In recent years, the advertised figures for driving range and battery energy density of NEVs have been continuously refreshed. However, many people may not have noticed that such improvements do not entirely stem from breakthroughs in electrochemical systems—the iterations of cathode materials, anode materials, and electrolytes often take years or even longer. The more direct changes have occurred at the structural level within the battery pack. CTM, CTP, CTB, and CTC represent several technology routes with progressively higher levels of battery integration. Their shared logic is simple: reduce intermediate layers and pack the battery more tightly into the auto body. Yet each generation of solutions differs in the trade‑offs among space utilization, manufacturing cost, and ease of repair. I. CTM (Cell to Module): Traditional “Nested Dolls” Approach In the early stages of NEV development, assembly methods for battery packs followed a relatively conservative approach. Battery cells were first assembled into modules, the modules were then arranged into a battery pack, and finally the battery pack was fixed beneath the vehicle floor. Cell→Module→Pack→Auto body thus formed four independent layers. The advantages and disadvantages of this solution are both obvious. The advantage lies in repair convenience—if a single module fails, it can be replaced individually without touching the entire battery pack. At the same time, the module housing provides extra protection for the cells, resulting in relatively mature structural safety. Yet the cost is just as direct: module housings, connectors, and cooling pipes occupy a large amount of space, usually leaving the internal space utilization rate of the battery pack at only about 40%. This meant that for the same volume, the CTM solution could accommodate the fewest cells, limiting the driving range potential. For a long period, CTM was the industry’s default choice because it fit the division‑of‑labor logic of traditional automotive supply chains—battery enterprises supply modules, while automakers are responsible for integration. However, this division of labor also created a structural ceiling: the volumetric utilization rate of the battery pack was difficult to break through. II. CTP (Cell to Pack): Removing the “Middleman” The core change introduced by CTP is eliminating the intermediate module layer, allowing cells to form the battery pack directly; the space utilization rate rose from around 40% to over 70%. Meanwhile, because module housings, connectors, and fasteners were removed, the number of components in the battery pack dropped, and manufacturing costs decreased accordingly. Within the industry, two different technical choices have emerged for the implementation path of CTP. One is the completely module‑free solution represented by BYD’s blade battery. By manufacturing cells into elongated strips and arranging them directly into the battery pack, supported by a honeycomb structure, it not only improves space utilization but also assumes some structural functions. The other is the highly integrated solution represented by CATL’s CTP 3.0 (Qilin battery). It combines cells with multifunctional elastic interlayers into an integrated energy unit and integrates components such as crossbeams, longitudinal beams, cooling plates, and thermal insulation pads, further optimizing the internal layout and thermal management. The Qilin battery achieved a volumetric utilization rate of 72% and a system energy density of 255 Wh/kg. In terms of market penetration, CTP has already secured a dominant mainstream position. Currently, leading domestic NEV manufacturers have launched mass‑produced models equipped with CTP solutions, covering both independent and joint‑venture brands, and spanning a broad price range from entry‑level to high‑end products. At the same time, the market share of the traditional CTM solution has continued to shrink, now retained mainly in some micro vehicles or specific export models. Overall, CTP has become the most prevalent battery integration technology route at this stage. III. CTB and CTC: The Battery Becomes Part of the Auto Body The idea behind CTB (Cell to Body) is to integrate the upper cover of the battery pack with the vehicle floor into a single part. Battery cells are installed directly onto the vehicle floor, eliminating the separate battery pack upper cover. One of the main benefits of this solution is releasing vertical layout space, making the passenger compartment more spacious or creating conditions to lower the vehicle stance. Meanwhile, once the battery pack participates in the body’s load‑bearing, the torsional rigidity of the whole vehicle can increase by more than 70%. BYD’s Seal series and Xiaomi’s Pengcheng series are representative models employing the CTB solution. The torsional rigidity of the Seal body officially announced by BYD reaches 40,500 N·m/°; Xiaomi’s announced CTB battery volumetric efficiency is 77.8%. CTC (Cell to Chassis) goes a step further, integrating the battery system more deeply with the chassis or lower vehicle body and further weakening the structural boundary of the battery pack