Some Indonesian RKEF operations could swing into loss-making if the new HPM benchmark pricing mechanism is fully passed through downstream. The report said the revised Harga Patokan Mineral formula could reset the nickel cost curve higher across the industry, while ongoing supply-chain disruption may further reshape margin distribution in Indonesia’s nickel sector. It added that producers with stronger cost positions and integrated operating models are likely to remain better insulated, while broader margin pressure across the sector could ultimately support a supply-led recovery in nickel prices.

Given the high reliance of the Copperbelt’s mineral processing and logistics on critical consumables supplied via the Middle East, SMM conducted a 17-day field investigation across the Copperbelt to assess the short-term stability of the copper supply chain and the impact of regional infrastructure bottlenecks, engaging with 25 stakeholders in Zambia and DRC and covering the entire value chain, ranging from mining, smelting, refining to downstream logistics and infrastructure investment.

[SMM Analysis] Reassessing the Logic Behind Sulfur's "Surge" Driving Nickel Prices Higher

Every $10 increase in crude oil prices is expected to raise the per-ton extraction cost of large iron ore mines by an average of $0.3, while the cost for small mines is expected to rise by about $2.85. High-cost small mines, especially iron concentrate producers, will be very vulnerable when facing cost shocks, and mines with different product types will face varying degrees of impact.

Over the past half-century of industrialisation, the global seaborne iron ore market took shape and solidified into a "duopoly" supply structure dominated by Australia's Pilbara region and Brazil's Carajás and Iron Quadrangle regions. However, with the evolution of macroeconomic cycles, the structural shift in China's economic growth momentum, and the historic imperative for the global steel industry to transition toward low-carbonisation and green development, this traditional supply landscape is undergoing an unprecedented reshaping. On November 26, 2025, as the first commercial vessel loaded with Simandou iron ore slowly departed Mabariya Port for the open sea, Guinea's Simandou iron mine officially commenced production. As the world's largest and highest-quality greenfield iron ore project, this milestone signalled the gradual rise of the African continent—long relegated to a secondary position—as an important emerging force in the global ferrous metals market. Why should we pay attention to the African market? The African continent's iron ore resources are regarded as the third most important region for global iron ore supply, after Brazil's Carajás region and Australia's Pilbara region. The sheer scale and high grade of its resources account for 13.8% of global iron ore resources. It is also set to be the primary supply-side growth driver over the next five years. Therefore, changes in African iron ore will long remain a key market determining international iron ore prices . This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the current status and landscape of African iron ore and select steel markets, offers an in-depth discussion of future development trends, and presents a data-driven outlook on market changes. I. Global Iron Ore Background According to SMM survey data, as of 2025, global iron ore production is estimated at approximately 2.472 billion mt. Of this, Africa contributed approximately 95 million mt, accounting for nearly 4% of total global production. With the successive commissioning of various large-scale mining projects, Africa's iron ore capacity is expected to double by 2030, reaching a scale of nearly 259 million mt. Assuming no production cuts in other regions, Africa-produced iron ore's global market share is expected to rise to nearly 10%, while the global iron ore market's oversupply is estimated to increase to approximately 220 million mt. (Chart-1: Balance Sheet) Although the international iron ore market has already entered a prolonged cycle of loose supply, the substantive supply shock from African iron ore is expected to materialise gradually only over the next five years. In the short term, based on an estimated 15 million mt of new African shipments in 2026, their outstanding high-grade characteristics are expected to quickly meet steel mills' current demand for low-carbon ore blending, allowing the market to absorb them smoothly, with a relatively mild impact on absolute international iron ore prices. The key point to watch will be from 2028 to 2029. As railway, port, and other infrastructure facilities still under development in Africa are fully connected, the surge in high-grade iron ore production will exert heavy downward pressure on the right side of the global iron ore cost curve. This will not only systematically push down the price center of iron ore but also trigger intense structural squeeze; that is, the survival space for low-grade, high-cost mines will be significantly compressed. This price downcycle is expected to persist through 2028. When international ore prices fall below the marginal cost support level of $90/mt, non-mainstream small mines on the far right of the cost curve will be forced to shut down and exit the market. By then, the global iron ore supply landscape will have completed a new round of reshuffle, re-forming a multi-oligopoly ecosystem dominated by ultra-large, low-cost mines (including new African mines), supplemented by quality mid-sized mines. (Chart-2: Price Forecast Curve) II. African Market Current Landscape: South Africa as the Dominant Leader with Multiple Strong Players, West African Countries Actively Expanding Having analyzed the foundation of the global iron ore market landscape, the focus will now shift to the overall situation in Africa. As the primary driving force behind supply growth over the next five years, Africa's iron ore production is concentrated in West Africa and South Africa. Currently, Africa is dominated by three major countries. Among them, South Africa is the largest producer, with production reaching approximately 67 million mt in 2025, and its export shipments firmly hold an absolute dominant position of approximately 65% of Africa's total iron ore exports. However, constrained by potential structural limitations, the future organic growth potential of South Africa's iron ore industry is relatively limited. As major iron ore projects in other emerging resource-rich African countries successively come into production and release capacity, South Africa's share in Africa's overall export market is expected to face sustained contraction. Next is Mauritania, as Africa's second-largest iron ore producer, with production of 15 million mt in 2025 and export volumes of approximately 12 million mt, accounting for 12% of the African