Over the past half-century of industrialisation, the global seaborne iron ore market consolidated around a duopoly dominated by Australia's Pilbara region and Brazil's Carajás and Iron Quadrangle districts. However, driven by macroeconomic cycle evolution, a structural shift in China's growth engine, and the steel industry's irreversible push toward low-carbon and green transformation, this traditional supply map is undergoing an unprecedented reshaping. On 26 November 2025, the first commercial vessel loaded with Simandou iron ore departed from the Port of Mabarya, marking the official commissioning of Guinea's Simandou Iron Ore Project — the world's largest undeveloped high-grade greenfield iron ore deposit by reserve. This milestone signals that the African continent, long relegated to secondary status, is progressively emerging as a significant new force in the global ferrous metals market. Africa's iron ore resources are widely regarded as the third-largest iron ore supply region globally, after Brazil's Carajás and Australia's Pilbara. With an estimated 13.8% share of global iron ore resources, and representing the most significant supply-side growth driver over the next five years, shifts in African iron ore dynamics will be a key determinant of international iron ore pricing over the long term. I. Global Iron Ore Market Background According to SMM research data, global iron ore production in 2025 is estimated at approximately 2.472 billion tonnes (bt). Africa contributes roughly 95 million tonnes (Mt), representing close to 4% of global output. As major mining projects progressively come on stream, Africa's iron ore production capacity is forecast to double by 2030, reaching approximately 259 Mt. Assuming no production curtailments elsewhere, Africa's global market share could rise to nearly 10%, while the overall global iron ore supply surplus is projected to widen to approximately 220 Mt. Although the international iron ore market has already entered a prolonged loose supply cycle, the substantive supply shock from African iron ore is expected to materialise gradually over the next five years. In the near term, Africa's estimated incremental shipment of approximately 15 Mt in 2026 — bolstered by its superior high-grade characteristics — is expected to be absorbed relatively smoothly by steelmakers seeking low-carbon blending feedstocks, resulting in a relatively moderate impact on absolute benchmark pricing. The critical inflection point is projected to fall in 2028–2029. As rail and port infrastructure currently under construction in West Africa is fully commissioned, a surge in high-grade iron ore output will exert heavy downward pressure on the right-hand side of the global iron ore cost curve. This will not only systematically compress the iron ore price floor but will trigger intense structural displacement — squeezing the operating margin of low-grade, high-cost producers. The current price downcycle is expected to persist through 2028. When international ore prices breach the USD 90/tonne marginal cost support level, higher-cost non-mainstream small and mid-size mines will be forced into curtailment and exit. The resulting supply shakeout will reshape the global iron ore supply structure into a multi-oligopoly dominated by ultra-large, low-cost operations (including the new African mines), complemented by quality mid-tier producers. II. Africa's Current Market Landscape: South Africa as Dominant Producer, West Africa Expanding Aggressively Building on the global context, this section focuses on Africa's overall iron ore landscape. As the primary driver of supply growth over the next five years, Africa's iron ore production is concentrated in West Africa and South Africa, currently dominated by three key countries. South Africa South Africa is the continent's largest producer, with 2025 output reaching approximately 67 Mt and export shipments maintaining an overwhelming 65% share of total African iron ore exports. However, South Africa's iron ore sector faces structural constraints limiting its organic growth headroom. As other emerging African resource nations commission significant new projects, South Africa's share of total African export volumes is projected to face sustained compression. Mauritania Mauritania is Africa's second-largest iron ore producer, with 2025 output of 15 Mt and export volumes of approximately 12 Mt, representing approximately 12% of the African market. Strategically situated adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean with high-grade iron ore deposits deep within the Sahara Desert, Mauritania possesses highly advantageous geographic and mineralogical characteristics. Its proximity to European and Middle Eastern markets — both in urgent need of green industrial raw materials — provides ideal conditions for the country to become a hub for global green metallurgy capacity relocation. Mauritania is expected to emerge as a highly promising iron ore supply nation going forward. Sierra Leone Sierra Leone is another important regional supply pole, with projected 2025 output also reaching approximately 12 Mt, holding a stable share of approximately 12% in the African export market. Chinese-invested iron ore mines within the country are actively scaling up their operations. Trade Flow Overview Based on full-year 2024 trade data, the proportion of African iron ore shipped to China is relatively low compared to traditional mainstream ore origins, at approximately 60%. The broader Pan-Asian market — encompassing China, Japan, and South Korea — absorbs approximately 70% of total African iron ore shipments. Western European countries, led by the Netherlands and Germany, constitute Africa's core secondary destination, accounting for close to 14% of trade flows. The remaining marginal trade flows are broadly diversified, extending to emerging steelmaking capacity clusters in the Middle East, including Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Key