June 24, 2026 The price of gold remains under short-term pressure following recent setbacks, but the broader bull market is far from over. For Jerry Prior, Chief Operating Officer and Senior Portfolio Manager at the KraneShares Mount Lucas Managed Futures Index Strategy ETF (NYSE: KMLM), the current decline is primarily a healthy readjustment following overheated positioning. The true long-term drivers—above all, the global shift away from the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency—remain absolutely intact. Healthy Correction: Why the Fed Shock Is Cleaning Up the Market In recent weeks, the precious metal has come under noticeable selling pressure due to several concurrent factors. The Federal Reserve’s more restrictive stance under its new chairman, Kevin Warsh, and the associated expectations of higher interest rates massively increased the opportunity cost of non-interest-bearing gold. At the same time, immediate safe-haven demand eased due to a de-escalation in the Middle East, prompting speculative investors and systematic trend-following funds to engage in massive selling. However, it is precisely this sharp reduction in positions that has already removed the bulk of the downside risk from the market. According to the expert, the risk of panic selling driven by retail inflows has been virtually eliminated following this rigorous market correction. Even if prices were to slip temporarily below the psychologically important threshold of $4,000 per ounce, the focus would instead shift to the enormous potential in the period that follows. As soon as global oil markets stabilize again and new revenues flow into commodity-exporting countries, a massive return of central banks seeking to further build up their gold reserves is to be expected. The Catalyst: De-dollarization Fuels the Next Bull Run Structural de-dollarization remains the strongest argument for strategic gold positions. The increasing use of the U.S. dollar as a geopolitical lever—the so-called “weaponization of the dollar”—is forcing more and more countries to seek alternative stores of value beyond U.S. Treasury bonds. This trend is considered irreversible. Additional revenues from exporting nations are likely to be channeled directly into the gold market in the future, rather than being used to finance the U.S. deficit. This development is accompanied by a macroeconomic environment characterized by structurally higher inflation. The end of cheap globalization benefits from China, the resource-intensive restructuring of global supply chains, and the costly relocation of production facilities virtually guarantee that inflation will not permanently return to the extremely low pre-pandemic level. The recent correction is therefore not a harbinger of a long bear market, but merely a temporary pullback within a secular uptrend. For long-term commodity investors, this market movement is actually good news. Viewed in this light, the current pullback to historically significant support levels flushes speculative market participants out of the system and offers a healthy entry opportunity. Since the fundamental megatrends—from global de-dollarization to massive central bank purchases—remain absolutely intact, as many experts emphasize, the foundation for the next upward cycle could be taking shape here, initially heading toward the $4,500 mark. Source： https://goldinvest.de/en/gold-prices-remain-under-pressure-but-this-is-exactly-where-a-new-opportunity-could-lie

[SMM Coking Coal and Coke Daily Briefing] Market news: rumors suggest that the ninth round of coke price increases is about to be proposed, requiring implementation on June 27 or 29. Supply side, after the eighth round of coke price increase was implemented, coke enterprises' losses narrowed somewhat, but the cost of coal charged into furnaces remained high, and most coke enterprises were not profitable, constraining their production. Demand side, steel mills' hot metal production remained at high levels, there is rigid demand for coke, and procurement remains active. In summary, coke fundamentals remain tight, and cost support is still expected to increase. In the short term, the coke market may hold up well, and there is a possibility that the ninth round of coke price increase will be implemented.

On June 22, China’s MOFCOM imposed export controls on 10 US entities, including rare earth giants MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, retaliating against the US expansion of its "Chinese Military Companies List" on June 8. While largely symbolic for China's magnet exports, the move targets the Achilles' heel of US supply chain autonomy, threatening higher costs and delays for American defense and rare earth projects.

Futures: Overnight, LME lead opened at a low of $1,965/mt, fluctuating upward during Asian trading hours; entering the European session, it touched a high of $1,981/mt, then gave back some gains towards the close, eventually ending at $1,968.5/mt, up 0.08%. Overnight, the most-traded SHFE lead 2607 contract opened at 16,240 yuan/mt, dipping to a session low of 16,210 yuan/mt early on before edging up to a high of 16,315 yuan/mt, finally settling at 16,265 yuan/mt, up 0.15%. On the macro front: The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell to a 43-year low. Middle East situation – Trump: Will allow Iran to conduct low-level uranium enrichment. May or may not attend the agreement signing on the 19th. The strait will fully open on Friday. Importantly, oil prices have dropped sharply while the stock market is rising. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and other departments issued a notice to launch a three-year campaign to tackle energy conservation and carbon reduction in key industries. SAFE: In May, foreign-invested enterprises' dividend and profit distribution expenditures increased seasonally, and foreign investors were net buyers of domestic stocks and bonds overall. Spot fundamentals: SHFE lead reversed course and rebounded, with suppliers selling along with the market. Some offered wider discounts from last Friday, but some smelters, with low inventory, remained relatively firm in their pricing. Mainstream production region primary lead quotations against the SMM #1 lead average price were at discounts of 25 yuan/mt to premiums of 25 yuan/mt, EXW. For secondary lead, smelters had divergent attitudes toward selling. Secondary refined lead quotations against SMM #1 lead were at discounts of 25 yuan/mt to premiums of 125 yuan/mt, EXW. Downstream enterprises mostly turned cautious, with fewer inquiries; some temporarily focused on digesting inventories, and spot market transactions weakened. Inventory: On June 15, LME lead inventory decreased by 1,025 mt to 304,850 mt; as of June 15, SMM lead ingot social inventory across five regions totaled 67,700 mt, an increase of 3,000 mt from June 8 and an increase of 2,300 mt from June 11. Lead price forecast today: Last week, lead prices declined, and downstream dip-buying demand warmed up. Affected by secondary lead smelters holding back from selling and their high quotes, purchasing demand shifted significantly to EXW primary lead cargoes. At present, Henan smelters are still shipping on order. Yesterday, the SHFE lead 2606 contract completed delivery, with suppliers shipping to delivery warehouses in a concentrated manner, and social inventory increased as expected. Currently, both primary and secondary lead enterprises face maintenance and raw material shortages, with supply tight and uncertain. SMM believes that after the delivery, lead ingot inventory buildup pressure will gradually ease, and upside resistance to lead prices is expected to weaken.