market. Mauritania borders the Atlantic Ocean, possesses abundant high-grade iron ore deposits deep in the Sahara Desert, and enjoys exceptionally favorable geographic location and mineral resources. Moreover, it is within close proximity to European and Middle Eastern markets that urgently need green industrial raw materials, providing it with unique advantages for absorbing the global transfer of green metallurgical capacity. It will be a highly promising iron ore supplier in the future. In addition, Sierra Leone, as another important supply hub in the region, also has an expected production of 12 million mt in 2025, holding a stable share of approximately 12% in the African export market. Chinese-invested iron ore mines within the country are actively expanding their operations. Macro trade flow perspective, based on full-year 2024 trade data, the proportion of African iron ore shipped to the Chinese market was relatively low compared to traditional mainstream mining regions, accounting for only about 60%, while the broader Asian market encompassing China, Japan, and South Korea collectively absorbed approximately 70% of African iron ore shipments. Meanwhile, Western European countries represented by the Netherlands and Germany constituted the core secondary shipping destination for African iron ore, with a trade flow share of nearly 14%. The remaining marginal trade flows exhibited a diversified pattern, radiating broadly to emerging steel capacity clusters in the Middle East, including Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. (Chart-3: African Iron Ore Market Overview) Enterprise level, Kumba Iron Ore and Assmang , both based in South Africa, became Africa's largest and second-largest iron ore producers with annual production of 37 million mt and 17 million mt, respectively. Kumba's mines such as Sishen are globally renowned for producing high-grade fines (>62%) and premium lump with excellent physical and metallurgical properties (Premium Lump, Fe 65.2%). Under the current trend of blast furnace emission reduction, this type of lump ore that can be directly charged into furnaces and reduce sintering carbon emissions has been highly sought after by the market, commanding a significant premium. Assmang also possesses high-quality iron ore assets, jointly controlled by African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) and Assore at a 50:50 ratio. Its Assmang fines and Assmang lump (grade at 64-65%) are also high-quality direct furnace charge materials. However, for this enterprise, the biggest bottleneck lies not at the pit head but on the rails. Heavy reliance on Transnet's rail shipping capacity means that logistics bottlenecks frequently cap its shipment volumes. SNIM (Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie) is Mauritania's state-owned mining company and Africa's third-largest iron ore producer after the two South African companies. Unlike mainstream Australian and Brazilian ore, SNIM's products occupy a unique niche in terms of physicochemical specifications and market segmentation. Its most widely traded product is TZFC fines, characterized by extremely low aluminum (Al2O3) and phosphorus (P) content. As an excellent blending raw material, major steel mills prefer to blend SNIM ore fines with high-aluminum Australian fines (such as certain Pilbara blend ores) to significantly dilute the impurity ratio in furnace charge and optimize blast furnace performance. (Chart-4: Top-Tier Enterprises) III. Transformation of the African Market: Major Producing Countries May Stagnate While Emerging Projects Become Key Growth Drivers So where will future growth come from? According to SMM observations, the African market is expected to undergo significant structural changes over the next five years. Multiple large-scale iron ore projects across African countries are already under construction and plan to commence production before 2030. Based on estimates, Africa's iron ore supply is expected to grow substantially from approximately 95 million mt currently to 260 million mt over the next five years, representing a cumulative increase of up to 85%. The market landscape will also shift from South Africa-dominated exports led by Western players to Guinea-dominated exports. (Chart-5: African Market Production Trend) The primary growth driver will come from Guinea in West Africa. The country's renowned Simandou iron ore mine, jointly developed by multiple enterprises, is currently the world's largest undeveloped high-grade open-pit hematite deposit. With resource reserves exceeding 5 billion mt and a designed capacity of 120 million mt, it is the project with the greatest strategic potential to reshape the existing iron ore market landscape. Since the first ore shipment in late November 2025, as of Q1 2026, Simandou's main export port, Morebaya Port, has cumulatively shipped nearly 1.6 million mt. Blocks 1 and 2, developed under the leadership of the Winning Consortium Simandou (WCS), have been successfully commissioned, with 2026 capacity expected to be achieved and shipments expected to reach full production of 60 million mt within the next 2–3 years. Blocks 3 and 4, which are expected to commence production in Q1 2026, are led by Simfer (a Rio Tinto & Baowu joint venture) and are expected to ship 5 million mt of ore in 2026, reaching full production of 60 million mt over 30 months. In other words, Guinea is expected to reach 120 million mt before 2030, vaulting to become the world's second-largest iron ore project, behind only Brazil's S11D project (with a post-expansion designed capacity of 200 million mt, expected to commence production in 2030). Other countries such as Liberia, Gabon, Sierra Leone, and Congo Republic all have iron ore projects under development, with a combined capacity of approximately 46 million mt planned to commence production by 2030. The largest among these is the Tokadeh Phase II project (Tokadeh Phase II) in Liberia, owned by ArcelorMittal (AML), which is expected to commence production in H2 2026 and reach full production of 20 million mt capacity by year-end, with iron ore concentrate expected to exceed Fe 66%. Given that AML's steelmaking capacity in Europe cannot absorb such a massive increase in the short term, the majority of Tokadeh 's products are expected to flow into the international market for trading, exerting downward pressure on iron ore concentrate prices. Currently, the largest exporting country, South Africa, is expected to largely maintain its production within the range of 63–67 million mt, with a risk of slight decline. The primary reason is that South Africa's iron ore transportation is highly dependent on the heavy-haul railway line (TFR) from Sishen to Saldanha Port. In recent years, Transnet Freight Rail (TFR), under South Africa's national transport company Transnet, has seen a significant decline in