Price Trends In the first half of 2026, domestic lithium hydroxide prices followed a trajectory of "surge – high-level volatility – softening decline," with the price center first rising and then falling amid the interplay of multiple factors. January: Prices surged sharply. Concentrated maintenance shutdowns at major lithium salt producers tightened spot supply. Combined with persistently rising costs of lithium carbonate and lithium ore, lithium salt producers held firm on pricing, pushing the monthly average price up by 65% month-on-month. Although ternary material manufacturers maintained just-in-time procurement and remained cautious on spot orders, and some import flows returned due to domestic-international price spreads, the phase of supply shortages and cost support still drove prices to a high level. February: Prices fluctuated at high levels with thinning trading. Macro sentiment drove overall lithium prices downward, but producers' firm pricing stance persisted. Downstream ternary manufacturers, having ample inventories and some entering maintenance, saw eased raw material shortages, with procurement mostly based on monthly average prices. During the Chinese New Year holiday, transportation of lithium hydroxide, classified as hazardous chemicals, stalled, leading to a seasonal quiet period; post-holiday restocking demand was tepid, limiting upside momentum, and prices oscillated widely throughout the month. March: Gains narrowed notably. Cell manufacturers' offtake fell short of expectations, and new orders for ternary materials were limited. Additionally, increased customer-supplied materials in mid-month sharply reduced spot demand, leading to subdued trading and an upward price channel that stalled. The monthly average price rose only 3.4% month-on-month. April: First down then up. In the first half, limited new ternary orders and scarce spot demand put mild pressure on prices; in the second half, pre-holiday stocking and new orders drove increased inquiries from ternary producers, while sharp rises in lithium carbonate and ore prices pulled lithium hydroxide higher. The monthly average price rose 2.73% month-on-month. May: Rose then fell. In the first half, positive demand expectations and supply-side disruptions lifted lithium carbonate and ore prices, pulling lithium hydroxide higher in tandem; in the second half, sentiment turned weaker, with more trades settled via negotiation between traders and material mills. As ternary demand trends became clearer, upstream producers softened their price support, prompting a modest pullback. The monthly average price reached RMB 174,000/ton, up 13.6% month-on-month. June: Prices fell notably, with range-bound volatility intensifying. Frequent supply disruptions on the lithium resource side amplified market volatility significantly, prompting holders to adopt a cautious stance and quote prices in line with market conditions. Upstream producers adjusted prices flexibly, while traders maintained a high discount (over RMB 15,000/ton against the lithium carbonate futures main contract). On the demand side, total ternary material demand remained weak month-on-month, but within the RMB 135,000–145,000/ton range, downstream buyers showed strong willingness to stockpile on dips, providing some bottom support and exacerbating range-bound fluctuations. The monthly average price fell 11.52% month-on-month. Looking at the price trends, the correlation between lithium hydroxide prices and lithium carbonate futures prices has strengthened over the past six months. This is partly because upstream producers use a "lithium carbonate price × discount factor" formula as a floor price in their pricing. On the other hand, traders capitalize on the price spreads between domestic and overseas lithium hydroxide and between hydroxide and carbonate, by importing lithium hydroxide and pricing their sales with reference to lithium carbonate futures, further reinforcing this price linkage. Production In the first half of 2026, domestic total lithium hydroxide output reached 172,000 tons, up 21% year-on-year, driven by relatively robust downstream demand, with notable incremental growth. By output structure, the refining segment contributed the most, accounting for about 88%. Within this, the gradual ramp-up of new production lines at leading companies added some volume, while other enterprises maintained steady output backed by downstream orders, resulting in an 18% year-on-year increase for the overall refining segment. For the causticization segment, most active producers sustained stable operations, and the industry CR5 reached 72% in the first half, indicating a persistently high market concentration. From the capacity utilization perspective, although some capacity has been switched to lithium carbonate production, the operating rate for the lithium hydroxide industry has consistently lingered below 50% over the past six months, reflecting an ongoing overcapacity trend. Costs and margins: For the refining segment, lithium ore feedstock remained relatively tight in the first half of 2026, with ore prices staying elevated and closely correlated with lithium carbonate prices, providing strong cost support for lithium hydroxide. As a result, non‑integrated producers faced notable pressure on the sales side, and their product discount prices did not decline further, which in turn provided marginal support for profit margins at current price levels. For the causticization segment, the supply of salt‑lake‑based lithium salts has increased over the past six months, making causticization feedstock relatively ample. The linkage between actual procurement costs and industrial‑grade carbonate quotes has weakened, which has alleviated cost pressures for enterprises that purchase lithium carbonate externally, leading to actual profitability in the causticization segment being better than theoretical estimates. Import and Export The import‑export landscape has seen a notable reversal. On the export front, since the second half of 2025, some overseas ternary material producers have shifted to entrusting domestic tolling processors, resulting in products that would have been exported being delivered domestically instead, effectively suppressing export volumes. At the same time, overseas demand for ternary materials has remained persistently weak, reducing foreign buyers' appetite for Chinese lithium hydroxide. This, combined with the gradual ramp‑up of overseas local production lines, has collectively kept export volumes at low levels over the past six months. On the import side, weak overseas demand, high accumulated inventories, and arbitrage opportunities have driven import volumes to remain relatively elevated, further reinforcing the net import trend. Supply‑Demand Balance and Inventory The surge in import data made most months in the first half of the year oversupplied. However, from the perspective of directly usable lithium hydroxide products, the market as a whole remained in a relatively tight balance, providing effective support for upstream price control. As for inventory, current lithium hydroxide stock levels have improved significantly compared with the same period last year. This is mainly attributable to two factors: first, part of the inventory has been absorbed into the market by being converted into lithium carbonate; second, active producers have flexibly adjusted their output pace, keeping current inventory days at around one month. Future Outlook Looking ahead, although the LFP route continues to squeeze the ternary route, ternary materials currently have no rival in the high‑nickel segment. In addition, the cost advantages of 6‑series materials offer more possibilities for the ternary route. Based on end‑user production schedules, ternary power demand in the second half of 2026 is expected to maintain a sound performance, growing by approximately 36% compared with the first half. This will drive a roughly 7% sequential increase in ternary material output in the second half. As ternary materials continue to move toward higher nickel content, this brings an incremental demand trend for lithium