[SMM Analysis: High Comprehensive Costs of Anode Materials in June Support Upward Shift in Price Center] SMM July 13 News: In June, the price center of China's artificial graphite anode material achieved a slight upward shift.

Hong Kong is further solidifying its position as a major Asian bullion trading hub, with several banks reportedly importing large gold bars ahead of the planned launch of a new central gold clearing system in July. At least four of the 11 banks participating in the new mechanism have asked traders to move 400-ounce gold bars into the city, Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the matter. The bars meet the London Good Delivery standard, the global benchmark for wholesale physical gold trading. The move suggests that banks are building up physical inventories to support delivery once the clearing system begins operating. The 400-ounce gold bar is the standard format used in London, the world’s largest bullion trading hub. These bars are commonly traded among banks, sovereign entities, and large institutional players. In Asia, however, gold trading is more commonly conducted in smaller kilogram bars, or kilobars. The decision to bring in 400-ounce bars therefore reflects Hong Kong’s intention to align its new clearing system with international bullion market practices, at least at launch. According to people familiar with the preparations, banks need to hold sufficient gold inventories in Hong Kong to facilitate physical delivery when clearing begins. The Role of the New Clearing Company The Hong Kong Precious Metals Central Clearing Company Limited is spearheading the development of this upcoming mechanism. Its board comprises 11 banks, including six international lenders, as well as other industry participants. Some of these lenders are expected to act as clearing banks when the system launches, while others may need more time to build the necessary bullion trading and settlement capabilities. Hong Kong’s Financial Services and Treasury Bureau said the clearing company has been working closely with the market to formulate the framework and rules for the system. Preparatory work has entered its final stage, according to the bureau. Hong Kong’s planned gold clearing system is expected to closely resemble key parts of London’s bullion market infrastructure. One important feature is the use of unallocated accounts. These accounts allow market participants to trade gold without assigning specific physical bars to each transaction. This structure helps improve liquidity and allows for faster, larger-scale settlement. At launch, Hong Kong plans to use the London Good Delivery standard. Longer-term arrangements, including whether the system will expand to other bar formats or delivery standards, are still to be determined. Competition With Singapore Hong Kong’s launch comes as competition intensifies among Asian financial centers seeking a larger role in the global gold market. Singapore has also announced plans to launch its gold clearing mechanism by the end of the year. Its system is expected to align with the London Good Delivery framework for large bars while also supporting delivery and settlement standards for kilobars used by major exchanges in Chicago and Shanghai. By moving first, Hong Kong could gain an advantage in attracting banks, trading houses, and institutional investors seeking more options for bullion trading and settlement in Asia. Both Hong Kong and Singapore are trying to capitalize on strong demand for gold across Asia. Many investors continue to view the precious metal as a long-term store of wealth and a hedge against uncertainty. Gold prices reached record highs earlier this year before retreating as geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, inflation concerns, and expectations of higher interest rates weighed on the market. Despite the pullback, demand for gold infrastructure in Asia remains significant, particularly as investors and financial institutions seek alternatives to traditional Western trading centers. Conclusion The reported import of London-standard 400-ounce gold bars marks a practical step in Hong Kong’s effort to build a deeper and more liquid bullion market. If the clearing system launches as planned in July, it could give Hong Kong a stronger role in regional gold trading by offering market participants a local platform for settlement, delivery, and liquidity. For now, the inventory buildup by participating banks signals that preparations are entering their final stage and that Hong Kong is positioning itself as a more important bridge between Asia’s gold demand and the global bullion market. source： https://www.phoenixrefining.com/blog/hong-kong-banks-build-gold-inventories-ahead-of-new-bullion-clearing-system-launch

Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource (ESDM) clarified on 25th June 2026 that the total 2026 nickel RKAB quota has not yet been decided, countering the recent uprise speculations from the market. Director General of Minerals and Coal, Tri Winarno, emphasized that the government is still evaluating RKAB revision proposals submitted by mining companies and "Regarding the nickel RKAB, the government will continue to follow the official evaluation mechanism before determining any RKAB revisions. No production figure has been decided yet, as discussions are still ongoing," on Thursday (June 25), adding that the current process is an assessment of industry requirements rather than a relaxation of production limits. While companies may submit RKAB revisions following second-quarter reporting under Ministerial Regulation No. 17/2025, any changes must undergo a comprehensive review based on production data, downstream industry demand, market conditions, supply chain balance, commodity prices, and long-term resource sustainability.

