Argentine Mining Minister Lucero Luis said on Thursday that as Argentina implements economic reforms and a new legal framework to attract and support mining projects, the country’s government is poised to become a preferred destination for critical mineral investment.Speaking at a critical minerals event hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce, Lucero said: “Argentina possesses one of the world’s most important critical mineral resource portfolios.” According to S&P Global Market Intelligence, the country holds 85.5 million mt of lithium reserves and resources and 124.3 million mt of copper reserves and resources.

The application for the first batch of 2026 municipal fixed-asset investment PV power generation projects from the Beijing Municipal Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) closes today (June 12). Projects that support building-integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) and those using perovskite, cadmium telluride, and other new-type cell modules will be preferred. In principle, such projects should have a construction scale of no less than 500 kW and may receive construction investment support of no more than 30%. Applying projects must commit to starting construction before the end of July 2026 and being connected to the grid by December 31, 2026.

Nearly 500 recycling projects are under development globally, with copper recycling among the fastest-growing segments. Rising demand for sustainable metal supply is driving investment into scrap processing and secondary copper production.

Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the H.R.7037 bill, known as the Developing Overseas Mineral Investments and New Allied Networks for Critical Energies Act (DOMINANCE ACT, referred to as the "Domination Act"). The bill was jointly introduced by California Representatives Ami Bera and Young Kim, aiming to strengthen U.S. energy security and build a more resilient supply chain with trusted allies and partners.

The Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) released its latest Global Semiconductor Equipment Market Statistics Report on June 11. Data showed that in Q1 2026, global semiconductor equipment sales reached $36.55 billion, up 1% QoQ and 14% YoY, hitting a record high for a single quarter. Region-wise, South Korea surpassed Taiwan, China, to rank second globally. SEMI stated that the semiconductor equipment market in Q1 of this year continued to benefit from the investment wave in artificial intelligence, with global semiconductor enterprises increasing their capacity expansion and technological upgrades. These investments were mainly directed at advanced logic processes, dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), and advanced packaging, continuously boosting the equipment market size higher.

[SMM Tin Morning Update: The most-traded SHFE tin contract continued to climb in the night session, the spot market saw muted trading.]