hydroxide. Meanwhile, considering that most lithium hydroxide production lines have flexible switching or carbonation purification capabilities, lithium hydroxide output is projected to grow by about 6% sequentially. Coupled with a modest recovery in overseas ternary demand, the supply‑demand balance for lithium hydroxide is expected to remain tight through 2026–2027. In terms of price, under a market structure with highly concentrated supply, lithium hydroxide prices are primarily determined by the supply‑demand dynamics of its own industrial chain and closely track lithium ore and lithium salt price trends. Prices are currently oscillating in a range above RMB 150,000/ton. Futures Developments As for lithium hydroxide futures, there has been a flurry of related developments in the second quarter. The Guangzhou Futures Exchange (GFEX) and the Lithium Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association have both explicitly stated that they will continue to strengthen cooperation and jointly advance the listing of lithium hydroxide and other lithium‑chain futures products. The征求意见稿 of Guangzhou's "15th Five‑Year Plan" for finance also clearly supports GFEX in listing new‑energy futures such as lithium hydroxide. On the industrial side, companies have moved swiftly to follow up. In June, Yahua Group, Shengxin Lithium Energy, and Tianqi Lithium all announced their intention to apply to GFEX for designated delivery factory warehouse status for lithium hydroxide. In addition, Milkyway's shareholders' meeting approved a proposal for its subsidiary to apply to become a designated delivery warehouse for battery‑grade lithium hydroxide at GFEX. According to media reports, lithium salt producers (Ganfeng Lithium, Tianqi Lithium, Yahua Group, etc.) have already positioned themselves in the factory‑warehouse system. However, due to the high‑risk storage requirements of lithium hydroxide—such as strong corrosiveness, exothermic reaction with water, and the need for inert gas protection—no logistics‑focused player had previously entered this category. On the market front, some traders have already made early arrangements in anticipation of futures listing, and the number of merchants participating in lithium hydroxide import trade has noticeably increased. In summary, preparations for the listing of lithium hydroxide futures are progressing in an orderly manner, with positive official signals and accelerating industrial infrastructure development.

Price In H1, China's lithium hydroxide prices showed a trend of "surge—consolidation at highs—loosen and pull back", with the price center rising initially and then falling amid the interplay of multiple factors. In January, prices surged sharply. Concentrated maintenance at leading lithium chemical plants tightened spot supply, while costs of lithium carbonate and lithium ore continued to climb, prompting lithium chemical plants to hold prices firmly. This drove the monthly average lithium hydroxide price to soar 65% MoM. Although ternary cathode material enterprises maintained just-in-time procurement and were cautious about spot orders, and the price spread between Chinese and overseas markets led to some import backflows, phased shortages and cost support still pushed prices to highs. In February, prices consolidated at highs with trading activity turning sluggish. Macro sentiment dragged lithium prices lower overall, but smelters' firm pricing sentiment persisted. Downstream ternary cathode material manufacturers had sufficient inventories and some entered maintenance, easing raw material tightness, with purchases mainly based on monthly average prices. During the Chinese New Year, lithium hydroxide transportation stalled due to its hazardous chemical nature, and the market entered a seasonal quiet period. Post-holiday restocking demand was mediocre, and prices lacked upward momentum, resulting in wild swings throughout the month. In March, price increases narrowed significantly. Battery cell manufacturers' cargo pick-up pace fell short of expectations, new orders for ternary cathode materials were limited, and increased customer-supplied materials mid-month caused spot orders to plummet. Market trading was sluggish, the upward price channel was blocked, and the monthly average price edged up only 3.4% MoM. In April, prices fell first and then rose. In the first half, limited new orders for ternary cathode materials led to muted demand for spot orders, and prices were slightly under pressure. In the second half, driven by pre-holiday stockpiling and new orders, ternary cathode material manufacturers increased inquiries, and combined with sharp rises in lithium carbonate and lithium ore prices, lithium hydroxide prices strengthened, with the monthly average price up 2.73% MoM. In May, prices retreated after a rapid rise. In the first half, expectations of improving demand and supply-side disruptions pushed lithium carbonate and lithium ore prices higher, pulling lithium hydroxide up in tandem. In the second half, lithium market sentiment weakened, traders and material manufacturers increased point-price transactions, and with the trend of ternary demand already set, upstream suppliers' firm pricing stance loosened, leading to a slight correction. The monthly average price reached 174,000 yuan/mt, up 13.6% MoM. In June, prices pulled back notably with heightened price range volatility. Supply disturbances at the lithium resource side were frequent, and market fluctuations amplified significantly. Suppliers became cautious, quoting prices in line with market conditions. Upstream players adjusted prices flexibly, and traders maintained deep discounts (discount of more than 15,000 yuan/mt to the most-traded lithium carbonate contract). On the demand side, total ternary cathode material demand remained weak MoM, but in the 135,000-145,000 yuan/mt range, downstream players showed strong willingness to stockpile at lows, forming some bottom support and intensifying price range consolidation. The monthly average price fell 11.52% MoM. From a price trend perspective, the linkage between lithium hydroxide prices and lithium carbonate futures prices strengthened over the past six months. On the one hand, upstream enterprises adopted a “lithium carbonate price × discount coefficient” approach in pricing as a floor price; on the other, traders leveraged the lithium carbonate-lithium hydroxide price spread and price differences in and outside China, importing lithium hydroxide and selling it with reference to lithium carbonate futures prices, further reinforcing this price linkage. Production Production side: In H1 2026, China’s total lithium hydroxide production reached 172,000 mt, up 21% YoY, with relatively robust downstream demand driving notable growth. By output structure, the smelting segment contributed the largest share at around 88%. Among this, production ramp-ups at new lines of top-tier players added some volume, while other enterprises mainly relied on downstream orders for steady output; overall smelting segment production increased 18% compared to the same period last year. For the causticisation segment, most operating enterprises maintained stable production, with the H1 CR5 reaching 72% and market concentration remaining at a high level. Regarding capacity utilization rate, although some capacity had already been switched to lithium carbonate production, the lithium hydroxide industry’s operating rate hovered below 50% throughout the first half, and overcapacity trends persisted. Cost and profitability: In the smelting segment, lithium ore raw materials were relatively tight in H1 2026, with ore prices staying at a relatively high level and highly linked to lithium carbonate prices, providing strong cost support for lithium hydroxide. As a result, non-integrated producers faced significant sales pressure, and their product discount prices did not fall further, offering marginal support to profit margins at current price levels. In the causticisation segment, supply of salt-lake-based lithium chemicals increased over the past six months, and raw materials for causticisation were relatively abundant; the