On June 9, a fire broke out at Greenbushes Chemical-Grade Beneficiation Plant 3 (CGP3). The fire was quickly extinguished with no casualties, CGP1 and CGP2 continued normal operations, and IGO confirmed the next day that its FY2026 concentrate guidance of 1.375 million to 1.425 million mt remained unchanged. CGP4 is planned to commence in 2027. Judging solely by the announcement, this was a well-handled operational incident. However, the location of the fire warrants closer attention: CGP3 is not existing capacity but incremental capacity being ramped up at the far left of the global cost curve – with a total investment of about AUD 880 million, designed to add approximately 500,000 mt/year of concentrate capacity, and which only achieved first feed in December 2025 and was originally expected to reach full production by mid-this year. The damage assessment is still ongoing, repair costs and timetable are yet to be quantified, and the so-called "guidance maintained" is based only on information from the initial stage of the incident. What merits tracking going forward is not the guidance itself, but whether the timing of reaching full production will be delayed. At the world's lowest-cost mine, a new production line has had a minor incident – should the market be concerned? Today, I aim to break down and clarify this mechanism by analyzing the role of Australian ore in the lithium price formation. Note: Clarification on the timeline for CGP3 reaching full production. At its FY26 Q2 results briefing in late January 2026, IGO stated that CGP3 achieved first feed in December 2025 and that ramp-up to nominal capacity would take approximately five months. Some English transcripts recorded management's remarks as "completing ramp-up before the end of the calendar year" (end of the calendar year). However, based on the timing of first feed, five months corresponds to mid-2026, i.e., before the end of the Australian financial year (FY26), which is consistent with the company's previously disclosed guidance of "reaching full production in mid-2026." The transcript likely mistook "end of the financial year" for "end of the calendar year." This article adopts the "mid-2026 full production" timeline. This timing implies that the June 9 CGP3 fire occurred a few weeks before the originally scheduled full production, and the actual impact will be confirmed in IGO's Q4 report (expected in late July). Greenbushes: A Benchmark at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes' most fundamental advantage lies first in its ore grade. It is one of the world's largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines in production, with raw ore grade roughly double the industry average. For spodumene mines, grade directly determines mining and processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrates, Greenbushes needs to process significantly less raw ore than typical mines, giving it natural cost advantages in mining, beneficiation, energy consumption, and tailings management. Building on its high-grade ore, Greenbushes also benefits from economies of scale. The mine site now hosts multiple beneficiation plants with a combined nominal processing capacity of approximately 6.5 million mt/year, supporting a maximum lithium concentrate capacity of up to 1.5 million mt; once CGP3 has fully ramped up, it will add roughly 500,000 mt of additional concentrate capacity. With the mine life further extended to 2045, Greenbushes not only possesses low-cost advantages but also strong long-term supply capability. This is why Greenbushes has demonstrated significant resilience during the lithium price downturn. From 2024 to 2025, as lithium prices continued to pull back, many high-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced pressure to suspend or cut production, yet Greenbushes maintained relatively sound profitability and continued to advance the CGP3 expansion. It represents not the industry's average cost, but the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium ore cost curve. Therefore, Greenbushes serves as a useful benchmark for observing the industry bottom. When lithium prices fall, high-cost capacity exits first, while low-cost capacity continues to produce. The closer prices move to Greenbushes' cost range, the fewer marginal units of capacity can sustain normal operations in the market, and the nearer supply exits are to completion. Greenbushes Has the Largest Production, but Limited Free-Float Volume Although Greenbushes has a very large production scale, relatively little of its concentrates can enter the spot market directly. Greenbushes is operated by Talison Lithium, whose shareholders include TLEA and Albemarle, with TLEA jointly held by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. The spodumene concentrates produced at the mine are primarily allocated under shareholder offtake arrangements, flowing to lithium chemical production lines within the shareholder systems of Tianqi, Albemarle, and others, and are not normally offered for direct sale to the market. Viewed through the framework of [Resources – Designed Capacity – Actual Production – Saleable Volume – Available Spot Volume], Greenbushes is a very typical case. Its actual production ranks among the world's largest, but since most of its concentrates are locked up within its shareholder system, the volume truly available for market-based transactions is relatively limited. This also means Greenbushes' influence on market prices is mostly indirect. On one hand, it defines the scale of global low-cost lithium resource supply, which has an important impact on the lithium chemical cost curve; on the other, its operating costs, offtake pricing, and expansion pace also serve as key references for long-term lithium ore contract negotiations and price assessments. By contrast, what really influences spot lithium ore prices in the short term are typically the marginal resources not fully locked up by shareholder offtake agreements and needing to find buyers on the market. These include some Australian mines, African lithium ore, and saleable cargo held by traders. Therefore, while the addition of approximately 500,000 mt of concentrate capacity at Greenbushes will alter medium and long-term supply-demand expectations, its short-term impact on the spot market may not be particularly pronounced. In contrast, the suspension or resumption of a marginal mine with an annual output of over 100,000 mt that primarily sells on the open market could rapidly influence spot quotes and market sentiment. It is well known that short-term prices are not entirely determined by total output; rather, they depend more on the volume of material freely available for trading in the market. For example, lithium carbonate's price elasticity hinges more on the current available volume in the market. The mine with the largest output does not necessarily hold the most direct pricing power in the spot market; what truly dictates short-term marginal prices are typically resources that are available, negotiable, and require immediate transaction. However, shareholder offtake does not mean such concentrates are completely isolated from the market. When smelters within the frameworks of shareholders like Tianqi and Albemarle reduce their operating rates, or when some smelting lines operate erratically, concentrates originally intended for internal consumption may indirectly enter the market through toll processing, resales, or inventory adjustments. These cargoes are usually not publicly tallied but affect the actual circulating volume in the lithium ore market. Their tracking requires assessment by combining shareholder smelter operating rates, concentrate inventory, toll processing arrangements, and import flows. In analyzing Australian ore supply, such shadow spot cargoes are often harder to observe than a mine's nominal production, yet can significantly influence the market during specific phases. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: Transmission Direction Reversed Once Within a Year The price transmission relationship between Australian ore concentrates (SC6, CIF China) and China's lithium chemicals has completed a full round trip over the past year. In H1 2025, ore prices followed the downtrend. In Q1, Australian mines aggressively cut costs but did not reduce production, showing a strong willingness to sell. SC6 fell all the way to around $620/mt, and the lower concentrate prices, in turn, pressured lithium chemicals downward, forming a spiral. The market's concern at the time was: When would mines finally be willing to cut? The situation reversed starting at the end of Q3. The announcement of Yichun's plan to cancel 27 mining rights, along with the suspension at Jianxiawo, tightened expectations for domestic resource supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first, and SC6 followed with an uptrend that proved even more elastic—by December, the average price had already returned to around $1,300/mt. Formula pricing, linked to lithium chemical prices, allowed the mining side to capture the bulk of the upside gains, while the tolling margins of Chinese smelters were instead compressed. Meanwhile, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana project reflect that lithium chemical conversion in Australia continues to face high hurdles in terms of cost control, production ramp-up, and operational stability. TLEA's Kwinana lithium hydroxide plant was fully impaired in mid-2025, with the second-phase construction halted, and IGO has clearly shifted its priority to mining. The role of Australian ore in the industry chain has been refixed as a supplier of concentrates, and the linkage between SC6 and Chinese lithium chemical prices will only tighten going forward, not decouple. The implied smelting margin—calculated by multiplying SC6 by the processing coefficient and comparing it to spot lithium chemical prices—has turned negative, meaning Chinese smelters using externally purchased ore are losing cash. Either ore prices must pull back or lithium chemical prices must rise; one of the two is inevitable. This indicator is the most powerful gauge of whether mines or lithium chemicals hold more pricing