transport capacity due to numerous issues including locomotive and rolling stock shortages, frequent cable theft, and prolonged underinvestment in infrastructure, resulting in severely reduced transportation capacity for major bulk commodities such as iron ore and coal. South Africa's largest iron ore mine, Kumba, in its 2025 year-end financial report released in February 2026, indicated that its total finished product inventories reached as high as 7.5 million mt , increasing rather than decreasing compared to 6.9 million mt at the end of 2024. As railway transport capacity failed to match mine production capabilities, major South African iron ore producers were forced to accumulate large inventories at mine sites. To prevent inventory overflow, miners had to proactively lower production guidance. Although miners have been working to address transportation issues, the deep-rooted railway problems are difficult to resolve in the short term. Beyond 2030, there is also Mauritania's SNIM strategic growth blueprint. In the first phase (Horizon 1), the company plans to raise annual capacity to 45 million mt by 2031 through implementing lean production, equipment and technology upgrades, and joint development of new reserves. Of this, 20 million mt will be absorbed by SNIM's own wholly-owned capacity, while another 25 million mt will be achieved through attracting international capital to form joint ventures. Furthermore, SNIM has even set its sights on 2045 (Horizon 3), formulating a long-term goal of raising annual capacity to 80 million mt . In addition, there is the MIFOR project in the DRC. On March 26, 2026, the DRC signed a relevant memorandum of understanding with China, and the MIFOR project was listed as a flagship project with priority support. The mine is estimated to hold cumulative resources of 15 billion to 20 billion mt, with an average grade exceeding 60%. Its potential scale is considered to be approximately 2.5 times that of the Simandou project in Guinea. The first phase of the project is expected to cost $28.9 billion, involving the construction of a heavy-haul freight railway combined with Congo River shipping, ultimately connecting to the Banana deep-water port on the Atlantic coast. Initial annual production is expected to be 50 million mt, with a long-term goal of expanding to 300 million mt per year . All these projects are destined to make Africa an indispensable source of iron ore supply in the future. (Chart-6: Selected African Iron Ore Projects) IV. Global Steel Industry Chain Transformation: Will Africa, as a Hub of High-Grade Ore, Empower DRI Production? Notably, most of Africa's currently operating and planned iron ore projects have an average total iron grade (Fe) largely above 65% , with extremely low impurity content. This scarce high-grade ore is an ideal raw material for the direct reduced iron (DRI) process. As the DRI-EAF green steel route gains traction in Europe, the US, and China, future demand for iron ore with grades of 65% and above will surge exponentially. This will confer an exceptionally high "grade premium" on major iron ore projects including South Africa's Kumba, Guinea's Simandou, and other mines coming into production in the future. In the long run, the pricing benchmark for iron ore is inevitably shifting away from the traditional Platts 62% index, and African miners will gain bargaining leverage when renewing long-term agreements, thereby reshaping the global industry chain profit distribution landscape. In line with the global carbon neutrality trend, international investors, encouraged by local governments, are actively deploying high-value-added processing facilities, including DRI plants and high-grade pellet plants, aiming to fully leverage Africa's abundant high-grade iron ore resources and enormous energy potential for DRI production. Based on SMM's observations, approximately 200,000kt of DRI capacity is expected to emerge in Africa by 2030. The largest project among them is an 8.1 million mt DRI complex located in Libya, a joint venture between Turkish steel mill Tosyali and Libya's national steel company. (Chart-7: African DRI Projects) As China advances its "dual carbon" goals, the steelmaking industry is undergoing corresponding adjustments. China has set out a strategic blueprint for carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. The traditional high-carbon-emission long-process steelmaking route dominated by blast furnace-converter operations is facing extremely stringent capacity replacement policies and environmental protection regulations. Meanwhile, the global trade system is also accelerating the imposition of carbon costs — for example, the implementation of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — compelling the global steel supply chain to accelerate its transition from the source toward a low-carbon or even zero-carbon "green steel" era. Under this irreversible transformation trend, the short-process route combining DRI with electric furnace (EAF) has become the most commercially feasible decarbonization pathway. To meet the surging global demand for green steel in the future, market forecasts indicate that by the 2030s, global DRI designed capacity will need to increase by hundreds of millions of metric tons. This dramatic expansion in production scale will profoundly reshape the global steel supply landscape. The share of traditional pig iron production will gradually decline, while low-carbon DRI supply will directly determine the competitiveness of major economies in the global green steel market. In particular, the "hydrogen metallurgy" technology, which uses green hydrogen to replace natural gas and coal for iron ore reduction, is widely recognized by the industry as the core to achieving ultimate zero-carbon steelmaking. (Chart-8: Reshaping of the Steel Industry Chain Under Green Transformation) Represented by world-class high-quality iron ore projects such as Simandou in Guinea, the gradual commissioning of these super mines is expected to inject over 100 million mt of high-grade iron ore supply into the global market annually, significantly alleviating the global shortage of DRI-grade ore. More critically, North Africa and West Africa possess solar and wind energy potential that is second to none globally, enabling large-scale green hydrogen production at extremely low costs locally. This perfect combination of "high-grade ore + affordable green hydrogen" has led multinational capital and steel giants to increasingly favor establishing DRI production lines directly on African soil, reducing iron ore locally into low-carbon Hot Briquetted Iron (HBI) that is convenient for transport, before shipping it to electric furnaces in Asia and Europe for smelting. As a result, Africa will formally transition from the old era to become an indispensable part of the green iron production chain.