linkage between actual enterprise procurement costs and industrial-grade lithium carbonate quotes weakened, alleviating cost pressure on enterprises purchasing lithium carbonate externally to some extent and resulting in actual causticisation segment profitability exceeding theoretical estimates. Imports and Exports The pattern of imports and exports also underwent a notable reversal. On the export side, since H2 2025, some overseas ternary enterprises shifted to outsourcing processing to domestic toll manufacturers, causing products originally destined for export to be delivered domestically and effectively pushing down exports. Meanwhile, overseas ternary cathode material demand remained sluggish, downstream material plants showed weaker purchase willingness for Chinese lithium hydroxide, and local production lines outside China gradually ramped up, jointly keeping exports at low levels over the past six months. On the import side, driven by weak overseas demand, high prior inventories, and arbitrage opportunities, import volumes stayed at a relatively high level, further reinforcing the net import trend. Balance and Inventory The surge in import data led to a supply surplus in most months in H1. However, considering directly usable lithium hydroxide products, the overall market remained in a relatively tight balance, effectively supporting upstream price control efforts. Regarding inventory levels, current lithium hydroxide inventories have improved significantly compared to the same period last year, driven primarily by two factors: first, some inventory was digested by converting into lithium carbonate and flowing into the market; second, operating enterprises flexibly adjusted their output pace, bringing days of inventories down to approximately one month. Outlook Going forward, although the LFP route continues to squeeze the ternary route, ternary cathode materials still face no rivals in the high-nickel segment. Additionally, the cost advantage of 6-series materials has opened up further possibilities for the ternary route. From the perspective of end-user production schedules, ternary battery demand is expected to maintain good momentum in H2 2026, with growth of approximately 36% compared to H1, which in turn brings about a 7% QoQ increase in demand for ternary cathode material output in H2. As ternary cathode materials continue trending toward higher nickel content, this generates a certain incremental growth trend in demand for lithium hydroxide. Meanwhile, considering that most lithium hydroxide production lines have the flexibility to switch or use carbonisation purification, lithium hydroxide production is expected to see approximately 6% growth in demand QoQ. Combined with a slight recovery in ternary demand outside China, the supply-demand balance for lithium hydroxide is expected to remain tight from 2026 to 2027. In terms of pricing, given the highly concentrated supply structure, lithium hydroxide prices are primarily determined by the supply-demand relationship of its own industry chain and closely follow the price trend of lithium ore and lithium chemicals, currently consolidating above 150,000 yuan per mt. Finally, regarding the listing of lithium hydroxide futures, Q2 saw frequent related developments. The Guangzhou Futures Exchange and the Lithium Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association explicitly stated their intention to continue strengthening cooperation and jointly promote the futures listing of lithium hydroxide and other lithium battery industry chain products; the draft of Guangzhou's 15th Five-Year Plan for the financial sector also explicitly supports GFEX in listing new energy futures products such as lithium hydroxide. The industry side followed closely with intensive preparations. In June, Yahua, Chengxin Lithium, and Tianqi Lithium all announced approval to apply to GFEX for designated lithium hydroxide delivery factory warehouse qualifications; additionally, Milkyway’s shareholder meeting reviewed and approved a proposal for its subsidiary to apply to become a designated delivery warehouse for battery-grade lithium hydroxide on GFEX. According to media reports, lithium chemical plants (Ganfeng Lithium, Tianqi Lithium, Yahua Group, etc.) are already building out factory warehouse systems, but lithium hydroxide, due to its high hazardous chemical storage thresholds—strong corrosiveness, exothermic reaction with water, and requirement for inert gas protection—has seen no logistics players enter this product category so far. At the market level, some traders had already positioned themselves in advance due to expectations of the futures listing, and the number of traders involved in lithium hydroxide import trade increased significantly. In summary, the preparations for the listing of lithium hydroxide futures are progressing in an orderly manner, with positive official statements and accelerated industrial support.

On June 9, a fire broke out at Chemical Grade Plant 3, or CGP3, at the Greenbushes lithium operation. The fire was quickly extinguished, no injuries were reported, and CGP1 and CGP2 continued to operate as normal. The following day, IGO confirmed that its FY2026 spodumene concentrate production guidance of 1.375–1.425 million tonnes remained unchanged. Chemical Grade Plant 4, or CGP4, is scheduled to commence construction in 2027. Viewed in isolation, this was a well-contained operational incident. However, the location of the fire deserves closer attention. CGP3 is not part of Greenbushes’ existing production base. It represents incremental supply currently ramping up at the far-left end of the global lithium cost curve. The project involved approximately A$880 million of investment and is designed to add around 500,000 tonnes per year of spodumene concentrate capacity. First ore was fed into the plant in December 2025, and the facility had originally been expected to reach nameplate capacity around mid-2026. The damage assessment is still under way. Neither the repair cost nor the recovery timeline has been quantified. The fact that production guidance remains unchanged should therefore be understood as an initial assessment rather than a definitive conclusion. The key question is not whether IGO has immediately revised its annual guidance. It is whether the CGP3 ramp-up schedule will be delayed. Should the market be concerned when an incremental production line at the world’s lowest-cost lithium mine experiences an operational disruption? To answer this question, it is useful to examine the role of Australian lithium mines in the broader lithium pricing mechanism. Note on the CGP3 ramp-up timeline: At IGO’s FY2026 second-quarter results briefing in late January 2026, management stated that CGP3 had received first ore in December 2025 and would require approximately five months to ramp up to nameplate capacity. Some English-language transcripts recorded management as referring to completion “by the end of the calendar year.” However, based on the timing of first ore feed, a five-month ramp-up period would imply completion around mid-2026, before the end of Australia’s FY2026 financial year. This is also consistent with the company’s previous guidance. The transcript may therefore have intended to say “by the end of the financial year.” This article adopts the mid-2026 ramp-up assumption. The timing is relevant because the June 9 fire occurred only weeks before the originally expected completion of the ramp-up. The actual impact should become clearer in IGO’s fourth-quarter report, which is expected in late July. Greenbushes: A Reference Point at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes’ most important advantage begins with ore grade. It is one of the world’s largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines currently in production. Its ore grade is approximately twice the industry average. For a spodumene operation, grade directly affects processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrate, Greenbushes needs to process materially less ore than a typical mine. This provides a structural advantage across mining, beneficiation, energy