Recently, geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East has emerged, bringing a certain degree of impact to the overall overseas PV market. Below, we provide an in-depth analysis of the current Middle East PV market from various perspectives:

1. Procurement Conditions The purchaser of this procurement project, the Beiying Mine High Manganese Steel Castings and Other Items Project (BG2026020036) (BGBCGFHGXHD260228270076), is the Equipment Spare Parts Procurement Department of the Procurement Center of Bensteel Group Sheets & Plates Co., Ltd. The project funds are self-raised, and the project has met the procurement conditions. Now, a public request for quotation and comparison is being conducted. 2. Project Overview and Procurement Scope 2.1 Project Name: Beiying Mine High Manganese Steel Castings and Other Items Project (BG2026020036) 2.2 Alternative procurement method in case of procurement failure: Negotiated procurement 2.3 The procurement content, scope, and scale of this project are detailed in the attachment "Material List Attachment.pdf". 3. Bidder Qualification Requirements 3.1 Joint bidding is not allowed for this procurement. 3.2 This procurement requires bidders to meet the following qualification requirements: (1) Production-oriented business license 3.3 This procurement requires bidders to meet the following registered capital requirements: Production-oriented registered capital: 500 (10,000 yuan) or more 3.4 This procurement requires bidders to meet the following performance requirements: See the attachment for details. 3.5 This procurement requires bidders to meet the following capability requirements, financial requirements, and other requirements: Financial requirements: See the attachment for details. Capability requirements: See the attachment for details. Other requirements: See the attachment for details. 3.6 For projects that must be tendered according to the law, bids from discredited persons subject to enforcement are invalid. 4. Obtaining Procurement Documents 4.1 Interested bidders are requested to log in to the Ansteel Smart Tender and Bid Platform at http://bid.ansteel.cn from 08:00 on March 1, 2026, to 08:00 on March 10, 2026 (Beijing Time, the same hereinafter) to download the electronic procurement documents. Click to view tender details:

[smm silicon-based pv morning meeting summary: upstream silicon market prices mostly stable over the weekend downstream module quotes show an upward trend] over the weekend, n-type recharging polysilicon quotes were 48-56 yuan/kg, the n-type polysilicon price index was 51.4 yuan/kg, and granular polysilicon quotes were 49-51 yuan/kg. polysilicon prices remained temporarily stable over the weekend. previously, the market sentiment was bearish, with limited transactions this weekend. the market is focusing on order signing conditions in early march, as well as the trend of silver prices amid international situations.