as an independent assembly. In some solutions, the battery system is also integrated collaboratively with thermal management, electric drive, and high/low‑voltage control modules. Representative examples of this approach are the Tesla Model Y (produced at the Texas factory) and the CTC2.0 Plus solution installed on the Leap Motor C10. The technical goals of CTB and CTC are consistent—exchange structural integration for higher space utilization and body stiffness. The difference between the two routes is mainly reflected in engineering implementation: CTB subtracts elements from the existing body architecture while retaining a relatively independent chassis frame; CTC, on the other hand, treats the chassis and battery as an integrated whole from the very beginning of design, demanding a higher level of upfront vehicle platform definition. From market data, although CTB and CTC are still at a relatively early stage of penetrating from the high‑end to the mass market, this technology route has already begun to extend down to lower price brackets. The 2026 MG4 applies CTB technology to the 60,000–100,000 yuan price range, indicating that structural integration solutions are no longer exclusive configurations for high‑end models. Concerns Regarding Structural Integration Solutions The most direct challenge faced by CTB and CTC structural integration solutions is repair economy. Under the traditional CTM approach, some faults could be repaired by replacing the module. Once CTP eliminated modules, the battery pack can usually still be removed as an independent assembly, but the smallest unit for on‑site repair and the difficulty of repair depend on the specific structure. CTB and CTC further increase the degree of integration between the battery and the auto body, which may raise the difficulty of disassembly, detection, and damage assessment. According to estimates by industry institutions, the single‑repair cost of CTB/CTC solutions is 3 to 5 times that of CTP solutions for equivalent damage. This poses new challenges for insurance companies, repair systems, and used‑car residual‑value management. Currently, some automakers, when promoting CTB solutions, simultaneously roll out supporting services such as “battery‑body integrated warranty” or “chassis armor” to alleviate consumer concerns, but a standardized solution at the industry level has yet to be formed. In addition, CTB and CTC solutions impose significantly higher requirements on vehicle manufacturing precision and after‑sales detection equipment. Once the battery is integrated with the auto body, the disassembly process involves the removal and installation of body structural components. The repair equipment and technical capabilities of traditional 4S stores may need corresponding upgrades, and behind this lies the cost of restructuring the entire after‑sales system. Evolution Direction From CTM to CTP, and then to CTB and CTC, the direction of battery pack integration technology evolution is clear—the fewer the layers, the higher the space efficiency and the stronger the body stiffness. This is an advancement path driven by space efficiency and manufacturing costs. Yet this trend is not a linear acceleration. For CTB and CTC to achieve large‑scale popularization, in addition to breakthroughs in engineering technology, supporting systems such as repair standards, insurance pricing, and used‑car evaluation need to be developed synchronously. Based on current industry data, CTP will maintain its mainstream position, while the penetration rate of CTB/CTC will depend on two variables: the degree of standardization of structural integration solutions, and the speed at which repair costs and the insurance system can adapt. SMM New Energy Industry Research Lithium Battery End‑User Analyst Fu Linqi 18122430020

Executive Summary Australia is a major supplier of feedstock to the Asia-Pacific zinc smelting system, but its supply structure is shifting from dominance by a small number of mature mines to a mix of mine closures, volatility at existing operations and ramp-ups at new projects. Glencore's Mount Isa zinc-lead business includes George Fisher and the nearby Lady Loretta mine, which reached the end of its mine life in late 2025. Meanwhile, Dugald River, McArthur River, Rosebery, Century, Cannington and Golden Grove remain the core of zinc concentrate supply from Australia, while newly commissioned or restarted projects such as Federation, Woodlawn and Endeavor have begun contributing incremental output. Zinc mine supply in Australia fell sharply in 2024 due to extreme weather, difficult underground mining conditions and changes in ore sequencing. It recovered in 2025 as McArthur River returned to normal and Dugald River delivered record production. In H1 2026, Glencore's operations in Australia produced 218 kt of zinc in concentrate, down 54 kt year on year, with roughly 51 kt of the reduction attributable to Lady Loretta's closure. Dugald River produced 87.2 kt of zinc in concentrate over the same period, indicating that the overall decline was driven primarily by the exit of a specific mature mine rather than by simultaneous cuts across