consumption and tailings management. Greenbushes also benefits from scale. The operation currently has several processing facilities, with combined nominal ore-processing capacity of around 6.5 million tonnes per year and spodumene concentrate capacity of up to approximately 1.5 million tonnes per year. Once CGP3 completes its ramp-up, the mine will add a further 500,000 tonnes per year of concentrate capacity. With the mine life extended to 2045, Greenbushes combines low costs with long-term supply capacity. This explains the mine’s resilience during the lithium price downturn. During 2024 and 2025, lithium prices declined sharply. A number of higher-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced production cuts or temporary shutdowns. Greenbushes, however, continued to maintain relatively strong profitability and moved ahead with the CGP3 expansion. Greenbushes does not represent the industry’s average cost. It represents the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium cost curve. For that reason, Greenbushes is better understood as a reference point for the bottom of the cycle. As lithium prices fall, higher-cost supply exits first, while low-cost assets remain in operation. The closer prices move toward the cost range of Greenbushes, the fewer marginal producers remain capable of operating normally, and the more advanced the supply-side clearing process becomes. This does not mean that lithium prices can never fall below the cost level of Greenbushes. In the short term, inventory pressure, liquidity conditions and market sentiment can push prices below the cost levels implied by the marginal supply curve. Greenbushes is not an absolute price floor. Its significance is that it provides a structural reference point for assessing how far supply-side clearing has progressed. Greenbushes: The Largest Producer, but with Limited Freely Traded Supply Although Greenbushes produces large volumes of spodumene concentrate, relatively little of that material enters the open spot market directly. The mine is operated by Talison Lithium. Talison is owned by Tianqi Lithium Energy Australia, or TLEA, and Albemarle. TLEA is in turn jointly owned by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. Greenbushes concentrate is primarily distributed through shareholder offtake arrangements and supplied into the downstream conversion systems of Tianqi, Albemarle and their respective partners. Under normal conditions, the material is not sold directly into the open market. Greenbushes therefore provides a useful example of why lithium supply should be analysed through several different layers: Resources → Design capacity → Actual production → Saleable volume → Freely traded spot volume Greenbushes ranks among the world’s largest producers by actual output. However, because most of its concentrate is locked into shareholder offtake arrangements, the amount available for open-market trading remains relatively limited. This means Greenbushes affects lithium pricing mainly through indirect channels. First, it determines the size of the lowest-cost portion of global lithium supply and therefore plays an important role in shaping the lithium chemical cost curve. Second, its operating costs, offtake pricing mechanism and expansion schedule provide reference points for long-term contract negotiations and price assessments in the spodumene market. By contrast, short-term spot prices are often more directly influenced by marginal resources that are not fully locked into shareholder arrangements and must actively seek buyers in the market. These include certain Australian mines, African lithium resources and trader-held cargoes. This explains an apparent paradox. An additional 500,000 tonnes of Greenbushes concentrate capacity can materially change the medium-term supply-demand balance, yet its immediate impact on the spot market may be limited. Meanwhile, the shutdown or restart of a marginal mine producing only 100,000–200,000 tonnes per year can quickly influence spot quotations and market sentiment if its output is sold on a market basis. Short-term pricing is not determined solely by total production. It is also shaped by the volume of material that is freely available for negotiation and immediate transaction. The same logic applies to lithium carbonate. Price elasticity depends not only on total inventory but also on how much inventory is genuinely available for circulation. The largest producer does not necessarily exert the most direct influence over the spot market. Short-term marginal pricing is usually driven by the resources that are tradeable, negotiable and available for immediate delivery. However, shareholder offtake does not mean that Greenbushes material is completely isolated from the market. If lithium conversion plants within the Tianqi or Albemarle systems reduce operating rates, or if downstream conversion assets experience operational issues, part of the concentrate originally intended for internal consumption may re-enter the market indirectly through tolling, resale or inventory adjustments. These volumes are rarely captured in public statistics, but they can affect the actual liquidity of the spodumene market. Tracking this material requires a broader set of indicators, including shareholder conversion-plant operating rates, concentrate inventories, tolling arrangements and import flows. This type of “shadow spot supply” is harder to observe than nominal mine production, yet it can become relevant at specific points in the cycle. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: The Direction of Price Transmission Reversed Within a Year The relationship between Australian spodumene concentrate prices and Chinese lithium chemical prices has completed a full cycle over the past year. During the first half of 2025, spodumene prices followed lithium chemical prices downward. Australian miners reduced costs materially in the first quarter but largely avoided production cuts. Mining companies remained willing to ship material, and the price of SC6 concentrate fell to around US$620 per tonne. Falling concentrate prices then placed additional pressure on lithium chemical prices, reinforcing the downward cycle. At the time, the key market question was straightforward: When would the mining sector finally reduce supply? The direction of transmission reversed in the end of third quarter. The announcement that 27 mining licences in Yichun could be cancelled, together with the suspension of the Jianxiawo mine, tightened expectations around domestic Chinese lithium supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first. SC6 prices then followed, with greater elasticity. By December, the monthly average price had recovered to around US$1,300 per tonne. Formula-based pricing mechanisms linked to lithium chemical prices allowed mining companies to capture a large share of the upside, while Chinese converters saw their processing margins squeezed. At the same time, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana lithium hydroxide project highlighted the challenges facing Australian downstream conversion. The project has faced difficulties in cost control, production ramp-up and operational stability. TLEA’s Kwinana lithium hydroxide refinery was fully impaired in mid-2025, the second train was suspended, and IGO made clear that it would prioritize mining. These developments reinforce Australia’s role as a supplier of spodumene concentrate rather than a major lithium chemical conversion hub. As a result, the relationship between SC6 prices and Chinese lithium chemical prices is likely to remain strong. However, the speed and magnitude of transmission will continue to depend on inventories, contract formulas, shipping cycles and converter operating rates. One of the most useful indicators is the implied conversion margin between SC6 concentrate and lithium chemical spot prices. When the implied conversion margin turns negative, Chinese converters purchasing third-party concentrate are effectively losing cash on incremental production. The market then needs to rebalance through at least one of three channels: Spodumene