On June 9, a fire broke out at Chemical Grade Plant 3, or CGP3, at the Greenbushes lithium operation. The fire was quickly extinguished, no injuries were reported, and CGP1 and CGP2 continued to operate as normal. The following day, IGO confirmed that its FY2026 spodumene concentrate production guidance of 1.375–1.425 million tonnes remained unchanged. Chemical Grade Plant 4, or CGP4, is scheduled to commence construction in 2027. Viewed in isolation, this was a well-contained operational incident. However, the location of the fire deserves closer attention. CGP3 is not part of Greenbushes’ existing production base. It represents incremental supply currently ramping up at the far-left end of the global lithium cost curve. The project involved approximately A$880 million of investment and is designed to add around 500,000 tonnes per year of spodumene concentrate capacity. First ore was fed into the plant in December 2025, and the facility had originally been expected to reach nameplate capacity around mid-2026. The damage assessment is still under way. Neither the repair cost nor the recovery timeline has been quantified. The fact that production guidance remains unchanged should therefore be understood as an initial assessment rather than a definitive conclusion. The key question is not whether IGO has immediately revised its annual guidance. It is whether the CGP3 ramp-up schedule will be delayed. Should the market be concerned when an incremental production line at the world’s lowest-cost lithium mine experiences an operational disruption? To answer this question, it is useful to examine the role of Australian lithium mines in the broader lithium pricing mechanism. Note on the CGP3 ramp-up timeline: At IGO’s FY2026 second-quarter results briefing in late January 2026, management stated that CGP3 had received first ore in December 2025 and would require approximately five months to ramp up to nameplate capacity. Some English-language transcripts recorded management as referring to completion “by the end of the calendar year.” However, based on the timing of first ore feed, a five-month ramp-up period would imply completion around mid-2026, before the end of Australia’s FY2026 financial year. This is also consistent with the company’s previous guidance. The transcript may therefore have intended to say “by the end of the financial year.” This article adopts the mid-2026 ramp-up assumption. The timing is relevant because the June 9 fire occurred only weeks before the originally expected completion of the ramp-up. The actual impact should become clearer in IGO’s fourth-quarter report, which is expected in late July. Greenbushes: A Reference Point at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes’ most important advantage begins with ore grade. It is one of the world’s largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines currently in production. Its ore grade is approximately twice the industry average. For a spodumene operation, grade directly affects processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrate, Greenbushes needs to process materially less ore than a typical mine. This provides a structural advantage across mining, beneficiation, energy consumption and tailings management. Greenbushes also benefits from scale. The operation currently has several processing facilities, with combined nominal ore-processing capacity of around 6.5 million tonnes per year and spodumene concentrate capacity of up to approximately 1.5 million tonnes per year. Once CGP3 completes its ramp-up, the mine will add a further 500,000 tonnes per year of concentrate capacity. With the mine life extended to 2045, Greenbushes combines low costs with long-term supply capacity. This explains the mine’s resilience during the lithium price downturn. During 2024 and 2025, lithium prices declined sharply. A number of higher-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced production cuts or temporary shutdowns. Greenbushes, however, continued to maintain relatively strong profitability and moved ahead with the CGP3 expansion. Greenbushes does not represent the industry’s average cost. It represents the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium cost curve. For that reason, Greenbushes is better understood as a reference point for the bottom of the cycle. As lithium prices fall, higher-cost supply exits first, while low-cost assets remain in operation. The closer prices move toward the cost range of Greenbushes, the fewer marginal producers remain capable of operating normally, and the more advanced the supply-side clearing process becomes. This does not mean that lithium prices can never fall below the cost level of Greenbushes. In the short term, inventory pressure, liquidity conditions and market sentiment can push prices below the cost levels implied by the marginal supply curve. Greenbushes is not an absolute price floor. Its significance is that it provides a structural reference point for assessing how far supply-side clearing has progressed. Greenbushes: The Largest Producer, but with Limited Freely Traded Supply Although Greenbushes produces large volumes of spodumene concentrate, relatively little of that material enters the open spot market directly. The mine is operated by Talison Lithium. Talison is owned by Tianqi Lithium Energy Australia, or TLEA, and Albemarle. TLEA is in turn jointly owned by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. Greenbushes concentrate is primarily distributed through shareholder offtake arrangements and supplied into the downstream conversion systems of Tianqi, Albemarle and their respective partners. Under normal conditions, the material is not sold directly into the open market. Greenbushes therefore provides a useful example of why lithium supply should be analysed through several different layers: Resources → Design capacity → Actual production → Saleable volume → Freely traded spot volume Greenbushes ranks among the world’s largest producers by actual output. However, because most of its concentrate is locked into shareholder offtake arrangements, the amount available for open-market trading remains relatively limited. This means Greenbushes affects lithium pricing mainly through indirect channels. First, it