Indonesia has officially activated one of the most structurally significant commodity trade reforms in its recent history. On May 20, 2026, President Prabowo Subianto signed Government Regulation (PP) No.24/2026 on the Governance of Strategic Natural Resource Commodity Exports (State Gazette No.58, Supplementary State Gazette No.7178), which took effect on June 1, 2026 per Article 10. The regulation designates Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI) as the mandatory sole export intermediary for all shipments of coal, palm oil, and ferro alloys. No Indonesian producer in these categories can sell directly to a foreign buyer anymore. Every transaction must legally pass through DSI first. The constitutional grounding is explicit. The preamble invokes Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which establishes that natural resources are controlled by the state and must be used for the greatest possible benefit of the Indonesian people ( sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat ). The regulation's explanatory notes go further, stating that "so long as the state possesses the capital, technology, and management capability to manage Strategic SDA Commodities, the state should undertake direct management," and that doing so ensures "all results and profits will become state revenue bringing more optimal benefits for the welfare and prosperity of the people." This is framed not as a technical trade regulation but as a matter of constitutional duty. The explanatory notes to Article 7 explicitly name the five digital systems through which DSI will exercise oversight: CEISA (Customs Excise Information System and Automation), SINSW (Indonesia National Single Window), INATRADE (Trade Information System), SiMoDIS (Integrated Foreign Exchange Monitoring System), and MOMS (Minerba Online Monitoring System). Real-time visibility across all five platforms forms the enforcement backbone of the entire reform. On June 9, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia and DSI COO Dony Oskaria offered three key reassurances at a press conference to calm investor sentiment. Oskaria confirmed that existing B2B contracts and Letters of Credit will continue to be honored during the transition period, provided DSI's monitoring system confirms that pricing is fair and transparent. Bahlil categorically denied market rumors of a "profit-sharing" mechanism in the minerals sector, stating that this concept applies only to oil and gas and that Minerba rules remain unchanged. He also committed to aligning RKAB mining quotas with smelting capacity and promised quota relaxations during periods of highly favorable global prices. June 8th DPR RI Coordination Hearing: What Bahlil and Dony Oskaria Actually Said The Indonesian House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia / DPR RI) convened a coordination hearing to align the new natural resource export governance policy between Danantara's Investment Management Agency (BPI Danantara) and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Kementerian ESDM). The session featured Minister Bahlil Lahadalia representing ESDM and DSI COO Dony Oskaria representing BPI Danantara. Oskaria opened by clarifying the precise scope of DSI's mandate in its initial phase. He confirmed that DSI's primary and immediate purpose is to halt under-invoicing and transfer pricing — not to disrupt physical commodity flows. He gave explicit assurance that existing B2B sales contracts and Letters of Credit will continue to be honored and executed normally during the transition period, with one condition: DSI's digital monitoring system must determine that the declared pricing is fair and reflects genuine market values. Any contract where declared prices are flagged as suspiciously below market will be subject to DSI scrutiny, but standard commercially negotiated contracts should proceed without interruption. Bahlil addressed three distinct concerns that had been circulating in the market. First and most urgently, he categorically denied rumors of a "gross split" profit-sharing mechanism being introduced into the minerals sector. He stated directly that gross split calculations exist only in the oil and gas sector and that there are "absolutely no changes" to the existing rules governing the minerals and coal (Minerba) space. This denial was significant because the rumor alone had been enough to cause investors to reconsider capital commitments to Indonesian smelting projects. Second, Bahlil acknowledged the domestic ore supply squeeze that has been tightening around Indonesian smelters, and committed to aligning RKAB mining quotas with downstream smelter capacity. He promised "measured relaxations" of production limits during periods when global commodity prices are highly favorable, signaling that the government has no interest in strangling the smelting industry it has spent years building. Third, on the broader question of investment security, Bahlil framed DSI as a value-capture mechanism rather than a market interference tool — the government wants more of the revenue that Indonesian commodities generate to stay in Indonesia, not to reduce the volume of those commodities being exported. What the Regulation Actually Says: Key Articles Reading PP No.24/2026 directly, several provisions carry commercial implications beyond what the market has fully absorbed. Article 3(1) establishes the core mandate: strategic commodities may only be exported by the BUMN Ekspor, acting either as owner or as sole intermediary. The word hanya ("only") in the Indonesian text is unconditional. Article 3(2) goes further: the selling price of Strategic SDA Commodities is determined by the BUMN Ekspor. This is not a transparency or monitoring function — DSI holds formal pricing authority over every export transaction. Article 3(4) confirms that DSI may charge a margin at a reasonable level in accordance with prevailing regulations, meaning DSI is legally entitled to a fee for its intermediary role. The combination of state-determined selling price and a state-imposed margin on every nickel and ferro alloy export has not yet been fully digested by the market. Article 4(2) contains the most important exemption in the regulation. DSI's mandatory intermediary role can be waived for business operators who hold contracts or agreements with the government that include provisions on at minimum: investment, divestment, and domestic processing and/or refining. Exemptions are decided in a coordination meeting chaired by the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs. For the nickel sector, this is a critical provision, any smelter with an existing government contract containing these three elements has a legal pathway to apply for exemption from DSI routing entirely. Article 7 governs the full transition timeline. It states that from June 1 through no later than December 31, 2026, exports must go through BUMN Ekspor. Within three months of the effective date — meaning by approximately September 1, 2026 — a formal inter-ministerial evaluation must take place. Based on that evaluation, the Coordinating Minister has the