Over the past few days, the Indonesian nickel market has reacted to the government’s announcement of a restricted 2026 RKAB production quota, set at approximately 260–270 million tons. This reduction has sent shockwaves through the industry, sparking widespread concern among both operational and upcoming smelters. Stakeholders are increasingly worried that these tightened supply levels will be insufficient to sustain their long-term production requirements. For the first one, The Indonesian Nickel Miners Association (APNI) has stated that the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) has agreed to consider revisions to the 2026 Work Plan and Budget (RKAB) starting in July. It is believed that the RKAB revisions could increase nickel production quotas by 25% to 30%. According to APNI, the domestic smelter demand based on the capacity is around 380-400 million tons, With the existing RKAB quota at 270 million tons and projected imports from the Philippines at 23 million tons, this 30% adjustment is critical to meeting the national ore deficit. This potential for more quota provides some relief to the market, but there is a second, more pressing issue to consider Another media also stated that The Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) has set a conservative nickel ore production target of 209.08 million tons for 2026, a figure notably lower than the approved RKAB quota of 260–270 million tons. According to Siti Sumilah Rita Susilawati of the Directorate General of Minerals and Coal, this strategic reduction is intended to preserve national reserves and stabilize global commodity prices As a result, the sudden perception of even deeper quota cuts has fueled confusion across the Indonesian market, which might further intensifying the pressure from already spiking nickel ore prices. I. Indonesia’s Calculated Nickel Ore Demand in 2026 According to SMM’s latest calculations, the total nickel ore requirement for 2026, which includes the demand from NPI, FeNi, Nickel Matte, and MHP, is estimated at approximately 334 million tons, based on the production estimates of smelter's current condition. This sharp increase is primarily driven by the rapid expansion of MHP production, which utilizes higher volumes of limonite ore. This surge in consumption has intensified the pressure on smelters to secure significantly higher mining quotas. II. Current Update and Understanding The Quota Revision? According to current understanding from the Regulation of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Number 17 of 2025, citing the 11 th Article Regarding the Amendment of Work Approved Quotas in ESDM, it is stated that: Article 11 (1) Holders of an IUP (Mining Business License) for the Exploration stage, holders of an IUPK (Special Mining Business License) for the Exploration stage, holders of an IUP for the Production Operation stage, holders of an IUPK for the Production Operation stage, or holders of an IUPK as a Continuation of Contract/Agreement Operations may submit one (1) application for an amendment to the Exploration stage RKAB or the Production Operation stage RKAB in each current year. (2) The application for the RKAB Amendment as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted after the holders of the Exploration stage IUP, Exploration stage IUPK, Production Operation stage IUP, Production Operation stage IUPK, or IUPK as a Continuation of Contract/Agreement Operations have submitted periodic reports up to the second quarter or no later than July 31st of the current year. SMM observes that RKAB revisions and amendments are standard procedure, as seen in both 2024 and 2025. This year, however, the submission window for revisions is expected to open after June, with a final deadline of July 31st. While the ESDM has not clarified whether the 260–270 million ton target already accounts for these mid-year adjustments, it remains highly likely that these revisions will be sufficient to meet domestic smelter demand. Another Potential Cuts? According to SMM’s further communication with ESDM, the predicted quota for 2026 still remains on 260-270 million tons estimate. Since the further production cuts rumor by ESDM is not in an official setting announcement, it is hereby confirmed that the quota approved of 2026 will not be lower than ESDM’s initial estimate of 260-270 million tons. From SMM's understanding, the target number to be lower than the quota is merely just an estimate of the production target, not necessarily reflecting the actual production numbers. III. Nickel Ore Supply and Demand Given the government’s push to tighten annual quotas, SMM expects this year’s revisions to land at approximately 20%, a more conservative number. Furthermore, nickel ore imports from the Philippines are unlikely to see significant growth compared to 2025, with estimates holding at approximately 19 million tons. This stagnant growth is due to the heavy concentration of Philippine exports to China, coupled with limited domestic mining capacity and a lack of new mining companies . After factoring in import volumes from the Philippines, the nickel ore market is likely to remain in a tight supply-demand balance, especially with potential hurdles like the rainy season slowing down mining operations. Nonetheless, this scenario is much more realistic than the alternative: a massive 50+ million ton deficit that would occur if the total quota were strictly capped at 270 million tons. IV. Conclusion Overall, the signal for significant quota cuts at the start of the year has already triggered a sharp rally in nickel ore prices, which could be seen from the substantial rise in premiums, largely driven by quota reductions at major mining companies and persistent uncertainty among small-to-mid-scale operators. Looking ahead, if the government maintains these restricted levels and fails to approve adequate supplemental quotas, domestic ore prices are poised for further upward momentum, potentially intensifying the cost burden on the downstream smelting sector.

So far, the FOB price of Indonesian MHP nickel is $15,658/mt Ni, and the FOB price of Indonesian MHP cobalt is $49,660/mt Co. The MHP payables (against SMM battery-grade nickel sulphate index) are 88-89, and the payable indicator for MHP cobalt element (against SMM refined cobalt (Rotterdam warehouse)) is 91. The FOB price of Indonesian high-grade nickel matte is $16,021/mt Ni.

February 2026 proved to be a pivotal month of challenge and adjustment for the global stainless steel market. Driven by the compounding pressures of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), intensifying geopolitical trade friction, significantly tightened raw material quotas, and sudden supply chain disruptions, the market navigated a complex landscape.

On February 26, 2026, the European Commission announced its final decision on the first anti-dumping sunset review of steel road wheels originating from China. If the current anti-dumping measures were to be lifted, the dumping of the products in question would continue or recur and cause injury to the EU industry. Therefore, it was decided to maintain the anti-dumping duties on the Chinese products: Xingmin Intelligent Transportation Systems Co., Ltd., Tangshan Xingmin Wheels Co., Ltd., Xianning Xingmin Wheels Co., Ltd., and other cooperating enterprises (see the annex to the original announcement for details) will all be subject to a rate of 50.3%, while other companies will face a rate of 66.4%. The measures took effect the day after the announcement. The EU CN (Combined Nomenclature) codes for the products under investigation are ex 8708 70 10, ex 8708 70 99, and ex 8716 90 90 (TARIC codes are 870870 10 80, 8708 70 10 85, 8708 70 99 20, 8708 70 99 80, 8716 90 90 95, and 8716 90 90 97). The period of the dumping investigation for this sunset review was from January 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024, and the period for the analysis of injury to the industry was from January 1, 2021, to the end of the dumping investigation period. The announcement took effect the day after its publication. On February 15, 2019, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigation into steel road wheels originating from China. On March 4, 2020, the European Commission made its final determination on the anti-dumping investigation of steel road wheels from China. On March 3, 2025, the European Commission launched the first anti-dumping sunset review investigation into steel road wheels from China. (Compiled from: European Commission website) Original text: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600428