determines the size of the lowest-cost portion of global lithium supply and therefore plays an important role in shaping the lithium chemical cost curve. Second, its operating costs, offtake pricing mechanism and expansion schedule provide reference points for long-term contract negotiations and price assessments in the spodumene market. By contrast, short-term spot prices are often more directly influenced by marginal resources that are not fully locked into shareholder arrangements and must actively seek buyers in the market. These include certain Australian mines, African lithium resources and trader-held cargoes. This explains an apparent paradox. An additional 500,000 tonnes of Greenbushes concentrate capacity can materially change the medium-term supply-demand balance, yet its immediate impact on the spot market may be limited. Meanwhile, the shutdown or restart of a marginal mine producing only 100,000–200,000 tonnes per year can quickly influence spot quotations and market sentiment if its output is sold on a market basis. Short-term pricing is not determined solely by total production. It is also shaped by the volume of material that is freely available for negotiation and immediate transaction. The same logic applies to lithium carbonate. Price elasticity depends not only on total inventory but also on how much inventory is genuinely available for circulation. The largest producer does not necessarily exert the most direct influence over the spot market. Short-term marginal pricing is usually driven by the resources that are tradeable, negotiable and available for immediate delivery. However, shareholder offtake does not mean that Greenbushes material is completely isolated from the market. If lithium conversion plants within the Tianqi or Albemarle systems reduce operating rates, or if downstream conversion assets experience operational issues, part of the concentrate originally intended for internal consumption may re-enter the market indirectly through tolling, resale or inventory adjustments. These volumes are rarely captured in public statistics, but they can affect the actual liquidity of the spodumene market. Tracking this material requires a broader set of indicators, including shareholder conversion-plant operating rates, concentrate inventories, tolling arrangements and import flows. This type of “shadow spot supply” is harder to observe than nominal mine production, yet it can become relevant at specific points in the cycle. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: The Direction of Price Transmission Reversed Within a Year The relationship between Australian spodumene concentrate prices and Chinese lithium chemical prices has completed a full cycle over the past year. During the first half of 2025, spodumene prices followed lithium chemical prices downward. Australian miners reduced costs materially in the first quarter but largely avoided production cuts. Mining companies remained willing to ship material, and the price of SC6 concentrate fell to around US$620 per tonne. Falling concentrate prices then placed additional pressure on lithium chemical prices, reinforcing the downward cycle. At the time, the key market question was straightforward: When would the mining sector finally reduce supply? The direction of transmission reversed in the end of third quarter. The announcement that 27 mining licences in Yichun could be cancelled, together with the suspension of the Jianxiawo mine, tightened expectations around domestic Chinese lithium supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first. SC6 prices then followed, with greater elasticity. By December, the monthly average price had recovered to around US$1,300 per tonne. Formula-based pricing mechanisms linked to lithium chemical prices allowed mining companies to capture a large share of the upside, while Chinese converters saw their processing margins squeezed. At the same time, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana lithium hydroxide project highlighted the challenges facing Australian downstream conversion. The project has faced difficulties in cost control, production ramp-up and operational stability. TLEA’s Kwinana lithium hydroxide refinery was fully impaired in mid-2025, the second train was suspended, and IGO made clear that it would prioritize mining. These developments reinforce Australia’s role as a supplier of spodumene concentrate rather than a major lithium chemical conversion hub. As a result, the relationship between SC6 prices and Chinese lithium chemical prices is likely to remain strong. However, the speed and magnitude of transmission will continue to depend on inventories, contract formulas, shipping cycles and converter operating rates. One of the most useful indicators is the implied conversion margin between SC6 concentrate and lithium chemical spot prices. When the implied conversion margin turns negative, Chinese converters purchasing third-party concentrate are effectively losing cash on incremental production. The market then needs to rebalance through at least one of three channels: Spodumene concentrate prices decline; Lithium chemical prices rise; Converters reduce operating rates. This indicator provides a useful way to judge whether bargaining power currently sits with the mining segment or the conversion segment. Australian Mine Restarts: Lithium Prices Develop an Upper Constraint The key theme for Australian lithium mines during 2024 and 2025 was supply-side clearing. In 2026, the theme has shifted toward reactivation. As lithium prices recovered during the first half of the year and futures briefly exceeded RMB 200,000 per tonne, a series of restart decisions emerged across May and June. Project Action Timing Key Point Bald Hill, Mineral Resources Restart after approximately 18 months of suspension Restart announced in May; first concentrate expected in July Restart cost of around A$20 million Ngungaju, PLS Processing plant restart Planned for July Approximately 200,000 tonnes per year of restored output Finniss, Core Lithium Final investment decision approved; financing secured Targeting first ore in the third quarter Financing package of approximately US$205 million Kathleen Valley, Liontown Expansion under assessment Ongoing