authority to set a new deadline that is either earlier or later than originally planned, provided it remains before December 31. This is a genuine two-way valve: if the transition is going well, implementation can be accelerated; if problems emerge, the government can extend the timeline. Article 7(e) further provides that if the transition completes ahead of any applicable deadline, the full DSI-only rules apply from that earlier date immediately. Article 8 addresses existing contracts: all sales contracts signed before June 1, 2026 that remain valid are subject to evaluation by the BUMN Ekspor. DSI holds formal authority to assess every pre-existing long-term purchase agreement, including those between Indonesian smelters and their Chinese offtake partners. Critical Dates and Deadlines: The Full Regulatory Calendar May 20, 2026 — PP No.24/2026 signed by President Prabowo Subianto. June 1, 2026 — Regulation takes effect. Phase 1 begins. CEISA 4.0 mandatory DSI reporting pop-up activated. Pre-June 1 sales contracts enter DSI evaluation period under Article 8. By ~September 1, 2026 — Mandatory inter-ministerial evaluation of the transition (Article 7b). This review is a legal obligation, not optional. Its outcome determines the pace of everything that follows: the Coordinating Minister may accelerate, maintain, or extend the timeline to any date before December 31. September 1, 2026 — Phase 1.5 begins (unless the evaluation resets the timeline). PEB Box 6 changes to BUMN Ekspor (DSI). QQ document format begins. Companies act as DSI's legal agents. December 31, 2026 — The hard outer ceiling (Article 7a). After this date, no transitional exceptions remain. Only DSI may export, unconditionally. The Coordinating Minister cannot extend beyond this date. January 1, 2027 (or earlier if accelerated) — Phase 2 full implementation. DSI is the sole legal exporter. DSI drafts all contracts and L/Cs, handles all customs clearance, and reports DHE directly to Bank Indonesia via SiMoDIS. The NPI Classification Crisis The inclusion of ferro alloys has created the most significant market confusion, centered on a single unresolved technical problem: where Nickel Pig Iron sits relative to the regulated ferro-nickel HS code. Ferronickel (FeNi) is a mature, refined iron-nickel alloy produced through capital-intensive smelting, typically containing 20–40% nickel . It is a direct feedstock for stainless steel production and commands a meaningful price premium. Nickel Pig Iron (NPI) was developed in China in the mid-2000s as a low-cost alternative, produced via the simpler Rotary Kiln-Electric Furnace (RKEF) process using laterite ore. Indonesian RKEF-line NPI consistently produces at 10–14% Ni — a structural result of the process and the ore body, not a product specification smelters can adjust. NPI trades at a significant discount to FeNi, and any trader or stainless steel mill can distinguish the two products immediately. The problem is that Indonesia's customs classification framework cannot reliably tell them apart. Both products can fall under HS 7202.60 (ferro-nickel), and Indonesian NPI smelters have historically declared under that code without issue. Under Permendag No.12/2026, HS 7202.60.00 is now DIATUR (Regulated) — triggered when Ni content reaches ≥ 8% . The Ministry of Trade chose this as the demarcation: refined FeNi at 20–40% Ni would clearly exceed it, while NPI was assumed to fall below it and escape the regulation. That assumption fails entirely. Standard Indonesian RKEF output runs 10–12% Ni; higher-grade lines reach 12–14% Ni. There is no commercially significant NPI stream below 8% Ni under normal operating conditions. The threshold sits below average grade Indonesia actually produces, meaning every Indonesian NPI shipment technically triggers under the regulated classification, capturing precisely the product the government intended to exempt. Internal Rakortek documents confirm the Coordinating Minister directed that NPI should not be captured. The discussion slides acknowledge the collision and propose corrective steps: set a threshold above actual RKEF NPI norms, issue binding technical definitions for NPI, and align classification consistently across HS 7201 (pig iron), 7202.60 (ferro-nickel), and 7502.20 (nickel alloys). None of that supplemental guidance has been published yet. Strategic Outlook: The September Evaluation Is the Pivot Point The most important thing to understand about PP No.24/2026's near-term trajectory is that the regulation has deliberately built in a recalibration mechanism — and that mechanism has not been priced into most market participants' planning. Article 7(b) and 7(c) together create a genuine two-way valve. The September evaluation is a legally mandated inter-ministerial review that gives the Coordinating Minister real authority to reset the timeline in either direction. If the first three months reveal that DSI is not operationally ready, and the Rakortek checklists, which showed nearly every DSI readiness item as incomplete as of May 25, suggest that risk is real — the Coordinating Minister can formally extend the transition and push the QQ phase and beyond to a later date before December 31. Equally, if the reporting data flowing through CEISA, SiMoDIS, and MOMS shows that compliance is working smoothly and DSI is ready, the same evaluation could authorize an accelerated Phase 2 arrival, potentially as early as October or November 2026. What is not negotiable is the December 31, 2026 ceiling. Articles 7(a) and 7(d) together make clear that this is the absolute outer boundary of the Coordinating Minister's authority. Regardless of what the evaluation finds, the transition cannot be extended beyond December 31. After that date, except for legally approved exemptions, DSI is the sole legal exporter and no amount of industry pressure or operational unreadiness changes that. The Article 4(2) exemption pathway remains the most immediately actionable provision for smelters with qualifying government contracts. Any agreement containing investment, divestment, and domestic processing provisions should be reviewed against that exemption criteria now. Engaging the Coordinating Minister's coordination meeting process before the September evaluation is concluded is far preferable to doing so afterward. On NPI, the plain text of Permendag No.12/2026 as it stands today classifies Indonesian NPI as regulated. Smelters should not wait for the Ministry of Trade's supplemental guidance before beginning compliance preparation. Seeking an advance product classification ruling, exploring the Article 4(2) exemption if applicable, and building DSI integration workflows in parallel remains the most prudent path. The December 31 deadline, or whatever earlier date the post-evaluation acceleration may set, is not the end of the story. It is the point at which the entire B2B architecture of Indonesian strategic commodity exports permanently and irreversibly changes. SMM Analysis makes no representations as to the official legal interpretation of any regulation cited. Stakeholders should seek formal legal counsel for all compliance decisions.

