According to foreign media reports, recently, the state-owned enterprise Mutapa Energy Resources of Zimbabwe announced that its Sandawana lithium mine project confirmed 39.9 million mt of JORC-compliant lithium resources, of which 28.7 million mt are measured resources, accounting for about 72% of the total. It is reported that the resources confirmed at the Sandawana lithium mine project this time cover only about 30% of the approximately 3,800-hectare mining right area. The first phase of exploration for the project lasted 11 months, completed 103,000 meters of drilling and 33,000 sample analyses, with a cumulative investment of $24 million.

Zimbabwe has recently continued to advance its domestic lithium-processing policy while simultaneously improving the logistics infrastructure used for lithium concentrate exports. At first glance, the construction of new railway transport links appears inconsistent with the proposed restrictions on concentrate exports. In practice, however, the two policies correspond to different stages of industrial development. Railway investment is intended to support current mine operations, export earnings and logistics cost reductions, while export restrictions are designed to encourage the extension of the domestic value chain into intermediate products such as lithium sulphate. The principal objective is therefore not to halt lithium exports immediately, but to use export permits and policy deadlines to retain a greater share of processing investment and capital expenditure within Zimbabwe. From a policy perspective, the restrictions are better understood as an industrial investment requirement than as a conventional trade ban. Zimbabwe remains dependent on mineral exports for foreign-exchange earnings, tax revenue and employment. A complete suspension of concentrate exports before sufficient domestic processing capacity has been established would therefore conflict with the country’s near-term economic interests. A more probable policy path would be to link export quotas to the construction progress of processing facilities, local investment commitments and the operating status of individual projects. Under this framework, export access would effectively be exchanged for additional domestic investment. The main constraint on implementation is that Zimbabwe’s existing processing capacity is largely captive capacity built to serve individual mining projects. The country has not yet developed a market-based processing system capable of handling concentrate from multiple third-party suppliers. Concentrates from different mines vary in lithium grade, impurity content, particle size and metallurgical characteristics. Third-party processing therefore requires not only technical adaptation, but also commercial arrangements covering recovery rates, treatment charges, material losses and product-quality responsibilities. As a result, nominal processing capacity should not be treated as equivalent to effective capacity available to the broader industry. The existence of several lithium sulphate plants does not necessarily provide a viable conversion route for mines without their own processing facilities. This constraint is likely to reshape the competitive structure of Zimbabwe’s lithium industry. Project value will increasingly depend not only on resource size, grade and mining costs, but also on access to processing capacity, export permits, logistics infrastructure and end-market channels. Vertically integrated companies controlling mines, concentrators, conversion plants and customer relationships in China will be better positioned to comply with the policy and monetise their resources. Smaller mines without processing facilities may become increasingly dependent on toll treatment, offtake agreements, equity partnerships or asset sales. The export restrictions could therefore raise the domestic processing ratio while also accelerating the concentration of lithium resources in the hands of a limited number of integrated operators. For the Chinese lithium supply chain, the policy does not imply that Zimbabwean lithium resources will permanently disappear from the market. Rather, the form in which those resources enter China and the channels through which they are traded are likely to change. Part of the current concentrate supply may eventually be exported as lithium sulphate or other intermediate products. At the same time, supply may shift from a relatively fragmented network of miners and traders towards a smaller number of integrated producers. This would reduce the volume of African concentrate directly available to independent Chinese lithium refiners and increase the share of material moving through long-term offtake agreements or internal corporate supply chains. The principal market impact may therefore be reflected less in a substantial reduction in annual resource supply and more in changes to supply timing and spot-market liquidity. During the transition, export-quota adjustments, delays to processing projects and changes in product form could create volatility in mine inventories, export volumes and Chinese arrivals. When downstream inventories are low or freely tradable concentrate is limited, such disruptions can be amplified and translated into a higher short-term risk premium for both spodumene concentrate and lithium carbonate. The expansion of railway infrastructure is not inherently inconsistent with the domestic-processing policy. Railways can support current concentrate exports, but they can also transport lithium sulphate, processing equipment and chemical inputs in the future. The more important issue is that the pace of policy implementation may exceed the development of processing capacity, electricity supply, chemical inputs and commercial infrastructure. If the restrictions are implemented too rapidly, they may result in production cuts, inventory accumulation and project delays. A sufficiently long transition period would allow processing capacity to develop gradually while limiting disruption to existing exports and employment. Overall, Zimbabwe is more likely to adopt an approach based on formal restrictions, transitional quotas and investment-linked exemptions , rather than impose a complete and immediate halt to all concentrate exports. The long-term effect of the policy will not be to reduce the country’s underlying lithium resource base, but to redistribute processing margins and control across the value chain. The companies best positioned to benefit will not simply be those that own lithium resources, but those able to integrate mining, processing, logistics, export access and downstream customer relationships.