Corporate Players At the corporate level, South Africa's Kumba Iron Ore and Assmang rank as Africa's largest and second-largest iron ore producers, with annual output of approximately 37 Mt and 17 Mt respectively. Kumba Iron Ore: Kumba's mining operations — including the Sishen mine — are globally recognised for producing high-grade fines (Fe >62%) and metallurgically superior premium lump ore (Fe 65.2%). Under the prevailing trend of blast furnace (BF) emission reduction, this type of direct-charge lump ore — which reduces sintering-related carbon emissions — commands strong market demand and a substantial price premium. Assmang: Assmang similarly holds high-quality iron ore assets, operated as a 50:50 joint venture between African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) and Assore. Its Assmang Fines and Assmang Lump products (Fe 64–65%) are also direct-charge, high-quality materials. However, the company's key bottleneck lies not at the pithead but on the rail. Heavy dependence on Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) for haulage means logistics constraints frequently cap its achievable shipment volumes. SNIM (Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière): Mauritania's state-owned mining company is Africa's third-largest iron ore producer after the two South African majors. Unlike mainstream Australian and Brazilian ores, SNIM products occupy a distinctive niche in terms of physicochemical specifications and market segment. Its most widely traded product, TZFC fines, is characterised by extremely low alumina (Al2O3) and phosphorus (P) content. As an excellent blending ore, major steelmakers regularly blend SNIM fines with high-alumina Australian fines (such as certain Pilbara blend products) to significantly dilute the impurity ratio in the burden, thereby optimising blast furnace performance metrics. III. Africa's Market Transformation: Major Producers Facing Stagnation; Emerging Projects as Primary Growth Drivers Where does future growth lie? According to SMM observations, Africa is expected to undergo a significant structural transformation within the next five years. Multiple large-scale iron ore projects across the continent are currently under construction, with scheduled commissioning prior to 2030. Based on our modelling, African iron ore supply is forecast to grow substantially from the current approximately 95 Mt to 260 Mt over five years — a cumulative increase of 85%. The market structure is also expected to shift from South Africa-dominated Western-oriented exports to a Guinea-led export paradigm. Guinea — Simandou Iron Ore Project The primary growth driver will be Guinea's renowned Simandou iron ore project, jointly developed by multiple entities and representing the world's largest undeveloped high-grade open-pit hematite deposit. The project holds reserves in excess of 5 billion tonnes (bt) and a designed production capacity of 120 Mt per annum, making it the project with the greatest strategic potential to reshape the existing iron ore market structure. Since first ore shipments in late November 2025, cumulative exports from the principal export hub — the Port of Mabarya — reached approximately 1.6 Mt through Q1 2026. Blocks 1 & 2, developed under the Winning Consortium Simandou (WCS), have successfully commenced production, with 2026 capacity expected to reach nameplate and ramp-up to 60 Mt per annum projected over the next two to three years. Blocks 3 & 4, led by Simfer (a Rio Tinto and Baowu joint venture), are forecast to commission in Q1 2026, with estimated 2026 shipments of 5 Mt and a 30-month ramp-up timeline to reach 60 Mt per annum. In aggregate, Guinea is projected to achieve 120 Mt per annum before 2030, becoming the world's second-largest single iron ore project by capacity — second only to Vale's S11D project in Brazil (designed capacity of 200 Mt post-expansion, expected by 2030). Other African Countries — Key Development Projects Other nations — including Liberia, Gabon, Sierra Leone, and the Republic of Congo — all have iron ore projects under development. Projects scheduled for commissioning before 2030 account for a combined planned capacity of approximately 46 Mt. The largest single project is ArcelorMittal Liberia's (AML) Tokadeh Phase II, expected to commission in H2 2026 and reach a nameplate capacity of 20 Mt per annum by year-end, producing iron ore concentrate with an estimated grade exceeding Fe 66%. Given that AML's European steelmaking capacity cannot absorb such a large volume increment in the near term, the majority of Tokadeh's output is expected to enter the international seaborne market, exerting pricing pressure on the iron ore concentrate segment. South Africa — Structural Constraints on Production Growth South Africa's output is expected to remain broadly stable in the 63–67 Mt range, with mild downside risk. The primary underlying cause is the country's heavy dependence on the heavy-haul Sishen–Saldanha Bay rail corridor, operated by Transnet Freight Rail (TFR). In recent years, TFR has suffered a severe reduction in effective haulage capacity due to locomotive fleet shortages, frequent cable theft incidents, and chronic infrastructure underinvestment, materially constraining the rail transport of major bulk commodities including iron ore and coal. In its FY2025 annual results published in February 2026, Kumba Iron Ore — South Africa's dominant iron ore producer — reported total finished goods inventory of 7.5 Mt, up from 6.9 Mt at end-2024. With rail haulage capacity unable to match mine production, South Africa's major iron ore producers have been compelled to stockpile large volumes at mine sites. To avoid inventory saturation, miners have been forced to proactively revise production guidance downward. While producers are actively addressing haulage constraints, the deeply entrenched structural issues on the rail network are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. Mauritania — SNIM Long-Term Strategic Growth Blueprint Post-2030, attention turns to SNIM's strategic growth roadmap. Under its Horizon 1 programme, the company plans to raise annual production capacity to 45 Mt by 2031, through the implementation of lean manufacturing practices, equipment and technology upgrades, and the co-development of new mineral reserves. Of this total, 20 Mt will be produced under SNIM's wholly owned capacity, while the remaining 25 Mt will be realised through joint ventures with international capital partners. SNIM has further set a long-term target to expand annual capacity to 80 Mt by 2045 under its Horizon 3 plan. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) — MIFOR (Grand Est Iron Ore Project) On 26 March 2026, the DRC and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding designating the MIFOR project as a priority flagship initiative. The deposit is estimated to hold cumulative resources of 15–20 bt, with an average grade exceeding Fe 60% — a potential scale approximately 2.5 times that of Guinea's Simandou. Phase I capital expenditure is estimated at USD 28.9 billion, encompassing the construction of a heavy-haul railway and the utilisation of Congo River navigation, ultimately linking to a deep-water port at Banana on the Atlantic coast. Phase I design capacity stands at 50 Mt per annum, with a long-term target of scaling to 300 Mt per annum. These projects collectively underscore Africa's inevitable emergence as an indispensable iron ore supply source for the global steel industry. IV. Global Steel Industry Chain Transformation: Can Africa, as a Hub for High-Grade Ore, Enable DRI Production? High-Grade Ore as a DRI Feedstock Advantage Notably, the majority of Africa's current and planned iron ore projects produce ore at average total iron (Fe) grades predominantly above 65%, with extremely low impurity content. This scarce, high-grade ore is the ideal feedstock for the Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) process. As the DRI-Electric Arc Furnace (EAF) green steel route gains traction across Europe, the Americas, and China, demand for iron ore at Fe 65% and above will grow exponentially on the demand side. This will confer a substantial 'grade premium' on major projects, including South Africa's Kumba, Guinea's Simandou, and other future African producers. Over the longer term, iron ore pricing benchmarks are inexorably shifting away from the traditional Platts 62% Fe index, and African ore producers will gain bargaining leverage when renewing long-term supply agreements, thereby reshaping the global industry chain profit distribution structure. DRI Investment Pipeline in Africa In alignment with global carbon neutrality objectives, international investors — encouraged by local governments — are actively deploying capital into high value-added downstream processing facilities, including DRI plants and high-grade pellet facilities, aimed at leveraging Africa's abundant high-grade iron ore resources and vast renewable energy potential for DRI production. According to SMM observations, Africa is projected to add approximately 20 Mt of DRI capacity by 2030. The largest single project is a Libyan integrated DRI complex, jointly developed by Turkish steelmaker Tosyali and the Libyan National Steel Company, with a total design capacity of 8.1 Mt. China's Decarbonisation Push and the Global Green Steel Transition As China advances its dual carbon targets — carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 — the domestic steelmaking sector is undergoing significant adjustment. The traditional carbon-intensive Blast Furnace–Basic Oxygen Furnace (BF-BOF) long route faces increasingly stringent capacity replacement policies and environmental regulations. Simultaneously, the global trade system is accelerating the imposition of carbon costs, most notably through the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), compelling global steel supply chains to accelerate the transition from the source toward a low-carbon, ultimately zero-carbon 'green steel' era. In the context of this irreversible transition, the DRI-EAF short-route process has become the most commercially viable decarbonisation pathway. To meet surging global demand for green steel, market projections indicate that global DRI designed production capacity will need to expand by hundreds of millions of tonnes during the 2030s. This scale of expansion will profoundly alter the global steel supply structure: the share of traditional hot metal (pig iron) production will progressively decline, while low-carbon DRI supply will directly determine the competitiveness of major economies in the global green steel market. In particular, 'hydrogen metallurgy' — using green hydrogen to replace natural gas and coking coal as the reductant in iron ore reduction — is widely recognised by the industry as the core technology for achieving ultimate zero-carbon steelmaking. Africa as the Future 'Green Iron' Production Hub Represented by world-class high-grade iron ore projects such as Guinea's Simandou, the progressive commissioning of these mega-mines is expected to inject over 100 Mt of high-grade iron ore per year into the global market, substantially alleviating the global scarcity of DRI-grade ore. More critically, North Africa and West Africa possess world-leading solar and wind energy potential, enabling large-scale, low-cost green hydrogen production in situ. This perfect combination of 'high-grade ore + low-cost green hydrogen' is increasingly inclinng multinational capital and steel majors toward establishing DRI production lines directly on African soil — reducing iron ore to low-carbon Hot Briquetted Iron (HBI) on-site for ocean transport to EAF facilities in Asia and Europe. Africa is thus formally transitioning from its historical role as a raw material exporter to become an indispensable link in the green iron production chain of the future.