power. Australian Mine Production Resumptions: Price Breaks Through the Ceiling The key words for Australian ore in 2024-2025 were market exits, while in 2026 they have become revivals. Lithium prices have been climbing steadily since the beginning of the year, with futures prices once surpassing 200,000 yuan/mt, triggering a series of production resumptions in May and June: Project Action Timing Notes Bald Hill (MinRes) Resumed production after an 18-month shutdown Announced in May, first concentrates expected in Jul Restart cost approximately A$20 million Ngungaju Plant (PLS) Restart Planned for Jul Resuming roughly 200,000 mt/year Finniss (Core Lithium) FID approved, financing secured Targeting first ore in Q3 Financing approximately $205 million Kathleen Valley (Liontown) Evaluating expansion In progress — Mt Cattlin (Rio Tinto) Remains shut down From Mar 2025 to present Restart conditions not yet clarified Looking at these cases together, the real threshold for resuming production is more complex than simply having prices exceed cash costs. Bald Hill took only about two months from announcement to first ore because it had maintained a production-ready state throughout the shutdown, and MinRes's own mining services division could internally mobilize all operations—mining, crushing, and transport—without needing to wait for external contractors. Assets of this type are the quickest-responding supply when prices rise. Finniss, by contrast, was an entirely different situation: it first sold inventory to Glencore in exchange for liquidity, then cobbled together three financing instruments—convertible bonds, debt, and a share placement—before reaching FID. For mines with fragile balance sheets, resuming production is not an operational decision but a financing event; what low-price cycles destroy is not resources, but financing capacity. The market consequences of the resumption wave are already visible. Lithium carbonate hit a two-year high of 200,500 yuan/mt on May 13, then pulled back to the 160,000–170,000 yuan range in June, partly because the market saw resumption supply coming back. The logic is straightforward: when prices rise, idle capacity resumes production, supply expectations increase, and prices pull back. That list of idle capacity in Australia, when sorted, essentially forms the supply curve above lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and this wave of production resumptions are actually two sides of the same market: disruption to the incremental supply at the far left of the cost curve is bullish, while idle capacity at the right end accelerating its return is bearish. Looking at lithium prices this year from the resource perspective, equilibrium is being sought between these two forces. Lithium prices in 2026 are expected to fluctuate more frequently, but one-sided market moves will be shorter. After prices rise, what truly caps the height of the rally is the speed at which idle capacity re-enters the market. Projects under care and maintenance or on standby, such as Bald Hill, Finniss, and Ngungaju, essentially constitute elastic supply above lithium prices. When lithium prices return above the cash costs of these projects and stay there long enough, mines have the incentive to resume production. But production resumptions do not happen instantly. From the announcement of a restart to the rehiring of personnel, equipment maintenance, resumption of mining and processing, inventory buildup, and finally, the entry of concentrates into the market, it typically takes from two months to several quarters. This time lag is the window during which supply disruptions can drive prices higher. The suspension at Jianxiawo and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes were able to affect market sentiment not because of a sudden global shortage of lithium resources, but because of a reduction in short-term available supply while idle capacity had yet to return. Compared to the previous cycle, it is worth noting that the window for risk premiums arising from resource-side disruptions is shortening. A growing number of mines are opting for care and maintenance rather than permanent closure; mining service companies, traders, and downstream enterprises are also participating in restart financing and offtake arrangements. As long as prices return above the break-even line, some idle capacity can resume more quickly. This means that in the future, lithium prices may still rise rapidly following supply disruptions, but the duration and height of one-sided market moves will be more easily constrained by production resumption expectations. Prices may not necessarily become more stable, but supply feedback could be faster. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le