Rio Tinto released its production results for the second quarter of 2026. According to the report, Rio Tinto’s lithium production in Q2 stood at 14,600 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE), up 20% year-on-year and 15% quarter-on-quarter. By product, lithium carbonate output reached 13,900 tonnes, lithium hydroxide output was 5,300 tonnes, and other specialty lithium products stood at 1,100 tonnes on an LCE basis. Rio Tinto noted in the announcement that, as its lithium business is vertically integrated, the production volumes of different lithium products should not be directly added together. In terms of production changes, Rio Tinto’s Q2 lithium output growth was mainly driven by the ramp-up of the Rincón starter plant in Argentina, as well as the earlier-than-scheduled first production from the Sal de Vida and Fénix 1B projects. The Rincón starter plant produced 385 tonnes of LCE in the second quarter. Year to date, Rio Tinto’s lithium production declined 7% year-on-year, mainly due to the Mt Cattlin mine being placed on care and maintenance at the end of March 2025, which weighed on hard-rock lithium output. On project progress, construction of the full-scale Rincón lithium plant is advancing and remains in the early execution stage. Current work is focused on key infrastructure, including camp facilities, utilities and pipelines, while site earthworks, early preparation works and supporting infrastructure construction are also underway. The Sal de Vida project achieved first production ahead of schedule in Q2 and is currently in the commissioning stage. The Fénix 1B expansion project also delivered first production ahead of schedule in Q2 and has entered commissioning. Rio Tinto previously disclosed that Sal de Vida has a planned capacity of 15,000 tonnes of LCE per year, while the Fénix 1B expansion has a planned capacity of 10,000 tonnes of LCE per year. In terms of prices, the average CIF China, Japan and Korea price stood at US$22,043/tonne in the second quarter of 2026. Meanwhile, Rio Tinto’s average realised lithium product price in the first half of 2026 was US$18,960/tonne LCE. In addition, the Nemaska Lithium project is planned to deliver first production in 2028. Following an in-depth review initiated in the first quarter, the construction pace of its Bécancour processing plant will slow in 2026. The plant is currently more than 70% complete. Necessary activities such as asset preservation and site integrity works will continue, while other activities will be paused or deferred and the contractor workforce will be temporarily reduced. Rio Tinto previously disclosed that the Nemaska Lithium project is located in Quebec, Canada, with Rio Tinto holding a 50% interest. The project has a planned capacity of 28,000 tonnes of LCE per year, producing integrated lithium hydroxide. SMM believes Rio Tinto’s year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter growth in Q2 lithium output mainly reflects the gradual production ramp-up of its Argentine brine assets, particularly as Sal de Vida and Fénix 1B achieved first production ahead of schedule. This indicates that the execution progress of the company’s brine lithium project portfolio is slightly ahead of previous expectations. In the short term, as these new projects remain in the commissioning and ramp-up stages, their actual contribution to global lithium supply still requires further observation. In the medium to long term, as Rincón, Sal de Vida and the Fénix expansion continue to advance, Rio Tinto’s capacity weighting in South American brine lithium resources is expected to increase further. However, the care and maintenance status of Mt Cattlin and the slower construction pace at Nemaska also suggest that, under the current lithium price environment, mining companies are continuing to adjust development priorities across different assets based on project economics and capital expenditure pressure.

SMM, July 15: According to an announcement by IGO Limited (ASX: IGO), the company has entered into a binding share purchase agreement with Global Lithium Resources Limited (ASX: GL1) to divest its Nova Nickel Operation in Western Australia. The transaction assets include the Nova processing plant and related infrastructure, while Global Lithium will also assume the associated rehabilitation obligations. The total transaction consideration is A$7 million, comprising A$3 million in cash, A$2 million in GL1 shares, and A$2 million in deferred cash payable 12 months after completion. According to the announcement, Global Lithium plans to use Nova’s existing processing facilities and supporting infrastructure to process pegmatite ore from its 100%-owned Manna Lithium Project. The Manna project is located approximately 170 km from Nova by road. Global Lithium is currently advancing studies for the integrated Manna-Nova operating model and plans to commence lithium concentrate production through Nova by mid-2027. IGO stated that Nova remains in operation and is expected to cease mining activities as planned in Q4 2026. The transaction is expected to complete after the end of mining operations at Nova and remains subject to customary conditions precedent, including approval from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). SMM believes that the core significance of this transaction lies in GL1’s ability to leverage existing processing and infrastructure assets, thereby reducing the development timeline and capital expenditure pressure for converting the Manna lithium project from a resource asset into a lithium concentrate production operation. If the integrated Manna-Nova plan progresses smoothly, the Nova assets could be transformed from nickel operation infrastructure into a spodumene concentrate processing platform, potentially contributing incremental supply from Western Australia. However, given that the planned production start is in mid-2027, and that the transaction remains subject to regulatory approval and the completion of project integration studies, the short-term impact on global lithium concentrate supply and prices is expected to be limited. The transaction is more indicative of marginal progress in the medium- to long-term development of overseas hard-rock lithium resources.