concentrate prices decline; Lithium chemical prices rise; Converters reduce operating rates. This indicator provides a useful way to judge whether bargaining power currently sits with the mining segment or the conversion segment. Australian Mine Restarts: Lithium Prices Develop an Upper Constraint The key theme for Australian lithium mines during 2024 and 2025 was supply-side clearing. In 2026, the theme has shifted toward reactivation. As lithium prices recovered during the first half of the year and futures briefly exceeded RMB 200,000 per tonne, a series of restart decisions emerged across May and June. Project Action Timing Key Point Bald Hill, Mineral Resources Restart after approximately 18 months of suspension Restart announced in May; first concentrate expected in July Restart cost of around A$20 million Ngungaju, PLS Processing plant restart Planned for July Approximately 200,000 tonnes per year of restored output Finniss, Core Lithium Final investment decision approved; financing secured Targeting first ore in the third quarter Financing package of approximately US$205 million Kathleen Valley, Liontown Expansion under assessment Ongoing Further details pending Mt Cattlin, Rio Tinto Remains suspended Suspended since March 2025 Restart conditions remain unclear Taken together, these cases show that the true threshold for mine restart is more complex than a simple comparison between lithium prices and cash costs. Bald Hill moved from restart announcement to expected first concentrate production in around two months. The mine had remained in a production-ready care-and-maintenance state, and Mineral Resources has its own mining-services platform, allowing it to mobilize mining, crushing and haulage internally without relying heavily on external contractors. This type of asset represents the fastest-reacting segment of supply when prices recover. Finniss is a different case. The project first monetized inventories through Glencore to improve liquidity, then assembled a financing package involving convertible debt, additional borrowings and equity issuance before reaching a final investment decision. For miners with weaker balance sheets, a restart is not simply an operational decision. It is a financing event. A low-price cycle does not eliminate the resource base. It eliminates the ability to finance production. The market impact of the restart wave is already visible. Lithium carbonate futures reached a two-year high of RMB 200,500 per tonne on May 13 before retreating to around RMB 160,000–170,000 per tonne in June. One reason for the pullback is that the market has begun to price in the return of idle supply. The mechanism is straightforward: Prices rise → Idle capacity restarts → Expected supply increases → Prices come under pressure The list of suspended Australian mines, once ranked by restart economics and response time, effectively becomes an upside supply curve for lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and the restart wave represent two sides of the same market. At the low-cost end of the curve, incremental Greenbushes supply has experienced an operational disruption, creating a bullish signal. At the higher-cost end, idle assets are returning to production, creating a bearish signal. From a resource perspective, lithium prices in 2026 are searching for equilibrium between these two forces. Lithium Prices in 2026 May Become More Volatile, but One-Way Trends Could Be Shorter Once prices rise, the factor that ultimately limits the upside is the speed at which idle capacity returns to the market. Bald Hill, Finniss and Ngungaju represent a broader pool of suspended or standby assets that can respond when lithium prices move sufficiently above their cash-cost thresholds and remain there for long enough. However, restart supply is not instantaneous. From the moment a restart is announced, companies need to remobilize personnel, inspect equipment, resume mining and processing, build concentrate inventories and arrange shipments. Depending on the asset, concentrate may enter the market within two months or only after several quarters. This delay creates a window during which supply disruptions can push prices higher. The suspension of the Jianxiawo mine and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes matter not because global lithium resources have suddenly become scarce, but because short-term freely available supply has tightened while idle capacity has not yet fully returned. Compared with the previous cycle, this risk-premium window appears to be shortening. An increasing number of mines are being placed on care and maintenance rather than permanently closed. Mining-services companies, traders and downstream customers are also becoming more involved in restart financing and offtake arrangements. Once prices move back above the relevant breakeven levels, some idle assets can return more quickly. This does not necessarily mean lithium prices will become more stable. Supply disruptions can still trigger rapid price increases. However, the duration and magnitude of one-way rallies are likely to face stronger constraints from restart expectations. Prices may become more volatile in the short term, but sustained unilateral trends could become shorter. Conclusion Australian lithium mines influence lithium prices through several distinct channels. Greenbushes provides a structural reference point at the bottom of the hard-rock lithium cost curve. However, because most of its output is absorbed through shareholder offtake arrangements, it does not directly determine short-term spot pricing. Spot-market tightness is more directly influenced by marginal saleable supply: Australian mines, African resources and trader-held inventories that are available for negotiation and immediate transaction. Once lithium prices rise, the speed at which suspended assets restart becomes the key constraint on the duration of the rally. The framework can therefore be summarized in three lines: Low-cost mines provide a structural reference point for the bottom of the cycle. Freely traded supply determines short-term spot-market tightness. The speed of mine restarts determines how long an upside cycle can last. The CGP3 fire and the restart wave sit at opposite ends of this framework. One represents a disruption to low-cost incremental supply. The other represents the return of higher-cost idle capacity. Lithium prices in 2026 will continue to seek equilibrium between these two forces. Lesley Yang Senior New Energy Analyst, SMM yangle@smm.cn

On June 9, a fire broke out at Greenbushes Chemical-Grade Beneficiation Plant 3 (CGP3). The fire was quickly extinguished with no casualties, CGP1 and CGP2 continued normal operations, and IGO confirmed the next day that its FY2026 concentrate guidance of 1.375 million to 1.425 million mt remained unchanged. CGP4 is planned to commence in 2027. Judging solely by the announcement, this was a well-handled operational incident. However, the location of the fire warrants closer attention: CGP3 is not existing capacity but incremental capacity being ramped up at the far left of the global cost curve – with a total investment of about AUD 880 million, designed to add approximately 500,000 mt/year of concentrate capacity, and which only achieved first feed in December 2025 and was originally expected to reach full production by mid-this year. The damage assessment is still ongoing, repair costs and timetable are yet to be quantified, and the so-called "guidance maintained" is based only on information from the initial stage of the incident. What merits tracking going forward is not the guidance itself, but whether the timing of reaching full production will be delayed. At the world's lowest-cost mine, a new production line has had a minor incident – should the market be concerned? Today, I aim to break down and clarify this mechanism by analyzing the role of Australian ore in the lithium price formation. Note: Clarification on the timeline for CGP3 reaching full production. At its FY26 Q2 results briefing in late January 2026, IGO stated that CGP3 achieved first feed in December 2025 and that ramp-up to