Indonesia has officially activated one of the most structurally significant commodity trade reforms in its recent history. On May 20, 2026, President Prabowo Subianto signed Government Regulation (PP) No.24/2026 on the Governance of Strategic Natural Resource Commodity Exports (State Gazette No.58, Supplementary State Gazette No.7178), which took effect on June 1, 2026 per Article 10. The regulation designates Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI) as the mandatory sole export intermediary for all shipments of coal, palm oil, and ferro alloys. No Indonesian producer in these categories can sell directly to a foreign buyer anymore. Every transaction must legally pass through DSI first. The constitutional grounding is explicit. The preamble invokes Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which establishes that natural resources are controlled by the state and must be used for the greatest possible benefit of the Indonesian people ( sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat ). The regulation's explanatory notes go further, stating that "so long as the state possesses the capital, technology, and management capability to manage Strategic SDA Commodities, the state should undertake direct management," and that doing so ensures "all results and profits will become state revenue bringing more optimal benefits for the welfare and prosperity of the people." This is framed not as a technical trade regulation but as a matter of constitutional duty. The explanatory notes to Article 7 explicitly name the five digital systems through which DSI will exercise oversight: CEISA (Customs Excise Information System and Automation), SINSW (Indonesia National Single Window), INATRADE (Trade Information System), SiMoDIS (Integrated Foreign Exchange Monitoring System), and MOMS (Minerba Online Monitoring System). Real-time visibility across all five platforms forms the enforcement backbone of the entire reform. On June 9, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia and DSI COO Dony Oskaria offered three key reassurances at a press conference to calm investor sentiment. Oskaria confirmed that existing B2B contracts and Letters of Credit will continue to be honored during the transition period, provided DSI's monitoring system confirms that pricing is fair and transparent. Bahlil categorically denied market rumors of a "profit-sharing" mechanism in the minerals sector, stating that this concept applies only to oil and gas and that Minerba rules remain unchanged. He also committed to aligning RKAB mining quotas with smelting capacity and promised quota relaxations during periods of highly favorable global prices. June 8th DPR RI Coordination Hearing: What Bahlil and Dony Oskaria Actually Said The Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia / DPR RI) convened a coordination hearing to align the new natural resource export governance policy between Danantara's Investment Management Agency (BPI Danantara) and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Kementerian ESDM). The session featured Minister Bahlil Lahadalia representing ESDM and DSI COO Dony Oskaria representing BPI Danantara. Oskaria opened by clarifying the precise scope of DSI's mandate in its initial phase. He confirmed that DSI's primary and immediate purpose is to halt under-invoicing and transfer pricing — not to disrupt physical commodity flows. He gave explicit assurance that existing B2B sales contracts and Letters of Credit will continue to be honored and executed normally during the transition period, with one condition: DSI's digital monitoring system must determine that the declared pricing is fair and reflects genuine market values. Any contract where declared prices are flagged as suspiciously below market will be subject to DSI scrutiny, but standard commercially negotiated contracts should proceed without interruption. Bahlil addressed three distinct concerns that had been circulating in the market. First and most urgently, he categorically denied rumors of a "gross split" profit-sharing mechanism being introduced into the minerals sector. He stated directly that gross split calculations exist only in the oil and gas sector and that there are "absolutely no changes" to the existing rules governing the minerals and coal (Minerba) space. This denial was significant because the rumor alone had been enough to cause investors to reconsider capital commitments to Indonesian smelting projects. Second, Bahlil acknowledged the domestic ore supply squeeze that has been tightening around Indonesian smelters, and committed to aligning RKAB mining quotas with downstream smelter capacity. He promised "measured relaxations" of production limits during periods when global commodity prices are highly favorable, signaling that the government has no interest in strangling the smelting industry it has spent years building. Third, on the broader question of investment security, Bahlil framed DSI as a value-capture mechanism rather than a market interference tool — the government wants more of the revenue that Indonesian commodities generate to stay in Indonesia, not to reduce the volume of those commodities being exported. What the Regulation Actually Says: Key Articles Reading PP No.24/2026 directly, several provisions carry commercial implications beyond what the market has fully absorbed. Article 3(1) establishes the core mandate: strategic commodities may only be exported by the BUMN Ekspor, acting either