Zijin Mining's 2025 annual report sent a clear industry signal: its lithium business has officially moved from strategic reserve to the stage of scaled monetization.

I. Supply-Demand Pattern Shift Puts Iron Ore Prices on a Downtrend In 2021, driven by inflation expectations from global quantitative easing, frequent supply-side disruptions in Brazil and Australia, resilient demand in China, and strong speculative sentiment, iron ore prices hit a record high of $219.77/mt in July that year, with Platts’ annual average price as high as $160/mt ; they then entered a prolonged downtrend. In 2025, the annual average iron ore price was $102, down about 36% from the 2021 average. Source: SMM Iron ore prices have continued to fall in recent years, mainly due to the global project investment boom spurred by high prices before 2021. After 2024, multiple large iron ore projects worldwide entered a concentrated commissioning phase, and the market’s supply-demand pattern shifted from tight to loose, with the supply-demand gap widening from -12 million mt to 46 million mt. Meanwhile, China has implemented crude steel production cuts since 2022, significantly curbing iron ore demand. Coupled with persistent weakness in real estate, an overall downturn in the steel industry, and an overseas economic slowdown, among other factors, iron ore demand declined markedly. Entering 2025, a rebound in China’s steel exports drove iron ore demand to increase slightly, while capacity in emerging steel-producing countries such as Southeast Asia was gradually released, narrowing the supply-demand gap somewhat. Over the long term, however, iron ore supply is still on a growth trend, market expectations remain bearish, and prices are pressured to set new lows repeatedly. Source: SMM (the forecast assumes an extreme balance under normal commissioning of new mines and no voluntary production cuts by mines) II. Mine Costs Form a Solid Bottom Support for Iron Ore Prices From the global iron ore cost curve, about 90% of global mine cash cost is no higher than $85/mt, and about 93.8% is no higher than $90/mt. International mining giants represented by FMG, BHP, Rio Tinto, and Vale have costs far below those in China and other non-mainstream countries, forming the main body on the left side of the cost curve in the chart—low and relatively flat—which explains their strong cost competitiveness and earnings resilience in the global market. At present, the $85-90 cost line is the lifeline for the vast majority of mines; once prices remain below this range for an extended period, high-cost capacity will be forced to exit, thereby supporting prices. China’s iron ore mines due to low raw ore grade and high underground mining costs, among other reasons, currently have a nationwide per-mt processing cost of about 595 yuan/mt, equivalent to around $85 . Its costs have long been at the high end globally, serving as the "anchor point" and "ceiling" of the cost curve. The high cost and low production of China's domestic iron ore mines have led the steel industry to heavily rely on imports for raw materials, and fluctuations in international ore prices directly impact the profit stability of the domestic steel industry. Therefore, promoting domestic resource supply, investing in low-cost overseas resources, and developing steel scrap recycling are crucial for the strategic security of China's steel industry. Data source: SMM III. The global iron ore supply has long been characterized by a landscape dominated by the "Big Four" mines, supplemented by "non-mainstream" mines. Currently, the iron ore production industry is highly concentrated, primarily following a pattern dominated by the "Big Four" mines, supplemented by "non-mainstream" mines. Australia and Brazil have long contributed over half of the global iron ore production. Australia, leveraging advantages such as high resource concentration, low mining costs, and stable supply, firmly holds its position as the world's largest producer and exporter; while Brazil is renowned for its high-grade ore and is the world's second-largest iron ore exporter. Data source: SMM The "Big Four" mines, consisting of Rio Tinto, BHP, FMG, and Vale, have long dominated global iron ore supply, accounting for approximately 70% of global production. Data source: SMM The Rise of Emerging Mines Promoting the Multipolar Development of Global Iron Ore In recent years, India has actively promoted domestic mining development, leading to a significant increase in production; since 2023, its iron ore production has surpassed that of China, and it shows a continuous expansion trend, maintaining an annual growth rate of 7%, gradually becoming a new force in regional supply growth. Emerging enterprises such as India's National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) and South Africa's Anglo American are gradually expanding capacity, enhancing their influence in the international market. Meanwhile, countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and regions in Africa are also actively developing domestic iron ore resources, seeking to increase their voice in regional markets, driving the global iron ore supply landscape from high concentration towards gradual multipolar development. Data source: SMM IV. Australia Firmly Holds the Top Spot, India Becomes a New Growth Engine From the perspective of major producing countries, Australia still firmly ranks first globally, with iron ore production of approximately 900 million mt in 2025, accounting for one-third of the global total, and maintaining a stable annual growth rate of about 2%. Brazil ranks second; after the 2019 dam collapse, production once fell sharply. Although it has recovered somewhat over the past two years, the increase has been relatively limited. China’s production scale is relatively large, but due to frequent safety incidents and the continued impact of the environmental protection-driven production restriction policy, production has not increased but instead declined in recent years. By contrast, India, as an emerging producer, has seen production rise steadily over the past decade, and is expected to post an increase of about 7% by 2030. Source: SMM V Over the next three years, the world will usher in a new peak in mine commissioning In addition to supply from existing mines, there are currently multiple large-scale iron ore projects under construction worldwide, with the number of mines expected to be commissioned in 2026 at six, mainly located in Africa and Brazil. Representative projects include Vale’s northern expansion “S11D +20mtpa,” the northern block of Guinea’s Simandou iron ore project, and the Nimba iron ore project. 