nominal capacity would take approximately five months. Some English transcripts recorded management's remarks as "completing ramp-up before the end of the calendar year" (end of the calendar year). However, based on the timing of first feed, five months corresponds to mid-2026, i.e., before the end of the Australian financial year (FY26), which is consistent with the company's previously disclosed guidance of "reaching full production in mid-2026." The transcript likely mistook "end of the financial year" for "end of the calendar year." This article adopts the "mid-2026 full production" timeline. This timing implies that the June 9 CGP3 fire occurred a few weeks before the originally scheduled full production, and the actual impact will be confirmed in IGO's Q4 report (expected in late July). Greenbushes: A Benchmark at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes' most fundamental advantage lies first in its ore grade. It is one of the world's largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines in production, with raw ore grade roughly double the industry average. For spodumene mines, grade directly determines mining and processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrates, Greenbushes needs to process significantly less raw ore than typical mines, giving it natural cost advantages in mining, beneficiation, energy consumption, and tailings management. Building on its high-grade ore, Greenbushes also benefits from economies of scale. The mine site now hosts multiple beneficiation plants with a combined nominal processing capacity of approximately 6.5 million mt/year, supporting a maximum lithium concentrate capacity of up to 1.5 million mt; once CGP3 has fully ramped up, it will add roughly 500,000 mt of additional concentrate capacity. With the mine life further extended to 2045, Greenbushes not only possesses low-cost advantages but also strong long-term supply capability. This is why Greenbushes has demonstrated significant resilience during the lithium price downturn. From 2024 to 2025, as lithium prices continued to pull back, many high-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced pressure to suspend or cut production, yet Greenbushes maintained relatively sound profitability and continued to advance the CGP3 expansion. It represents not the industry's average cost, but the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium ore cost curve. Therefore, Greenbushes serves as a useful benchmark for observing the industry bottom. When lithium prices fall, high-cost capacity exits first, while low-cost capacity continues to produce. The closer prices move to Greenbushes' cost range, the fewer marginal units of capacity can sustain normal operations in the market, and the nearer supply exits are to completion. Greenbushes Has the Largest Production, but Limited Free-Float Volume Although Greenbushes has a very large production scale, relatively little of its concentrates can enter the spot market directly. Greenbushes is operated by Talison Lithium, whose shareholders include TLEA and Albemarle, with TLEA jointly held by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. The spodumene concentrates produced at the mine are primarily allocated under shareholder offtake arrangements, flowing to lithium chemical production lines within the shareholder systems of Tianqi, Albemarle, and others, and are not normally offered for direct sale to the market. Viewed through the framework of [Resources – Designed Capacity – Actual Production – Saleable Volume – Available Spot Volume], Greenbushes is a very typical case. Its actual production ranks among the world's largest, but since most of its concentrates are locked up within its shareholder system, the volume truly available for market-based transactions is relatively limited. This also means Greenbushes' influence on market prices is mostly indirect. On one hand, it defines the scale of global low-cost lithium resource supply, which has an important impact on the lithium chemical cost curve; on the other, its operating costs, offtake pricing, and expansion pace also serve as key references for long-term lithium ore contract negotiations and price assessments. By contrast, what really influences spot lithium ore prices in the short term are typically the marginal resources not fully locked up by shareholder offtake agreements and needing to find buyers on the market. These include some Australian mines, African lithium ore, and saleable cargo held by traders. Therefore, while the addition of approximately 500,000 mt of concentrate capacity at Greenbushes will alter medium and long-term supply-demand expectations, its short-term impact on the spot market may not be particularly pronounced. In contrast, the suspension or resumption of a marginal mine with an annual output of over 100,000 mt that primarily sells on the open market could rapidly influence spot quotes and market sentiment. It is well known that short-term prices are not entirely determined by total output; rather, they depend more on the volume of material freely available for trading in the market. For example, lithium carbonate's price elasticity hinges more on the current available volume in the market. The mine with the largest output does not necessarily hold the most direct pricing power in the spot market; what truly dictates short-term marginal prices are typically resources that are available, negotiable, and require immediate transaction. However, shareholder offtake does not mean such concentrates are completely isolated from the market. When smelters within the frameworks of shareholders like Tianqi and Albemarle reduce their operating rates, or when some smelting lines operate erratically, concentrates originally intended for internal consumption may indirectly enter the market through toll processing, resales, or inventory adjustments. These cargoes are usually not publicly tallied but affect the actual circulating volume in the lithium ore market. Their tracking requires assessment by combining shareholder smelter operating rates, concentrate inventory, toll processing arrangements, and import flows. In analyzing Australian ore supply, such shadow spot cargoes are often harder to observe than a mine's nominal production, yet can significantly influence the market during specific phases. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: Transmission Direction Reversed Once Within a Year The price transmission relationship between Australian ore concentrates (SC6, CIF China) and China's lithium chemicals has completed a full round trip over the past year. In H1 2025, ore prices followed the downtrend. In Q1, Australian mines aggressively cut costs but did not reduce production, showing a strong willingness to sell. SC6 fell all the way to around $620/mt, and the lower concentrate prices, in turn, pressured lithium chemicals downward, forming a spiral. The market's concern at the time was: When would mines finally be willing to cut? The situation reversed starting at the end of Q3. The announcement of Yichun's plan to cancel 27 mining rights, along with the suspension at Jianxiawo, tightened expectations for domestic resource supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first, and SC6 followed with an uptrend that proved even more elastic—by December, the average price had already returned to around $1,300/mt. Formula pricing, linked to lithium chemical prices, allowed the mining side to capture the bulk of the upside gains, while the tolling margins of Chinese smelters were instead compressed. Meanwhile, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana project reflect that lithium chemical conversion in Australia continues to face high hurdles in terms of cost control, production ramp-up, and operational stability. TLEA's Kwinana lithium hydroxide plant was fully impaired in mid-2025, with the second-phase construction halted, and IGO has clearly shifted its priority to mining. The role of Australian ore in the industry chain has been refixed as a supplier of concentrates, and the linkage between SC6 and Chinese lithium chemical prices will only tighten going