Further details pending Mt Cattlin, Rio Tinto Remains suspended Suspended since March 2025 Restart conditions remain unclear Taken together, these cases show that the true threshold for mine restart is more complex than a simple comparison between lithium prices and cash costs. Bald Hill moved from restart announcement to expected first concentrate production in around two months. The mine had remained in a production-ready care-and-maintenance state, and Mineral Resources has its own mining-services platform, allowing it to mobilize mining, crushing and haulage internally without relying heavily on external contractors. This type of asset represents the fastest-reacting segment of supply when prices recover. Finniss is a different case. The project first monetized inventories through Glencore to improve liquidity, then assembled a financing package involving convertible debt, additional borrowings and equity issuance before reaching a final investment decision. For miners with weaker balance sheets, a restart is not simply an operational decision. It is a financing event. A low-price cycle does not eliminate the resource base. It eliminates the ability to finance production. The market impact of the restart wave is already visible. Lithium carbonate futures reached a two-year high of RMB 200,500 per tonne on May 13 before retreating to around RMB 160,000–170,000 per tonne in June. One reason for the pullback is that the market has begun to price in the return of idle supply. The mechanism is straightforward: Prices rise → Idle capacity restarts → Expected supply increases → Prices come under pressure The list of suspended Australian mines, once ranked by restart economics and response time, effectively becomes an upside supply curve for lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and the restart wave represent two sides of the same market. At the low-cost end of the curve, incremental Greenbushes supply has experienced an operational disruption, creating a bullish signal. At the higher-cost end, idle assets are returning to production, creating a bearish signal. From a resource perspective, lithium prices in 2026 are searching for equilibrium between these two forces. Lithium Prices in 2026 May Become More Volatile, but One-Way Trends Could Be Shorter Once prices rise, the factor that ultimately limits the upside is the speed at which idle capacity returns to the market. Bald Hill, Finniss and Ngungaju represent a broader pool of suspended or standby assets that can respond when lithium prices move sufficiently above their cash-cost thresholds and remain there for long enough. However, restart supply is not instantaneous. From the moment a restart is announced, companies need to remobilize personnel, inspect equipment, resume mining and processing, build concentrate inventories and arrange shipments. Depending on the asset, concentrate may enter the market within two months or only after several quarters. This delay creates a window during which supply disruptions can push prices higher. The suspension of the Jianxiawo mine and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes matter not because global lithium resources have suddenly become scarce, but because short-term freely available supply has tightened while idle capacity has not yet fully returned. Compared with the previous cycle, this risk-premium window appears to be shortening. An increasing number of mines are being placed on care and maintenance rather than permanently closed. Mining-services companies, traders and downstream customers are also becoming more involved in restart financing and offtake arrangements. Once prices move back above the relevant breakeven levels, some idle assets can return more quickly. This does not necessarily mean lithium prices will become more stable. Supply disruptions can still trigger rapid price increases. However, the duration and magnitude of one-way rallies are likely to face stronger constraints from restart expectations. Prices may become more volatile in the short term, but sustained unilateral trends could become shorter. Conclusion Australian lithium mines influence lithium prices through several distinct channels. Greenbushes provides a structural reference point at the bottom of the hard-rock lithium cost curve. However, because most of its output is absorbed through shareholder offtake arrangements, it does not directly determine short-term spot pricing. Spot-market tightness is more directly influenced by marginal saleable supply: Australian mines, African resources and trader-held inventories that are available for negotiation and immediate transaction. Once lithium prices rise, the speed at which suspended assets restart becomes the key constraint on the duration of the rally. The framework can therefore be summarized in three lines: Low-cost mines provide a structural reference point for the bottom of the cycle. Freely traded supply determines short-term spot-market tightness. The speed of mine restarts determines how long an upside cycle can last. The CGP3 fire and the restart wave sit at opposite ends of this framework. One represents a disruption to low-cost incremental supply. The other represents the return of higher-cost idle capacity. Lithium prices in 2026 will continue to seek equilibrium between these two forces. Lesley Yang Senior New Energy Analyst, SMM yangle@smm.cn

[SMM Coking Coal and Coke Daily Review] Supply side, as coking coal prices, the raw material, continue to rise, some coke producers are forced to implement production restrictions, affecting production levels. In addition, shipments at some coke producers were not smooth, leading to a slight increase in coke inventories at these producers. Demand side, hot metal production at steel mills overall remains at a high level, and combined with still-low coke inventories at some mills, there is rigid demand for coke. In summary, coke fundamentals remain tight, with strong cost support. In the short term, the coke market continues to hold up well, with expectations of a seventh round of price increases.

It is worth noting that with the gradual ramp-up of large cylindrical battery production, the share of 9-series materials is rising rapidly both domestically and internationally.