Price Trends In the first half of 2026, domestic lithium hydroxide prices followed a trajectory of "surge – high-level volatility – softening decline," with the price center first rising and then falling amid the interplay of multiple factors. January: Prices surged sharply. Concentrated maintenance shutdowns at major lithium salt producers tightened spot supply. Combined with persistently rising costs of lithium carbonate and lithium ore, lithium salt producers held firm on pricing, pushing the monthly average price up by 65% month-on-month. Although ternary material manufacturers maintained just-in-time procurement and remained cautious on spot orders, and some import flows returned due to domestic-international price spreads, the phase of supply shortages and cost support still drove prices to a high level. February: Prices fluctuated at high levels with thinning trading. Macro sentiment drove overall lithium prices downward, but producers' firm pricing stance persisted. Downstream ternary manufacturers, having ample inventories and some entering maintenance, saw eased raw material shortages, with procurement mostly based on monthly average prices. During the Chinese New Year holiday, transportation of lithium hydroxide, classified as hazardous chemicals, stalled, leading to a seasonal quiet period; post-holiday restocking demand was tepid, limiting upside momentum, and prices oscillated widely throughout the month. March: Gains narrowed notably. Cell manufacturers' offtake fell short of expectations, and new orders for ternary materials were limited. Additionally, increased customer-supplied materials in mid-month sharply reduced spot demand, leading to subdued trading and an upward price channel that stalled. The monthly average price rose only 3.4% month-on-month. April: First down then up. In the first half, limited new ternary orders and scarce spot demand put mild pressure on prices; in the second half, pre-holiday stocking and new orders drove increased inquiries from ternary producers, while sharp rises in lithium carbonate and ore prices pulled lithium hydroxide higher. The monthly average price rose 2.73% month-on-month. May: Rose then fell. In the first half, positive demand expectations and supply-side disruptions lifted lithium carbonate and ore prices, pulling lithium hydroxide higher in tandem; in the second half, sentiment turned weaker, with more trades settled via negotiation between traders and material mills. As ternary demand trends became clearer, upstream producers softened their price support, prompting a modest pullback. The monthly average price reached RMB 174,000/ton, up 13.6% month-on-month. June: Prices fell notably, with range-bound volatility intensifying. Frequent supply disruptions on the lithium resource side amplified market volatility significantly, prompting holders to adopt a cautious stance and quote prices in line with market conditions. Upstream producers adjusted prices flexibly, while traders maintained a high discount (over RMB 15,000/ton against the lithium carbonate futures main contract). On the demand side, total ternary material demand remained weak month-on-month, but within the RMB 135,000–145,000/ton range, downstream buyers showed strong willingness to stockpile on dips, providing some bottom support and exacerbating range-bound fluctuations. The monthly average price fell 11.52% month-on-month. Looking at the price trends, the correlation between lithium hydroxide prices and lithium carbonate futures prices has strengthened over the past six months. This is partly because upstream producers use a "lithium carbonate price × discount factor" formula as a floor price in their pricing. On the other hand, traders capitalize on the price spreads between domestic and overseas lithium hydroxide and between hydroxide and carbonate, by importing lithium hydroxide and pricing their sales with reference to lithium carbonate futures, further reinforcing this price linkage. Production In the first half of 2026, domestic total lithium hydroxide output reached 172,000 tons, up 21% year-on-year, driven by relatively robust downstream demand, with notable incremental growth. By output structure, the refining segment contributed the most, accounting for about 88%. Within this, the gradual ramp-up of new production lines at leading companies added some volume, while other enterprises maintained steady output backed by downstream orders, resulting in an 18% year-on-year increase for the overall refining segment. For the causticization segment, most active producers sustained stable operations, and the industry CR5 reached 72% in the first half, indicating a persistently high market concentration. From the capacity utilization perspective, although some capacity has been switched to lithium carbonate production, the operating rate for the lithium hydroxide industry has consistently lingered below 50% over the past six months, reflecting an ongoing overcapacity trend. Costs and margins: For the refining segment, lithium ore feedstock remained relatively tight in the first half of 2026, with ore prices staying elevated and closely correlated with lithium carbonate prices, providing strong cost support for lithium hydroxide. As a result, non‑integrated producers faced notable pressure on the sales side, and their product discount prices did not decline further, which in turn provided marginal support for profit margins at current price levels. For the causticization segment, the supply of salt‑lake‑based lithium salts has increased over the past six months, making causticization feedstock relatively ample. The linkage between actual procurement costs and industrial‑grade carbonate quotes has weakened, which has alleviated cost pressures for enterprises that purchase lithium carbonate externally, leading to actual profitability in the causticization segment being better than theoretical estimates. Import and Export The import‑export landscape has seen a notable reversal. On the export front, since the second half of 2025, some overseas ternary material producers have shifted to entrusting domestic tolling processors, resulting in products that would have been exported being delivered domestically instead, effectively suppressing export volumes. At the same time, overseas demand for ternary materials has remained persistently weak, reducing foreign buyers' appetite for Chinese lithium hydroxide. This, combined with the gradual ramp‑up of overseas local production lines, has collectively kept export volumes at low levels over the past six months. On the import side, weak overseas demand, high accumulated inventories, and arbitrage opportunities have driven import volumes to remain relatively elevated, further reinforcing the net import trend. Supply‑Demand Balance and Inventory The surge in import data made most months in the first half of the year oversupplied. However, from the perspective of directly usable lithium hydroxide products, the market as a whole remained in a relatively tight balance, providing effective support for upstream price control. As for inventory, current lithium hydroxide stock levels have improved significantly compared with the same period last year. This is mainly attributable to two factors: first, part of the inventory has been absorbed into the market by being converted into lithium carbonate; second, active producers have flexibly adjusted their output pace, keeping current inventory days at around one month. Future Outlook Looking ahead, although the LFP route continues to squeeze the ternary route, ternary materials currently have no rival in the high‑nickel segment. In addition, the cost advantages of 6‑series materials offer more possibilities for the ternary route. Based on end‑user production schedules, ternary power demand in the second half of 2026 is expected to maintain a sound performance, growing by approximately 36% compared with the first half. This will drive a roughly 7% sequential increase in ternary material output in the second half. As ternary materials continue to move toward higher nickel content, this brings an incremental demand trend for lithium hydroxide. Meanwhile, considering that most lithium hydroxide production lines have flexible switching or carbonation purification capabilities, lithium hydroxide output is projected to grow by about 6% sequentially. Coupled with a modest recovery in overseas ternary demand, the supply‑demand balance for lithium hydroxide is expected to remain tight through 2026–2027. In terms of price, under a market structure with highly concentrated supply, lithium hydroxide prices are primarily determined by the supply‑demand dynamics of its own industrial chain and closely track lithium ore and lithium salt price trends. Prices are currently oscillating in a range above RMB 150,000/ton. Futures Developments As for lithium hydroxide futures, there has been a flurry of related developments in the second quarter. The Guangzhou Futures Exchange (GFEX) and the Lithium Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association have both explicitly stated that they will continue to strengthen cooperation and jointly advance the listing of lithium hydroxide and other lithium‑chain futures products. The征求意见稿 of Guangzhou's "15th Five‑Year Plan" for finance also clearly supports GFEX in listing new‑energy futures such as lithium hydroxide. On the industrial side, companies have moved swiftly to follow up. In June, Yahua Group, Shengxin Lithium Energy, and Tianqi Lithium all announced their intention to apply to GFEX for designated delivery factory warehouse status for lithium hydroxide. In addition, Milkyway's shareholders' meeting approved a proposal for its subsidiary to apply to become a designated delivery warehouse for battery‑grade lithium hydroxide at GFEX. According to media reports, lithium salt producers (Ganfeng Lithium, Tianqi Lithium, Yahua Group, etc.) have already positioned themselves in the factory‑warehouse system. However, due to the high‑risk storage requirements of lithium hydroxide—such as strong corrosiveness, exothermic reaction with water, and the need for inert gas protection—no logistics‑focused player had previously entered this category. On the market front, some traders have already made early arrangements in anticipation of futures listing, and the number of merchants participating in lithium hydroxide import trade has noticeably increased. In summary, preparations for the listing of lithium hydroxide futures are progressing in an orderly manner, with positive official signals and accelerating industrial infrastructure development.

