Q1 SHFE Aluminum Price Review (By Stage) January: Market traded on Fed rate-cut expectations, decoupled from fundamentals Fundamentals: Spring Festival low season + demand vacuum + inventory accumulationAluminum prices rose continuously and hit a historical high for the period, squeezing downstream profit margins and weighing on primary aluminum demand.Environmental production restrictions in some regions constrained raw material consumption.Social inventories of primary aluminum kept accumulating. By the end of January, SMM social aluminum ingot inventory rose to 782,000 tonnes, the highest level for the same period in nearly three years. Macroeconomics: The Federal Reserve was in a rate-cut cycle in January. The U.S. dollar weakened notably, and large capital inflows into commodity futures boosted broad commodity prices.Coupled with positive domestic consumption-boosting policies, aluminum prices were well supported. February: Market traded on Fed rate-hold expectations, decoupled from fundamentals Fundamentals: Aluminum prices traded in a weak range.Domestic downstream fabricators sharply reduced purchases due to the Spring Festival holiday, while smelters raised ingot-casting activity, leading to continued accumulation in primary aluminum social inventories.After the holiday, SMM social aluminum ingot inventory climbed to 1.108 million tonnes. High inventory provided little upward support for aluminum prices. Macroeconomics: Diminished U.S. rate-cut expectations drove the DXY stronger. Profit-taking capital outflows triggered a pullback in aluminum prices, reinforcing the weak sideways pattern. March: Market swung between Middle East supply disruptions and demand headwinds Intensive long-short competition drove aluminum prices into a “rally – correction – rebound” volatile structure. Supply side: Frequent overseas production cuts continued to roil the market.Mozal entered maintenance. Qatar Aluminum announced it would halt further cuts and maintain 60% operating rate.Alba Bahrain shut down Lines 1, 2 and 3 under controlled and safe conditions, with market rumors later emerging that Line 4 may also face production cuts or shutdowns.EGA suffered severe facility damage, with the extent still under assessment; the market expects large-scale production cuts or shutdowns.Worsening concerns over global supply shortages became the key driver of periodic aluminum price gains. Escalating Middle East conflicts and safety concerns over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz heightened uncertainty over global primary aluminum supply, injecting sustained geopolitical risk premium and supporting high price levels. Demand side: Rising stagflation fears boosted risk aversion, pressuring aluminum prices to correct and limiting upside. Downside risks in overseas demand became prominent, as downstream fabricators faced multiple constraints:(1) High aluminum prices significantly suppressed purchasing willingness and restrained demand realization;(2) Shortages of natural gas, crude oil and other energy resources forced some fabricators to cut or halt production;(3) Sharply rising freight and smelting costs squeezed downstream margins, further dampening demand indirectly.

[SMM Analysis] Steel Export Review: Geopolitical Conflicts Trigger the Reshaping of the Export Landscape In terms of steel billet exports , the main target market in the first two months remained Indonesia. Part of the cargoes was imported by Chinese-funded or joint-venture rolling mills in Indonesia for further processing and use, thereby avoiding Southeast Asia’s import tariffs on finished steel products, while another part was supplied directly to local projects under construction. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America formed a solid base of exports. In particular, on the African side, Djibouti, as a core transshipment hub, had been handling a large volume of circulating resources. Turkey, meanwhile, saw a wave of concentrated external purchases due to delays in steel scrap vessel schedules and spot-futures price spread arbitrage. In terms of bar exports , the share to Hong Kong, China declined somewhat from the end of last year, while exports to Singapore overtook it. The main reason was that procurement in Singapore was rigidly driven by local public housing renewal and public infrastructure projects, such as the Greater Southern Waterfront, according to construction periods, with actual end-user consumption remaining relatively stable; whereas Hong Kong, China, as a capital and logistics transshipment hub, saw some earlier speculative re-export orders constrained by offshore exchange-rate fluctuations at the beginning of the year and funding borrowing costs. Traders proactively reduced some speculative exposure for financial risk hedging purposes, which led to a decline in transshipment procurement volume. Looking ahead to March , with the full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s semi-finished products export