Chapter 1: The Energy Crisis Reshapes Coking Coal Value In 2026, with the Russia-Ukraine war still ongoing and the U.S.-Iran war reigniting, crude oil price centers continued to shift upward. Coupled with persistent geopolitical conflicts in other regions worldwide, energy security demand climbed, driving a systematic revaluation of coking coal value. Moreover, against the backdrop of high oil prices, the cost advantages of coal-based chemicals over oil-based chemicals began to emerge, improving the economics of coal-to-oil substitution and expanding coking coal demand. Coking coal possesses the dual attributes of industrial raw material and energy commodity, supported by both rigid demand and high elasticity to energy prices, with premium capacity far exceeding that of ordinary industrial products. Market perception underwent a fundamental shift, as coking coal gradually shed its subordinate positioning within the steel industry chain and was upgraded to a scarce strategic energy asset. The energy crisis restructured its valuation logic. Pricing broke free from the singular steel supply-demand framework and was incorporated into the global energy price comparison system. Energy and security premiums elevated the valuation center, making it an important target for hedging geopolitical risks and allocating strategic resources. Chapter 2: Global Coking Coal Market Landscape (1) Global Coking Coal Resource Distribution Data source: publicly available data Global coking coal resources account for 13% of total global coal resources, approximately 1,140 billion mt. About 49% are distributed in Europe, 29% in Asia, and 19% in North America. The economically recoverable reserves of coking coal are approximately 500 billion mt, of which high-quality coking coal with low ash and low sulfur content amounts to only about 60 billion mt. Economically recoverable coking coal resources are primarily concentrated in three countries: Russia (42%, approximately 210 billion mt), China (23%, approximately 115 billion mt), and the US (18%, approximately 90 billion mt), with other countries accounting for relatively small shares. (II) Global Coking Coal Production Distribution Data source: publicly available data Global coking coal production in 2025 was approximately 1.1 billion mt, with a highly concentrated production landscape. China ranked first at 514 million mt, accounting for 47% of global production and serving as the core supply pillar, though virtually all output was consumed domestically. Australia (172 million mt) and Russia (98 million mt) ranked second and third, followed closely by the US (59 million mt), Mongolia (54 million mt), and Canada (32 million mt), while India produced 25 million mt and Indonesia produced 11 million mt. These eight countries collectively accounted for 88% of global coking coal production. Data source: World Steel Association, IEA Major producing countries: China firmly held the top global position with absolute volumes rising from 480 million mt (2020) to 514 million mt (2025), achieving the highest global increase of 34 million mt, primarily driven by new domestic mine commissioning and supply security policies. Russia and Mongolia became key growth contributors with increases of 12 million mt and 23 million mt respectively — the former benefiting from post-sanction market redirection and new mine development, while the latter achieved substantial production increases through upgraded border customs clearance with China and railway cost reductions. Australia's capacity remained basically flat. EU countries (Germany, Poland) and Ukraine continued to cut production due to factors such as coal phase-out policies, aging mines, and geopolitical conflicts, while the US, India, Mozambique and other countries achieved capacity growth driven by export demand and downstream industry boost. (III) Analysis of Global Coking Coal Export Trade Data source: publicly available data Global coking coal export trade is highly concentrated in five countries—Australia, Russia, Mongolia, the US, and Indonesia—primarily for the following reasons: Monopolistic resource endowment: Russia accounts for 42% of the world's recoverable coking coal reserves, and the US accounts for 18%. Australia possesses globally scarce high-quality coking coal resources with low ash and low sulfur content. Mongolia and Indonesia also have distinctive coal varieties suited to blending needs. These resource barriers create a supply-side monopoly. Locational and logistics cost advantages: Australia's coking coal producing regions are adjacent to east coast ports, enabling low-cost seaborne access to the world's core steel-producing regions. Mongolia's mining areas border China, with overland logistics providing direct access to the Chinese market. Russia, the US, and Indonesia leverage mature seaborne and cross-border railway networks to achieve efficient coverage of global demand markets. Industrial structure and supply-demand mismatch: Although China holds 23% of the world's coking coal reserves, as the world's largest steel producer, China has extremely rigid coking coal consumption demand, making it the world's largest coking coal importer. In contrast, the five countries mentioned above have limited domestic consumption and surplus coking coal supply. Their industrial structures are centered on resource exports, providing a supply foundation for large-scale exports. Coal quality and global demand matching: The coal varieties from these countries form a complementary supply system. Australian coal is suited to high-end coke demand, Mongolian coal serves as a premium blending raw material, Russian coal covers the full range of varieties, and US and Indonesian coal meet the blending needs of different steelmaking processes. This precisely matches the rigid blending needs of global steel enterprises, forming a stable export pattern. Chapter 3: China's Coking Coal Market (1) Current Supply and Demand of Coking Coal in China Data sources: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), General Administration of Customs of China, publicly available data Supply side, China's coking coal concentrate production grew steadily, rising gradually from 480 million mt in 2020 to 514 million mt in 2025, with overall supply scale remaining stable and no wild swings observed. Import and export side, imports became the core variable supplementing China's domestic supply: imports briefly declined 24% YoY to 54.768 million mt in 2021, then entered a sustained expansion trajectory, with 2025 imports surging 117% from 2021 to 118 million mt; exports remained at low levels over the long term, once plunging 89% YoY to 92,000 mt in 2021, then gradually rebounding, but the 2025 export volume of 1.175 million mt had minimal impact on the overall market. Demand side, coking coal concentrate demand also maintained mild growth, with 2025 demand reaching 628 million mt, a modest increase from 2020. Demand growth was primarily supported by the concurrent expansion of coke production (coke production reached 502 million mt in 2025). Overall, China's domestic coking coal production growth was unable to fully match demand expansion, with imported resources effectively filling the supply-demand gap. (II) China's Coking Coal Supply-Demand Balance Data source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), publicly available data From 2020 to 2025, China's coking coal concentrate market completed a transition from tight supply to a tight balance with a slight surplus, with both supply and demand expanding simultaneously and market operational stability improving significantly. The supply side exhibited a sustained and steady growth trend, with the release of domestic capacity combined with supplementary import resources jointly driving continuous enhancement of supply capability. The demand side maintained mild expansion, primarily supported by rigid production demand from the coke and steel industries, with overall growth notably slower than the supply side. By phase, from 2020 to 2022, the market was in a state of persistent undersupply, with supply gaps appearing in all three years, and the industry was highly reliant on imported resources to fill the supply-demand gap. In 2023, the market reached a structural turning point, achieving a supply surplus for the first time; in 2024, the surplus scale expanded significantly; in 2025, the surplus pulled back, but the market had thoroughly shed its prolonged deficit status. With China's coking coal concentrate supply assurance capability continuing to improve, combined with flexible adjustment of import channels, the market entered a healthy tight balance range where supply was slightly greater than demand. Chapter 4: Global Coking Coal Supply-Demand Balance Data source: IEA, publicly available data From 2020 to 2025, the global coking coal market gradually shifted from maintaining a slight surplus to a slight supply-demand deficit. The long-term tightening of global premium coking coal resources, compounded by multiple external factors such as the restructuring of the global energy landscape triggered by the energy crisis and shifts in national energy policies, ultimately drove the global coking coal market from a relatively loose state in the earlier period to a slight deficit. Chapter 5: Summary Affected by geopolitical conflicts and energy transition, the strategic value of coking coal continued to rise, with energy security premiums becoming prominent, and the overall industry landscape gradually evolving toward a tight supply-demand balance. Global coking coal production is limited, with low-ash, low-sulfur premium resources being particularly scarce. Reserves, capacity, and export trade are all highly concentrated, with a few countries such as Russia, China, the U.S., and Australia controlling the supply side, forming a monopolistic landscape through advantages in resources, logistics, and coal grade complementarity, while the energy crisis brings new opportunities and challenges. Overall, coking coal markets both in and outside China have shifted toward a tight balance, with structural shortages of premium coal grades being a prominent issue. The coking coal market may hold up well throughout 2026.