From a supply-demand balance perspective, China's lithium carbonate market exhibited a tight balance in H1 2026, with sellers and buyers continuously seeking new equilibrium points amid bargaining.

Tianhua New Energy expects net profit attributable to shareholders of RMB 2.2 billion-2.4 billion in the first half of 2026, compared with a loss a year earlier. The company said robust demand from the energy storage and EV battery sectors boosted demand for lithium resources, driving both sales volumes and prices of its lithium battery materials business. Higher revenue and profitability contributed to a significant earnings recovery.

Core View The main theme of lithium ore prices in H1 2026 was a sharp rally followed by a correction, rather than a one-way upward shift in the price center. The SMM spodumene concentrate index price (SC6, CIF China) started the year at around USD 2,000/t in January, briefly fell to USD 1,875/t in early February, then followed lithium carbonate prices higher and reached the year-to-date high of USD 2,780–2,840/t in mid-May, before retreating to the USD 2,385–2,480/t range in June. This trajectory almost fully mirrored lithium carbonate prices. Lithium carbonate spot prices started the year at around RMB 130,000/t, rose above RMB 200,000/t in May, and then pulled back to RMB 160,000–180,000/t in June. Lithium ore did not experience an independent rally throughout the period. It was pulled upward by lithium carbonate pricing via the futures market and then corrected as lithium carbonate prices peaked. Therefore, the starting point for understanding lithium ore prices in H1 is not resource-side supply and demand, but lithium carbonate pricing and market sentiment. One common misinterpretation needs to be corrected first: the strength in lithium ore prices in H1 was not the result of “tight effective supply pushing the price center higher.” The real drivers were the resonance of front-loaded demand, supply disruption expectations, and futures-driven sentiment. Front-loaded demand was triggered by export tax rebate adjustments; supply disruption expectations came from the repeated delays in Jianxiawo’s restart and Zimbabwe’s lithium concentrate export ban. When warehouse receipts accumulated and macro headwinds were released in May, and when Jianxiawo’s restart expectation materialized in June, prices corrected accordingly. After that, prices rebounded again as demand expectations improved. 1. Lithium Ore Followed Lithium Carbonate, While Spodumene-Based Conversion Margins Stayed Negative Throughout H1 The clearest evidence of the lithium ore pricing mechanism in H1 was not how much ore prices rose, but the fact that spot conversion margins for producing lithium carbonate from externally procured spodumene concentrate were negative for most of the period. The ore-salt margin inversion was structural and persistent in H1, rather than a short-lived squeeze on processing margins. The cause of this inversion directly points to the reversal of the pricing mechanism. Ore prices are no longer determined by a cost-plus model from the upstream side, which then determines lithium salt prices. Instead, lithium carbonate has become the pricing anchor, and ore prices are reverse-priced through the futures market. In early January, when lithium carbonate prices rallied on front-loaded demand and sentiment, ore prices were pushed higher at the same time. However, downstream lithium salt demand could not fully absorb the higher cost, and processing margins were squeezed into negative territory. In April, under the reality of ore-salt inversion and limited hedging opportunities, lithium salt producers relying on externally procured ore saw their ability to accept high-priced ore weaken significantly. For overseas miners, this means their realized selling prices are increasingly anchored by the profitability of China’s refining sector. This is not a narrative assumption, but a mechanism that can be verified month by month through spot margin data. The financialization of pricing was also visible in market transactions. When prices fell at the end of May, lithium salt producers became more active in pricing ore purchases. In June, the basis for new cargoes strengthened. Pricing based on futures quotation plus premium or discount has become the mainstream transaction model. Lithium salt producers tend to use pricing windows during price corrections to lock in ore supply. Whoever holds the pricing right controls the settlement timing, and in H1’s highly volatile two-way lithium carbonate market, this directly led to margin differentiation among different lithium salt producers. 2. The Three Drivers of the Rally and the Triggers of the Correction Front-loaded demand — export tax rebate adjustment. In January 2026, the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation Administration clarified that the VAT export rebate rate for lithium battery products would be reduced from 9% to 6% from April 1, and fully removed from January 1, 2027. This policy directly stimulated downstream players to concentrate export shipments and inventory preparation before April, significantly front-loading demand into H1, especially supporting demand for energy storage and ternary-related materials. This was the most important demand-side catalyst in H1 and the one most easily overlooked by the “weak recovery” narrative. Supply disruption expectations — Jianxiawo and Zimbabwe. After Jianxiawo’s mining permit expired and production was halted in August 2025, its restart timeline was repeatedly pushed back in H1, continuously providing room for both bullish and bearish speculation in the market. Now that Jianxiawo’s restart has been confirmed, the largest bearish factor has been priced in, and the market’s focus has shifted back to whether demand can outperform expectations. In Zimbabwe, the lithium concentrate export ban at the beginning of the year disrupted shipment expectations. Positive progress was reported in late March, and by mid-May, Chinese-funded mining companies in Zimbabwe had completed export procedures and restarted shipments, easing the previous short-term tightness in African cargo arrivals. SMM expects the first batch of cargoes to arrive in China in mid-to-late July. Correction triggers — warehouse receipts, macro factors, and the materialization of restart expectations. After lithium carbonate prices rose above RMB 200,000/t in May, exchange warehouse receipts continued to accumulate and hit new highs, while concerns over off-balance-sheet inventory increased. Together with macro pressure from expectations of further Fed rate hikes, prices peaked and corrected in late May. On June 17, the approval of Jianxiawo’s land use application materialized, and clearer restart expectations further weighed on both ore and salt prices. By late June, according to SMM monthly production schedules, July demand showed resilience despite the seasonal lull, with both power and energy storage cell production schedules increasing month on month. Monthly lithium carbonate consumption remained at a high level, which restored some market confidence and pushed lithium prices higher again. 