all core operations. Supply from Australia should therefore be assessed on three horizons. In the short term, the focus is on wet-season disruptions to railways, ports and vessel schedules. Over the medium term, the key issues are the permanent loss of Lady Loretta, Century's approaching tailings-resource limit around 2027 and Cannington's lower operating rates, alongside the ramp-up of Federation, Woodlawn, Endeavor and the Gossan Valley mining front at Golden Grove. Changes in supply from Australia will affect arrivals in China and spot TCs, but the final assessment must also account for global net mine-supply growth and feedstock demand from smelters in China and overseas. I. Zinc Mine Supply in Australia: Mine Closures and New Capacity Ramp-Ups Australia's main zinc mines are located in Queensland, the Northern Territory, Tasmania, New South Wales and Western Australia. Major existing operations include Glencore's Mount Isa zinc-lead business and McArthur River, MMG's Dugald River and Rosebery, Sibanye-Stillwater's Century, South32's Cannington, and 29Metals' Golden Grove. Newly commissioned or restarted projects such as Federation, Woodlawn and Endeavor mean that supply from Australia is no longer determined solely by Mount Isa and Dugald River. The chart shows that Australia's zinc concentrate production has remained relatively high in recent years, although year-to-year volatility has been significant. In 2024, extreme weather at McArthur River and increasingly complex underground mining conditions at Cannington caused a marked decline in supply. McArthur River's recovery and higher production at Dugald River drove a rebound in 2025, before Lady Loretta's closure weighed on output again in 2026. Supply from Australia is therefore not static; it reflects the combined effects of recoveries, declines and additions across individual mines. Performance among existing assets has diverged markedly. Dugald River produced 183.5 kt of zinc in concentrate in 2025, up 12% year on year and a record annual result. MMG's Rosebery produced approximately 48.6 kt over the same period. Century's tailings reprocessing operation produced about 101 kt of payable zinc in concentrate in 2025, although the existing tailings project is approaching a mine-life milestone around 2027. Cannington produced approximately 44.5 kt of payable zinc in FY2025, with guidance of about 40 kt for FY2026 and 43 kt for FY2027, indicating a relatively stable but lower production profile. Lady Loretta's closure has created a confirmed supply loss. Glencore data show that zinc concentrate production in Australia fell 20% year on year in H1 2026, with most of the decline attributable to the mine reaching the end of its life in late 2025. Looking ahead to 2027–2030, supply from Australia will be shaped by offsets between losses and additions. Century faces the gradual depletion of its tailings resource, while Cannington is constrained by more complex underground mining conditions. On the upside, Federation continues to ramp up, Woodlawn has returned to stable production, the Gossan Valley mining front at Golden Grove is expected to deliver first ore in H2 2026, and Endeavor's restart will add supply. Australia's medium-term supply outlook is therefore not a one-way contraction, but rather a period in which retiring mines hand over to new sources of production. II. China's Imports from Australia: Monthly Volatility Does Not Necessarily Signal Mine-Supply Cuts The chart shows that China's imports of zinc concentrate from Australia are highly seasonal and sensitive to shipment schedules. A monthly decline may reflect lower mine output, but it may also result from rail disruptions, delayed port loading, ocean transit times, customs-clearance timing or changes in smelter procurement. A subsequent spike may simply represent delayed cargoes arriving in a later month. Import data should therefore be assessed against at least three sets of information: the gap between miners' production and sales, operating conditions on railways and at ports in northern Australia, and arrival patterns at China's major ports. The low readings in 2024 should not automatically be equated with a lasting production decline. Likewise, the 2026 trend should be assessed primarily on the basis of cumulative imports rather than exaggerated moves in individual months. III. Why Does the Wet Season Affect Zinc Concentrate Exports from Australia? The wet season in northern Australia typically runs from October to April, while the tropical cyclone season lasts from November to April. The 2025–2026 northern wet season was the seventh-wettest on record, with average rainfall of about 684 mm, 44% above the long-term average. Eleven tropical cyclones occurred in the region surrounding Australia during the season. Many zinc mines in Australia are located inland, requiring concentrate to be transported over long distances to port. For example, the Mount Isa mining complex relies on rail links to the Port of Townsville; McArthur River ships through the Bing Bong loading facility; and Century is connected by slurry pipeline to the Port of Karumba. Zinc concentrate from