This week (March 20–26), the operating rate of SMM copper wire and cable enterprises was 70.77, up 0.24 percentage points MoM and down 2.09 percentage points YoY. Overall operating performance was stable, while market performance was relatively mediocre. During the week, the pullback in copper prices suppressed the release of new orders, but ample orders on hand and pending delivery orders supported basically stable production. By segment, new orders across downstream sectors were generally weak, with demand in the home decoration segment particularly mediocre due to rising plastic raw material prices. Industry production still mainly relied on orders on hand from the power and new energy sectors. Inventory side, the earlier pullback in copper prices drove concentrated restocking by enterprises, and raw material inventory fell 2.7% MoM this week as raw materials were mainly consumed from prior stockpiling. As for finished product inventories, the pullback in copper prices restrained downstream cargo pick-up, and finished product inventories therefore edged down 2.65% MoM. Looking ahead to next week, continued fluctuations in copper prices are expected to keep disturbing end-user procurement sentiment, while rising plastic prices will bring cost pressure. However, existing orders will continue to support enterprises’ baseline production schedules, leaving limited downside room for the operating rate. SMM expects the operating rate of copper wire and cable enterprises next week (March 27–April 2) to fall 1.54 percentage points MoM to 69.23, down 5.99 percentage points YoY.

In January and February, exports of copper cathode rod (HS codes 74081100 and 74081900) continued to strengthen, showing growth both MoM and YoY. The detailed data were as follows: According to customs data, in terms of total exports of copper wire rod, total exports of copper cathode rod (HS codes 74081100 and 74081900) in January increased 51.19% MoM and rose 83.78% YoY. In February, total exports of copper cathode rod increased 19.73% MoM and rose 160.07% YoY. In January 2026, exports of copper wire rod (HS codes 74081100 and 74081900) rose MoM, mainly due to weak domestic demand for copper rod in China, coupled with a concentrated release of power infrastructure demand in Southeast Asia, which together drove a sharp increase in copper wire rod exports. By specific export trade mode, processing trade with imported materials accounted for 66.3% of total copper wire rod exports in January 2026, processing trade with supplied materials accounted for 22.37%, Entrepot Trade by Customs Special Control Area accounted for 7.5%, and Ordinary Trade accounted for 2.81%. In February 2026, exports of copper wire rod (HS codes 74081100 and 74081900) continued to grow MoM, mainly driven by concentrated demand release from power grid upgrades and the new energy sector in Southeast Asia. Coupled with weak downstream demand in China during the Chinese New Year holiday, enterprises stepped up export efforts. By specific export trade mode, in January 2026, exports under processing trade with imported materials accounted for 50.95% of total exports, processing trade with supplied materials 38.73%, Entrepot Trade by Customs Special Control Area 8.46%, and Ordinary Trade 1.82%. By country, from January to February, copper wire rod was mainly exported to Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, India, the Philippines, and Malaysia, with combined exports accounting for more than 70% of the national total. In summary, copper wire rod exports continued to grow from January to February, mainly benefiting from robust demand in the power grid and new energy sectors in Southeast Asia, coupled with weak downstream operating rates in China, prompting enterprises to actively expand into markets outside China to broaden demand. Although copper prices pulled back significantly in March, demand in the Middle East weakened due to geopolitical conflicts. In addition, as the main export destinations for China’s copper wire rod are concentrated in this region, and ocean freight rates have risen, copper wire rod exports were expected to be in the doldrums in March.

This week, the weekly operating rate of leading downstream aluminum processing enterprises in China rebounded 1.1 percentage points MoM to 64%.

According to SMM, supported by the pullback in copper prices, industry orders for enamelled wire improved, with the overall pace aligning with peak-season expectations. End-use demand recovered across the board, home appliance orders maintained peak-season performance, demand for power transformers remained steady, demand in the new energy sector gradually improved, and orders in traditional segments such as industrial motors and power tools also performed well. Against expectations of high production schedules among enterprises, the industry's operating rate is expected to continue rebounding to above 90%.

This Week (March 13–March 19), the Operating Rate of Machinery in the Enamelled Wire Industry Rebounded 3.8 Percentage Points WoW to.....