In times of peace, oil and gas are cost variables; in a war context, traditional energy becomes a security variable. The escalation of conflict in the Middle East at the end of February led to a high opening for oil prices on the first trading day of March. During peacetime, energy prices fluctuate around the supply-demand gap, with the market focusing on production, inventory, and cost curves. However, in a war environment, the market first trades not on production but on deliverability. Whether key shipping routes are open, whether insurance costs soar, and whether sanctions spread, all quickly translate into risk premiums. As a result, oil prices exhibit high fluctuations, even if actual supply has not significantly decreased, as prices are pushed up by delivery uncertainties. Energy thus transforms from a commodity into a strategic resource. As an analyst in the new energy sector, I believe that this change does not simply benefit new energy. Rising oil prices reinforce the logic of electrification, making EVs and renewable energy more economically attractive. However, the macroeconomic uncertainty brought about by war may also dampen consumer and investment confidence. If high oil prices drive inflation and slow growth, overall demand for cars and industry will slow down, and new energy will not be immune. Therefore, the investment logic for new energy is no longer unidirectional, but depends on the balance between substitution effects and macroeconomic contraction effects. A deeper change lies in the fact that capital is beginning to re-evaluate energy security. The traditional oil and gas system is highly dependent on cross-border transportation and continuous fuel supply, with its vulnerabilities lying in shipping and geopolitics. In contrast, wind and PV do not require continuous fuel input during operation, and energy storage can enhance the stability of the power system, giving new energy strategic value in a war environment. They are not only low-carbon tools but also a path to reducing external dependence. The security attributes of new energy are thus being revalued. However, it must be recognized that this security attribute is not absolute. The manufacturing of new energy is highly dependent on critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, with their mining and processing concentrated and heavily reliant on transportation. If upstream resource policies tighten or logistics are disrupted, risks will also propagate through the industry chain. Therefore, the security of new energy is operational security, not supply security. This means that future investment logic will shift from simply pursuing the lowest cost to focusing on supply chain control capabilities and regional diversification. In a war environment, the allocation of risk premiums by capital changes. Transportation premiums, geopolitical premiums, and supply chain concentration premiums all rise. The volatility of traditional energy intensifies; new energy generation assets gain a security bonus; and critical minerals and midstream processing capabilities become new strategic nodes. Efficiency is no longer the sole criterion, with redundancy and controllability becoming important components of the valuation system. Deglobalization and supply chain restructuring may push up the cost center of the industry, but they also enhance the strategic position of assets. In this context, the value of energy storage and power grid assets stands out. If conflicts persist, the core goal of the energy system will shift from cost optimization to system resilience. Distributed energy, microgrids, and energy storage have insurance-like attributes, and their value becomes more evident in extreme scenarios. Even if high raw material prices increase project costs, an elevated policy priority may still provide long-term support. Over the past five to ten years, the narrative of the energy transition has largely focused on new energy as a tool for decarbonization to ensure sustainable development of the planet. However, geopolitical tensions in the last two to three years have redefined new energy as part of the energy security framework. Within new energy, it is not just the power generation assets that are being repriced, but also energy storage and the power grid. 1) In a war environment, the core issue of the energy system shifts from efficiency to resilience During peacetime, the goal of the energy system is to maximize efficiency: lowest cost, highest utilization rate, and optimal allocation. Cross-border trade and centralized power generation have made the global energy structure highly globalized and scaled. War exposes the vulnerabilities of such a system. Maritime transport routes, natural gas pipelines, tanker insurance, key ports, and large power plants can all become risk nodes. At this point, the system's priority is no longer efficiency but resilience – the ability to maintain basic operational capacity under shocks. Energy storage and the power grid are at the core of a resilient system. 2) Energy storage: from an arbitrage tool to system insurance In normal circumstances, the value of energy storage mainly comes from electricity arbitrage, ancillary services, and peak load regulation, with its return on investment depending on fluctuations in electricity prices and policy subsidies. However, in a wartime context, the value of energy storage is redefined. It is no longer merely an economic optimization tool but a guarantee of power system stability. Energy storage can provide emergency support during fuel supply disruptions or grid shocks, preventing the power system from collapsing due to a single point of failure. This means that energy storage assets have insurance-like attributes. When system risks rise, capital's risk appetite for these assets increases. Even if high raw material prices drive up project costs, there may still be stronger policy support because of the rising strategic value. The valuation logic of energy storage thus transitions from "IRR-driven" to "system safety premium." 3) Power grid: an undervalued strategic hub The impact of war on the energy system often first manifests in the transmission and distribution network. Centralized energy structures rely on a few key periods, and once damaged, the impact is widespread. Therefore, power grid upgrades and digitalization have become the focus of secure investments. Enhancements in smart grids, regional interconnections, grid redundancy, and distributed access capabilities can significantly strengthen the system's resilience to shocks. The investment logic for power grid assets becomes clearer in a wartime context: it is not only infrastructure but also the backbone of national energy security. In the long term, power grid upgrades will be a necessary prerequisite for the expansion of new energy. The fluctuations in new energy generation require more robust transmission, distribution, and dispatching capabilities. When risk environments rise, countries are more inclined to accelerate grid construction to reduce dependence on external energy. 