Australia is shipped not only to China but also to South Korea and other overseas smelters. Weather disruptions therefore first affect individual transport corridors before feeding through to the Asia-Pacific spot market. Heavy rainfall and flooding generally affect the market through the following chain: Flooding or cyclones → rail and road disruptions → delayed port loading and vessel schedules → inventory accumulation at mines → delayed and lower arrivals in China In Q1 2026, Dugald River still produced 41.1 kt of zinc concentrate despite flooding and rail disruptions. However, logistics constraints caused concentrate sales to fall short of production, leaving some inventory temporarily stockpiled at the mine. This shows that extreme weather often affects transportation and shipment timing rather than directly impairing mine capacity. Once rail and port operations resume, accumulated concentrate may be shipped in a concentrated wave, allowing China's imports to rebound. Flood impacts are therefore usually temporary and should not automatically be treated as a permanent loss of mine supply from Australia. IV. Why Do Changes in Supply from Australia Affect TCs? Zinc concentrate treatment charges (TCs) are fees paid by miners or concentrate sellers to smelters for processing. They essentially reflect the balance between concentrate supply and smelter demand over a given period. Changes in mine supply and logistics in Australia can alter regional spot-market tightness, but the direction of TCs is not determined by any single country. In general: Ample zinc concentrate supply gives smelters more feedstock options and generally pushes TCs higher; Tight zinc concentrate supply intensifies competition for feedstock and generally pushes TCs lower. Australia is an important source of zinc concentrate for the Asia-Pacific region and the global market. When shipments from Australia are delayed and arrivals in China decline while domestic smelters maintain strong feedstock demand, competition for spot concentrate may intensify and spot TCs may come under short-term pressure. If delayed cargoes subsequently arrive in a concentrated wave, or incremental supply from other regions becomes available in time, the impact may dissipate relatively quickly. At the global mine-supply level, the outlook for 2026 is not a one-way contraction. Kipushi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo produced 70.2 kt of contained zinc in concentrate in Q2, marking a seventh consecutive quarter-on-quarter increase. In Australia, Woodlawn returned to stable production, Federation continued to ramp up and Endeavor's restart added new supply. These gains are being offset by the closure of Lady Loretta, Antamina's shift to a copper-rich, zinc-poor ore sequence, feedstock-blending constraints at Kazzinc and the potential depletion of Century's tailings resource around 2027. Global mine supply is therefore increasingly characterised by simultaneous growth at new mines and declines at mature assets. TC assessments should therefore focus on whether annual net additions are sufficient to offset losses, as well as changes in smelter operating rates in China and overseas. In the short term, the key variables are rail and port conditions in Australia and arrivals in China. Over the medium term, additions from Kipushi, Woodlawn and Federation should be weighed against reductions at Lady Loretta, Antamina and Century. Only by assessing the global mine balance alongside smelter demand can the market determine whether pressure on TCs is temporary or structural. Conclusion Australia's zinc mine supply is moving through a handover between mature and emerging assets. Lady Loretta's closure represents a confirmed loss, while established operations such as Mount Isa's zinc-lead business and McArthur River are expected to focus on stable production. Dugald River remains resilient, and Rosebery, Century, Cannington and Golden Grove continue to underpin existing supply. Meanwhile, newly commissioned and restarted projects are beginning to add incremental tonnes. In the short term, the wet season and flooding mainly affect the timing of China's imports through disruptions to railways, ports and vessel schedules, rather than causing permanent capacity losses. Over the medium term, supply from Australia in 2027–2030 will depend on the balance between potential declines—such as the depletion of Century's resource and Cannington's lower operating rates—and growth from the ramp-up of Federation, Woodlawn, Endeavor and the Gossan Valley mining front at Golden Grove. For TCs, fluctuations in supply from Australia can affect the Asia-Pacific spot market but cannot by themselves determine the long-term global zinc concentrate balance. The market should track mine production and sales in Australia, logistics in northern Australia, China's cumulative imports, developments at overseas mines such as Kipushi, Antamina and Kazzinc, and smelter operating rates in China and overseas. Only if global net mine-supply growth remains insufficient while smelter demand stays high will supply losses in Australia translate into sustained downward pressure on TCs.