2026 will be the year with the most concentrated new supply over the next three years. With the northern block of Simandou officially commencing production, the overall capacity ceiling of the mining area will, with capacity ramp-up, rise to 120 million mt, becoming the core incremental source of global iron ore supply over the next five years. From 2027 to 2028, projects expected to commence production will mainly come from China, including the Xi’an Mountain iron ore mine and the Honggenan iron ore mine, adding about 25 million mt of iron ore supply to the domestic market. Overall, as emerging producers continue to release capacity, and traditional suppliers such as Australia and Brazil consolidate their export advantages through expansion projects, the global iron ore supply structure will become more diversified. A new cycle of capacity release has gradually begun, and the loose supply landscape is expected to continue deepening over the next several years. Source: SMM Simandou Project Commissioning Reshaping the Global Iron Ore Supply Landscape Among the many new projects, Africa’s Simandou iron ore is particularly noteworthy. The mine is expected to reach annual capacity of 120 million mt, and the ore’s average grade exceeds 65%, providing the market with a high-grade, high-quality option beyond Australia and Brazil, and becoming an important variable in the recent contest over the global iron ore supply landscape. In terms of project progress, the Simandou iron ore project has entered a substantive shipment phase; as logistics corridors are gradually opened up, the mining area’s substantive impact on global supply will gradually become evident. Source: SMM Nearly 400 million mt of Capacity Release by 2030, Global Iron Ore Market Faces Impact With the entry of emerging producers, iron ore supply is beginning to diversify. Projects led by Simandou iron ore are breaking the industry landscape and taking the iron ore market into a new stage. Looking ahead to the next five years, global iron ore capacity is expected to see a wave of concentrated releases, with incremental supply mainly coming from two major regions: Africa and Australia . Leveraging the development of new high-grade mines such as Simandou, Africa is reshaping the global supply landscape; meanwhile, Australia, relying on its existing capacity base and ongoing expansion projects, is further consolidating its export-dominant position. Overall, the global iron ore supply landscape is evolving toward greater diversification and a looser market. Source: SMM VI Simandou High-Quality Iron Ore Enters the Market; Global Iron Ore Enters an Era of “Quality Upgrading” As some older mines gradually enter a period of resource depletion , coupled with the fact that many newly commissioned projects are dominated by mid- to low-grade ore, the average global iron ore grade shows a downward trend from 2025 to 2026 . However, as high-grade mines such as Simandou are commissioned one after another, the share of high-grade ore supply is expected to increase, and is projected to drive a rebound in the overall global iron ore grade in 2027. Source: SMM VII “Green Steel” Reshapes the Global Crude Steel Production Landscape From a policy perspective, the low-carbon transition represented by “green steel” is profoundly reshaping the global crude steel production landscape . Whether in China or Europe, carbon neutrality has become the core theme for the future development of the steel industry. Therefore, whether it is China’s ongoing capacity replacement policy or the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) that is about to be fully implemented , both clearly indicate that the global steel industry is accelerating its transition toward low-carbon and green development. Achieving carbon neutrality across the entire industry chain is no longer an isolated task for a single link, but must rely on close upstream-downstream coordination and deep integration of technological pathways. Source: SMM Technology Reshaping: Green Iron Supply + Green Production Demand Against the broader backdrop of carbon neutrality, merely maintaining the current supply-demand structure dominated by iron ore can no longer meet future low-carbon requirements. The deeper need of industry transformation lies in reconstructing metallurgical processes: resource-rich countries—such as Australia and Brazil, traditional major iron ore exporters—need to fully leverage their renewable energy endowments and mineral advantages, shifting from simply exporting iron ore to producing high-grade, low-carbon-footprint direct reduced iron (DRI) or hot briquetted iron (HBI) and other high value-added intermediate products. By shipping this clean-energy-driven “green DRI” to steel consumption hubs and integrating it with local green electric arc furnace (EAF) processes, it can effectively replace the traditional “blast furnace–converter” long process, thereby substantially reducing carbon emissions at the source. This multinational collaborative model of “high-quality resources + green energy + short-process” is not only a critical measure to address trade barriers such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, but also an essential pathway to build a new global green steel supply chain and drive deep decarbonization across the industry. Data source: SMM Rising Share of Electric-Furnace Steelmaking, Stronger Substitutability of Steel Scrap, Squeezing Iron Ore Demand Driven by carbon-neutrality targets, the steel industry, as a major source of carbon emissions in the industrial sector, has drawn close attention for its emissions-reduction pathway. Among these, the traditional long-process route centered on “blast furnace–converter,” due to its heavy reliance on coke and iron ore, is regarded as a primary source of carbon emissions and has therefore become a key focus of regulation and retrofitting in various countries. By contrast, the short-process route represented by “steel scrap–electric furnace,” with a significantly lower carbon-emissions intensity, is being favoured by an increasing number of countries. This structural shift has driven the share of electric-furnace steelmaking in global crude steel production to continue rising. Data source: SMM From an economic perspective, the substitution relationship between steel scrap and pig iron is typically measured by the price spread. Generally, after factoring in steelmaking costs and losses, pig iron costs should be about 100-150 yuan/mt higher than steel scrap prices ; this range is viewed as the cost-performance equilibrium band: if steel scrap prices are lower than pig iron costs by more than this threshold, steel scrap is more economical; otherwise, pig iron has a more pronounced advantage. In 2025, the average price spread between pig iron and steel scrap was 122 yuan/mt, lower than the 2024 average of 211.8 