4) Distributed Energy and Microgrids: The Strategic Significance of Decentralization While centralized energy systems are efficient, they are also highly vulnerable. Although distributed PV, community energy storage, and microgrids are relatively small in scale, they possess the capability for independent operation. In a war context, distributed energy has two advantages: first, it reduces the risk of single-point failures; second, it decreases reliance on cross-border fuel transportation. The strategic value of such assets is being re-evaluated in high-risk environments. 5) Deep Changes in Investment Logic The rising value of energy storage and power grids means that new energy investments no longer solely revolve around installation growth and cost reduction, but rather around system security and supply chain control. Key changes include: a. Capital is more focused on localized manufacturing and supply chain diversification; b. The weight of security in investment decisions has increased; c. The cost center may shift upward in stages, but the strategic premium has risen. The valuation system of the new energy industry is transitioning from a growth premium to a strategic premium. What opportunities and risks does geopolitics bring to China's new energy industry? 1) China's Energy Security Structure: From Import Dependence to Electrification Advantage China has long been one of the world's largest crude oil importers, with persistent energy security issues. In a wartime environment, oil price fluctuations and transportation risks increase, directly affecting energy costs and macro expectations. However, unlike before, China has established the most complete new energy manufacturing system globally. The high integration of the PV, wind, energy storage, battery, and EV industry chains gives China a manufacturing and scale advantage during the energy transition. In a war context, this advantage is beginning to translate into security attributes: an increase in electrification means a reduction in dependence on external fuels; an increase in new energy installations means a more resilient energy structure. Thus, China's new energy system has the potential for alternative security. 2) Energy Storage and Power Grid: China's Most Strategic Assets If the war becomes protracted, the core of the energy system will no longer be power generation capacity itself, but system stability. China's layout in energy storage and power grid gives it a relative advantage at this stage. In terms of energy storage, China possesses the world's largest battery manufacturing capacity and cost advantages. Under the logic of energy security, energy storage is no longer solely about economics, but has become an important tool for ensuring the stability and emergency response capability of the power system. At the policy level, there may be an emphasis on increasing the proportion of energy storage in the power system. Regarding the power grid, China has developed the world's largest ultra-high voltage transmission network and grid construction capabilities. The increased redundancy and interconnectivity of the grid help to absorb more new energy installations while enhancing the system's resilience against shocks. In a high-risk environment, investment in the grid may accelerate. This means that, under the security logic, China's energy storage and power grid assets have structural strategic premiums. 3) Critical Minerals and Supply Chain: Advantages and Risks Coexist China has advantages in the new energy manufacturing sector, but still relies on overseas layouts for upstream resources. The supply chains for critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt are highly internationalized, and wars or geopolitical risks may amplify policy and logistics uncertainties. For China's new energy industry chain, the real challenge lies not in the manufacturing end, but in the stability and cost fluctuations of the resource end. The trend of supply chain deglobalization may push up the cost center, compressing profit margins. The core of future competition will shift from scale expansion to resource control capabilities and the diversification of global layouts. 4) New Energy Vehicles: China's Structural Advantages and Short-term Fluctuations The impact of the war environment on new energy vehicles also has a dual nature. On one hand, rising oil prices reinforce the economic advantages of EVs. In a context of high oil prices, the cost advantages of using EVs become even more evident, which is conducive to increasing the penetration rate among end-users. China has the world's largest EV capacity and supply chain system, with scale and cost advantages. On the other hand, high oil prices may suppress consumer confidence through inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty. If the war continues for a long time, global economic growth may slow down, putting overall car demand under pressure. Although new energy vehicles have a substitution logic, they cannot be completely independent of the macro cycle. Therefore, the short-term performance of China's new energy vehicle industry will depend on the relative strength of the substitution effect and macroeconomic drag. 5) Long-term Structure: Re-stratification of Strategic Assets In the era of energy security, the competitiveness of China's new energy system will be more reflected in three aspects: First, manufacturing scale and cost control capabilities; Second, the system support capacity of the power grid and energy storage; Third, the diversification of upstream resources and supply chain layout. War has accelerated the stratification of the global energy system. Traditional energy bears higher fluctuation risks; new energy power generation and power grid assets gain a safety premium; critical minerals become the focal point of geopolitical competition. For China, the new energy industry is no longer just an engine for growth but also a part of the energy security system. The investment logic will shift from pure growth rate and subsidies to strategic position and supply chain stability. Overall, as energy transitions from a cost variable to a security variable, the strategic value of China's new energy system rises, but it also faces higher supply chain risks and global competitive pressures. Energy storage and the power grid are becoming the core of system stability; new energy vehicles benefit under the substitution logic, but one must be wary of macro cycles; critical minerals will determine the cost center and industrial profit margins. In an era where war reshapes the energy order, stability is more important than growth. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le 13916526348