as owner or as sole intermediary. The word hanya ("only") in the Indonesian text is unconditional. Article 3(2) goes further: the selling price of Strategic SDA Commodities is determined by the BUMN Ekspor. This is not a transparency or monitoring function — DSI holds formal pricing authority over every export transaction. Article 3(4) confirms that DSI may charge a margin at a reasonable level in accordance with prevailing regulations, meaning DSI is legally entitled to a fee for its intermediary role. The combination of state-determined selling price and a state-imposed margin on every nickel and ferro alloy export has not yet been fully digested by the market. Article 4(2) contains the most important exemption in the regulation. DSI's mandatory intermediary role can be waived for business operators who hold contracts or agreements with the government that include provisions on at minimum: investment, divestment, and domestic processing and/or refining. Exemptions are decided in a coordination meeting chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. For the nickel sector, this is a critical provision, any smelter with an existing government contract containing these three elements has a legal pathway to apply for exemption from DSI routing entirely. Article 7 governs the full transition timeline. It states that from June 1 through no later than December 31, 2026, exports must go through BUMN Ekspor. Within three months of the effective date — meaning by approximately September 1, 2026 — a formal inter-ministerial evaluation must take place. Based on that evaluation, the Coordinating Minister has the authority to set a new deadline that is either earlier or later than originally planned, provided it remains before December 31. This is a genuine two-way valve: if the transition is going well, implementation can be accelerated; if problems emerge, the government can extend the timeline. Article 7(e) further provides that if the transition completes ahead of any applicable deadline, the full DSI-only rules apply from that earlier date immediately. Article 8 addresses existing contracts: all sales contracts signed before June 1, 2026 that remain valid are subject to evaluation by the BUMN Ekspor. DSI holds formal authority to assess every pre-existing long-term purchase agreement, including those between Indonesian smelters and their Chinese offtake partners. Critical Dates and Deadlines: The Full Regulatory Calendar May 20, 2026 — PP No.24/2026 signed by President Prabowo Subianto. June 1, 2026 — Regulation takes effect. Phase 1 begins. CEISA 4.0 mandatory DSI reporting pop-up activated. Pre-June 1 sales contracts enter DSI evaluation period under Article 8. By ~September 1, 2026 — Mandatory inter-ministerial evaluation of the transition (Article 7b). This review is a legal obligation, not optional. Its outcome determines the pace of everything that follows: the Coordinating Minister may accelerate, maintain, or extend the timeline to any date before December 31. September 1, 2026 — Phase 1.5 begins (unless the evaluation resets the timeline). PEB Box 6 changes to BUMN Ekspor (DSI). QQ document format begins. Companies act as DSI's legal agents. December 31, 2026 — The hard outer ceiling (Article 7a). After this date, no transitional exceptions remain. Only DSI may export, unconditionally. The Coordinating Minister cannot extend beyond this date. January 1, 2027 (or earlier if accelerated) — Phase 2 full implementation. DSI is the sole legal exporter. DSI drafts all contracts and L/Cs, handles all customs clearance, and reports DHE directly to Bank Indonesia via SiMoDIS. The NPI Classification Crisis The inclusion of ferro alloys has created the most significant market confusion, centered on a single unresolved technical problem: where Nickel Pig Iron sits relative to the regulated ferro-nickel HS code. Ferronickel (FeNi) is a mature, refined iron-nickel alloy produced through capital-intensive smelting, typically containing 20–40% nickel . It is a direct feedstock for stainless steel production and commands a meaningful price premium. Nickel Pig Iron (NPI) was developed in China in the mid-2000s as a low-cost alternative, produced via the simpler Rotary Kiln-Electric Furnace (RKEF) process using laterite ore. Indonesian RKEF-line NPI consistently produces at 10–14% Ni — a structural result of the process and the ore body, not a product specification smelters can adjust. NPI trades at a significant discount to FeNi, and any trader or stainless steel mill can distinguish the two products immediately. The problem is that Indonesia's customs classification framework cannot reliably tell them apart. Both products can fall under HS 7202.60 (ferro-nickel), and Indonesian NPI smelters have historically declared under that code without issue. Under Permendag No.12/2026, HS 7202.60.00 is now DIATUR (Regulated) — triggered when Ni content reaches ≥ 8% . The Ministry of Trade chose this as the demarcation: refined FeNi at 20–40% Ni would clearly exceed it, while NPI was assumed to fall below it and escape the regulation. That assumption fails