This week (March 6–12), the operating rate of SMM copper wire and cable enterprises was 66.59, up 5.69 points MoM and down 10.62 points YoY. The operating rate steadily rebounded this week, mainly due to a slight correction in copper prices that drove order release, coupled with support from concentrated power grid deliveries, though the current pace of order recovery remained weaker than in the same period last year. By sector, orders from the power segment continued to support enterprise production schedules, orders from the new energy segment also improved, while construction project orders remained weak, dragging on overall operating rates. Inventory side, the correction in copper prices drove enterprises to restock for rigid demand, but as enterprises maintained production schedules, days of raw material inventories fell 0.31 days MoM this week; for finished product inventories, the correction in copper prices boosted downstream consumption, but high copper prices still restrained end-user purchase willingness, so days of finished product inventories fell 0.41 days MoM. Looking ahead to next week, current orders on hand from the power and new energy sectors will continue to provide the main support for production scheduling. SMM expects the operating rate of copper wire and cable next week (March 13–19) to increase 3.45 points MoM to 70.04, down 4.49 points YoY.

Geopolitical conflict in the Middle East led to a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off the global sulphur supply chain (China’s import dependence exceeds 50%, with the Middle East accounting for 56%). Sulphur prices surged to 4,395 yuan/mt, directly pushing up phosphate fertiliser costs. Rigid demand from spring ploughing provided support, but China’s policies to ensure supply and stabilise prices curbed phosphate fertiliser gains。

In 2025, driven by supply contraction and multiple demand growth , the global sulfur market saw supply-demand mismatch throughout the year, with prices rising sharply to new highs in recent years. Entering 2026, sulfur’s byproduct nature will constrain supply; Russia’s supply recovery will be slow; the Middle East will centrally control prices; the resonance of rigid demand from spring plowing and new energy “scrambling for sulfur,” together with heightened shipping risks in the Strait of Hormuz, will drive the global sulfur market to continue in a tight balance, keep the price center at elevated levels, and further reshape the regional supply-demand pattern. 2025 Review: Widening Supply-Demand Gap, Sharp Price Increase (I) Supply Side: Pronounced Rigid Contraction, Intensified Regional Supply Divergence According to the SMM survey, current global sulfur capacity is approximately 85 million mt. The entire industry is operating at close to full capacity, but incremental growth is limited, with annual production at around 80 million mt. As the core of global sulphur supply (with total Middle East production accounting for over 30% of the global total), some resources are prioritised for local markets and emerging markets such as Indonesia (long-term contracts first + high-price diversion). Resources exported to traditional demand countries have been heavily diverted, exacerbating tightness in resource circulation. Meanwhile, Russia, as a core global sulphur producer, has shifted from a net exporter to a net importer due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Coupled with shipping disruptions, geopolitical disturbances, and capacity release falling short of expectations, globally circulating resources remain persistently tight, driving sulphur prices higher. (II) Demand Side: Stable Traditional Rigid Demand +Growth in Emerging New Energy, with a Significant Increase in Total Volume In 2025, global sulfur demand presented a dual-engine pattern of “traditional rigid demand providing a floor, and emerging demand surging”: agriculture remained the largest consumption mainstay, with phosphate fertiliser production at its core forming a solid base of demand; traditional chemical demand such as titanium dioxide and caprolactam grew steadily; the new energy track saw explosive growth , becoming the core engine boosting incremental sulfur consumption. Together, these three sectors drove total sulfur demand to keep rising, in stark contrast to the rigid contraction on the supply side caused by its oil-and-gas associated nature. Compared with previous years, the most notable change in the global sulfur market in 2025 was the explosive growth in new energy demand, which had become the central driver of incremental demand. Sulfur consumption in the new energy sector was highly concentrated in two major tracks—LFP and mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP)—and formed a clear global regional division of labor: LFP production was highly concentrated in China, while MHP was focused in Indonesia; the two production hubs jointly dominated sulfur demand for new energy. Against the backdrop of an accelerating global green energy transition, China’s NEV and energy storage industries have continued to expand. Leveraging core strengths of high safety, long cycle life, and significant cost advantages, LFP has become the preferred cathode material for large-scale energy storage and NEVs, boosting the continued expansion of