yuan/mt, and also largely within the cost-performance equilibrium band. By contrast, the 2024 spread was significantly above the upper limit of the equilibrium band, indicating that steel scrap offered a more prominent cost-performance advantage at that time. After the spread narrowed in 2025, the economic advantage of steel scrap weakened somewhat. As a result, in the short term, there is limited room for China to increase the share of electric-furnace steelmaking; overall, it remains at a relatively low level and still lags far behind the global average. This also reflects that, at the current stage, cost factors still impose a substantive constraint on the choice of smelting process routes. Data source: SMM Taken together, the blast furnace–converter long-process route will remain the dominant model for global steel production over the next five years, but the shares of electric furnaces and steel scrap usage will increase year by year; in the long run, this trend will suppress iron ore demand, causing it to weaken gradually. Data source: SMM VIII Global Total Iron Ore Demand in 2030 to Be About 2.4 Billion mt, with Gradual Shifts in Global Flows As China began encouraging domestic steel mills to develop overseas markets while adjusting the domestic industry chain’s transformation toward producing high value-added products needed by the manufacturing sector, global crude steel production began to rebound gradually. Data Source: SMM From the perspective of the global demand structure, although crude steel production outside China is entering a new round of development, with capacity expansion particularly notable in regions such as India and Southeast Asia, a considerable portion of the incremental increase comes from electric furnace processes, providing limited substantive boost to iron ore demand. Meanwhile, as the world’s largest iron ore consumer, China’s crude steel production has entered a downward trajectory, constituting the primary source of demand-side reductions. Overall, overseas increments are unlikely to fully offset China’s reductions. It is expected that by 2030, total global iron ore demand will be approximately 2.4 billion mt, with overall growth trending toward a slowdown. Compared with the mild growth on the demand side, the supply side remains in a phase of continuous expansion. The oversupply landscape will become an important factor that suppresses ore prices over the long term. Data Source: SMM SMM will continue to track the impact of changes in iron ore supply and demand on prices. Comments are welcome—scan the code to follow us! Data Source Statement: Except for publicly available information, all other data are processed and derived by SMM based on publicly available information, market communication, and SMM’s internal database models, for reference only and not constituting decision-making advice. Scan the code to access information for free

Geopolitical conflict in the Middle East led to a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off the global sulphur supply chain (China’s import dependence exceeds 50%, with the Middle East accounting for 56%). Sulphur prices surged to 4,395 yuan/mt, directly pushing up phosphate fertiliser costs. Rigid demand from spring ploughing provided support, but China’s policies to ensure supply and stabilise prices curbed phosphate fertiliser gains。

In times of peace, oil and gas are cost variables; in a war context, traditional energy becomes a security variable. The escalation of conflict in the Middle East at the end of February led to a high opening for oil prices on the first trading day of March. During peacetime, energy prices fluctuate around the supply-demand gap, with the market focusing on production, inventory, and cost curves. However, in a war environment, the market first trades not on production but on deliverability. Whether key shipping routes are open, whether insurance costs soar, and whether sanctions spread, all quickly translate into risk premiums. As a result, oil prices exhibit high fluctuations, even if actual supply has not significantly decreased, as prices are pushed up by delivery uncertainties. Energy thus transforms from a commodity into a strategic resource. As an analyst in the new energy sector, I believe that this change does not simply benefit new energy. Rising oil prices reinforce the logic of electrification, making EVs and renewable energy more economically attractive. However, the macroeconomic uncertainty brought about by war may also dampen consumer and investment confidence. If high oil prices drive inflation and slow growth, overall demand for cars and industry will slow down, and new energy will not be immune. Therefore, the investment logic for new energy is no longer unidirectional, but depends on the balance between substitution effects and macroeconomic contraction effects. A deeper change lies in the fact that capital is beginning to re-evaluate energy security. The traditional oil and gas system is highly dependent on cross-border transportation and continuous fuel supply, with its vulnerabilities lying in shipping and geopolitics. In contrast, wind and PV do not require continuous fuel input during operation, and energy storage can enhance the stability of the power system, giving new energy strategic value in a war environment. They are not only low-carbon tools but also a path to reducing external dependence. The security attributes of new energy are thus being revalued. However, it must be recognized that this security attribute is not absolute. The manufacturing of new energy is highly dependent on critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, with their mining and processing concentrated and heavily reliant on transportation. If upstream resource policies tighten or logistics are disrupted, risks will also propagate through the industry chain. Therefore, the security of new energy is operational security, not supply security. This means that future investment logic will shift from simply pursuing the lowest cost to focusing on supply chain control capabilities and regional diversification. In a war environment, the allocation of risk premiums by capital changes. Transportation premiums, geopolitical premiums, and supply chain concentration premiums all rise. The volatility of traditional energy intensifies; new energy generation assets gain a security bonus; and critical minerals and midstream processing capabilities become new strategic nodes. Efficiency is no longer the sole criterion, with redundancy and controllability becoming important components of the valuation system. Deglobalization and supply chain restructuring may push up the cost center of the industry, but they also enhance the strategic position of assets. In this context, the