German aluminum producer Trimet has announced a series of investments to expand its recycling operations across Germany. The company has increased capacity at its Gelsenkirchen recycling plant through the installation of new melting units, adding up to 80,000 tones of annual recycled aluminum output. From August 2026, the site will begin using hydrogen-rich process gas to reduce CO₂ emissions. Trimet is also building a new recycling facility in Hamm, scheduled to start operations by the end of 2026, focusing on aluminum scrap sorting, processing and logistics using laser-based analysis technology. In addition, storage upgrades at its Essen site will add around 16,000 tones of capacity. The company is also expanding its portfolio of high-recycled-content aluminum alloys for automotive and industrial applications.

June 9, 2026 The price of gold is stagnating despite tensions in the Middle East. While the risk of escalation around the Strait of Hormuz is supporting safe-haven demand, the robust U.S. labor market is dampening hopes for imminent interest rate cuts. Macroeconomic Factors: U.S. Labor Market and Interest Rate Path The latest US labor market data is weighing on non-interest-bearing precious metals and capped the recovery from the day’s lows. In May, 172,000 new jobs were created in the US non-farm sector (primarily in the leisure/hospitality, local government, and healthcare sectors). The unemployment rate remained at 4.3%. A resilient labor market gives the Federal Reserve leeway to keep interest rates high for longer. However, higher yield expectations increase the opportunity costs of gold investments. Other market indicators & dates: US Dollar Index: Fell to 99.96 points after previously reaching a two-month high. A weaker dollar tends to support gold. 10-Year U.S. Treasury Yield: Moved in the range of 4.6%, limiting the upside potential for precious metals. Focus: Upcoming U.S. consumer price data (CPI) on Wednesday and producer prices (PPI) on Thursday will provide new signals regarding the Federal Reserve’s interest rate path. Geopolitics: Strait of Hormuz and oil price linkage Following an exchange of fire between Israel and Iran, concerns about supply bottlenecks in the Strait of Hormuz flared up. Under pressure from the U.S., both sides suspended the attacks for the time being. For the gold market, the development is a double-edged sword: Geopolitical risks drive up the gold price as a hedge, but at the same time, energy prices are rising. Brent crude briefly climbed above $98 and was last trading at $94.78 per barrel; WTI stood at around $91.83 per barrel. Persistently high oil prices fuel inflation, which in turn can lead to more restrictive Fed interest rates and weigh on gold. Key technical levels In the short term, the interplay of inflation data and geopolitics will determine whether precious metals test their resistance levels or approach support levels. Gold Resistance: The first relevant zone lies between $4,350 and $4,370. A sustained breakout opens the path toward $4,530 to $4,550. Above that, the 50-day moving average stands at around $4,624. Support levels: The $4,300 mark is technically crucial. A break below this zone could push the price down to $4,180 to $4,200. Silver Resistance: Above $70, the next target is $71 to $72. The 50-day moving average stands at approximately $76.12. Support: The zone between $65 and $66 offers an initial support level. A slide below this level brings the $61 mark into focus. Source: https://goldinvest.de/en/gold-at-at-an-inflection-point-inflation-and-hormus-in-the-spotlight