domestic capacity. According to the SMM database, global LFP production reached 3.77 million mt in 2025, of which China accounted for 3.75 million mt , representing more than 99%, corresponding to a boost in total sulfur demand of over 3 million mt . Meanwhile, relying on world-class laterite nickel ore resource endowments, Indonesia has vigorously developed HPAL hydrometallurgy, converting low-grade nickel ore into high value-added battery-grade nickel raw materials (MHP). By extending the industry chain and enhancing product value-added, it has become deeply embedded in the global power battery supply chain. According to the SMM database, Indonesia’s MHP production reached 443,900 mt Ni in 2025 , directly boosting sulfur consumption by over 5 million mt; and after planned capacity comes on stream in 2026, Indonesia’s share of global MHP capacity will further rise from 67% to 77% , becoming the most explosive source of incremental sulfur demand globally and a key variable reshaping global sulfur trade flows. Outlook for 2026: The Supply-Demand Gap Further Widens, and Prices Hover at Highs In 2026, the global sulfur market further maintained a tight balance, with supply growth failing to keep pace with demand growth and the supply-demand gap widening further, becoming the core factor supporting prices fluctuating at highs. （I）Supply Side: Limited Growth, Constrained by Multiple Factors As a by-product of oil and gas extraction and refining, sulfur’s supply capability is highly dependent on the level of activity in global crude oil and natural gas production, while also being directly affected by geopolitical conditions, the smoothness of international shipping, and changes in trade policies. Disruptions at any stage will significantly impact the stability of global sulfur supply, the pace of price movements, and the distribution of trade flows. In 2026, the global sulfur supply side will exhibit operating characteristics of “ constrained growth and a diverging regional landscape .” According to the SMM survey, incremental global sulfur supply in 2026 was only about 2.6 million mt, including about 500,000 mt in China and about 2.1 million mt in the Middle East. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), under the long-term trend of the global energy transition, global refining capacity and crude oil throughput are expected to enter a peak plateau around 2035 and then gradually pull back, which will fundamentally constrain the long-term growth potential of sulphur supply. According to the SMM survey, global crude oil demand growth in 2025 only remained at around 1%, with relatively weak growth momentum. As the core producing region for high-sulphur crude oil globally, the Middle East saw OPEC+ confirm a temporary pause in production increases in Q1 2026, further suppressing upstream supply elasticity. Meanwhile, Iran has long been subject to US sanctions, with crude oil production and exports continuously constrained. The most-traded refineries in Russia continued to come under impact, with both production stability and logistics channels significantly affected; sulphur output and export capacity were sharply constrained and are expected to be difficult to recover in H1 2026, further exacerbating the tight globalised sulphur supply landscape. In early 2026, geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East intensified, and shipping risks in the Strait of Hormuz rose markedly ; nearly 50% of global sulfur trade volumes passed through this corridor. Vessel detours, longer voyages, and a sharp rise in war-risk insurance premiums directly pushed up the landed cost of sulfur. In 2025, Middle East sulfur FOB prices climbed from about $170/mt at the beginning of the year to the latest level of about $520/mt , an increase of more than 200%. Meanwhile, continued turmoil in the Red Sea further extended shipping cycles and lifted overall import costs. Disrupted logistics and rising costs created dual pressure, reducing effective market circulation and slowing the pace of arrivals, becoming a key factor supporting sulfur prices fluctuate at highs. The natural gas sector brought marginal improvement to supply: according to the latest quarterly report released today by the International Energy Agency (IEA), global natural gas demand in 2025 was about 1.3% . As a substantial increase in LNG supply eased market fundamentals and drove strong demand growth in Asia, global demand growth in 2026 will accelerate to about 2% . New projects in the US, Canada, and Qatar will come on stream in succession, and LNG supply is expected to increase by 7%, i.e., 40 billion m³. With natural gas consumption rising steadily, sulfur production as a by-product of natural gas desulfurization will increase accordingly, providing some supplementation to overall supply. According to the SMM survey, global sulphur production growth slowed to 2.28% in 2025. In 2026, supply-side expansion will be limited, and supply growth will remain at a low level, with total annual supply expected to reach 82-83 million mt. (II)Demand Side: New Energy-Driven, with Continuous Structural Optimization Global sulphur demand in 2026 will sustain strong growth, with demand growth significantly outpacing supply growth . The key drivers are underpinned by rigid agricultural demand and a