value of energy storage and power grid assets stands out. If conflicts persist, the core goal of the energy system will shift from cost optimization to system resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and energy storage have insurance-like attributes, and their value becomes more evident in extreme scenarios. Even if high raw material prices increase project costs, an elevated policy priority may still provide long-term support. Over the past five to ten years, the narrative of the energy transition has largely focused on new energy as a tool for decarbonization to ensure sustainable development of the planet. However, geopolitical tensions in the last two to three years have redefined new energy as part of the energy security framework. Within new energy, it is not just the power generation assets that are being repriced, but also energy storage and the power grid. 1) In a war environment, the core issue of the energy system shifts from efficiency to resilience During peacetime, the goal of the energy system is to maximize efficiency: lowest cost, highest utilization rate, and optimal allocation. Cross-border trade and centralized power generation have made the global energy structure highly globalized and scaled. War exposes the vulnerabilities of such a system. Maritime transport routes, natural gas pipelines, tanker insurance, key ports, and large power plants can all become risk nodes. At this point, the system's priority is no longer efficiency but resilience – the ability to maintain basic operational capacity under shocks. Energy storage and the power grid are at the core of a resilient system. 2) Energy storage: from an arbitrage tool to system insurance In normal circumstances, the value of energy storage mainly comes from electricity arbitrage, ancillary services, and peak load regulation, with its return on investment depending on fluctuations in electricity prices and policy subsidies. However, in a wartime context, the value of energy storage is redefined. It is no longer merely an economic optimization tool but a guarantee of power system stability. Energy storage can provide emergency support during fuel supply disruptions or grid shocks, preventing the power system from collapsing due to a single point of failure. This means that energy storage assets have insurance-like attributes. When system risks rise, capital's risk appetite for these assets increases. Even if high raw material prices drive up project costs, there may still be stronger policy support because of the rising strategic value. The valuation logic of energy storage thus transitions from "IRR-driven" to "system safety premium." 3) Power grid: an undervalued strategic hub The impact of war on the energy system often first manifests in the transmission and distribution network. Centralized energy structures rely on a few key periods, and once damaged, the impact is widespread. Therefore, power grid upgrades and digitalization have become the focus of secure investments. Enhancements in smart grids, regional interconnections, grid redundancy, and distributed access capabilities can significantly strengthen the system's resilience to shocks. The investment logic for power grid assets becomes clearer in a wartime context: it is not only infrastructure but also the backbone of national energy security. In the long term, power grid upgrades will be a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of new energy. The fluctuations in new energy generation require more robust transmission, distribution, and dispatching capabilities. When risk environments rise, countries are more inclined to accelerate grid construction to reduce dependence on external energy. 4) Distributed Energy and Microgrids: The Strategic Significance of Decentralization While centralized energy systems are efficient, they are also highly vulnerable. Although distributed PV, community energy storage, and microgrids are relatively small in scale, they possess the capability for independent operation. In a war context, distributed energy has two advantages: first, it reduces the risk of single-point failures; second, it decreases reliance on cross-border fuel transportation. The strategic value of such assets is being re-evaluated in high-risk environments. 5) Deep Changes in Investment Logic The rising value of energy storage and power grids means that new energy investments no longer solely revolve around installation growth and cost reduction, but rather around system security and supply chain control. Key changes include: a. Capital is more focused on localized manufacturing and supply chain diversification; b. The weight of security in investment decisions has increased; c. The cost center may shift upward in stages, but the strategic premium has risen. The valuation system of the new energy industry is transitioning from a growth premium to a strategic premium. What opportunities and risks does geopolitics bring to China's new energy industry? 1) China's Energy Security Structure: From Import Dependence to Electrification Advantage China has long been one of the world's largest crude oil importers, with persistent energy security issues. In a wartime environment, oil price fluctuations and transportation risks increase, directly affecting energy costs and macro expectations. However, unlike before, China has established the most complete new energy manufacturing system globally. The high integration of the PV, wind, energy storage, battery, and EV industry chains gives China a manufacturing and scale advantage during the energy transition. In a war context, this advantage is beginning to translate into security attributes: an increase in electrification means a reduction in dependence on external fuels; an increase in new energy installations means a more resilient energy structure. Thus, China's new energy system has the potential for alternative security. 2) Energy Storage and Power Grid: China's Most Strategic Assets If the war becomes protracted, the core of the energy system will no longer be power generation capacity itself, but system stability. China's layout in energy storage and power grid gives it a relative advantage at this stage. In terms of energy storage, China possesses the world's largest battery manufacturing capacity and cost advantages. Under the logic of energy security, energy storage is no longer solely about economics, but has become an important tool for ensuring the stability and emergency response capability of the power system. At the policy level, there may be an emphasis on increasing the proportion of energy storage in the power system. Regarding the power grid, China has developed the world's largest ultra-high voltage transmission network and grid construction capabilities. The increased redundancy and interconnectivity of the grid help to absorb more new energy installations while enhancing the system's resilience against shocks. In a high-risk environment, investment in the grid may accelerate. This means that, under the security logic, China's energy storage and power grid assets have structural strategic premiums. 