Recycling Industry Events This Week (December. 29-31)

This month, Rio Tinto stated during its earnings conference call that with all its owned projects progressing as planned, the company's lithium production capacity is expected to reach 200,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually by 2028. The increase will primarily stem from the Fenix project, the expansion of Sal de Vida, and the commissioning of the Rincon and Nemaska projects. By that time, total output will exceed three times the 57,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate production achieved in 2025. Rio Tinto previously announced its entry into the ranks of major lithium producers upon acquiring Arcadium, with plans to increase capacity to over 200,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually by 2028. The company has now confirmed its focus on achieving this target, positioning lithium as a “significant” component within its business structure. Expansion Projects: The mechanical portion of the 10,000-ton-per-year expansion at Fenix, one of the Argentine salt lake projects, has been completed, with commissioning progress reaching 60%. The mechanical vapor recompression unit has been put into operation to support the planned first production run. The first production from the expanded capacity remains on track to commence in the second half of 2026. At the new Sal de Vida project in Argentina, with an annual capacity of 15,000 metric tons, the mechanical works have been completed and commissioning is 40% complete. Production is expected to commence in the second half of 2026, projected to increase Rio Tinto's lithium output to 61,000–64,000 metric tons LCE in 2026. Regarding future projects: The Rincon project in Argentina, with an annual capacity of 60,000 metric tons, is progressing smoothly with its initial 3,000-metric-ton-per-year plant. It is expected to reach full capacity by year-end. The 57,000-metric-ton expansion plant has completed commissioning and is currently being started up, with first production planned for 2028. It will reach full production after a three-year ramp-up period. The mine has an estimated 40-year lifespan, with operating costs positioned in the top quartile of the industry cost curve. The Nemaska project in Canada features an integrated lithium hydroxide production line with a designed capacity of 28,000 metric tons per year. The mine's engineering design is complete, with construction progress at 60%. The lithium hydroxide refinery is scheduled to commence commissioning in 2026 and achieve first production in 2028. For the Whabouchi and Galaxy mines, strategic business and capital discipline reviews are underway with Canadian partners to determine the development of one of these mines. A decision is expected in the first half of 2026 to secure an integrated spodumene supply solution for the lithium hydroxide plant by 2028. In Chile, Rio Tinto anticipates closing agreements signed with state-owned mining companies Codelco and Enami in the first half of 2026. Rio Tinto has been selected as the private partner to develop Chile's two largest undeveloped lithium resources, with projects advancing upon agreement completion.