3. Supply-Side Reality: Imports Weakened Month on Month, but Cumulative Imports Still Increased; Australia Remained Dominant From January to May, spodumene imports showed a combination of weaker month-on-month momentum and continued year-on-year cumulative growth. On a monthly basis, imports reached 758,000 physical tonnes in April, down 9.5% month on month, and 680,800 tonnes in May, down 10.2% month on month. However, total spodumene imports in January–May reached around 3.66 million tonnes, up approximately 25% year on year. By origin, Australia remained the dominant source. China imported around 1.585 million tonnes from Australia in January–May, although May imports from Australia were around 330,000 tonnes, down approximately 15.2% year on year. The share of African supply continued to rise. On the shipment side, lithium concentrate shipments from Port Hedland to China showed clear quarter-end volume acceleration, with March shipments reaching around 122,000 tonnes, up 64.3% month on month. The marginal changes in overseas mines were concentrated in restarts and offtake agreements. Core Lithium restarted its Finniss project on May 20 and plans to ship the first batch of concentrate in Q4. Mineral Resources also restarted Bald Hill, with first spodumene output expected in July. These restart volumes are limited and will not change the short-term supply structure, but they reinforce the expectation of new supply materializing in H2 2026 and H1 2027. On the domestic side, SMM’s domestic sample mines produced 160,690 tonnes LCE in January–June. The restart of Jiangxi lepidolite mines was constrained by permitting procedures, environmental protection, profitability, and other factors, and did not fully ramp up in H1. 4. Migration of Long-Term Pricing Mechanisms: Floor Price Plus Pricing Optionality Has Become the Norm The long-term spodumene offtake agreements signed intensively in H1 provide direct contractual evidence of the financialization of ore pricing. In February, Pilbara Minerals signed a two-year offtake agreement with Tianhua New Energy, setting a floor price of USD 1,000/t, with no price ceiling, together with a USD 100 million interest-free prepayment. In the same period, Pilbara also signed a long-term agreement with Canmax. Yahua Group signed an offtake agreement with Brazil’s MGLIT, also with a minimum price of USD 1,000/t on a 6% basis. Liontown and Tianhua agreed on supply for 2027–2028, priced against a spodumene index. The common feature is a structure of USD 1,000/t floor price plus index or pricing optionality, with downside protection but no upside cap. The pricing benchmark is migrating from fixed website-based long-term pricing toward index-based and futures-linked pricing. This confirms that ore pricing is shifting from traditional long-term contracts to a more financialized structure of “floor price + pricing optionality + premium/discount.” This provides a contractual basis for assessing pricing transmission lags and distortions, and is also a key point for overseas investors to understand how China’s pricing system is penetrating upstream resources. 5. H2 Outlook H1 2026 provides a very clear methodological lesson for H2: lithium ore prices will not move independently from lithium carbonate. The core pricing variables for ore are not the nominal size of global lithium resources, but the dynamic matching among lithium carbonate futures, spot conversion margins for lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, domestic mine restart progress, African cargo arrival schedules, lithium salt producers’ feedstock inventories, and downstream material production schedules. In H1, lithium salt conversion margins remained negative for an extended period, yet ore prices did not fall quickly. Instead, they rose together with lithium carbonate prices under the influence of downstream restocking and supply disruption expectations. This shows that the H1 rally was not an independent strengthening of upstream fundamentals, but a synchronized industry-chain movement driven by front-loaded demand, delayed supply realization, and amplified futures sentiment. For H2 lithium ore analysis, the first step is to distinguish between “no shortage in total resources” and “short-term tightness in effective ore supply.” From a global resource perspective, Australia, Africa, Brazil, South American brines, and Chinese domestic mines all have incremental supply expectations, so there is no absolute shortage of resources. However, from the perspective of Chinese lithium salt production, what truly affects lithium carbonate supply is ore that can be purchased in time, arrive steadily, meet grade requirements, have controllable impurities, and match existing processing lines. If ore is locked in long-term contracts, still in transit, concentrated in trader inventories, or if high prices reduce lithium salt producers’ willingness to purchase, its contribution to short-term lithium salt supply will be weakened. Therefore, H2 analysis should not simply focus on mine output. It should track port inventories, traders’ saleable inventories, in-plant inventories at lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, vessel schedules, and long-term contract lock-up structures. On the domestic supply side, Jianxiawo is the core variable driving H2 market expectations, but its impact should not be simplified as “restart equals immediate supply.” After the mine was suspended, the market treated it as the key anchor for marginal domestic lepidolite supply. The real question in H2 is not the single event of whether it restarts, but whether the restarted volume becomes freely tradable ore. If the output is mainly consumed within CATL’s integrated system, the impact on the spot ore market and externally procured ore salt producers will be limited. Only if the output enters the spot market will it directly pressure ore prices and conversion margins. At the same time, the suspension and restart timeline of other Jiangxi lepidolite mines also needs to be incorporated into the framework. Previous public reports indicated that some mines in Yichun may first exhaust their annual mining quota during the license renewal process and then enter a production halt for license renewal. If these mines continue to be affected by permitting, environmental protection, safety, or profitability factors in H2, the supply elasticity of domestic lepidolite will be weaker than nominal capacity