After several rounds of sharp lithium price volatility, companies across the battery supply chain have become increasingly focused on raw-material risk management. Long-term agreements, spot procurement frameworks, futures and standard options are gradually becoming part of the procurement toolkit. At the same time, a more complex type of structured product has also attracted attention from industry participants: the Accumulator . At first glance, an accumulator contract offers a procurement opportunity at a price below the prevailing market level. In a range-bound or moderately rising market, it can indeed help reduce average procurement costs. However, the discount is not free. By obtaining a more favourable purchase price, the company is effectively selling part of its downside protection to the counterparty: it receives a limited procurement discount in exchange for assuming tail risk if prices fall. This article examines the basic mechanics of accumulators, their potential applications in the battery supply chain, their transmission effects on market prices and inventories, and the key issues companies should consider when using such instruments. 1. What Is an Accumulator? An accumulator is not a single standardized option. It is an over-the-counter structured contract under which the reference price is observed on a daily, weekly or monthly basis and procurement volumes accumulate over time. Under a typical structure, a downstream buyer agrees with a bank, trader or financial institution to purchase a specified quantity of raw-material exposure at a fixed price over a defined period. The agreed purchase price is usually below the prevailing spot price at inception, making the structure appear attractive from a pricing perspective. However, the contract normally includes two important features. The first is the knock-out mechanism . If the market price rises to a predetermined level, the contract terminates early. The buyer retains the discounts already obtained but can no longer continue purchasing at the discounted price. The second is the volume-multiplier mechanism . If the market price falls below the agreed strike price, the buyer is required to continue purchasing a larger quantity. A common structure is a doubling of the purchase volume, although other multipliers may also be agreed. This creates a clear asymmetry: Market Scenario Outcome for the Buyer Prices rise moderately but remain below the knock-out level The buyer continues purchasing at a price below spot and benefits from the discount Prices rise rapidly and reach the knock-out level The contract terminates early; previous discounts are retained, but the buyer must return to the spot market for future procurement Prices fall below the strike price The buyer must continue purchasing at the agreed price and at a higher volume, usually double the original quantity Prices continue to fall High-cost purchases accumulate, inventory pressure increases and cash-flow exposure expands; theoretical losses are uncapped The defining feature of the accumulator is therefore not simply price locking. It is the exchange of limited procurement discounts for downside tail-risk exposure. 2. Why Would Downstream Battery Companies Consider This Type of Structure? Several characteristics of the battery supply chain make accumulator structures attractive under certain conditions. First, raw-material prices can be highly volatile. Lithium prices have experienced both rapid increases and prolonged declines. For cathode-material producers and battery-cell manufacturers, changes in lithium carbonate prices can quickly affect product costs and profit margins. Second, there is a clear timing mismatch across the supply chain. Companies often need to secure raw materials in advance, while downstream orders and actual deliveries remain uncertain. When prices rise, buyers worry about insufficient procurement coverage. When prices fall, they worry about having locked in excessive volumes at elevated prices. Third, some downstream companies prefer not to pay the explicit upfront premium associated with standard options. An accumulator embeds knock-out and volume-multiplier provisions, converting part of the visible premium into conditional risk. This can make the initial pricing appear more attractive. However, this does not mean accumulators are suitable for every company. They are more appropriate for companies with stable raw-material demand, strong cash-flow capacity, mature risk-management systems and professional derivatives teams. For companies with volatile demand, limited inventory capacity or significant funding pressure, accumulators can materially amplify operating risk. 3. A Simplified Scenario: How Does an Accumulator Work? Consider a cathode-material producer. At the time of signing, the spot price of lithium carbonate is RMB 100,000 per tonne. The company is concerned about a possible price rebound and wants to lock in part of its future procurement cost. A simplified accumulator structure could be designed as follows: Contract Term Illustrative Setting Spot price at inception RMB 100,000/tonne Accumulator strike price RMB 90,000/tonne Knock-out price RMB 110,000/tonne Base purchase volume 100 tonnes per month Purchase volume if price falls below strike 200 tonnes per month Contract tenor 12 months Scenario 1: Prices Rise Moderately The lithium carbonate price rises from RMB 100,000 to RMB 105,000 per tonne but does not reach the knock-out price of RMB 110,000 per tonne. The company continues purchasing at RMB 90,000 per tonne and gains a procurement advantage of RMB 15,000 per tonne. This is the most favourable environment for an accumulator: prices remain range-bound or rise moderately, allowing the buyer to continue benefiting from discounted procurement. Scenario 2: Prices Rise Rapidly and Trigger the Knock-Out The lithium carbonate price rises to RMB 110,000 per tonne, triggering the knock-out mechanism. The contract terminates early. The company retains the discounts already achieved but must return to the spot market for future purchases, now at a higher price level. This demonstrates that an accumulator provides only limited protection against extreme upside risk. Scenario 3: Prices Fall Below the Strike Price The market price falls to RMB 70,000 per tonne. The company must still purchase at RMB 90,000 per tonne, and the monthly purchase volume doubles from 100 tonnes to 200 tonnes. The monthly cost disadvantage reaches RMB 4 million. If the price falls further to RMB 50,000 per tonne, the monthly cost disadvantage increases to RMB 8 million. If actual production demand is insufficient, the additional volumes cannot be consumed immediately and will become involuntary inventory. The core risk of an accumulator is therefore not price volatility alone. It is that the company is forced to expand its exposure precisely when market prices move against it. Procurement volumes, inventory pressure and cash-flow risk rise at the same time. 4. How Can Accumulators Affect Lithium Market Prices and Inventories? When a market contains