In recent years, the official figures for NEV driving range and battery energy density have been continuously refreshed. However, many may not realize that these improvements do not entirely stem from breakthroughs in electrochemical systems—iterations in cathode materials, anode materials, and electrolytes often take years. More direct changes have occurred at the structural level inside battery packs. CTM, CTP, CTB, and CTC represent several technological routes where battery integration levels continue to increase. Their common logic is simple: reduce intermediate layers to "stuff" the battery more tightly into the auto body. But the trade-offs between space utilization, manufacturing cost, and repairability vary from one generation to the next. 1. CTM (Cell to Module): The Traditional "Layered Doll" Approach In the early stages of NEV development, battery pack assembly followed a relatively conservative approach. Battery cells were first assembled into modules, the modules were then arranged into a battery pack, and finally, the battery pack was fixed under the vehicle floor. Battery cell → module → battery pack → auto body formed four independent layers. The pros and cons of this solution were clear. The advantage was repair convenience—a faulty module could be replaced individually without touching the entire battery pack. Simultaneously, the module casing provided additional protection for the cells, leading to relatively mature structural safety. But the cost was just as direct: module casings, connectors, and cooling pipes took up significant space, resulting in a space utilization rate of only about 40% inside the battery pack. This meant that, for the same volume, the CTM solution could hold the fewest battery cells, limiting its driving range potential. CTM was the industry's default choice for a long time because it aligned with the traditional automotive supply chain's division of labor—battery enterprises supplied modules, and automakers handled integration. But this division also created a structural ceiling: the volumetric utilization rate of the battery pack was difficult to break through. 2. CTP (Cell to Pack): Eliminating the "Middleman" The core modification in CTP was skipping the module layer, allowing cells to directly form the battery pack; space utilization improved from around 40% to over 70%. Simultaneously, by reducing module casings, connectors, and fasteners, the number of battery pack parts decreased, leading to lower manufacturing costs. Two different technological choices for CTP implementation existed in the industry. One was the thoroughly module-free solution represented by BYD's blade battery. By shaping cells into long strips and arranging them directly into the battery pack, supported by a honeycomb-like structure, it enhanced space utilization while also assuming some structural functions. The other was the highly integrated solution represented by CATL's CTP 3.0 (Qilin battery). It combined cells with multi-functional elastic interlayers into integrated energy units and integrated components like crossbeams, longitudinal beams, water-cooling plates, and thermal pads to further optimize internal layout and thermal management. The Qilin battery achieved a volumetric utilization rate of 72% and a system energy density of 255 Wh/kg. From a market penetration perspective, CTP has achieved a dominant mainstream position. Mainstream NEV manufacturers in China have launched mass-produced car models equipped with CTP solutions, ranging from independent brands to joint ventures, covering a broad price range from entry-level to high-end products. Meanwhile, the market share of traditional CTM solutions continues to shrink, currently remaining only in some micro-vehicles or specific export models. Overall, CTP has become the most prevalent battery integration technology route at the current stage. 3. CTB and CTC: The Battery Becomes Part of the Auto Body The concept behind CTB (Cell to Body) is to merge the battery pack's top cover with the vehicle floor. Cells are installed directly onto the vehicle floor, eliminating the need for a separate battery pack top cover. One of the main benefits of this solution is freeing up vertical space, allowing for a more spacious cabin or creating conditions to lower the vehicle's stance. Simultaneously, when the battery pack participates in bearing vehicle loads, torsional stiffness can increase by over 70%. BYD's Seal series and Xiaomi's Pengcheng series are representative models featuring CTB solutions. BYD officially announced that the Seal's body torsional stiffness reached 40,500 N·m/°. Xiaomi Auto announced