suggests. Conversely, if Jianxiawo and other Yichun mines move forward with restarts or license renewals in Q3–Q4, the marginal contribution of domestic ore to lithium carbonate supply will increase significantly and put pressure on high ore prices. In other words, domestic ore supply in H2 should not be treated as a single variable. It is jointly determined by Jianxiawo, other Yichun mines, and the operating rates of Jiangxi lepidolite-based lithium salt producers. For overseas ore, African supply remains one of the largest sources of H2 supply elasticity. In H1, the disruptions in Africa were more about policy, shipment, and arrival timing rather than the disappearance of resources. If shipments from Zimbabwe and other regions recover and previously delayed cargoes arrive in China in a concentrated manner, feedstock availability for lithium salt producers will improve and the bargaining power of ore sellers will weaken. However, if policy disruption, logistics cycles, grade volatility, or financing pressure cause arrivals to remain inconsistent, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore may still be unable to raise operating rates quickly even if margin repair expectations improve. Australian supply is relatively stable, but a large portion is locked under long-term contracts, limiting its marginal adjustment impact on the spot market. Brazilian and other emerging resources are more important for medium- and long-term expectations, while their short-term impact on Chinese lithium salt production depends on arrival timing and quality stability. Demand is the key factor determining downside support for ore prices. In H2, power batteries and energy storage will enter the traditional peak season, and the expansion and ramp-up of cell and material producers will continue to lift lithium salt consumption. In particular, lithium iron phosphate output, supported by energy storage and commercial vehicle demand, is expected to remain high and provide sustained demand for lithium carbonate. Although ternary materials are growing more slowly than LFP, they may still see periodic restocking driven by certain overseas and high-end power battery demand. If material producers’ expansion is realized smoothly, lithium salt producers will need to maintain high operating rates to meet long-term contract deliveries and spot orders, which will in turn support rigid ore procurement demand. Conversely, if terminal orders fail to absorb the expansion of materials, material producers may enter a destocking cycle, and lithium salt producers’ ore procurement will quickly weaken, causing ore prices to come under pressure earlier. Therefore, H2 lithium ore prices can be divided into four scenarios. Base case: margins gradually rebalance, and ore prices fluctuate at high levels before edging lower. Jianxiawo’s restart expectation materializes, but actual mining and beneficiation ramp-up is gradual. African cargo arrivals recover but do not form a concentrated shock. Power battery and energy storage production schedules remain high, while material producers’ expansion is gradually realized. In this scenario, lithium carbonate prices remain volatile at high levels, the margin inversion of externally procured ore salt producers slowly improves, and lithium ore prices follow lithium carbonate lower but do not collapse. The profits that were excessively concentrated in upstream resources and futures expectations in H1 begin to gradually flow back toward midstream refining. Correction scenario: supply materializes in a concentrated manner, and profits quickly flow back to midstream refining. If Jianxiawo ramps up faster than expected and part of its output enters the spot market; if other Yichun mines progress faster than expected in license renewals; if African ore arrives in China in a concentrated way; and if lithium carbonate warehouse receipts and futures market pressure intensify, ore prices will face stronger downside pressure. The transmission chain would be: lithium carbonate futures turn bearish → lithium salt producers become more cautious in procurement → rigid demand for externally procured ore slows → traders release saleable inventories → ore prices correct quickly. In this scenario, profits do not disappear; they shift quickly from upstream resources back to midstream refining, and overseas miners’ realized prices also come under pressure. The key is not the nominal restart volume of Jianxiawo, but whether the restarted ore is internally consumed or enters the spot market, and whether downstream material inventories can absorb the additional lithium salt supply. Support scenario: effective ore supply remains tight, and profits stay upstream. If Jianxiawo’s actual output is later than market expectations, if license renewals or environmental factors continue to suppress the supply elasticity of other Yichun mines, if African arrivals remain inconsistent, and if peak-season energy storage and power battery production schedules continue to exceed expectations, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore will still face the situation of “orders and capacity available, but feedstock either expensive or unstable.” In this case, negative conversion margins will force some marginal lithium salt producers to reduce operating rates. The contraction of effective lithium carbonate supply will support lithium salt prices; and once salt prices stabilize, ore prices will also gain support. The persistent margin inversion in H1 has already shown that losses are not simply bearish. They act as an automatic stabilizer for the industry chain: they force some marginal refining capacity to shut down, reduce lithium salt supply, and thereby support prices in reverse. Upside scenario: effective ore shortage transmits into lithium salt supply contraction, driving ore prices higher again. If H2 sees the combination of stronger-than-expected demand, weaker-than-expected domestic ore realization, and inconsistent overseas arrivals, lithium ore prices could still rise further. Specifically, if energy storage demand remains highly robust and power batteries enter the traditional peak season with further upward revisions to cell and material production schedules, especially as new LFP capacity continues to ramp up, monthly lithium carbonate consumption will continue to rise. At the same time, if Jianxiawo’s restart is slower than expected, or if output after the restart is mainly consumed within the integrated system with limited spot supply, and if other Jiangxi lepidolite mines are temporarily halted due to license renewal, environmental protection, safety, or profitability factors, domestic ore supply elasticity will fall short of nominal expectations. If African ore arrivals are also inconsistent due to shipment schedules, policy disruptions, grade