channels were effectively cut off. Chinese steel billet is expected to absorb these additional export orders arising from geopolitical conflict, and traders and steel mills will also accelerate shipments to markets outside China such as Southeast Asia to gain a larger replacement share. Therefore, total steel billet exports still have room to rise. By contrast, Chinese bar exports mainly rely on short-haul regional shipping routes into the inland areas within Asia, and were subject to extremely limited direct impact from the disruption of long-haul Middle East logistics. Therefore, March shipments are expected to remain stable, supported by rigid-demand restocking within the region. Source: SMM, General Administration of Customs Unlike the strong performance of billets, sheets & plates exports in the first two months were unsatisfactory. The cumulative exports of both cold galvanized and hot-rolled products in January and February declined YoY , with the drop in hot-rolled products being more pronounced. However, it should be noted that before the full suspension of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February, logistics channels to the Middle East remained open, which secured a critical delivery window for sheets & plates. Therefore, in terms of HRC exports , Saudi Arabia still firmly ranked first among export destinations with a volume of 348,000 mt , mainly because its large-scale non-oil infrastructure and manufacturing projects in China were still in an intensive construction phase, with strong end-user steel demand, which also prompted local buyers to lock in relatively lower-priced Chinese HRC ahead of shipping disruptions, thereby maintaining its leading position. Pakistan (230,000 mt ), by contrast, saw this mainly due to bottlenecks in domestic supply, creating phased concentrated restocking demand, and according to the SMM survey, most purchases were made by downstream pipe factories. From the perspective of cold galvanized exports , the Southeast Asian market was currently in a stage of rapid development, and macroeconomic expansion had created a huge gap in flat steel products. Thailand in particular (304,000 mt ) was in a concentrated raw material stocking cycle for local downstream auto manufacturers at the beginning of this year, so just-in-time procurement by multiple physical manufacturers directly pushed up local imports. Looking ahead to March , under the dual impact of the Strait of Hormuz blockade and the Ramadan effect, sheets & plates exports to the Middle East core region are expected to face a sharp contraction. SMM shipping data showed that steel arrivals had already declined by more than 900,000 mt. However, under the pressure of elevated destocking in China, this portion of blocked exports is expected to be redirected to Southeast Asia and other alternative markets with “rigid manufacturing demand” for redistribution, thereby offsetting shipment reductions caused by localized logistics disruptions. Therefore, there is no need for excessive concern over total sheets & plates exports in March Source: SMM, General Administration of Customs Copyright and Intellectual Property Statement: This report is independently created or compiled by SMM Information & Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "SMM"), and SMM legally enjoys complete copyright and related intellectual property rights. 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India’s steel market in 2026 is expected to remain balanced, with demand slightly outpacing supply. Domestic consumption will absorb most output, while imports decline overall and exports increase modestly as a balancing mechanism. Supported by strong growth and infrastructure investment, India is transitioning toward a demand-led steel market with solid long-term potential.

Indonesia's new nickel tariffs and Europe's CBAM have sharply raised overseas stainless steel costs, driving Asian mills to hike prices. Downstream demand remains mixed: Japan and South Korea are resilient, while the Taiwan, China region faces pressure. Wary of rapid price spikes, buyers are limiting purchases to rigid demand. The market will remain cautious until tariff details and actual demand are validated.

The gold price has undergone a sharp correction since its January high, unsettling many investors. The price decline of more than $1,000 per ounce appears at first glance to represent a break in the previous uptrend. However, according to analysts at WisdomTree, this movement reflects less a fundamental change in the macroeconomic situation than a combination of position adjustments, liquidity needs, and short-term market pressure.

Concluding our series, we shift focus to 2026's emerging NdFeB growth drivers: robotics, low-altitude economy, and electric two-wheelers. While viewed as the "second growth curve," we analyze their actual demand support amidst current macro and industry cycles to determine if they can offset traditional sector slowdowns.