[SMM Shanghai Spot Copper] Looking ahead to tomorrow, a new monthly procurement cycle begins, and downstream restocking demand is released. Suppliers are expected to significantly raise their quotes accordingly. In terms of market performance, as copper prices remain at a relatively high level, after suppliers raise their quotes, downstream enterprises' willingness to chase higher prices remains limited. Some transactions are expected to occur after consecutive quote reductions, with coexisting willingness to hold prices firm and to cut prices for shipments. Overall, amid the tug-of-war between partial release of early-month procurement demand and high-price suppression, spot prices against the SHFE copper 2606 contract are expected to remain at a discount tomorrow.

On May 29, the average warrant price remained unchanged from the previous trading day at $70/mt (price range $66-74/mt); the average B/L price remained unchanged from the previous trading day at $71/mt (price range $68-74/mt); the average EQ copper (CIF B/L) price remained unchanged from the previous trading day at $41/mt (price range $38-46/mt), with quotes referencing cargoes arriving in late May and early June. Intraday COMEX-LME price spread widened. Some COMEX-registered B/L offers were seen at $120/mt. Bonded zone warrants were heard traded at around $70/mt. Other brand-registered B/L offers were scarce. Some EQ cargoes arriving in late June were offered at $40-45/mt, QP July, but no deals were heard due to the weak SHFE/LME price ratio.

[SMM Shanghai Spot Copper] Looking ahead to tomorrow, copper prices remain at a relatively high level, downstream demand is weak, and the market is dominated by just-in-time procurement. Trading sentiment has pulled back slightly for consecutive days, and market transactions are sluggish. In terms of market structure, the inter-month Contango price spread between futures contracts remains around 150 yuan/mt, suppliers show a strong willingness to hold open interest for delivery, and a tendency to hold prices firm has emerged. During the day, some suppliers offered standard-quality copper with cargoes with invoices dated this month at a discount of 120 yuan/mt. Overall, Shanghai spot copper prices against the SHFE copper 2606 contract are expected to remain at a discount tomorrow, but downside room is limited.

[SMM Shanghai Spot Copper] Outlook for tomorrow: during the day, copper prices edged down, activating some buying interest, but downstream enterprises overall still focused on just-in-time procurement, with limited willingness to chase higher prices. In terms of invoice structure, the price spread between cargoes with invoices dated this month and cargoes with invoices dated next month remained around 40 yuan, and the periodic shortage of invoices continued. Overall, spot prices against the SHFE copper 2606 contract are expected to remain at a discount tomorrow, potentially widening slightly.