forward, not decouple. The implied smelting margin—calculated by multiplying SC6 by the processing coefficient and comparing it to spot lithium chemical prices—has turned negative, meaning Chinese smelters using externally purchased ore are losing cash. Either ore prices must pull back or lithium chemical prices must rise; one of the two is inevitable. This indicator is the most powerful gauge of whether mines or lithium chemicals hold more pricing power. Australian Mine Production Resumptions: Price Breaks Through the Ceiling The key words for Australian ore in 2024-2025 were market exits, while in 2026 they have become revivals. Lithium prices have been climbing steadily since the beginning of the year, with futures prices once surpassing 200,000 yuan/mt, triggering a series of production resumptions in May and June: Project Action Timing Notes Bald Hill (MinRes) Resumed production after an 18-month shutdown Announced in May, first concentrates expected in Jul Restart cost approximately A$20 million Ngungaju Plant (PLS) Restart Planned for Jul Resuming roughly 200,000 mt/year Finniss (Core Lithium) FID approved, financing secured Targeting first ore in Q3 Financing approximately $205 million Kathleen Valley (Liontown) Evaluating expansion In progress — Mt Cattlin (Rio Tinto) Remains shut down From Mar 2025 to present Restart conditions not yet clarified Looking at these cases together, the real threshold for resuming production is more complex than simply having prices exceed cash costs. Bald Hill took only about two months from announcement to first ore because it had maintained a production-ready state throughout the shutdown, and MinRes's own mining services division could internally mobilize all operations—mining, crushing, and transport—without needing to wait for external contractors. Assets of this type are the quickest-responding supply when prices rise. Finniss, by contrast, was an entirely different situation: it first sold inventory to Glencore in exchange for liquidity, then cobbled together three financing instruments—convertible bonds, debt, and a share placement—before reaching FID. For mines with fragile balance sheets, resuming production is not an operational decision but a financing event; what low-price cycles destroy is not resources, but financing capacity. The market consequences of the resumption wave are already visible. Lithium carbonate hit a two-year high of 200,500 yuan/mt on May 13, then pulled back to the 160,000–170,000 yuan range in June, partly because the market saw resumption supply coming back. The logic is straightforward: when prices rise, idle capacity resumes production, supply expectations increase, and prices pull back. That list of idle capacity in Australia, when sorted, essentially forms the supply curve above lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and this wave of production resumptions are actually two sides of the same market: disruption to the incremental supply at the far left of the cost curve is bullish, while idle capacity at the right end accelerating its return is bearish. Looking at lithium prices this year from the resource perspective, equilibrium is being sought between these two forces. Lithium prices in 2026 are expected to fluctuate more frequently, but one-sided market moves will be shorter. After prices rise, what truly caps the height of the rally is the speed at which idle capacity re-enters the market. Projects under care and maintenance or on standby, such as Bald Hill, Finniss, and Ngungaju, essentially constitute elastic supply above lithium prices. When lithium prices return above the cash costs of these projects and stay there long enough, mines have the incentive to resume production. But production resumptions do not happen instantly. From the announcement of a restart to the rehiring of personnel, equipment maintenance, resumption of mining and processing, inventory buildup, and finally, the entry of concentrates into the market, it typically takes from two months to several quarters. This time lag is the window during which supply disruptions can drive prices higher. The suspension at Jianxiawo and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes were able to affect market sentiment not because of a sudden global shortage of lithium resources, but because of a reduction in short-term available supply while idle capacity had yet to return. Compared to the previous cycle, it is worth noting that the window for risk premiums arising from resource-side disruptions is shortening. A growing number of mines are opting for care and maintenance rather than permanent closure; mining service companies, traders, and downstream enterprises are also participating in restart financing and offtake arrangements. As long as prices return above the break-even line, some idle capacity can resume more quickly. This means that in the future, lithium prices may still rise rapidly following supply disruptions, but the duration and height of one-sided market moves will be more easily constrained by production resumption expectations. Prices may not necessarily become more stable, but supply feedback could be faster. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le

On April 20, Tianqi Lithium Corporation released its performance forecast for the first quarter of 2026. The company expects its first-quarter performance to show a significant year-on-year increase, with net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company ranging from 1.7 billion yuan to 2.0 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 1530.31% to 1818.01%. On the one hand, benefiting from the development of the new energy industry and growth in downstream demand, the company's operating revenue for the first quarter increased significantly compared to the same period last year. On the other hand, the company's investment income from its associate SQM increased significantly year-on-year.

On January 30, 2026, the Phase 3 chemical-grade spodumene concentrate expansion project at Talison successfully produced its first batch of qualified products and has now entered the production ramp-up stage. The project will provide a stable supply of raw materials for Tianqi Lithium's global production bases, enhance synergy across the industry chain, and is expected to further strengthen the company's profitability.

[Tianqi Lithium: Expects 2025 Net Profit of 369 Million–553 Million Yuan, Turning Loss into Profit] Tianqi Lithium announced that it expects a net profit of 369 million–553 million yuan in 2025, representing a turnaround from loss to profit. Despite the impact of fluctuations in the lithium product market, which led to a decline in the company's lithium product selling prices compared to the same period last year, the time-cycle mismatch that previously existed between the pricing mechanism for chemical-grade lithium concentrates at its wholly-owned subsidiary Talison Lithium Pty Ltd and the sales pricing mechanism for the company's lithium chemical products has been significantly mitigated, thanks to the shortened pricing cycle for lithium ore at its controlling subsidiary Windfield Holdings Pty Ltd. With the gradual intake of newly purchased lithium concentrates domestically and the progressive consumption of lithium concentrate inventory, the cost of chemical-grade lithium concentrates utilized in the production costs at the company's various lithium chemical product production sites has largely aligned with the latest purchase prices.

[Tianqi Lithium: SQM and Codelco Complete Strategic Partnership as per Signed Partnership Agreement] Tianqi Lithium announced that on December 27, 2025, local time in Chile, SQM disclosed that it had completed its strategic partnership with Codelco. The joint venture, SQM Salar, will be renamed Nova Andino Litio SpA. This merger was executed in accordance with the terms stipulated in the Partnership Agreement signed by both parties on May 31, 2024, but it remains subject to one resolutive condition, pending a ruling by the Supreme Court of Chile on the appeal filed by Tianqi Chile, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company.