Next week, due to the Qingming Festival in the Chinese market, SHFE will not conduct night session trading on the evening of April 3; outside China, due to Good Friday, exchanges including the LME will be closed for one day on April 3. In terms of macroeconomic data, key releases are expected to include China’s official manufacturing PMI for March, US ADP employment for March, US retail sales MoM for February, and US ISM manufacturing PMI for March. LME lead, current geopolitical tensions outside China remained prominent, shipping cycles lengthened, and crude oil prices rose, all of which had a significant impact on the base metal market. For lead, consumption in the Middle East was relatively stagnant, supply chains were disrupted, and transportation cycles for lead ingot and lead-acid batteries lengthened. Meanwhile, China’s lead ingot import arbitrage remained favorable, and overseas lead ingot continued to flow into the Chinese market. This week, LME lead ingot inventory fell by nearly 1 kt, and the LME Cash-3M contango narrowed to -$34.62/mt, providing support for lead prices. LME lead is expected to trade at $1,880-1,930/mt next week. SHFE lead, lead ingot inventory was destocked, including inventories at lead smelters and social warehouses, and lead prices showed signs of stabilizing after the decline. However, the lead ingot import window is currently open, while lead-acid batteries will enter the traditional off-season in April, limiting expectations for lead consumption. In addition, some secondary lead smelters recently resumed production and raised output, while new maintenance plans are also scheduled for April. With bullish and bearish factors coexisting in fundamentals, lead prices are expected to continue to fluctuate rangebound. If lead smelter maintenance is implemented as planned, lead prices may have a chance to rise relatively. The most-traded SHFE lead contract is expected to trade at 16,300-16,700 yuan/mt next week. Spot price forecast: 16,250-16,550 yuan/mt. With the traditional off-season for lead-acid batteries approaching in April, downstream enterprises mostly maintained purchasing as needed, with limited procurement enthusiasm. Supply side, both primary lead and secondary lead enterprises saw output increases, and imported lead continued to flow into China, so spot lead premium trading may be difficult to sustain for long.

Recent volatility in the Indonesian commodities sector has been driven by mixed signals regarding new fiscal policies. Market participants are currently evaluating the implications of two distinct regulatory mechanisms: a broader windfall tax on bulk commodities like coal, nickel, and a targeted export duty. The conflation of these two policies has generated significant market uncertainty, culminating in a sharp spike in global nickel prices this week. To understand the current market anxiety, which culminated in a sharp spike in global nickel prices this week, it is essential to unpack the timeline of these policy discussions, differentiate the fiscal mechanisms at play, and assess the likelihood of their implementation. Background: From Broad Windfall Deliberations to Targeted Export Tariffs The narrative surrounding new commodity taxes in Indonesia did not emerge overnight; rather, it has evolved through distinct phases of policy signaling. The current policy discourse has evolved in phases. Initial discussions, highlighted by statements from Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto on Mar 13, 2026, focused on the potential implementation of a windfall tax. This broader fiscal measure was aimed at capturing excess margins from exporters of coal, palm oil, and base metals, such as nickel, gold, and copper during periods of elevated global prices, functioning primarily as a macroeconomic revenue-generation tool. However, the conversation shifted dramatically on March 25, 2026. According to Bloomberg, news broke that Indonesia’s President had officially approved an export tax specifically targeting coal and nickel. This headline acted as an immediate catalyst, sending LME and SHFE nickel prices spiking. The confusion currently gripping the market stems from the conflation of these two distinct policy trajectories: the older, revenue-focused windfall tax concept championed by economic ministers, and the newly approved, strategically focused nickel export tax aimed at forcing further downstream industrialization. Analysis & Understanding: The Precedent of the "Windfall Tax" To accurately gauge the impact of these rumors, it is critical to understand that the concept of a "windfall tax" is not entirely unprecedented in Indonesia's regulatory framework, particularly for bulk commodities. There has actually been a windfall tax structure in place previously, though often masked under the nomenclature of progressive royalties and non-tax state revenues (PNBP). For the coal sector, the government already utilizes a tiered royalty system pegged to the Harga Batubara Acuan (HBA) benchmark. As coal prices escalate into higher brackets, the royalty percentage automatically increases, effectively