22 May, 2026 Highlights Gold import duty was raised sharply by 9%– from 6% to 15%, the steepest increase on record – alongside broader regulatory tightening Domestic gold prices have not yet fully reflected the duty hike amid weak demand and ample supply; local markets are currently in deep discount from the landed price 1 Past trends indicate that higher duty increases unofficial inflows, although official imports remain relatively resilient Gold demand is expected to moderate in 2026, with jewellery and bar and coin demand projected to decline by 50–60t (~10% y/y) on account of the import duty hike. Policy actions on gold imports Since early April the government has adopted a series of measures aimed at moderating gold imports. These have been part of a broader push to conserve foreign exchange reserves amid geopolitical uncertainty and mounting pressure on the INR, which has depreciated by more than 7% y-t-d. These measures include price-based actions, administrative and regulatory tightening, and consumer-directed messaging. While noteworthy, they are not unprecedented; gold is among the top five imports for India, accounting for 8% of the country’s merchandise imports in 2025, and similar measures have been utilised in the past. On the price front, the gold import duty was raised sharply from 6% to 15%, making it the single largest increase on record and fully reversing the duty cut of July 2024 ( Chart 1 ). Rules were also tightened for gold imports linked to exports (under the advance authorisation scheme) 2 and the Prime Minister has directly appealed to consumers, urging them to avoid buying gold for a year. 3 Chart 1: Import duty reverses course Customs duty on gold (%)* *As of 13 May 2026 Source: CBIC, World Gold Council. These measures followed a series of policy actions that were seen as efforts to slow the import of gold, including the delay in issuing annual licenses for bullion imports to banks, 4 restrictions on the import of all forms of gold, silver and platinum jewellery and platinum alloys; 5 and continued delay in issuance of notification exempting banks from the Integrated Goods and Service Tax (IGST), 6 which led to the banks pausing bullion imports for over a month. 7 The pattern of gold import duty revisions To date, India’s gold import duty revisions have been infrequent, with long periods of stability between policy revisions. Gold imports were subject to a flat duty (a fixed rupee amount per 10g) prior to 2012, but this was subsequently replaced by a value-based duty structure. Between 2012 and 2013 duties were raised repeatedly through a series of 2% hikes, up to 10%. This was followed by a prolonged gap of nearly six years before a further 2.5% hike in July 2019. Since then, revisions have become larger and more frequent, including duty cuts in 2021 and 2024 and sharp hikes in 2022 and 2026, reflecting a more active use of import duties to manage trade dynamics. Table 1: India’s gold import duty cycle Source: CBIC, World Gold Council Price adjustment – the tariff lag effect As expected, the import duty hike led to an immediate increase in domestic gold prices. However, the rise in prices was lower than the 9% increase in duty. Physical market prices, proxied by the MCX spot gold price, have risen in the range of 4% to 6% since the change in duty. While the duty hike mechanically raises the official domestic or landed price, 8 physical market prices do not fully or immediately mirror the increase in duty – rather they adjust to it with a lag, particularly when the change is as steep as the current 9%. Moreover, the increase came at a time of seasonally weak demand – summer wedding purchases are largely over, and the period from mid-May to mid-June is considered inauspicious for buying gold – thus limiting the full pass-through of the duty hike. Market feedback indicates that there is ample supply from the exchange of old gold jewellery for new, and the likely front-loading of imports, further limiting the rise in price. Chart 2: Prices have risen less than the duty hike Landed price and MCX spot gold price in USD per ounce* *As of 18 May 2026. Landed price is the international prices (LBMA Gold Price AM) adjusted for import taxes. Source: Bloomberg, CBIC World Gold Council. Domestic gold prices trade at a deep discount post duty revision In the immediate aftermath of the import duty hike, domestic gold prices traded at a steep discount to official prices, 9 widening from an average of US$14/oz the week prior to the duty hike to nearly US$150/oz ( Chart 3 ). The rise in domestic prices post the duty hike triggered profit-taking by investors, boosting supply even as physical buying weakened, and bullion dealers likely offloaded inventory imported at lower duty rates, adding to market supply. Chart 3: Discounts widened sharply NCDEX gold premium/discount relative to the official domestic price* *As of 15 May 2026. Source: NCDEX, World Gold Council. Previous import duty hikes in 2019 and 2022 also resulted in discounts in the domestic market, but this episode has been significantly more pronounced due to the scale of the increase ( Table 2 ). Table 2: Post-duty hike movement in domestic gold price discounts (US$/oz) Source: NCDEX, World Gold Council Market and trade reaction and expectations Share prices of listed jewellers fell by ~2%–17% following the duty hike, reflecting expectations of weaker discretionary demand. Market feedback and trade interactions suggest a varied impact across segments, with many retailers indicating a likely pause in procurement. Large chain stores saw a brief period of panic buying after the announcement, driven by expectations of further measures, and while they expect a slowdown in sales, they remain relatively resilient given inventory buffers and continued support from bridal demand. Mid-sized and regional players continue to see buying from affluent customers but are expecting to rely more on exchange programmes and tighter inventory cycles going forward. Smaller retailers appear the most vulnerable: already stretched by persistently high prices, they now face added pressure from sales volumes and profit margins. Import duties and smuggling Import data points to a consistent relationship between higher import duties and the inflow of unofficial gold. Between 2013 and 2026 increases in import duty were mostly followed by higher levels of unofficial or smuggled gold, while duty reductions coincided with sharp declines in such inflows. Excluding the COVID years of 2020–21, the correlation between import duty and unofficial imports is positive at 0.52, indicating a meaningful link between higher duties and smuggling activity. Following the 4% duty hike in 2013, unofficial imports increased sharply from around 10t in Q1 of that year to 70t by Q1 2014, a seven-fold increase in under a year. Even when duties were steady at 10% through the second half of 2013 until Q2 2019 unofficial inflows remained elevated, averaging 34t per quarter. This suggests that once smuggling networks are established they are difficult to unravel. A similar pattern was observed after duty was hiked from 10.75% to 15% in July 2022. Unofficial imports rose from 17t in Q2 2022 to nearly 50t by late that year and stayed elevated through much of 2023. In contrast, after duty was cut to 6% in July 2024, unofficial imports fell almost immediately to near zero. There was a temporary drop in unofficial imports during 2020–21, which can be attributed to COVID-related disruptions. The evidence suggests that higher import duties widen the domestic–international price gap and increase the incentive for smuggling, while lower duties reduce its attractiveness. Chart 4: Import duty driven shifts Source: Metal Focus, World Gold Council. Limited duty sensitivity of imports Our analysis suggests that import duty changes have had a limited influence on official import volumes over the past 13 years. 