a CTB battery volumetric efficiency of 77.8%. CTC (Cell to Chassis) goes a step further, integrating the battery system more deeply with the chassis or underbody, further blurring the structural boundary of the battery pack as an independent assembly. In some solutions, the battery system is also integrated collaboratively with thermal management, electric drive, and high/low-voltage control modules. Representative examples of this approach include the Tesla Model Y (Texas factory version) and the Leapmotor C10 equipped with the CTC 2.0 Plus solution. The technical goals of CTB and CTC are aligned—exchanging space utilization and body stiffness through structural integration. The difference between the two routes is more apparent in engineering implementation: CTB simplifies on top of the existing body architecture, retaining a relatively independent chassis frame; CTC treats the chassis and battery as a single whole from the outset, placing higher demands on the vehicle platform's upfront definition. Market data indicates that while CTB and CTC are still in the relatively early stages of penetrating from the high-end to the mass market, this technological route has begun to filter down to lower price brackets. The 2026 MG4 brought CTB technology down to the price range of 60,000 to 100,000 yuan, showing that structural integration solutions are no longer exclusive to high-end car models. Concerns Over Structural Integration Solutions The most direct challenge facing CTB and CTC structural integration solutions is repair economics. In traditional CTM solutions, some faults could be repaired by replacing the module. After CTP eliminated modules, the battery pack could usually still be removed as an independent assembly, but the smallest repairable unit and repair difficulty on-site depended on the specific structure. CTB and CTC, however, further increase the degree of integration between the battery and auto body, potentially increasing the difficulty of disassembly, detection, and damage assessment. According to industry estimates, the single-occurrence repair cost for a CTB/CTC solution is 3 to 5 times that of a CTP solution under the same damage conditions. This poses new challenges for insurance companies, the repair system, and the residual value management of used cars. Currently, some automakers, when promoting CTB solutions, simultaneously launch supporting services like "battery-body integrated warranty" or "chassis armor" to alleviate consumer concerns, but this issue has not yet formed a standardized solution at the industry level. Additionally, CTB and CTC solutions demand significantly higher vehicle manufacturing precision and after-sales detection equipment. Once the battery is integrated with the body, the removal process involves disassembling and reassembling structural body parts, requiring potential upgrades to traditional 4S shops' repair equipment and technical capabilities, involving the restructuring costs of the entire after-sales system. Evolutionary Direction From CTM to CTP, and then to CTB and CTC, the evolutionary direction of battery pack integration technology is clear—fewer layers lead to higher space efficiency and greater body stiffness. This is a forward path driven by space efficiency and manufacturing costs. But this trend is not a linear acceleration. For CTB and CTC to achieve large-scale adoption, besides engineering breakthroughs, simultaneous progress is needed in supporting systems like repair standards, insurance pricing, and used car evaluation. Based on current industry data, CTP will continue to hold its mainstream position, while the penetration rate of CTB/CTC will depend on two variables: the degree of standardization in structural integration solutions and the pace at which repair costs and insurance systems adapt.

【Imported Zinc Concentrate Market】The import arbitrage for zinc concentrate has deteriorated further amid a widening gap between domestic and overseas zinc prices, reducing the economic attractiveness of imported material. Smelters continue to prioritize domestic concentrate procurement. Spot trading activity for imported zinc concentrate remained relatively limited this week, while treatment charges (TCs) continued to hover at low levels.

[Frequent disruptions in China’s supply side; TCs fell in many regions of China in August]: On a weekly basis, the SMM Zn50 domestic weekly average TC fell 400 yuan/mt Zn WoW to -1,150 yuan/mt Zn, and the SMM Imported Zinc Concentrate Index fell $3.5/dmt WoW to -$98.13/dmt. On a monthly basis, the SMM Imported Zinc Concentrate Index fell $17.01/dmt MoM in July to -$89.81/dmt....