acting as a windfall capture mechanism. Similarly before, the nickel sector utilizes the Domestic Benchmark Price (HPM) and associated royalty structures to adjust to global price rallies. It is crucial to note that the government has previously experimented with specific windfall profit provisions for downstream products, though the regulatory stance has recently hardened. For instance, under Government Regulation (GR) No. 26/2022, a unique windfall profit incentive was applied to nickel matte: when prices exceeded $21,000 per ton, the royalty rate was actually reduced from the standard 2% to 1%. (Old Version) However, this accommodating policy was explicitly abolished under the recent GR No. 19/2025. The removal of this incentive underscores a definitive shift toward more aggressive state revenue capture. Consequently, the recent "windfall tax" rumors primarily concern further tightening these existing brackets or introducing a supplementary surcharge on operating margins above a specific baseline. (New Version) Conversely, the newly approved nickel export tax serves a different primary function. Therefore, it is completely different than the concept of windfall tax. Rather than merely earning from peak profits, an export duty on semi-processed nickel (like NPI, MHP, FeNi, and Nickel Matte) is a structural tool designed to penalize the export of lower-value products. It is the natural continuation of Indonesia’s downstreaming ( hilirisasi ) agenda, intended to force producers to build stainless steel and EV battery precursor plants domestically in Indonesia, rather than shipping intermediate goods to other countries. While a windfall tax fluctuates with market prices, an export tax acts as a permanent structural cost added to the global supply chain. Conclusion: Imminent Implementation Amidst Ongoing Deliberations Despite definitive headlines regarding executive approval and the targeted April 1, 2026 implementation date, the exact implementation details are currently under review by the relevant ministries. Currently, specific details, including exactly how the proposed 5%, 8%, and 11% tiers might translate from coal to specific nickel material classifications (e.g., NPI, MHP, and high-grade matte), must be urgently finalized ahead of the April deadline. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the Ministry of Finance, and the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs are working to balance state revenue optimization with the need to maintain the global cost-competitiveness of domestic smelters. This deliberative phase should not be interpreted as a policy reversal. According to SMM's understanding and industry checks, the implementation of these fiscal measures is highly probable. While the exact rollout of tariffs may be structured to mitigate immediate operational shocks to the domestic smelting sector, the fundamental policy direction indicates that the era of tariff-free exports for intermediate nickel products might decisively coming to an end.

【SMM Scrap Aluminium Market Analysis】Navigating the Choke Point: How Middle Eastern Geopolitics are Rewiring Global Aluminum Scrap Flows I. Introduction: The Macroeconomic Catalyst The global secondary aluminum market is currently navigating a severe logistical gauntlet. While physical smelting and processing facilities across the Middle East are facing their own localized pressures, the maritime arteries connecting the region to the rest of the world are fundamentally compromised. With vessel traffic heavily restricted through traditional waterways like the Red Sea, carriers are executing widespread, mandatory rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. This geographical detour has introduced hard, quantifiable friction into global trade flows. Transit times from Europe and the Middle East to major Asian main ports have stretched by an additional 12 to 14 days. Consequently, freight costs per container have also reported increases by up to 60-70%. Beyond the immediate ticket price of shipping, this delay translates to millions of dollars in working capital abruptly tied up in floating inventory, severely squeezing liquidity for global traders. To understand the future of secondary aluminum pricing and availability, the market must look at how this disruption cascades across the supply chain. The logistical fallout has created a massive supply shock that is permanently altering working capital dynamics and regional pricing. This structural shift can be traced from Western supply hubs, through the starved processing centers in Southeast Asia, and ultimately to the end-user markets in China and Other Asia, where tightened margins are reshaping the landscape of global scrap procurement. II. The Middle East: The Epicenter of the Bottleneck The Middle East serves as a critical reservoir of scrap aluminum, and current export metrics underscore the massive scale of the material caught in this logistical bottleneck. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia stand as the undisputed dominant suppliers in the region. Recent mirrored customs data shows the UAE exporting upwards of 309,000 metric tons (MT) in 2025, while Saudi Arabia commands a similar volume, exporting over 277,000 MT in 2024 and up to 260,000 MT by October 2025. Historically, a massive majority of this tonnage has been earmarked for Asian buyers, flowing seamlessly through previously unencumbered maritime routes. India and Korea respectively have been the top 2 export destinations for both the UAE and Saudi Arabia since 2020, with both Asian destinations encompassing a total of 81% for Saudi Arabia’s (2020-2024) and 74% for the UAE’s (2020-2025) total exports of scrap aluminum. Mid-tier exporters further supplement this outward flow. Nations such as Israel (exporting roughly 88,000 to 95,000 MT annually) and Kuwait (over 41,000 to 44,000 MT), alongside consistent volumes from Jordan, Bahrain, and Iran, collectively push significant supplementary tonnage into the global market. Similar to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s situation, South Asia and South Korea remains the most affected: between the years 2020 to 2025, India, Pakistan and South Korea import 60% of the Middle Eastern mid-tier exporters’ scrap aluminum. However, getting this material onto the water, especially through the Strait of Hormuz has become increasingly complex, expensive and operationally untenable. In response to the waterway risks, localized workarounds are emerging: suppliers are increasingly bypassing traditional choke points by trucking upstream material overland to alternative, safer ports before loading it onto eastbound vessels. Meanwhile, traditional transit bridges are feeling the strain. Typical scrap flows rely on the Red Sea in the Middle East to ship scrap between Europe and Asia, and this traditional trade route is feeling the strain from the current war in the Middle East. Although the Houthis in Yemen have not enforced shipment closures through the Red Sea, the threat of them doing so in extension of Iran’s closure of the Straits of Hormuz is enough to force certain companies and insurance policies off of Middle Eastern shipment routes, and to reroute around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. This leads to partial extensions of freight times for up to 12-14 days, and some 60% to 70% surge in per container shipment costs between Europe and Asia. The extended transit time is not just a scheduling issue; it translates to millions of dollars in working capital abruptly tied up in floating inventory. As outward flows from the Middle East and Europe slow down under these compounding pressures, the knock-on effect creates an immediate feedstock starvation for the processing hubs waiting further East. III. Asia: The Primary Impact Zone While the logistical friction originates in the West, the financial and operational shockwaves are most acutely felt in the "Other Asia" region, specifically within the Indian and South Korean markets. These nations serve as the primary off-takers for Middle Eastern scrap, and the sudden disruption to their traditional supply lines has triggered a rapid repricing of the market. India: Demand Absorbing the Freight Shock India represents the most immediate example of a market forced to reconcile surging logistics costs with robust domestic demand. As a direct result of the freight spike and logistical difficulties, CIF India prices for key imported grades from Europe like Tense and Taint/Tabor have seen approximately $50 USD per metric ton price hikes over the past week. Critically, this cost burden is not being borne by the sellers alone. Analysis of the current buyer/seller split suggests that recent increases in Indian domestic demand for scrap are providing significant upward pressure on prices. This has allowed a portion of the inflated freight costs to be absorbed by Indian buyers who are prioritizing material security over margin preservation. However, this absorption is not infinite; the $50 USD spike is beginning to significantly tighten margins for local secondary producers, raising concerns about how long this price elasticity can be maintained if transit delays persist. Korea and Japan: Strategic Stockpiling and Regional Procurement In East Asia, the response to the Middle Eastern bottleneck has been characterized by strategic stockpiling and a pivot toward Southeast Asian (SEA) supply. As both Japan and South Korea commonly purchase scrap and secondary products (like ADC12) from the Middle Eastern region, there is a sudden need to replace material sources that have been disrupted directly by the US/Israel-Iran conflict. Primary market intelligence from Southeast and East Asia has seen Japanese (and to a smaller extent, Korean and Indian) players engaging in large-scale procurement of secondary products from Southeast Asia at significant prices. SMM’s data reveals that over the first and second weeks of the Middle Eastern conflict, ADC12 CIF Japan prices have seen significant rises, reaching highs at 3350-60 USD/mt between the 11 th to 17 th of March 2026. This coincides with large amounts of stock clearance and/or signing of procurement deals that extend up till