[Key Step in Chile's National Lithium Strategy: Codelco-SQM Joint Venture Faces Audit and Shareholder Scrutiny] After the enterprise obtained approvals from multiple domestic and overseas regulators, its request for approval submitted to the Comptroller General represents the final step to finalise the agreement. Codelco and SQM plan to establish a joint venture in the Atacama Salt Flat to produce lithium, as part of President Gabriel Boric's strategy to expand state control over the lithium industry and increase production. Legislators have questioned why the agreement was reached through direct negotiations rather than a public tender, and raised concerns about matters such as Codelco choosing to partner with SQM, which has pending litigation with tax authorities. SQM declined to comment on the audit matters. Codelco stated in a declaration that it will "advance the process with full transparency and professionalism," and the audit will help "reaffirm the integrity of the agreement with SQM." The statement noted: "The audit will confirm the fairness, rigor, and reasonableness of the process, particularly including the appointment and work of the financial advisor Morgan Stanley, which played a key role in structuring the partnership." Codelco said it is still awaiting approval from the Comptroller General's Office for the salt flat asset lease agreement between the national development agency Corfo and its subsidiary, which commenced in September. Tianqi Lithium, a major investor in SQM, previously attempted to block the transaction in Chilean courts, arguing the agreement should require shareholder approval, but has not succeeded so far. Source: mining.com [Zinnwald Lithium plc Receives Strong Support from the German Federal Government] Zinnwald Lithium plc, which focuses on European lithium resource development and is committed to advancing the integrated Zinnwald lithium project in Germany, recently announced that the German Federal Government has confirmed its support for the project. It noted the project aligns with Germany's strategic raw material priorities and will promote its recognition at the EU level. Previously, the project had already received strong support from the State of Saxony. On December 12, Stefan Wenzel, State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, visited the project site during a political raw materials field trip. He inspected the progress on the ground and discussed pathways to accelerate the feasibility study and approval processes. The parties also explored opportunities arising from the EU's newly introduced Critical Raw Materials Act, which aims to accelerate the financing and permitting processes for critical raw material projects. Wenzel stated: "The German economy relies on stable raw material supplies and secure supply chains; these are fundamental prerequisites for industrial value creation in our country. Growing geopolitical tensions are prompting further joint efforts at the national and EU levels among political and business circles to secure raw material supplies. The National Raw Materials Fund, the Critical Raw Materials Act, and the Resource Action Plan, which includes plans to establish European critical raw materials hubs, will collectively improve the framework conditions for strategic raw material projects. "The Zinnwald project will also benefit from this. In any case, the project convincingly demonstrates that the modern extraction of strategic raw materials in Germany is feasible," further noted Ruhnau. Regarding the ongoing application process under the Critical Raw Materials Act, he pledged that the federal government will actively promote the recognition of the Zinnwald lithium project as a key project under this act. Dr. Andreas Handschuh, State Secretary of Saxony, listed the project as one of the state's long-term goals: "Saxony has a long mining tradition. Building on this tradition and developing existing raw material resources is a wise move and in our interest. Proactive enterprises like Zinnwald Lithium are crucial in this regard. Because developing domestic raw materials not only strengthens Saxony's position as a key business location but also enhances the autonomy and sovereignty of raw material supplies for critical industries in Germany and Europe. In the face of complex geopolitical situations and restrictive trade policies, domestic raw material extraction is more important than ever." Andreas Hill, an official from the Saxon Ministry for Economic Affairs, Labour, Energy, and Climate Protection, added: "Europe, Germany, and Saxony must do everything possible to achieve raw material autonomy. Without stable and predictable access to raw materials, our industrial transformation will stall. We must protect the competitiveness of Saxony as a business location and show enterprises that investments can be realized within a reliable timeframe." "We face significant challenges in the coming years—from industrial restructuring and supply chain risks to geopolitical tensions. Precisely for this reason, we need responsibly developed projects like Zinnwald Lithium: they can fully leverage regional expertise, retain value creation within the state, and make European industry more independent." Zinnwald Company is steadily advancing preparations for the feasibility study and the initiation of environmental and social impact assessments, while also conducting technical and logistical planning to support data-driven decision-making and responsible project development. Source: globalminingreview.com [Altis Mining to Invest 520 Million Canadian Dollars to Acquire Lithium Ore Concession Assets and Expand Portfolio] Altis Mining is betting on a recovery in the lithium market and plans to acquire a lithium ore concession company for 520 million Canadian dollars to expand its asset footprint in the battery metals sector. According to the final agreement announced by both parties on Monday, December 22, Altis plans to acquire all issued common shares and convertible common shares of Lithium Mine Royalty Company at a price of C$9.50 per share. Shareholders can choose to receive either C$9.50 in cash or 0.24 shares of Altis common stock per share. Through this acquisition, Altis will gain a portfolio of royalty interests covering 37 lithium mine projects. None of the interests involve production-sharing agreements, and the project stages span from production to early exploration. Among them, four royalties correspond to producing assets (three commenced production in 2025 and are in the capacity ramp-up or expansion phase), 12 projects have completed economic assessments and are in advanced stages, and an additional three to five assets are expected to commence production between 2026 and 2030. The company stated that the portfolio is geographically concentrated in low-risk regions, primarily in Canada, Australia, and South America, and includes both salt lake brine and hard-rock lithium production, demonstrating diversification. Based on current spot prices, Altis expects these royalty assets to generate annual revenues of $29 million to $43.7 million by 2030. Despite the continued expansion of lithium demand beyond EVs, the LCE price in 2025 fell to multi-year lows, remaining below $9,000 per mt for most of the year. Altis noted that global lithium demand is projected to exceed 1.5 million mt LCE in 2025, and after years of oversupply, the market could face a supply deficit as early as 2026. CEO Brian Dalton emphasized that lithium has become a "mainstream, large-scale mining commodity" and described the acquired portfolio as having "extremely long resource life, significant cost advantages, and low jurisdictional risk." A special shareholders' meeting is expected to be held no later than March 10, 2026. If the transaction is approved, the acquisition is scheduled to be completed in Q1 2026, at which point Lithium Mine Royalty Company's shares will be delisted, and its status as a reporting issuer in Canada will cease. Source:

The year 2025 is about to conclude.