a meaningful volume of outstanding accumulator contracts, physical orders alone may no longer fully explain procurement behaviour. Traditional supply-demand analysis usually focuses on mine output, lithium chemical production, cathode-material production schedules and end-use demand. However, financial instruments can influence physical procurement patterns around specific price levels, creating signals that do not fully reflect underlying fundamentals. When accumulator contracts are concentrated around a particular price range, three phenomena may emerge. First, Downstream Procurement May Increase as Prices Fall Falling prices would normally suggest weakening demand. However, if accumulator contracts trigger volume multipliers, downstream companies may be required to increase purchases. Some market participants may interpret this as restocking or demand recovery. In reality, part of the additional procurement may be driven by contractual obligations rather than improved end-use demand. Second, Inventory Composition May Change High-cost inventory accumulated through contractual obligations may not immediately return to the market. However, it can reduce companies’ willingness to make additional discretionary purchases and create destocking pressure when prices recover. Inventory analysis should therefore go beyond total volume. It should also examine how inventory was accumulated and at what cost. Third, Liquidity May Become Distorted Around Key Price Levels If a large number of contracts are concentrated near similar trigger prices, volume multipliers, margin changes and dynamic hedging by counterparties may jointly affect market liquidity. This can create short-term volatility that appears disconnected from the underlying supply-demand balance. It is important to emphasize that the price impact of accumulator structures is not necessarily one-directional. The effect depends on whether contracts are physically settled, how counterparties hedge their positions, whether contract sizes are sufficiently large and whether exposures are clustered around similar price levels. For analysts, periods of significant lithium price volatility require closer attention to procurement behaviour, unusual increases in transaction volumes during price declines and signs of involuntary inventory accumulation. An increase in procurement during a falling market should not automatically be interpreted as a recovery in real demand. 5. Lessons from the 2023–2024 Lithium Price Downturn Lithium carbonate prices declined by more than 80% from their peak during the 2023–2024 downturn. This provides a useful stress-test scenario for evaluating the risks embedded in accumulator structures. If downstream companies had entered large accumulator positions with relatively high strike prices during the elevated-price period, a prolonged decline would have amplified the pressure through volume multipliers, high-cost inventory accumulation and cash-flow requirements. The key lesson is that the knock-out mechanism terminates gains during price increases, while the volume-multiplier mechanism magnifies losses during price declines. This structural asymmetry can become particularly severe in highly volatile commodity markets. A company may have stable physical demand, but stable physical demand does not automatically mean that its financial exposure is safe. Because accumulator contracts are generally customized over-the-counter instruments, public markets rarely provide complete information on individual companies’ positions, strike prices or contract tenors. It is therefore more appropriate to view the 2023–2024 downturn as a risk scenario rather than as confirmation of any specific company’s actual transaction behaviour. 6. How Should Companies Use Accumulator Structures Prudently? Accumulators are most suitable for managing a portion of highly certain procurement demand. They should not replace the overall procurement framework. A more appropriate approach is to integrate accumulators into a layered procurement system rather than use them as the primary tool. Demand Category Characteristics More Suitable Instruments Base demand Supported by confirmed orders and rigid procurement needs Long-term agreements, spot frameworks and futures hedging Flexible demand Order probability is relatively high, but delivery timing may vary Staged spot procurement, futures or standard options Strategic demand The company can tolerate some volume variation and seeks to optimize average procurement cost Small-scale accumulator positions In practical terms, companies should focus on at least four constraints. Link the Structure to Real Procurement Demand The base volume under the accumulator should remain materially below confirmed procurement requirements. Even after the multiplier is triggered, the company should still be able to absorb the resulting volume through actual production. If a company needs 500 tonnes per month, it should not set the base accumulator volume at 500 tonnes. Once doubled, the required purchase volume would materially exceed actual consumption. Link the Structure to Inventory Limits Companies should define inventory limits in advance, including: Maximum inventory volume; Maximum inventory days; Maximum proportion of high-cost inventory; Warehouse capacity; Working-capital requirements. If the additional purchase volume triggered by a price decline would exceed these limits, the company should not expand its accumulator exposure. Conduct Stress Testing Before signing, the company should model scenarios in which prices fall by 20% or 40%, remain below the strike price for six consecutive months, downstream orders fall short of expectations and inventory turnover slows. Only companies that can maintain cash-flow safety under extreme scenarios should consider using accumulator structures. Ensure the Pricing Benchmark Matches the Physical Exposure Battery materials are not fully standardized products. If the specification or delivery location of the company’s physical lithium carbonate procurement differs from the settlement benchmark used in the derivative contract, basis risk may arise and reduce the effectiveness of the hedge. The contract should clearly define: Reference product; Product specification; Delivery location; Settlement benchmark; Price source; Quality differentials. Companies should not focus only on whether the strike price appears attractive. 