quality stability. Demand is the key factor determining downside support for ore prices. In H2, power batteries and energy storage will enter the traditional peak season, and the expansion and ramp-up of cell and material producers will continue to lift lithium salt consumption. In particular, lithium iron phosphate output, supported by energy storage and commercial vehicle demand, is expected to remain high and provide sustained demand for lithium carbonate. Although ternary materials are growing more slowly than LFP, they may still see periodic restocking driven by certain overseas and high-end power battery demand. If material producers’ expansion is realized smoothly, lithium salt producers will need to maintain high operating rates to meet long-term contract deliveries and spot orders, which will in turn support rigid ore procurement demand. Conversely, if terminal orders fail to absorb the expansion of materials, material producers may enter a destocking cycle, and lithium salt producers’ ore procurement will quickly weaken, causing ore prices to come under pressure earlier. Therefore, H2 lithium ore prices can be divided into four scenarios. Base case: margins gradually rebalance, and ore prices fluctuate at high levels before edging lower. Jianxiawo’s restart expectation materializes, but actual mining and beneficiation ramp-up is gradual. African cargo arrivals recover but do not form a concentrated shock. Power battery and energy storage production schedules remain high, while material producers’ expansion is gradually realized. In this scenario, lithium carbonate prices remain volatile at high levels, the margin inversion of externally procured ore salt producers slowly improves, and lithium ore prices follow lithium carbonate lower but do not collapse. The profits that were excessively concentrated in upstream resources and futures expectations in H1 begin to gradually flow back toward midstream refining. Correction scenario: supply materializes in a concentrated manner, and profits quickly flow back to midstream refining. If Jianxiawo ramps up faster than expected and part of its output enters the spot market; if other Yichun mines progress faster than expected in license renewals; if African ore arrives in China in a concentrated way; and if lithium carbonate warehouse receipts and futures market pressure intensify, ore prices will face stronger downside pressure. The transmission chain would be: lithium carbonate futures turn bearish → lithium salt producers become more cautious in procurement → rigid demand for externally procured ore slows → traders release saleable inventories → ore prices correct quickly. In this scenario, profits do not disappear; they shift quickly from upstream resources back to midstream refining, and overseas miners’ realized prices also come under pressure. The key is not the nominal restart volume of Jianxiawo, but whether the restarted ore is internally consumed or enters the spot market, and whether downstream material inventories can absorb the additional lithium salt supply. Support scenario: effective ore supply remains tight, and profits stay upstream. If Jianxiawo’s actual output is later than market expectations, if license renewals or environmental factors continue to suppress the supply elasticity of other Yichun mines, if African arrivals remain inconsistent, and if peak-season energy storage and power battery production schedules continue to exceed expectations, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore will still face the situation of “orders and capacity available, but feedstock either expensive or unstable.” In this case, negative conversion margins will force some marginal lithium salt producers to reduce operating rates. The contraction of effective lithium carbonate supply will support lithium salt prices; and once salt prices stabilize, ore prices will also gain support. The persistent margin inversion in H1 has already shown that losses are not simply bearish. They act as an automatic stabilizer for the industry chain: they force some marginal refining capacity to shut down, reduce lithium salt supply, and thereby support prices in reverse. Upside scenario: effective ore shortage transmits into lithium salt supply contraction, driving ore prices higher again. If H2 sees the combination of stronger-than-expected demand, weaker-than-expected domestic ore realization, and inconsistent overseas arrivals, lithium ore prices could still rise further. Specifically, if energy storage demand remains highly robust and power batteries enter the traditional peak season with further upward revisions to cell and material production schedules, especially as new LFP capacity continues to ramp up, monthly lithium carbonate consumption will continue to rise. At the same time, if Jianxiawo’s restart is slower than expected, or if output after the restart is mainly consumed within the integrated system with limited spot supply, and if other Jiangxi lepidolite mines are temporarily halted due to license renewal, environmental protection, safety, or profitability factors, domestic ore supply elasticity will fall short of nominal expectations. If African ore arrivals are also inconsistent due to shipment schedules, policy disruptions, grade volatility, or financing issues, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore will face difficulties replenishing feedstock. Under this scenario, ore is no longer merely a variable reverse-priced by lithium carbonate. It begins to constrain lithium salt supply in reverse. The transmission chain would be: downstream material and cell production schedules are revised upward → lithium carbonate spot destocking accelerates → lithium salt producers increase operating rates to fulfill orders → demand for processable ore rises → domestic ore and overseas arrivals fail to ramp up simultaneously → feedstock inventories at externally procured ore salt producers decline → some marginal producers cut output because they cannot secure suitable ore or because margins remain deeply negative → effective lithium carbonate supply contracts → lithium carbonate spot and futures prices strengthen again → lithium ore prices follow lithium carbonate upward. In this case, ore price increases are not driven by independent upstream strength. They are re-priced upward by lithium carbonate after insufficient effective ore supply starts to restrict lithium salt output. In this upside scenario, spot conversion margins for externally procured ore may remain negative or even widen further. On the surface, negative margins should pressure ore prices. But under the combination of strong demand, strong lithium salt prices, and tight ore supply, negative margins can instead become a price-supporting mechanism. On one hand, they force some high-cost externally procured ore producers to suspend operations, reducing lithium carbonate supply. On the other hand, producers with long-term delivery obligations, customer orders, or futures hedging needs still have to keep buying ore, further consuming saleable ore supply. The end result is that industry-chain profits remain concentrated upstream, lithium salt producers’ margin recovery is delayed, and the ore price center may move further upward. Overall, the core issue for the H2 lithium ore market is not whether there is too much or too little ore, but whether ore can be converted into lithium carbonate supply in time. The correct analytical framework should cover six variables: the strength of power battery and energy storage production schedules, inventory cycles at material and cell producers, lithium carbonate spot and futures pricing, the depth of margin inversion for lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, the actual restart and distribution path of Jianxiawo and other Yichun mines, and changes in African arrivals and traders’ saleable inventories. Lithium ore is not the starting point of the industry-chain cycle. It is the result of reverse pricing by lithium carbonate supply-demand fundamentals, refining margins, and the futures market. Only when ore starts to restrict lithium salt producers’ operating rates, or when new ore supply begins to materially increase lithium carbonate supply, will lithium ore shift from a price-following variable to a supply-demand-leading variable. SMM New Energy Analyst: Lesley Yang yangle@smm.cn +61 0451581533

Yahua Group expects net profit attributable to shareholders for the first half of 2026 to reach RMB 1.1-1.3 billion, up 710.17%-857.48% year-on-year. The company said stronger lithium salt prices and higher sales volumes significantly boosted revenue during the period. Improved production efficiency, optimized mine-to-market operations, and tighter cost control also contributed to higher profitability.

Yahua Group said its Zimbabwe-based KMC company is accelerating construction of its lithium sulfate processing project. With a total investment of approximately US$200 million, the project includes a smelter and a sulfuric acid plant, designed to process 350,000 mt of lithium concentrate annually and produce 75,000 mt of lithium sulfate per year. Commercial operation is scheduled for 2027. KMC is also developing a tin-niobium-tantalum separation project to enhance overall mineral resource utilization.