June 8, 2026 Increased mine production, rising recycling, but declining overall demand—at first glance, not a typical environment for new price records. Nevertheless, the experts at Metals Focus forecast an average gold price of $4,920 per ounce for 2026, representing a 43 percent increase from the previous year. This apparent contradiction stems from a profound structural shift in the gold market that has far-reaching implications for the industry. Bullion and coins overtake gold jewelry for the first time The most significant change is taking place on the demand side: In 2026, physical investments in bullion and coins are expected to replace gold jewelry as the largest source of demand for the first time. This trend was already emerging in 2025, when physical investment demand climbed 16 percent to a twelve-year high—driven primarily by growth in China (up 28 percent) and India (up 17 percent). At the same time, global jewelry production plummeted by 19 percent to a five-year low of 1,646 tons. For 2026, Metals Focus anticipates a further decline of 11 percent. The historically high price level is forcing consumers and manufacturers to opt for lighter pieces, lower karat grades, or more affordable alternatives such as gold-filled materials. Consequently, gold is not disappearing from demand but is shifting its primary function from a consumer good to a pure investment product. Unlike jewelry purchases, this investment demand is far less price-sensitive and is primarily driven by motives such as asset protection, diversification, and hedging against currency risks and uncertainties. Lower overall demand—but a higher gold price Although overall demand is expected to decline in 2026 due in part to a slowdown in the jewelry sector, the high quality of buyers supports the projected price surge. Simply looking at total tonnage falls short in the current environment. As early as 2025, gold-backed exchange-traded products (ETFs) recorded their highest annual inflows since 2020, at 803 tons. The driving forces behind this were tariffs, growing U.S. government debt, doubts about the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy independence, and geopolitical tensions. These factors will persist in 2026 and will be exacerbated by high stock market valuations and uncertainties regarding the long-term trajectory of the U.S. dollar. The precious metal is thus assuming an increasingly strategic role in investment portfolios. Central banks are buying less—but still at unusually high levels This strategic importance is also reflected in the behavior of central banks. Although net purchases fell by 22 percent to 848 tons in 2025, after having exceeded the 1,000-ton mark for three consecutive years, geographically broad-based demand remains well above pre-2022 levels. Sales were limited to a few countries and served primarily to rebalance portfolios following the recent gold rally. Despite headwinds such as the ongoing energy crisis, Metals Focus expects historically high net purchases in 2026 as well. While the pace of buying is slowing, the trend toward greater diversification of official reserves remains intact. Gold mines are producing more—but supply is slow to respond On the supply side, global mine production reached a new record of 3,817 tons (up 2 percent) in 2025. Growth was driven by new mines, expansions, and higher contributions from small-scale mining. A further increase of 2.4 percent to 3,907 tons is forecast for 2026, with all regions except Oceania and Europe expected to grow. Given the enormous price surge, this supply growth is nevertheless moderate and underscores that even strong price signals in the mining industry do not immediately lead to massive jumps in production. Compounding the issue is the fact that producers are grappling with significant cost increases: Global all-in sustaining costs (AISC) rose by 12 percent to $1,552 per ounce in 2025 due to inflation and taxes. For junior companies, this means that while a higher gold price improves the profitability of projects, factors such as grade, location, and infrastructure are increasingly decisive for success in light of cost trends. Why even record prices are barely triggering a recycling wave The supply of recycled gold is also responding sluggishly. In 2025, the volume rose by only 2.8 percent to 1,404 tons—a 13-year high that is, however, subdued relative to price trends. A 5.1 percent increase is forecast for 2026. This apparent contradiction can be explained by owners’ strong desire for security: precisely because of prevailing uncertainties, scrap gold is being sold less frequently. Paradoxically, the very factor driving prices is simultaneously limiting the additional supply that would normally cool the market. The Iran War Delays the Next Uptrend Short-term volatility remains a factor, however. Following new record highs at the start of 2026, a previously overbought market combined with shifting U.S. interest rate expectations led to a correction. The war in Iran is further fueling inflation, which limits the scope for interest rate cuts in the U.S. and drives up bond yields. In the short term, this is a headwind for gold, although geopolitical conflicts usually support the metal. Metals Focus, however, expects the rally to return once the situation calms down. The underlying premise: Policymakers are likely to tolerate slightly higher inflation rather than jeopardize economic growth through overly restrictive monetary policy. Conclusion: In 2026, it’s no longer just volume that counts in the gold market The market environment for 2026 is more complex than a purely quantitative analysis of supply and demand would suggest. The buyer structure is changing, strategic players are acting less price-sensitive, and structural drivers such as global debt and geopolitical risks remain. At the same time, supply from mines and recycling is growing only slowly. What is decisive, therefore, is not so much the absolute tonnage of total demand, but rather the fact that gold is undergoing a permanent shift from a consumer good to a strategic investment and reserve asset. The projected average price of $4,920 thus does not reflect mere exaggeration, but rather is an expression of a new, more resilient market structure. Source: https://goldinvest.de/en/gold-price-in-2026-new-market-structure-paves-the-way-for-a-rise-to-usd4-920