growth in incremental growth from new energy. According to the SMM survey, global phosphate fertiliser consumption will grow steadily at an annual rate of about 1.6%. As the largest downstream demand segment for sulphur, it provides a solid foundation for the overall market; demand in the chemical sector will also expand steadily at an annual rate of about 4%–6%. The most noteworthy incremental growth in 2026 will come from the concentrated ramp-up across the global new energy industry chain. According to the SMM database, newly built and commissioned LFP capacity in China in 2026 will exceed 2.5 million mt ; together with the release of existing capacity, the industry’s effective capacity is expected to surpass 9 million mt, driving a sharp increase in demand for high-purity sulphuric acid and sulphur. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s nickel hydrometallurgy projects are accelerating, adding about 400,000 mt Ni of new MHP capacity. Based on its sulphur intensity of as high as 11.7 mt, this will generate incremental sulphur demand on the order of 1 million mt, creating a global “competition for sulphur” alongside global phosphate fertiliser, traditional chemicals, and new energy materials, further exacerbating tight global sulphur supply. SMM has launched SMM CIF Indonesia Sulfur and Sulfur (Solid) price assessments for market reference. SMM CIF Indonesia Sulfur Definition:CIF Indonesian main ports; Quality: Sulfur 99.5% min, Particle; Price Origin: Indonesia. Sulfur (Solid) price Definition: Ex-works, China; Quality: Sulfur（S) 99.00% min，conforming to GB/T 2449-2006; Price Origin: China.

Against this backdrop, the value of energy storage and grid infrastructure becomes particularly prominent. If conflict persists, the core objective of energy systems will shift from cost optimization to systemic resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and storage possess an insurance-like function; their value becomes more visible under extreme conditions. Even if elevated raw material prices increase project costs, higher policy priority may provide long-term support.

In times of peace, oil and gas are cost variables; in a war context, traditional energy becomes a security variable. The escalation of conflict in the Middle East at the end of February led to a high opening for oil prices on the first trading day of March. During peacetime, energy prices fluctuate around the supply-demand gap, with the market focusing on production, inventory, and cost curves. However, in a war environment, the market first trades not on production but on deliverability. Whether key shipping routes are open, whether insurance costs soar, and whether sanctions spread, all quickly translate into risk premiums. As a result, oil prices exhibit high fluctuations, even if actual supply has not significantly decreased, as prices are pushed up by delivery uncertainties. Energy thus transforms from a commodity into a strategic resource. As an analyst in the new energy sector, I believe that this change does not simply benefit new energy. Rising oil prices reinforce the logic of electrification, making EVs and renewable energy more economically attractive. However, the macroeconomic uncertainty brought about by war may also dampen consumer and investment confidence. If high oil prices drive inflation and slow growth, overall demand for cars and industry will slow down, and new energy will not be immune. Therefore, the investment logic for new energy is no longer unidirectional, but depends on the balance between substitution effects and macroeconomic contraction effects. A deeper change lies in the fact that capital is beginning to re-evaluate energy security. The traditional oil and gas system is highly dependent on cross-border transportation and continuous fuel supply, with its vulnerabilities lying in shipping and geopolitics. In contrast, wind and PV do not require continuous fuel input during operation, and energy storage can enhance the stability of the power system, giving new energy strategic value in a war environment. They are not only low-carbon tools but also a path to reducing external dependence. The security attributes of new energy are thus being revalued. However, it must be recognized that this security attribute is not absolute. The manufacturing of new energy is highly dependent on critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, with their mining and processing concentrated and heavily reliant on transportation. If upstream resource policies tighten or logistics are disrupted, risks will also propagate through the industry chain. Therefore, the security of new energy is operational security, not supply security. This means that future investment logic will shift from simply pursuing the lowest cost to focusing on supply chain control capabilities and regional diversification. In a war environment, the allocation of risk premiums by capital changes. Transportation premiums, geopolitical premiums, and supply chain concentration premiums all rise. The volatility of traditional energy intensifies; new energy generation assets gain a security bonus; and critical minerals and midstream processing capabilities become new strategic nodes. Efficiency is no longer the sole criterion, with redundancy and controllability becoming