mid-April to early-May. These purchases are occurring at high price points, driven by robust Japanese demand that is effectively outbidding local processors. This "procurement blitz" is rapidly depleting regional liquidity, leaving Southeast Asian hubs starved of the very feedstock they traditionally rely on to serve their own domestic industries. Thailand local ADC12 prices have been observed to be lagging behind FOB prices by 100-200USD/mt, creating a supply starvation for local downstream needs. As of the 26 th of March, market intelligence has revealed a possible second wave of procurement from East Asian nations in Southeast Asia due to increasing worries over the extended war. Prices for ADC12 FOB Thailand and Malaysia deals have been stabilizing around the 3200-3230 USD/t mark as demand slowly creeps back up for both local and foreign demands. Thailand local and FOB ADC12 prices have just closed the gap to be roughly equal, and deals can be observed both within Thailand and exporting towards East and South Asian markets. IV. China: The Regional Exception While the rest of Asia grapples with supply starvation and skyrocketing premiums, China remains a notable outlier in the current crisis. Historically, China’s secondary aluminum sector has maintained a lower direct reliance on Middle Eastern scrap compared to its neighbors in South and East Asia, providing an initial layer of insulation. However, the primary reason for China’s relative stability is internal: a combination of sluggish domestic demand and historically high inventory levels. As of late March 2026, China’s social aluminum inventories have reached a five-year high, effectively acting as a massive buffer against global supply shocks. Furthermore, the LME-SHFE arbitrage window has remained largely unfavorable for primary imports, keeping Chinese buyers on the sidelines. On the secondary side, the lack of specificity and details regarding the reverse invoicing policy have generally led to the secondary aluminum market shifting towards a more passive stance. Downstream demand for secondary aluminum has pivoted towards immediate and small amounts of material to reduce risks associated with reverse invoicing, leading to weak demand within China. While higher global freight costs have increased the baseline cost for any incoming material, the lack of domestic "buy-side" pressure means that China has avoided the aggressive price spikes seen in India, Southeast Asia and Japan. For now, the Chinese market is a spectator to the volatility, characterized more by weak spot fundamentals and unclear policy than by the procurement panic gripping the rest of the continent. V. Strategic Outlook: The New Reality of Trade The current landscape suggests that the global aluminum scrap market is moving toward a "new normal" characterized by higher logistical floors and reduced liquidity. Increasing political and institutional instability in Iran and the wider Middle East creates ever-increasing tension and uncertainty for global trade through the Middle East. The transition from the Middle East to the Cape of Good Hope could possibly no longer be a temporary detour but a structural shift that traders must eventually consider as a safer alternative. In extension to the Middle Eastern conflict, the endurance of the "procurement blitz" in East Asia will serve as a bellwether for the long-term stability of scrap flows in Asia. If the inventory buffer in Southeast Asia remains depleted by aggressive Japanese and Korean bidding, the upward price pressure on Indian buyers will likely move from a temporary spike to a permanent baseline. Local downstream industries from Thailand and Malaysia might also find it hard in the medium-long term to cope with constantly spiking ADC12 prices and competition from East and South Asia. Ultimately, the traditional metrics of secondary aluminum pricing, such as the LME-SHFE spread or local collection rates, are being overshadowed by the premium on logistical certainty. As available aluminum scrap becomes increasingly scarce due to supply disruptions in the Middle East and increased costs for material from Europe, this creates price-side pressure for both producers and downstream industries across Asia. This leads to a zero-sum environment in which increasing costs are either burdened by buyers through increasing prices, heightened competition and larger local-export arbitrages that put pressure on local downstream industries, or burdened by producers and traders through shrinking margins and intense inter-producer competition. As the market adapts to this fragmented landscape, the value proposition of a successful trader is fundamentally shifting: it is no longer defined solely by the ability to source metal, but by the ability to guarantee its arrival through an increasingly volatile and high-risk global supply chain.

Silver has seen one of the sharpest pullbacks in recent years within just a few weeks. From the high of US$97.30 on March 2, the price fell to US$61.21 by March 23, losing around 37%. For the market, this was an abrupt break from the previous momentum.