7. What Problems Cannot Be Solved by Accumulators? Accumulator structures can help reduce a portion of procurement costs, but they cannot eliminate all supply-chain risks. First, they cannot solve physical supply shortages. If the market experiences resource constraints, logistics disruptions or supplier defaults, a cash-settled accumulator cannot provide physical material. Second, they cannot fully protect against extreme price increases. Once the knock-out level is triggered, the company must return to the spot market. Third, they cannot replace inventory discipline. Even a discounted purchase price can become a burden if the company lacks effective inventory management. Fourth, they cannot create real demand. Financial instruments do not generate physical orders. Companies should not expand procurement merely because a discounted purchase opportunity exists. Fifth, they cannot eliminate basis risk. Differences in product specifications, quality, geography and trading terms may still reduce hedging effectiveness. Conclusion Accumulator contracts are not inherently unsuitable, but they must be placed within a strict procurement-management framework. They can serve as a complementary tool alongside spot procurement, long-term agreements, futures and standard options. In range-bound or moderately rising markets, they may help companies optimize average procurement costs. However, the discount comes from risk transfer rather than risk elimination. The buyer receives a limited price advantage while assuming the obligation to expand purchase volumes, increase inventory and absorb greater cash-flow pressure when prices fall. From the perspective of lithium market analysis, accumulators introduce an important additional dimension: An increase in procurement during a falling market does not necessarily indicate real demand recovery. An increase in inventory does not necessarily indicate active restocking. Around key lithium price levels, the impact of financial contracts on physical procurement behaviour deserves close attention. Disclaimer: This article provides an analysis of market mechanisms based on commonly used industry structures and publicly available information. It does not constitute confirmation or implication of any specific company’s actual positions, trading activities or financial condition. Lesley Yang Senior New Energy Analyst, SMM yangle@smm.cn

Leveraging the dual-carbon strategy and the development trend of circular economy, China's recycled metal industry has taken a leading position globally, while also facing numerous development challenges. To assist enterprises in seizing industry policy and market opportunities, as well as addressing industrial development challenges, SMM will host the 2026 SMM Recycled Metal Industry Summit Forum and Casting Technology Special Session in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, from August 17 to 18, 2026 . cordially invites you to jointly witness and participate in building an international platform for exchange, cooperation, resource sharing, and collaborative innovation, contributing to the construction and improvement of a global resource recycling system and supporting the transition to a green economy. Click the to register immediately. Booth No.: E9 Huangshi Hongfu New Materials Co., Ltd. is a professional manufacturer of environmental protection aluminum extrusion . Established in November 2016, the company has a registered capital of 100 million yuan, covers an area of 172 mu, and has a construction area of 130,000 m². Located in Longquwan Industrial Park along National Highway 106 in Tieshan District, Huangshi City, which is rich in mineral resources, the company enjoys convenient transportation. With an investment of 360 million yuan, the company has built 24 extrusion production lines, 1 flexible intelligent horizontal oxidation electrophoresis line, 1 horizontal polishing oxidation line, 2 vertical powder coating lines, 1 horizontal painting line, 10 transfer printing lines, as well as supporting facilities for melting, casting, molds, and environmental protection. The annual production capacity of aluminum extrusion reaches 80,000 mt, with an annual output value of 1.6 billion yuan. The company boasts strong technical capabilities, including a provincial enterprise technology center, three high-tech enterprises, and an aluminum processing technology research institute. As a member of the Light Metals Subcommittee of the National Nonferrous Metals Standardization Committee, it has participated in drafting 6 national and industry standards and holds 264 patents, including 5 invention patents and 58 new-type utility patents. It possesses core technologies in melting, casting, and mold-making. The company has a comprehensive quality assurance system and has passed ISO 9001:2015 quality management system certification. The company's marketing network covers all regions of China except the three northeastern provinces. Its products are popular nationwide for their comprehensive range and high cost-performance ratio. They are widely used in construction doors and windows, home decoration, transportation vehicles, electrical and electronic fields, among others, with 1,100 series and 23,000 varieties, offering all possible surface treatment methods. The company holds a significant position in niche markets, with products like rolling shutters, artistic doors, and interior doors enjoying a strong reputation in the Chinese market. In 2019, the company was honored as one of China's Top 10 Construction Aluminum Extrusion Enterprises, Top 100 Private Building Materials Enterprises, and Top 200 Building Materials Enterprises. The company's newly registered brand "Hongfu Aluminum Semis" has been deeply embraced by the market. The company's mission is "People-oriented, honesty and trustworthiness, pioneering and enterprising, giving back to society," and the principles it adheres to are "Technology-first, quality-supreme, integrity-based, and customer satisfaction as the standard." The company will take innovation as the driving force, treat quality as life, be honest with people, and pursue pragmatic development. Contact Information Huang Xialin 1507205 6066 Ke Hao 15997102132 Yin Weigang 13972777500 Pi Hongbing 13971765063 SMM Conference Contact Zhou Shiyang Phone: 17278238856 Email:

SMM June 10 news: Metal markets: The domestic base metals market mostly fell overnight. SHFE copper fell 0.34%. SHFE aluminum fell 0.67%, and SHFE lead fell 0.4%. SHFE zinc rose 0.14%. SHFE tin fell 1.1%. SHFE nickel fell 1.34%. In addition, the most-traded alumina futures contract rose 0.68%, and the most-traded cast aluminum contract closed flat at 22,995 yuan/mt. Overnight, ferrous metals showed mixed performance, with iron ore up 0.26%, HRC flat at 3,360 yuan/mt, stainless steel down 0.69%, and rebar up 0.19%. Coking coal and coke: The most-traded coking coal futures contract fell 0.58%, and the most-traded coke futures contract rose 0.38%. On the overseas metals market overnight, LME base metals mostly fell. LME copper fell 0.23%. LME aluminum fell 2.08%, and LME lead fell 0.38%. LME zinc rose 0.33%. LME tin rose 0.16%. LME nickel fell 2.2%. Overnight precious metals market : Overnight COMEX gold fell 1.8%, and COMEX silver fell 4.56%. Overnight, the most-traded SHFE gold futures contract fell 1.51%, and the most-traded SHFE silver futures contract fell 4.06%. Bob Haberkorn, Senior Market Strategist at RJO Futures, stated: "Traders are slightly uneasy about the current market situation... A broad risk-off mode has taken hold across all markets. I believe this risk-off sentiment is what drove gold prices down." Haberkorn added: "Until the US Fed provides clearer guidance, gold and silver