important components of the valuation system. Deglobalization and supply chain restructuring may push up the cost center of the industry, but they also enhance the strategic position of assets. In this context, the value of energy storage and power grid assets stands out. If conflicts persist, the core goal of the energy system will shift from cost optimization to system resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and energy storage have insurance-like attributes, and their value becomes more evident in extreme scenarios. Even if high raw material prices increase project costs, an elevated policy priority may still provide long-term support. Over the past five to ten years, the narrative of the energy transition has largely focused on new energy as a tool for decarbonization to ensure sustainable development of the planet. However, geopolitical tensions in the last two to three years have redefined new energy as part of the energy security framework. Within new energy, it is not just the power generation assets that are being repriced, but also energy storage and the power grid. 1) In a war environment, the core issue of the energy system shifts from efficiency to resilience During peacetime, the goal of the energy system is to maximize efficiency: lowest cost, highest utilization rate, and optimal allocation. Cross-border trade and centralized power generation have made the global energy structure highly globalized and scaled. War exposes the vulnerabilities of such a system. Maritime transport routes, natural gas pipelines, tanker insurance, key ports, and large power plants can all become risk nodes. At this point, the system's priority is no longer efficiency but resilience – the ability to maintain basic operational capacity under shocks. Energy storage and the power grid are at the core of a resilient system. 2) Energy storage: from an arbitrage tool to system insurance In normal circumstances, the value of energy storage mainly comes from electricity arbitrage, ancillary services, and peak load regulation, with its return on investment depending on fluctuations in electricity prices and policy subsidies. However, in a wartime context, the value of energy storage is redefined. It is no longer merely an economic optimization tool but a guarantee of power system stability. Energy storage can provide emergency support during fuel supply disruptions or grid shocks, preventing the power system from collapsing due to a single point of failure. This means that energy storage assets have insurance-like attributes. When system risks rise, capital's risk appetite for these assets increases. Even if high raw material prices drive up project costs, there may still be stronger policy support because of the rising strategic value. The valuation logic of energy storage thus transitions from "IRR-driven" to "system safety premium." 3) Power grid: an undervalued strategic hub The impact of war on the energy system often first manifests in the transmission and distribution network. Centralized energy structures rely on a few key periods, and once damaged, the impact is widespread. Therefore, power grid upgrades and digitalization have become the focus of secure investments. Enhancements in smart grids, regional interconnections, grid redundancy, and distributed access capabilities can significantly strengthen the system's resilience to shocks. The investment logic for power grid assets becomes clearer in a wartime context: it is not only infrastructure but also the backbone of national energy security. In the long term, power grid upgrades will be a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of new energy. The fluctuations in new energy generation require more robust transmission, distribution, and dispatching capabilities. When risk environments rise, countries are more inclined to accelerate grid construction to reduce dependence on external energy. 4) Distributed Energy and Microgrids: The Strategic Significance of Decentralization While centralized energy systems are efficient, they are also highly vulnerable. Although distributed PV, community energy storage, and microgrids are relatively small in scale, they possess the capability for independent operation. In a war context, distributed energy has two advantages: first, it reduces the risk of single-point failures; second, it decreases reliance on cross-border fuel transportation. The strategic value of such assets is being re-evaluated in high-risk environments. 5) Deep Changes in Investment Logic The rising value of energy storage and power grids means that new energy investments no longer solely revolve around installation growth and cost reduction, but rather around system security and supply chain control. Key changes include: a. Capital is more focused on localized manufacturing and supply chain diversification; b. The weight of security in investment decisions has increased; c. The cost center may shift upward in stages, but the strategic premium has risen. The valuation system of the new energy industry is transitioning from a growth premium to a strategic premium. What opportunities and risks does geopolitics bring to China's new energy industry? 