10 Across duty regimes ranging from 6% to 15% official imports remained relatively resilient, between 175t and 236t per quarter in most periods, excluding the COVID period in 2020. The highest quarterly imports were recorded under the 10.75% duty regime (236.2t), while imports also remained stable at the higher 15% duty rate (174.5t). Statistically, the overall correlation between duty rates and official imports is negative 0.17, indicating a weak relationship between the two. This suggests that duty changes are not a key driver of imports; rather, broader demand conditions play a greater role. Chart 5: Steady imports through duty cycles Average quarterly official imports at various import duty levels* *As of 18 May 2026. Source: DGCIS, CBIC, World Gold Council Recent data also highlights import resilience: April imports rose to US$5.6bn, up more than 80% on an annual as well as a sequential basis. This was despite banks pausing gold imports as they awaited the renewal notification that exempt them from the integrated goods and services tax (IGST). This suggests that the imports were likely driven by refiners, who increased their intake of gold doré around the key demand period of Akshaya Tritiya (19-20 April) further supported by gold price moderation. At the same time, some degree of front loading of imports – in anticipation of curbs amid the prolonged Iran-US conflict, elevated oil prices, and the INR vulnerability to a high import bill – cannot be ruled out based on anecdotal evidence. In volume terms, we estimate imports in April were in the range of 48-55t. Chart 6: Imports rise despite disruptions Monthly gold imports in tonnes and US$bn* *Includes World Gold Council estimates. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, CMIE, World Gold Council Gold ETFs: flows slow Indian gold ETFs continued to attract inflows in April 2026, marking the 12th consecutive month of positive flows. Net inflows stood at INR30.4bn (US$325mn), broadly in line with our estimates . 11 While inflows were modestly higher sequentially (up 3% m/m), they remained well below January’s peak, at about 13% of the INR240bn (US$2.6bn) recorded at that time, signalling a moderation in demand after a very strong start to the year. Redemptions stayed elevated in April at INR20.5bn (US$220mn), reflecting ongoing profit-taking, a trend seen since February. Cumulative holdings rose by 1.1t to 116.7t, while AUM stood at INR1,781bn (US$19bn), a modest 3% decline from January, largely due to softer gold prices (down ~9% in INR terms). Investor participation remained healthy, with folios (or accounts) reaching 12.5mn, although growth slowed in April, with folio additions of 77,413 – the lowest since September 2024. Gold ETFs experienced outflows following the import duty hike, with redemptions from 13-18 May largely reversing earlier gains. On a month-to-day basis, however, demand remains marginally positive at around INR1bn (~US$12mn). Chart 7: Gold ETF momentum softens Gold ETF flows in INRbn, and total holdings in tonnes* *As of end April 2026. Source: AMFI, ICRA Analytics, CMIE, World Gold Council Demand moderation Gold demand trends across different duty regimes indicates that while import duties influence consumption, other key factors such as gold prices, income growth and inflation, simultaneously impact demand. Periods of high import duties have generally coincided with a moderation in demand, particularly for bars and coins. Average quarterly demand remained relatively subdued during the extended 10% duty period of 2013-19 ( Chart 8 ) as well as during the period of 12.5% duty (2019-20), although the latter was also affected by COVID. Chart 8: Tariffs temper demand Average jewellery and bar and coin demand at various import duty levels* Source: Source: Metal Focus, CBIC, World Gold Council Our econometric models 12 suggest that changes in import duties tend to impact gold demand in both the short and long term, although the impact differs across jewellery and investment products such as bars and coins. Investment demand appears more sensitive to duty changes, while jewellery demand has shown greater resilience. Jewellery consumption is influenced more by prices and inflation and import duties have less of an impact. This is likely because jewellery purchases often tend to be a requirement, particularly for weddings and social occasions. Investment demand on the other hand is linked to income levels and import duties, with higher duties and restrictions tending to weigh on demand. In the short term, factors such as inflation and rainfall also influence investment demand alongside taxes. Looking at 2026 as a whole, we estimate that combined jewellery and bar and coin demand could decline by around 50-60t, around 10% lower than the previous year due to the impact of the import duty hike. Other factors, such as the gold price, changes to income levels, inflation, or effects from the monsoon would further influence annual demand. Footnotes 1 Landed price is the international price (LBMA Gold Price AA) adjusted for import taxes. Prices as of 18 May 2026. 2 Centre further tightens gold import rules, caps advance authorization at 100 kg, The Tribune, 20 May 2026. 3 Why PM Modi asked Indian families not to buy gold for a year, India Today, 11 May 2026. 4 After delay, DGFT authorises 17 banks to import bullion for 3 years, Indian Express,17 April 2026 5 India imposes immediate restrictions on gold, silver and platinum jewellery imports to curb FTA misuse, NDTV Profit, 1 April 2026. 6 IGST is a tax on the supply of goods and services between states in India. 7 India's gold import crisis: Why banks halted shipments for a month and what it took to start again, Money Control, 12 May 2026. 8 Landed price is the international price (LBMA Gold Price AM) adjusted for import taxes. 9 Official domestic price is the landed prices which is the international price adjusted for import taxes. 10 Q3 2013 to Q1 2026. 11 Based on partial information 12 Reference page 128-132. Source： https://www.gold.org/goldhub/gold-focus/2026/05/india-gold-market-update-import-tightening