3) Critical Minerals and Supply Chain: Advantages and Risks Coexist China has advantages in the new energy manufacturing sector, but still relies on overseas layouts for upstream resources. The supply chains for critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt are highly internationalized, and wars or geopolitical risks may amplify policy and logistics uncertainties. For China's new energy industry chain, the real challenge lies not in the manufacturing end, but in the stability and cost fluctuations of the resource end. The trend of supply chain deglobalization may push up the cost center, compressing profit margins. The core of future competition will shift from scale expansion to resource control capabilities and the diversification of global layouts. 4) New Energy Vehicles: China's Structural Advantages and Short-term Fluctuations The impact of the war environment on new energy vehicles also has a dual nature. On one hand, rising oil prices reinforce the economic advantages of EVs. In a context of high oil prices, the cost advantages of using EVs become even more evident, which is conducive to increasing the penetration rate among end-users. China has the world's largest EV capacity and supply chain system, with scale and cost advantages. On the other hand, high oil prices may suppress consumer confidence through inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty. If the war continues for a long time, global economic growth may slow down, putting overall car demand under pressure. Although new energy vehicles have a substitution logic, they cannot be completely independent of the macro cycle. Therefore, the short-term performance of China's new energy vehicle industry will depend on the relative strength of the substitution effect and macroeconomic drag. 5) Long-term Structure: Re-stratification of Strategic Assets In the era of energy security, the competitiveness of China's new energy system will be more reflected in three aspects: First, manufacturing scale and cost control capabilities; Second, the system support capacity of the power grid and energy storage; Third, the diversification of upstream resources and supply chain layout. War has accelerated the stratification of the global energy system. Traditional energy bears higher fluctuation risks; new energy power generation and power grid assets gain a safety premium; critical minerals become the focal point of geopolitical competition. For China, the new energy industry is no longer just an engine for growth but also a part of the energy security system. The investment logic will shift from pure growth rate and subsidies to strategic position and supply chain stability. Overall, as energy transitions from a cost variable to a security variable, the strategic value of China's new energy system rises, but it also faces higher supply chain risks and global competitive pressures. Energy storage and the power grid are becoming the core of system stability; new energy vehicles benefit under the substitution logic, but one must be wary of macro cycles; critical minerals will determine the cost center and industrial profit margins. In an era where war reshapes the energy order, stability is more important than growth. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le 13916526348

This month, Rio Tinto stated during its earnings conference call that with all its owned projects progressing as planned, the company's lithium production capacity is expected to reach 200,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually by 2028. The increase will primarily stem from the Fenix project, the expansion of Sal de Vida, and the commissioning of the Rincon and Nemaska projects. By that time, total output will exceed three times the 57,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate production achieved in 2025. Rio Tinto previously announced its entry into the ranks of major lithium producers upon acquiring Arcadium, with plans to increase capacity to over 200,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually by 2028. The company has now confirmed its focus on achieving this target, positioning lithium as a “significant” component within its business structure. Expansion Projects: The mechanical portion of the 10,000-ton-per-year expansion at Fenix, one of the Argentine salt lake projects, has been completed, with commissioning progress reaching 60%. The mechanical vapor recompression unit has been put into operation to support the planned first production run. The first production from the expanded capacity remains on track to commence in the second half of 2026. At the new Sal de Vida project in Argentina, with an annual capacity of 15,000 metric tons, the mechanical works have been completed and commissioning is 40% complete. Production is expected to commence in the second half of 2026, projected to increase Rio Tinto's lithium output to 61,000–64,000 metric tons LCE in 2026. Regarding future projects: The Rincon project in Argentina, with an annual capacity of 60,000 metric tons, is progressing smoothly with its initial 3,000-metric-ton-per-year plant. It is expected to reach full capacity by year-end. The 57,000-metric-ton expansion plant has completed commissioning and is currently being started up, with first production planned for 2028. It will reach full production after a three-year ramp-up period. The mine has an estimated 40-year lifespan, with operating costs positioned in the top quartile of the industry cost curve. The Nemaska project in Canada features an integrated lithium hydroxide production line with a designed capacity of 28,000 metric tons per year. The mine's engineering design is complete, with construction progress at 60%. The lithium hydroxide refinery is scheduled to commence commissioning in 2026 and achieve first production in 2028. For the Whabouchi and Galaxy mines, strategic business and capital discipline reviews are underway with Canadian partners to determine the development of one of these mines. A decision is expected in the first half of 2026 to secure an integrated spodumene supply solution for the lithium hydroxide plant by 2028. In Chile, Rio Tinto anticipates closing agreements signed with state-owned mining companies Codelco and Enami in the first half of 2026. Rio Tinto has been selected as the private partner to develop Chile's two largest undeveloped lithium resources, with projects advancing upon agreement completion.