volatility, or financing issues, lithium salt producers using externally procured ore will face difficulties replenishing feedstock. Under this scenario, ore is no longer merely a variable reverse-priced by lithium carbonate. It begins to constrain lithium salt supply in reverse. The transmission chain would be: downstream material and cell production schedules are revised upward → lithium carbonate spot destocking accelerates → lithium salt producers increase operating rates to fulfill orders → demand for processable ore rises → domestic ore and overseas arrivals fail to ramp up simultaneously → feedstock inventories at externally procured ore salt producers decline → some marginal producers cut output because they cannot secure suitable ore or because margins remain deeply negative → effective lithium carbonate supply contracts → lithium carbonate spot and futures prices strengthen again → lithium ore prices follow lithium carbonate upward. In this case, ore price increases are not driven by independent upstream strength. They are re-priced upward by lithium carbonate after insufficient effective ore supply starts to restrict lithium salt output. In this upside scenario, spot conversion margins for externally procured ore may remain negative or even widen further. On the surface, negative margins should pressure ore prices. But under the combination of strong demand, strong lithium salt prices, and tight ore supply, negative margins can instead become a price-supporting mechanism. On one hand, they force some high-cost externally procured ore producers to suspend operations, reducing lithium carbonate supply. On the other hand, producers with long-term delivery obligations, customer orders, or futures hedging needs still have to keep buying ore, further consuming saleable ore supply. The end result is that industry-chain profits remain concentrated upstream, lithium salt producers’ margin recovery is delayed, and the ore price center may move further upward. Overall, the core issue for the H2 lithium ore market is not whether there is too much or too little ore, but whether ore can be converted into lithium carbonate supply in time. The correct analytical framework should cover six variables: the strength of power battery and energy storage production schedules, inventory cycles at material and cell producers, lithium carbonate spot and futures pricing, the depth of margin inversion for lithium salt producers using externally procured ore, the actual restart and distribution path of Jianxiawo and other Yichun mines, and changes in African arrivals and traders’ saleable inventories. Lithium ore is not the starting point of the industry-chain cycle. It is the result of reverse pricing by lithium carbonate supply-demand fundamentals, refining margins, and the futures market. Only when ore starts to restrict lithium salt producers’ operating rates, or when new ore supply begins to materially increase lithium carbonate supply, will lithium ore shift from a price-following variable to a supply-demand-leading variable. SMM New Energy Analyst: Lesley Yang yangle@smm.cn +61 0451581533

On June 9, a fire broke out at Chemical Grade Plant 3, or CGP3, at the Greenbushes lithium operation. The fire was quickly extinguished, no injuries were reported, and CGP1 and CGP2 continued to operate as normal. The following day, IGO confirmed that its FY2026 spodumene concentrate production guidance of 1.375–1.425 million tonnes remained unchanged. Chemical Grade Plant 4, or CGP4, is scheduled to commence construction in 2027. Viewed in isolation, this was a well-contained operational incident. However, the location of the fire deserves closer attention. CGP3 is not part of Greenbushes’ existing production base. It represents incremental supply currently ramping up at the far-left end of the global lithium cost curve. The project involved approximately A$880 million of investment and is designed to add around 500,000 tonnes per year of spodumene concentrate capacity. First ore was fed into the plant in December 2025, and the facility had originally been expected to reach nameplate capacity around mid-2026. The damage assessment is still under way. Neither the repair cost nor the recovery timeline has been quantified. The fact that production guidance remains unchanged should therefore be understood as an initial assessment rather than a definitive conclusion. The key question is not whether IGO has immediately revised its annual guidance. It is whether the CGP3 ramp-up schedule will be delayed. Should the market be concerned when an incremental production line at the world’s lowest-cost lithium mine experiences an operational disruption? To answer this question, it is useful to examine the role of Australian lithium mines in the broader lithium pricing mechanism. Note on the CGP3 ramp-up timeline: At IGO’s FY2026 second-quarter results briefing in late January 2026, management stated that CGP3 had received first ore in December 2025 and would require approximately five months to ramp up to nameplate capacity. Some English-language transcripts recorded management as referring to completion “by the end of the calendar year.” However, based on the timing of first ore feed, a five-month ramp-up period would imply completion around mid-2026, before the end of Australia’s FY2026 financial year. This is also consistent with the company’s previous guidance. The transcript may therefore have intended to say “by the end of the financial year.” This article adopts the mid-2026 ramp-up assumption. The timing is relevant because the June 9 fire occurred only weeks before the originally expected completion of the ramp-up. The actual impact should become clearer in IGO’s fourth-quarter report, which is expected in late July. Greenbushes: A Reference Point at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes’ most important advantage begins with ore grade. It is one of the world’s largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines currently in production. Its ore grade is approximately twice the industry average. For a spodumene operation, grade directly affects processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrate, Greenbushes needs to process materially less ore than a typical mine. This provides a structural advantage across mining, beneficiation, energy consumption and tailings management. Greenbushes also benefits from scale. The operation currently has several processing facilities, with combined nominal ore-processing capacity of around 6.5 million tonnes per year and spodumene concentrate capacity of up to approximately 1.5 million tonnes per year. Once CGP3 completes its ramp-up, the mine will add a further 500,000 tonnes per year of concentrate capacity. With the mine life extended to 2045, Greenbushes combines low costs with