SHFE/LME zinc price ratio pulled back to around 6.8 and consolidated: This week, the ratio pulled back to around 6.8 and consolidated, while the zinc ingot import window closed. Outside China, the US Fed held steady at its July FOMC meeting, while US GDP and PCE data came in below expectations, causing the US dollar index to pull back and boost base metals. Meanwhile, LME zinc inventory fell to around 100,000 mt, and LME zinc remained relatively strong.

On July 31, the SMM Imported Copper Concentrate Index (weekly) was reported at -$159.37/dmt, down $4.61/dmt from the previous -$154.76/dmt. In July, the SMM Imported Copper Concentrate Index (monthly) was -$148.28/dmt, down $26.84/dmt from June's -$121.44/dmt. The payable indicator for 20%-grade domestic ore was reported at 98.5%-99.5%, up 0.25% from the prior period. This week, the copper concentrates spot market saw more index-based deals, with some mines conducting tenders. In terms of spot deals, there were five index-deducted transactions this week, two of which used only the SMM index as a benchmark. A trader sold 10,000 mt of clean ore at the SMM index minus $20/dmt to a smelter for September shipment, QP: M+1/M+5; a trader sold 10,000 mt of Sierra Gorda at the index minus $23/dmt to a smelter for September shipment, QP: M+1/M+5; a trader sold 10,000 mt of South American clean ore at the SMM and FM index flat minus $20/dmt to a smelter for September shipment, QP: M+1/M+5. There were market rumors that a trader sold 20,000 mt of Q4 clean ore at the index minus $20 to a smelter, of which 10,000 mt of Carmen ore with silver at 20g was priced at 90%. Also, rumors that a trader sold 20,000-30,000 mt of Q4 cargoes at the index minus $25/dmt. In terms of mine tenders, the results of a large mine's tender were out, with market rumors that 20,000 mt of HVC was traded on the smelter side at -$220/dmt for September-October shipment, QP: M+0/M+4 (buyer's option); 20,000 mt of HVC was traded on the trader side at around -$275/dmt for September-October shipment, QP: M+0/M+4 (buyer's option); additionally, 10,000 mt of QB was traded on the trader side at prices ranging from -$275/dmt to -$280/dmt for October shipment, QP: M+0/M+4 (buyer's option). Furthermore, 10,000 mt of BISHA and around 2,000 mt of Black Mountain for September-October shipment were tendered, with the results currently unknown. Overall, this week's spot deals continued to be mainly in the index-minus format, with deductions remaining at deep levels; mine tender prices fell further. Smelters maintained restocking demand but remained relatively limited in accepting deeply negative-priced cargoes. On July 29, First Quantum Minerals said it was accelerating preparations to restart the Cobre Panama copper mine in Panama, having already begun processing stockpiled ore in advance and added around 1,000 jobs. The company stated that formal negotiations with the Panamanian government over the future arrangements of the mine are gradually approaching. In May this year, the company started the first of three grinding lines, processing approximately 2.1 million mt of stockpiled ore in Q2 and producing 3,216 mt of copper concentrates. Cobre Panama currently has about 38 million mt of stockpiled ore, expected to recover approximately 70,000 mt of copper, supporting about 12 months of production at the current processing pace. The company maintained its 2026 copper production guidance of 30,000 to 40,000 mt, all from stockpiled ore processing. Meanwhile, the number of mine employees increased from about 2,350 in early April to approximately 3,000 at end-June, to support equipment commissioning, maintenance, and operational preparations. Over half of the new hires came from communities near the mine site, with female employees accounting for about 17% of new recruits. Currently, the Panamanian government is studying various options for restarting the mine, including establishing a state-owned mining company to jointly operate the mine with First Quantum, or a model where First Quantum holds a 60% to 65% interest and the government holds the remainder. The company had previously suspended the $20 billion international arbitration against the Panamanian government, creating conditions for continued negotiations between the two parties. On July 29, Glencore released its H1 2026 production report, showing that its own-sourced copper production in H1 was 397,000 mt, up 15% YoY from 343,900 mt. The production growth was mainly driven by increased mined volumes and improved feed grades in African copper operations, along with higher grades at the Antamina copper mine in Peru, partially offset by the planned closure of the Mount