1) China's Energy Security Structure: From Import Dependence to Electrification Advantage China has long been one of the world's largest crude oil importers, with persistent energy security issues. In a wartime environment, oil price fluctuations and transportation risks increase, directly affecting energy costs and macro expectations. However, unlike before, China has established the most complete new energy manufacturing system globally. The high integration of the PV, wind, energy storage, battery, and EV industry chains gives China a manufacturing and scale advantage during the energy transition. In a war context, this advantage is beginning to translate into security attributes: an increase in electrification means a reduction in dependence on external fuels; an increase in new energy installations means a more resilient energy structure. Thus, China's new energy system has the potential for alternative security. 2) Energy Storage and Power Grid: China's Most Strategic Assets If the war becomes protracted, the core of the energy system will no longer be power generation capacity itself, but system stability. China's layout in energy storage and power grid gives it a relative advantage at this stage. In terms of energy storage, China possesses the world's largest battery manufacturing capacity and cost advantages. Under the logic of energy security, energy storage is no longer solely about economics, but has become an important tool for ensuring the stability and emergency response capability of the power system. At the policy level, there may be an emphasis on increasing the proportion of energy storage in the power system. Regarding the power grid, China has developed the world's largest ultra-high voltage transmission network and grid construction capabilities. The increased redundancy and interconnectivity of the grid help to absorb more new energy installations while enhancing the system's resilience against shocks. In a high-risk environment, investment in the grid may accelerate. This means that, under the security logic, China's energy storage and power grid assets have structural strategic premiums. 3) Critical Minerals and Supply Chain: Advantages and Risks Coexist China has advantages in the new energy manufacturing sector, but still relies on overseas layouts for upstream resources. The supply chains for critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt are highly internationalized, and wars or geopolitical risks may amplify policy and logistics uncertainties. For China's new energy industry chain, the real challenge lies not in the manufacturing end, but in the stability and cost fluctuations of the resource end. The trend of supply chain deglobalization may push up the cost center, compressing profit margins. The core of future competition will shift from scale expansion to resource control capabilities and the diversification of global layouts. 4) New Energy Vehicles: China's Structural Advantages and Short-term Fluctuations The impact of the war environment on new energy vehicles also has a dual nature. On one hand, rising oil prices reinforce the economic advantages of EVs. In a context of high oil prices, the cost advantages of using EVs become even more evident, which is conducive to increasing the penetration rate among end-users. China has the world's largest EV capacity and supply chain system, with scale and cost advantages. On the other hand, high oil prices may suppress consumer confidence through inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty. If the war continues for a long time, global economic growth may slow down, putting overall car demand under pressure. Although new energy vehicles have a substitution logic, they cannot be completely independent of the macro cycle. Therefore, the short-term performance of China's new energy vehicle industry will depend on the relative strength of the substitution effect and macroeconomic drag. 5) Long-term Structure: Re-stratification of Strategic Assets In the era of energy security, the competitiveness of China's new energy system will be more reflected in three aspects: First, manufacturing scale and cost control capabilities; Second, the system support capacity of the power grid and energy storage; Third, the diversification of upstream resources and supply chain layout. War has accelerated the stratification of the global energy system. Traditional energy bears higher fluctuation risks; new energy power generation and power grid assets gain a safety premium; critical minerals become the focal point of geopolitical competition. For China, the new energy industry is no longer just an engine for growth but also a part of the energy security system. The investment logic will shift from pure growth rate and subsidies to strategic position and supply chain stability. Overall, as energy transitions from a cost variable to a security variable, the strategic value of China's new energy system rises, but it also faces higher supply chain risks and global competitive pressures. Energy storage and the power grid are becoming the core of system stability; new energy vehicles benefit under the substitution logic, but one must be wary of macro cycles; critical minerals will determine the cost center and industrial profit margins. In an era where war reshapes the energy order, stability is more important than growth. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le 13916526348