According to China's General Administration of Customs, domestic bauxite imports in April 2026 totaled 19.743 million mt, down 9.4% MoM and 4.6% YoY. From January to April 2026, domestic cumulative bauxite imports reached 77.728 million mt, up 14.7% YoY. In April 2026, domestic imports of Guinean bauxite totaled 16.423 million mt, down 9.4% MoM and 1.9% YoY. From January to April 2026, domestic cumulative imports of Guinean bauxite reached 62.964 million mt, up 18.5% YoY. From January to April, shipments from Guinea remained at elevated levels, with domestic cumulative port arrivals up over 18% YoY. The domestic bauxite fundamentals were in a state of persistent oversupply, with inventory at ports and alumina refineries continuing to accumulate. As of late May, according to SMM data, domestic total bauxite inventory approached 90 million mt, an inventory buildup of approximately 10 million mt since the beginning of the year. In May, ocean freight rates remained elevated, with dry mt freight rates at approximately $38-40/mt. Miners faced high costs, with some experiencing losses, and Guinean bauxite enterprises began to reduce shipments successively. According to GoGo Trade data, the daily average bauxite shipments from Guinea's main ports from January to April were 627,000 mt, 670,000 mt, 717,000 mt, and 715,000 mt, respectively. As of May 22, data showed that the daily average bauxite shipments from Guinea's main ports declined to 559,000 mt/day, down approximately 21.8% MoM. Considering factors such as shipping schedules, domestic bauxite port arrivals are expected to decline starting from late June, with a more notable decrease anticipated in July. In the short term, high domestic bauxite inventory will keep counterbalancing high-cost bauxite from Guinea, and bauxite prices are expected to fluctuate and adjust.

[SMM Shanghai Spot Copper] Looking ahead to next week, during the day, some downstream processing enterprises had restocking demand, and procurement sentiment rebounded slightly, but constrained by high copper prices, the actual increase in procurement volume was limited. In terms of market performance, suppliers continued to lower their offers during the second trading session, and their willingness to sell increased somewhat, but suppressed by weakening consumption demand, actual transactions remained sluggish. Overall, spot prices against the SHFE copper 2606 contract are expected to maintain a discount next week.

Published: May 20, 2026 - 1:58 AM Updated: May 20, 2026 - 2:40 AM (Kitco News) – Central bank gold purchases have come in stronger than previous estimates so far in 2026, and updated projections have sovereign demand rising further in the second half of the year, according to commodity strategists at Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs analysts announced on Friday that they have revised their central bank gold demand model to account for gaps in official trade data. Back in March, the investment bank raised its nowcast of central bank purchases to about 50 tonnes per month on a 12-month moving average basis, up from 29 tonnes under its earlier methodology. The bank now expects central banks to average around 60 tonnes per month through 2026, supported by continued diversification demand amid geopolitical uncertainty. Goldman analysts said their previous estimates had underestimated sovereign demand since August 2025, when UK trade data began failing to fully capture gold outflows from London vaults, resulting in unrecorded sovereign buying. "Strong underlying interest in gold remains evident," Goldman said, citing its own central bank survey along with recent geopolitical developments as factors likely to support increased demand from both governments and private investors over time. Goldman Sachs reiterated its $5,400 per ounce gold price target for year-end 2026, but warned that bullion prices could still face near-term pressure if investors are compelled to sell liquid assets to raise cash during market stress. Back in late January, as gold prices were setting fresh all-time highs above $5,000 per ounce, Goldman Sachs raised its December 2026 price target to $5,400 an ounce . At the time, Goldman analysts led by Daan Struyven and Lina Thomas wrote in a note that the upgraded forecast is based on their belief that private investors who bought gold as a hedge against macro policy risks will hold these positions through the end of the year. The analysts said that, unlike previous hedges which were tied to specific events – such as the November 2024 US election – gold positions taken to protect against risks such as fiscal sustainability are unlikely to be fully resolved this year and are therefore “stickier.” Emerging market central banks are “likely to continue the structural diversification of their reserves into gold,” the analysts said. The debasement trade is also prompting physical bullion purchases by high-net-worth families and investor call-option buying amid mounting concerns over the long-term monetary and fiscal policy trajectories in major economies, they noted. Risks to the updated forecast are “significantly skewed to the upside because private-sector investors may diversify further on lingering global policy uncertainty,” the analysts wrote. “That said, a sharp reduction in perceived risks around the long-run path for global fiscal/monetary policy would pose downside risk if it were to cause liquidation of macro policy hedges.” The diversification trend was already very much on Goldman’s radar heading into this year. In their 2026 Commodities Outlook published in late December , the investment bank wrote that gold is the best bet in the entire commodities complex, adding that if private investors join central banks in their diversification, the price could well exceed their base case – though they also advocated diversification across the commodities complex as well. “Even as gold remains our single favorite long commodity, we see a strong role for broader commodity length in strategic portfolio allocations,” they wrote. “The very high geographic concentration of commodity supply and the increasing geopolitical, trade, and AI competition has led to a more frequent use of commodity dominance as leverage. This raises the risk of supply disruptions, which underscores the insurance value of commodities.” “Equity-bond portfolios are not well-diversified when commodity supply losses drive both weaker growth and higher inflation as well as strong commodity returns,” the analysts warned. Source： https://www.kitco.com/news/article/2026-05-19/central-banks-are-buying-more-gold-expected-and-purchases-will-increase