Isa copper mine in Australia in July 2025. Glencore maintained its 2026 own-sourced copper production guidance of 810,000 to 870,000 mt, with approximately 53% of annual copper production expected to be released in H2. The company stated that ore recovery rates and mining performance at the Collahuasi copper mine are expected to improve in H2, supporting a QoQ increase in copper production. Furthermore, although Glencore completed the sale of the Kidd Mine on June 1, reducing annual copper production by about 11,000 mt, the company has not lowered its full-year guidance. On July 28, Rio Tinto announced its H1 2026 results, with underlying earnings reaching $6.85 billion, up 43% YoY, the highest level for the same period in nearly four years. Within this, the copper and aluminum businesses, driven by demand from electrification, artificial intelligence, and the energy transition, together contributed about 56% of profit, surpassing the iron ore business for the first time to become the company's primary earnings driver. By business, copper EBITDA surged 84% YoY to $5.7 billion; iron ore EBITDA was $6.8 billion, down 1% YoY. The company stated that copper production growth and improved production efficiency in H1 were key drivers of earnings growth, while also benefiting from higher copper prices. As of July 31, 2026, SMM 11-port copper concentrates inventory stood at 664,400 mt in physical content, up 2,900 mt in physical content from July 24. The increases mainly came from Jinzhou Port and Qingdao Port, up 30,000 mt and 10,000 mt WoW, respectively; the decreases mainly came from Nanjing Port and Qinzhou Port, down 10,000 mt and 19,000 mt WoW, respectively. Overall inventory was basically flat.

This week, the weekly Pb50 domestic TC was flat at 150 yuan/mt Pb, and the weekly Pb60 imported TC was flat at -$170/dmt. During the week, enterprises were mainly negotiating TCs for the next month. Based on current negotiations, concentrates rich in associated metals are expected to edge down, while standard concentrates are expected to see relatively small changes. This is mainly because profits from minor metals such as sulphuric acid and silver have become the primary support for ore-derived lead smelting profits. During the week, it was heard that lead concentrates containing silver and antimony with separate valuation were transacted at a TC of -450 yuan/mt Pb. Meanwhile, some lead concentrates were sold together with zinc concentrates, with the lead concentrates containing copper, gold, and silver, settling at a TC of -200 yuan/mt Pb. Some high-silver concentrates with a small amount of unvalued copper were transacted at a TC price of -3,700 yuan/mt Pb. In July, some domestic mines reduced or halted production due to safety and environmental protection inspections and the rainy season. Production is expected to recover in August, while domestic ore-derived lead smelters are anticipated to undergo maintenance in late August. It is expected that there will be limited room for further declines in domestic lead concentrate TCs in August. On the imported concentrates side, port lead concentrate inventory stood at a relatively high level of over 30,000 mt, and with the ratio at low levels, mainstream transaction prices for imported concentrates remained unchanged, mainly steady.

As of July 28, LME zinc inventories (including off-warrant stocks) had fallen to 119,600 mt, down by approximately 45,000 mt from mid-June. As overseas inventories continued to decline, the LME zinc market structure shifted from contango to backwardation, with the backwardation widening further. By July 28, the LME zinc cash-to-3M spread had strengthened to US$61.09/mt.

[Zinc Ingot Export Window Opening? A Nearly 20-Year Rare Opportunity Reemerges!] As of July 28, LME zinc inventory (including non-registered warrants) had pulled back to 101,800 mt, down about 20,000 mt from mid-June. Amid continued destocking outside China, the LME zinc market structure shifted from contango to backwardation, and the backwardation structure kept widening. On July 28, the LME zinc Cash-3M spread strengthened to $61.09/mt. In stark contrast, zinc consumption in China remained in the traditional off-season, with SMM-reported social inventory of zinc ingots across seven domestic markets holding steady at a high level of around 260,000 mt. The supply-demand patterns in China and overseas clearly diverged, and the SHFE/LME zinc price ratio weakened all the way. Against this backdrop, the long-dormant export window for Chinese zinc ingots reappeared, and discussions in the market about reverse arbitrage involving "buying SHFE zinc, selling LME zinc" noticeably heated up...