entirely. Standard Indonesian RKEF output runs 10–12% Ni; higher-grade lines reach 12–14% Ni. There is no commercially significant NPI stream below 8% Ni under normal operating conditions. The threshold sits below average grade Indonesia actually produces, meaning every Indonesian NPI shipment technically triggers under the regulated classification, capturing precisely the product the government intended to exempt. Internal Rakortek documents confirm the Coordinating Minister directed that NPI should not be captured. The discussion slides acknowledge the collision and propose corrective steps: set a threshold above actual RKEF NPI norms, issue binding technical definitions for NPI, and align classification consistently across HS 7201 (pig iron), 7202.60 (ferro-nickel), and 7502.20 (nickel alloys). None of that supplemental guidance has been published yet. Strategic Outlook: The September Evaluation Is the Pivot Point The most important thing to understand about PP No.24/2026's near-term trajectory is that the regulation has deliberately built in a recalibration mechanism — and that mechanism has not been priced into most market participants' planning. Article 7(b) and 7(c) together create a genuine two-way valve. The September evaluation is a legally mandated inter-ministerial review that gives the Coordinating Minister real authority to reset the timeline in either direction. If the first three months reveal that DSI is not operationally ready, and the Rakortek checklists, which showed nearly every DSI readiness item as incomplete as of May 25, suggest that risk is real — the Coordinating Minister can formally extend the transition and push the QQ phase and beyond to a later date before December 31. Equally, if the reporting data flowing through CEISA, SiMoDIS, and MOMS shows that compliance is working smoothly and DSI is ready, the same evaluation could authorize an accelerated Phase 2 arrival, potentially as early as October or November 2026. What is not negotiable is the December 31, 2026 ceiling. Articles 7(a) and 7(d) together make clear that this is the absolute outer boundary of the Coordinating Minister's authority. Regardless of what the evaluation finds, the transition cannot be extended beyond December 31. After that date, except for legally approved exemptions, DSI is the sole legal exporter and no amount of industry pressure or operational unreadiness changes that. The Article 4(2) exemption pathway remains the most immediately actionable provision for smelters with qualifying government contracts. Any agreement containing investment, divestment, and domestic processing provisions should be reviewed against that exemption criteria now. Engaging the Coordinating Minister's coordination meeting process before the September evaluation is concluded is far preferable to doing so afterward. On NPI, the plain text of Permendag No.12/2026 as it stands today classifies Indonesian NPI as regulated. Smelters should not wait for the Ministry of Trade's supplemental guidance before beginning compliance preparation. Seeking an advance product classification ruling, exploring the Article 4(2) exemption if applicable, and building DSI integration workflows in parallel remains the most prudent path. The December 31 deadline, or whatever earlier date the post-evaluation acceleration may set, is not the end of the story. It is the point at which the entire B2B architecture of Indonesian strategic commodity exports permanently and irreversibly changes. SMM Analysis makes no representations as to the official legal interpretation of any regulation cited. Stakeholders should seek formal legal counsel for all compliance decisions.

[End-Use Consumption Showed Mediocre Performance, Die-Casting Zinc Alloy Production Declined] Currently, end-use consumption has entered the traditional off-season. Coupled with raw material prices remaining at high levels, downstream players mostly maintained just-in-time procurement, with overall stockpiling enthusiasm being insufficient...

Guinea's Minister of Mines and Geology announced plans to build five alumina refineries by 2030. Three projects — from Chinalco, SPIC, and SMB-Winning Consortium — are already under construction, with a combined planned capacity of 4.8 million mt. The Guinean government is currently in talks with Alcoa (CBG) for an additional alumina refinery project, as the country pushes to transition from a bauxite exporter to an alumina processor and move up the global aluminum value chain.

Q.ENEST Holdings has completed a JPY 9 billion syndicated loan arranged by SMBC to fund an 80MW portfolio of low-voltage distributed PV assets across Japan. The financing was structured through an SPC and will be drawn down in stages over around one year as assets are acquired, with the first drawdown covering existing plants. Q.ENEST Denki, the group’s retail power unit, will act as the offtaker, supplying fixed-price green electricity to residential and corporate customers. The deal highlights growing financing interest in Japan’s distributed PV assets, supported by integrated generation, retail offtake and hedging models.

