May 18, 2026 In April, the Chinese gold market presented itself as a fascinating two-tiered society: while physical consumption at the grassroots level cooled noticeably, institutional investors and the government continued to pour billions into the precious metal undeterred. A market is emerging that is decoupling itself from short-term price fluctuations and is instead dominated by hard-nosed strategic purchases. Geopolitics keeps the price in a sideways stranglehold In terms of price, gold largely treaded water in April. The LBMA Gold Price PM recorded a marginal gain of 0.1%, while the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price PM fell by 0.4%. Geopolitical ups and downs shaped the picture: An initial easing of tensions in the Middle East pushed bond yields lower and initially supported the precious metal. Shortly thereafter, new uncertainties surrounding the Strait of Hormuz drove up oil prices, dampened hopes for rapid U.S. interest rate cuts, and took the wind out of gold’s sails. Yet while the price stabilized, massive transactions were taking place behind the scenes. The driving forces: ETFs, the central bank, and imports Despite burgeoning competition from a resurgent Chinese stock market, financial investors and the central bank continued their accumulation unabated. The figures from the World Gold Council speak for themselves: ETFs on a record-breaking streak: For the eighth consecutive month, Chinese gold ETFs recorded inflows—specifically 3.5 billion renminbi (498 million USD). Holdings rose by 3 tons to a new month-end high of 301 tons. Assets under management thus climbed to 306 billion renminbi (45 billion USD). PBoC buys relentlessly: The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) increased its gold reserves by another 8 tons in April, bringing the total to 2,322 tons. It was the 18th consecutive monthly purchase and the largest since December 2024. Gold now accounts for 9% of total foreign exchange reserves (USD 3.8 trillion). Massive Q1 imports: Net imports underscore the massive appetite for the metal. In March, these rose to 143 tons (+49% month-over-month). The first quarter closed at 316 tons—a massive jump of 182% from the previous quarter and 333% year-over-year. Sluggish consumption and declining trading volumes On the flip side, there is a noticeable slowdown in physical wholesale trading, which coincides exactly with the start of the traditionally weaker seasonal phase in the second quarter. Gold withdrawals from the Shanghai Gold Exchange fell by 23% month-over-month in April to 103 tons. However, the 33% year-over-year decline is significantly mitigated by the fact that April 2025 marked the highest demand since 2018. The trend is nonetheless unmistakable: Chinese consumers are currently preferring to channel their capital into experiences and travel rather than traditional jewelry. While there was some light restocking ahead of the May 1 holidays, the major surge failed to materialize. Even physical bullion buyers have recently hesitated, lured by the renewed appeal of the domestic stock market. This caution was also evident in the futures market. Trading volume on the Shanghai Futures Exchange fell by 31% to 307 tons per day. However, the fact that this figure remains significantly above the five-year average of 265 tons per day demonstrates the market’s underlying strength. Outlook: The market remains divided This two-pronged picture is likely to persist in the coming months. Demand for jewelry and bullion is expected to remain weak during the seasonal lull, especially if the stock market remains strong as a competitor for capital. However, strategic and financial demand via ETFs and the central bank forms a massive foundation that cements China’s position as an indispensable anchor in the global gold sector. Source： https://goldinvest.de/en/china-s-gold-market-why-major-investors-and-the-central-bank-are-buying-up-massively-despite

Commerzbank’s Carsten Fritsch highlights extreme volatility in Gold and Silver, with sharp swings over consecutive days and record-high nominal prices.

①After a period of explosive performance growth, with changes in the PV market conditions, Hongyuan Green Energy incurred a loss of 2.697 billion yuan in 2024, marking its largest loss since going public. ②The company adheres to an integrated layout, believing that it can effectively mitigate systemic risks arising from sharp price declines in a single segment, and will not trade or sell its own polysilicon capacity. ③The company believes that self-regulated production cuts are conducive to the industry's recovery, and it is waiting for opportunities to emerge after the turning point.