prices remain under downward pressure." (Jinshi Data APP) Analysts at Saxo Bank stated that gold futures prices closed below their 200-day moving average for the first time since October 2023, following last Friday's non-farm payrolls report and a broad deterioration in risk sentiment that also weighed on stock markets. The combination of a resilient US economy and rising inflation expectations is creating a challenging environment for gold, overshadowing long-term supportive factors such as central bank purchases, fiscal concerns, and reserve diversification. (Jinshi Data APP) As of 7:19 on June 10, overnight closing prices: Macro front China: [Guangdong: Over 3 million charging facilities to be built province-wide by the end of 2027, meeting the charging demand of more than 8 million NEVs] The Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission and other departments recently issued the "Guangdong Province EV Charging Facility High-Quality Development Action Plan." The plan proposes to build a high-quality charging facility system where super-charging, fast charging, and slow charging complement each other by continuously innovating application scenarios, improving charging networks, enhancing charging efficiency, optimizing service quality, and innovating the industrial ecosystem. This aims to promote the balanced development of charging facilities in eastern, western, and northern Guangdong alongside the Pearl River Delta region, and facilitate the wider purchase and use of EVs. By the end of 2027, the province will have cumulatively built over 3 million charging facilities to meet the charging demand of more than 8 million NEVs; the province will achieve "super-charging coverage in every county," with the number of super-charging stations no fewer than the number of gas stations. (Jinshi Data APP) [CPCA: Retail sales in China's domestic narrow PV market reached 1.51 million units in May 2026] According to the latest retail sales statistics from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), retail sales in China's domestic narrow passenger vehicle (PV) market reached 1.51 million units in May 2026, down 22.1% YoY, but up 9.2% MoM. Cumulative sales from January to May totaled 7.099 million units, down 19.5% YoY. US Dollar: The overnight US dollar index fell 0.07% to 99.95. Data: The weekly change in US ADP employment for the week ending May 23 was 29,000, compared to the previous figure of 35,750. Jay Woods, Chief Global Strategist at Freedom Capital Markets, stated that the US May headline CPI YoY rate is expected to jump from 3.8% to 4.2%, which would be the highest level since March 2023. But the real concern isn't the headline number; it's the potentially entrenched "sticky" items like housing, insurance, and services. These categories could keep inflation persistently above the US Fed's comfort zone, as they may remain elevated for longer. Woods noted that high inflation driven by gasoline is typically less worrying, whereas sustained price increases in housing and services could be a trend that takes time to reverse. According to CME "FedWatch": The probability that the US Fed will keep interest rates unchanged through June is 98.2%, with a cumulative probability of a 25 basis point cut at 1.8%. The probability that the Fed will keep rates unchanged through July is 85.8%, with a cumulative probability of a 25 basis point hike at 12.6% and a cumulative 25 basis point cut at 1.6%. (Jinshi Data APP) China Securities pointed out that in the short term, the probability of a US Fed interest rate hike remains low, and market concerns about Fed tightening are mainly at the expectations level, based on assumptions of sticky domestic US inflation and a persistently hot job market. CME FedWatch data indicates that the most likely timing for a Fed rate hike expected by markets outside China begins in late October 2026. The current tightening of global liquidity and market adjustments represent a front-running reaction to expectations of a Q4 Fed rate hike. Regarding the domestic bond market, increased expectations for Fed tightening are not bearish. China's bond market is relatively independent and has a small correlation with US Treasuries. Furthermore, given ample domestic liquidity, the anticipated tightening of overseas liquidity and adjustments in equity markets could potentially drive capital flows into the bond market, supporting the current level of long-term bonds. Subsequently, China's 10-year government bond yield is expected to continue oscillating around the 1.70% level; a break below 1.70% still requires the emergence of new incremental information from domestic sources. Data: Today will see the release of China's May CPI YoY, the US May unadjusted CPI YoY, the US May seasonally adjusted CPI MoM, the US May seasonally adjusted core CPI MoM, the US May unadjusted core CPI YoY, the Bank of Canada interest rate decision as of June 10, and China's May M2 money supply YoY (date TBD), among other data points. Also, attention should be paid to: the Bank of Canada's announcement of its interest rate decision; and the monetary policy press conference held by Bank of Canada Governor Macklem and Senior Deputy Governor Rogers. Crude Oil: Overnight, both oil futures fell, with US crude oil down 2.85% and Brent crude oil down 2.03%. Oil prices were volatile on Tuesday. Trump stated earlier in the day that negotiations with Iran were "in the final stages of a very, very good deal," pushing Brent crude lower. However, Trump subsequently posted on social media stating that Iran had shot down a US Apache helicopter patrolling the Strait of Hormuz and declared "the US must respond," causing oil prices to jump immediately. Iranian officials further warned afterward that "foreign military forces near Iran face risks," briefly lifting oil prices further. Despite this, crude oil closed lower. (Wall Street CN) Data: The US API crude oil inventory for the week ending June 5 fell by 9.119 million barrels, compared to an expected draw of 3.421 million barrels, with the prior figure showing a draw of 6.757 million barrels. The US API gasoline inventory for the week ending June 5 fell by 1.191 million barrels, compared to an expected draw of 614,000 barrels, with the prior figure showing a build of 3.454 million barrels. (Jinshi Data APP) The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) stated on Tuesday local time that due to crude oil production losses exceeding 11 million barrels per day in the Middle East caused by the Iran war, major consumer nations are drawing down inventories to bridge supply shortfalls at an unprecedented rate. Consequently, oil inventories among OECD members are heading toward their lowest levels since at least 2003. The EIA stated that under its current assumptions, where maritime shipping activity through the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to return to pre-conflict levels before the beginning of 2027, total oil inventories held by OECD member nations will fall to just under 2.3 billion barrels by December. (Jinshi Data APP)