[US Lithium Mine Development Boom: From One Mine to Over 100 Planned Projects by 2030] The US lithium industry is standing at the threshold of a historic transformation, about to leap from its current status of having only one producing lithium mine to becoming a significant participant in the global critical battery metals market. Currently, only one lithium mine is operating across the entire US, but this landscape is about to change rapidly. By 2030, at least six new projects are expected to come into production successively, with another 13 projects close behind. This round of expansion is primarily concentrated in the geologically favorable arid regions of the Southwest, but this is merely the beginning of a potential mining boom. According to the latest industry data, enterprises have identified over 100 potential lithium ore extraction areas nationwide. Behind this aggressive expansion is the continued climb in lithium ore demand from EV batteries and renewable energy ESSs—both of which are indispensable key elements of the energy transition. The rapid expansion of lithium mining scale has raised important questions from the outside world about environmental impacts, water resource consumption, and how to strike a balance between domestic mineral security and ecological protection. In this race for self-sufficient supply of "white gold," community residents and environmental protection advocates are closely watching how this industrial transformation will advance and take shape in some of America's most fragile desert ecosystems. Source: https://www.envirolink.org [Lithium Ore Reserves in Eastern US States May Replace Over a Century of Import Demand] U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) scientists announced this discovery, estimating its scale sufficient to replace over three hundred years of lithium import demand. The US currently relies on imports for nearly half of its lithium consumption, a dependency that has long been a concern for energy security analysts. Lithium occupies a central position in the modern economy, serving as a critical material for lithium-ion batteries used in smartphones, laptops, EVs, and aerospace alloys. Against the backdrop of accelerating global demand and intensifying geopolitical pressures, domestic reserves of this scale carry significant strategic importance. This discovery came at a sensitive period in the global mineral landscape. Australia currently supplies nearly half of global lithium production, while China not only has considerable production but also dominates global refining and consumption. Thirty years ago, the US was the world's largest lithium producer, but that position was long since relinquished. Whether this discovery can help the US return to that position remains to be seen, but the scale of data cited is sufficient to warrant serious attention. The scale of this discovery is most vivid in numbers. According to USGS estimates, the reserves are sufficient to support the construction of 1.6 million grid-scale batteries, and officials stated they could power 130 million EVs or support 180 billion laptops running cumulatively for a thousand years. USGS also estimates that the reserves could support the production of 500 billion mobile phones, equivalent to approximately 60 devices for every person currently on Earth. Perhaps the most striking figure in the USGS assessment is this: measured against last year's consumption levels, the reserves are sufficient to replace 328 years of US lithium import demand. This is not a forecast of future demand, but merely a baseline comparison between existing underground reserves and historical US import demand. Source: https://indiandefencereview.com [European Metals' Cinovec Lithium Mine Project EIA Passes Czech Ministry of Environment Review] European Metals Holdings Limited (ASX/AIM: EMH) announced that its flagship Cinovec lithium mine project in the Czech Republic has achieved a significant milestone in environmental permitting. The Czech Ministry of Environment has completed its review and officially released the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report, with a public hearing scheduled to be held in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, a cross-border EIA process involving German authorities has been formally initiated to address the transnational impacts of the project along the Czech-German border. For investors tracking the development progress of the Cinovec project, these developments are not routine updates — the company has explicitly identified the EIA release as a critical path period for obtaining final approval and advancing the project to implementation. "We are pleased with the progress the project team has made on environmental permitting for the Cinovec project. The release of the EIA report by the Czech Ministry of Environment is a critical path period for obtaining final EIA approval and advancing the Cinovec project." — Executive Chairman Keith Coughlan Source: [Latin America's Lithium Supply Gap: Structural Barriers Constraining Capacity Release] The global energy transition is built on a series of assumptions, and one of the most consequential is that the world's largest lithium reserves, concentrated in a narrow strip of South America, will be able to reliably convert into the battery-grade lithium materials increasingly and urgently needed for EVs, power grid ESSs, and consumer electronics. However, this assumption is being put to a severe test. Latin America's lithium supply gap is not a matter of salt flats being depleted or aquifers running dry, but rather a widening chasm between underground reserves and market-accessible capacity. Reserves are abundant, yet production-ready capacity falls far short. More critically, this gap continues to widen at a pivotal moment when global demand is accelerating its climb. To understand the root causes, one must look beyond the surface figures and examine in depth the structural mechanisms behind the entire chain from lithium geological deposits to battery cathode material. Source:

First, multi-material indexation has become normal practice in domestic cell pricing. However, passing these costs through to project owners is far from smooth. Second, the adjustment cycle in overseas markets is shortening. Yet even a lithium-carbonate-only linkage faces resistance at the owner level. Third, cost pressure is concentrating heavily at the integration stage.