"At the time of investment, I thought PV was a tech growth stock, but later realized it was actually a cyclical stock." An investor made this self-deprecating remark while communicating with the company's management at the 2024 annual general meeting of HYGREEN (603185.SH) held yesterday afternoon. After experiencing a performance boom from 2020 to 2022, HYGREEN incurred a loss of 2.697 billion yuan in 2024 amid changes in the PV market, marking the highest loss since its listing. Correspondingly, the company's market capitalization also plummeted from nearly 100 billion yuan at its peak to around 10 billion yuan now. Regarding how to cope with the impact of cyclical risks, the company's management stated that it would comply with the self-discipline production cut requirements of the industry association to stabilize market prices. On the other hand, it would continue to maintain the company's core advantage of integration, with all of the company's self-owned polysilicon capacity used internally and no consideration given to external sales. "The company is confident in recovering ahead of the industry and now only needs to wait for the market to rebound," the management said. As of Q1 2025, HYGREEN's asset-liability ratio stood at 58.15%, which was at a relatively low level among publicly listed firms in the PV industry. Integration remains an effective risk-mitigation strategy Starting from the silicon wafer business and gradually extending its industry chain upstream and downstream, HYGREEN's development path shares many similarities with that of PV leader LONGi Green Energy (601012.SH), leading some investors to refer to it as "Little LONGi." A review of its operating performance in recent years after entering the manufacturing end of the PV industry can more vividly reflect the ups and downs of this cycle: In 2019, the company began to cross over from high-end intelligent equipment manufacturing into the PV monocrystalline silicon sector. Benefiting from a significant increase in terminal installation demand, various links in the crystalline silicon industry chain, especially upstream products, were in undersupply, and product prices remained high. By 2021, the proportion of the company's new energy materials business revenue in its main business revenue had exceeded 98%. From 2020 to 2022, HYGREEN also experienced a "boom period" in performance, with net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company increasing by 186.72%, 222.10%, and 77.22% YoY, respectively. The company's management introduced at the shareholders' meeting that as early as 2021, during the PV industry's rapid growth phase, the company had already detected the potential risk of overcapacity in the silicon wafer segment. While peers were still aggressively expanding their monocrystalline silicon wafer capacities, the company had already begun to establish a vertical integration layout covering "polysilicon-silicon wafer-battery-module." The management further stated that if it had bet solely on the silicon wafer segment at that time, although it could have achieved high short-term profits, it would have been difficult to withstand long-term cyclical fluctuations. An integrated layout could effectively avoid systemic risks brought about by sharp price drops in a single segment. However, it is worth noting that this layout model is often accompanied by controversies, especially when the entire industry chain faces challenges of periodic supply-demand imbalance, and integration also encounters the situation of "it is difficult for a large ship to change course." By Q4 2023, as this market trend neared its end, Hongyuan Green Energy's revenue and net profit began to decline, and in 2024, it recorded the largest loss since the company's listing. During the post-meeting exchange, an investor asked what the company's core "moat" was. The company's management responded that in the segmented equipment manufacturing business, the company maintains a stable leading position; in terms of PV materials, due to product homogeneity, enterprise competitiveness is mainly reflected in cost reduction. From polysilicon production to battery modules, the cost competitiveness in each segment is at the industry-leading level. Regarding the current operating status of each segment, the management did not provide a clear explanation but stated that the company is one of the few in the industry with layouts and operations in all four main material segments, and its operating rate is higher than the average. Hongyuan Green Energy has formed a vertically integrated industry chain pattern. In terms of polysilicon, the company currently has an existing self-owned capacity of 60,000 mt in Baotou, which can be increased to 75,000 mt through improved production efficiency. The company's management stated that Baotou, Inner Mongolia, is currently one of the regions in China with the greatest electricity price advantages, and its cost competitiveness is relatively obvious. This portion of polysilicon capacity is advanced capacity that has been newly commissioned in recent years, with all parameters at a relatively good level, and all output is for self-use, with no plans for sale or participation in mergers and acquisitions. Voluntary production cuts are conducive to the recovery of industry chain prices. In 2024, the prices of PV products in various segments continued to remain at low levels, putting pressure on the gross profit margins of the company's various products. Among them, the gross profit margin of silicon wafers was -4.14%, a decrease of 21.99 percentage points YoY, while the gross profit margin of solar modules and batteries was -12.42%, an increase of 1.15 percentage points YoY. The company's management frankly admitted during the exchange that the gross profit margin of modules is the lowest, but their sales account for a relatively small proportion of the company's overall business. The core reason for the losses is concentrated in silicon wafers. If calculated based on the current market price settlement, the actual gross profit margin of the silicon wafer business is -6.06%, and that of the module business is 3.18%. Regarding when the gross profit margin of the silicon wafer business can turn positive, the company stated that it depends on market conditions. In Q1 this year, driven by policies, there was an installation rush in distributed PV, leading to a significant price increase in the PV industry chain and driving an improvement in business operations. Financial reports show that Hongyuan Green Energy achieved revenue of 1.657 billion yuan in Q1 this year, a decrease of 24.37% YoY. Although the net profit attributable to the parent company was a loss of 61.88 million yuan, it increased by 56.23% YoY. The company's management stated that in the first quarter of this year, rising prices in the industry chain drove the company's gross profit margin to turn positive, making it one of the least loss-making enterprises in the PV industry. "As long as the industry shows a slight recovery, the company's operating conditions will improve rapidly. We are currently waiting for the opportunity to explode." During the exchange, investors repeatedly asked when the PV industry chain would reach an inflection point, but no definitive answer was given. The management admitted that the current situation in the industry cannot be changed by a single enterprise, and the company can only leverage its advantages within the broader environment. The company's management told a reporter from Cailian Press that the self-regulated production cuts in the PV industry since the beginning of the year have been effective in improving industry chain prices. The company will comply with the requirements proposed by the industry association to bring the industry back to a reasonable level as soon as possible. Modules are the most downstream segment in the crystalline silicon industry chain and one of the core sales sources for integrated producers. In 2024, Hongyuan Green Energy's module sales exceeded 4 GW. Regarding the module shipment target for this year, the management stated that there is no clear plan, and it will mainly depend on changes in market conditions. In terms of taking orders, the company adopts a cautious strategy, focusing on customers' payment collection capabilities and will not accept high-risk orders. However, it can accept orders that are at break-even or slightly loss-making, as it needs to maintain production line operations and provide working conditions for employees.

【What Are the Breakthroughs for Sodium-Ion Battery Products and Technology? What Are the Prospects for Its Application?】The breakthroughs for sodium-ion batteries lie in improving technical performance, optimizing costs, and applying them in differentiated scenarios. In the next 3 to 5 years, the market will focus on ESS and low and mid-end EV sectors, effectively complementing lithium batteries. With policy support, industry chain improvement, and technological iteration, sodium-ion batteries are expected to become one of the key pillars of energy transition by 2030. (Battery Network)

It is turning conventions upside down for industries, economies, and supply chains across the globe by hastening the change toward cleaner, renewable sources of energy. Inextricably interwoven with the core of such transition has been an exponential increase in demand for certain new energy metals like lithium and cobalt-essentials to batteries that would eventually power electric cars, renewable systems of energy storage, among many other such innovations. Yet supply is trying hard to meet up with their demand. Price trends fluctuated wildly with regard to businesses.

According to customs data, aluminum wire and cable exports in December 2024 reached 26,700 mt, marking a significant rebound at year-end, up 59% MoM from November exports and up 57% YoY from November 2023 exports. From January-December, domestic aluminum wire and cable exports totaled 195,300 mt, an increase of 1.83% YoY compared to the full-year 2023 total of 191,700 mt. (The above data is based on codes 76141000 and 76149000.)

In this blog, we touch on the most recent trends in demand for lithium, cobalt, and nickel-what the future might hold for the electric vehicle market in 2025-and go through the latest data from industry leading resources such as SMM for vital price, market condition, and demand forecasts of these metals.

2024 is a highly volatile year for lithium carbonate prices, with prices experiencing a "roller coaster" ride and an average price of 90,000 yuan/mt. Annual domestic lithium carbonate output reached 680,000 mt, up 47% YoY; annual lithium carbonate imports totaled 230,000 mt, up 46% YoY; and annual lithium carbonate demand reached 850,000 mt LCE, up 44% YoY. The domestic surplus pattern persisted. Looking ahead, with both lithium carbonate supply and demand increasing, supply growth is expected to outpace demand, leading to a continued expansion of the surplus. Additionally, under the deepening of low-cost integration and the impact of low-cost lithium carbonate imports from overseas, the cost center of lithium carbonate still has room to decline.

According to the SMM survey, as of last Friday, the total social inventory of tin across three regions monitored by SMM reached 7,342 mt, marking an inventory buildup of 230 mt WoW.