long-term supply capacity. This explains the mine’s resilience during the lithium price downturn. During 2024 and 2025, lithium prices declined sharply. A number of higher-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced production cuts or temporary shutdowns. Greenbushes, however, continued to maintain relatively strong profitability and moved ahead with the CGP3 expansion. Greenbushes does not represent the industry’s average cost. It represents the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium cost curve. For that reason, Greenbushes is better understood as a reference point for the bottom of the cycle. As lithium prices fall, higher-cost supply exits first, while low-cost assets remain in operation. The closer prices move toward the cost range of Greenbushes, the fewer marginal producers remain capable of operating normally, and the more advanced the supply-side clearing process becomes. This does not mean that lithium prices can never fall below the cost level of Greenbushes. In the short term, inventory pressure, liquidity conditions and market sentiment can push prices below the cost levels implied by the marginal supply curve. Greenbushes is not an absolute price floor. Its significance is that it provides a structural reference point for assessing how far supply-side clearing has progressed. Greenbushes: The Largest Producer, but with Limited Freely Traded Supply Although Greenbushes produces large volumes of spodumene concentrate, relatively little of that material enters the open spot market directly. The mine is operated by Talison Lithium. Talison is owned by Tianqi Lithium Energy Australia, or TLEA, and Albemarle. TLEA is in turn jointly owned by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. Greenbushes concentrate is primarily distributed through shareholder offtake arrangements and supplied into the downstream conversion systems of Tianqi, Albemarle and their respective partners. Under normal conditions, the material is not sold directly into the open market. Greenbushes therefore provides a useful example of why lithium supply should be analysed through several different layers: Resources → Design capacity → Actual production → Saleable volume → Freely traded spot volume Greenbushes ranks among the world’s largest producers by actual output. However, because most of its concentrate is locked into shareholder offtake arrangements, the amount available for open-market trading remains relatively limited. This means Greenbushes affects lithium pricing mainly through indirect channels. First, it determines the size of the lowest-cost portion of global lithium supply and therefore plays an important role in shaping the lithium chemical cost curve. Second, its operating costs, offtake pricing mechanism and expansion schedule provide reference points for long-term contract negotiations and price assessments in the spodumene market. By contrast, short-term spot prices are often more directly influenced by marginal resources that are not fully locked into shareholder arrangements and must actively seek buyers in the market. These include certain Australian mines, African lithium resources and trader-held cargoes. This explains an apparent paradox. An additional 500,000 tonnes of Greenbushes concentrate capacity can materially change the medium-term supply-demand balance, yet its immediate impact on the spot market may be limited. Meanwhile, the shutdown or restart of a marginal mine producing only 100,000–200,000 tonnes per year can quickly influence spot quotations and market sentiment if its output is sold on a market basis. Short-term pricing is not determined solely by total production. It is also shaped by the volume of material that is freely available for negotiation and immediate transaction. The same logic applies to lithium carbonate. Price elasticity depends not only on total inventory but also on how much inventory is genuinely available for circulation. The largest producer does not necessarily exert the most direct influence over the spot market. Short-term marginal pricing is usually driven by the resources that are tradeable, negotiable and available for immediate delivery. However, shareholder offtake does not mean that Greenbushes material is completely isolated from the market. If lithium conversion plants within the Tianqi or Albemarle systems reduce operating rates, or if downstream conversion assets experience operational issues, part of the concentrate originally intended for internal consumption may re-enter the market indirectly through tolling, resale or inventory adjustments. These volumes are rarely captured in public statistics, but they can affect the actual liquidity of the spodumene market. Tracking this material requires a broader set of indicators, including shareholder conversion-plant operating rates, concentrate inventories, tolling arrangements and import flows. This type of “shadow spot supply” is harder to observe than nominal mine production, yet it can become relevant at specific points in the cycle. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: The Direction of Price Transmission Reversed Within a Year The relationship between Australian spodumene concentrate prices and Chinese lithium chemical prices has completed a full cycle over the past year. During the first half of 2025, spodumene prices followed lithium chemical prices downward. Australian miners reduced costs materially in the first quarter but largely avoided production cuts. Mining companies remained willing to ship material, and the price of SC6 concentrate fell to around US$620 per tonne. Falling concentrate prices then placed additional pressure on lithium chemical prices, reinforcing the downward cycle. At the time, the key market question was straightforward: When would the mining sector finally reduce supply? The direction of transmission reversed in the end of third quarter. The announcement that 27 mining licences in Yichun could be cancelled, together with the suspension of the Jianxiawo mine, tightened expectations around domestic Chinese lithium supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first. SC6 prices then followed, with greater elasticity. By December, the monthly average price had recovered to around US$1,300 per tonne. Formula-based pricing mechanisms linked to lithium chemical prices allowed mining companies to capture a large share of the upside, while Chinese converters saw their processing margins squeezed. At the same time, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana lithium hydroxide project highlighted the challenges facing Australian downstream conversion. The project has faced difficulties in cost control, production ramp-up and operational stability. TLEA’s Kwinana lithium hydroxide refinery was fully impaired in mid-2025, the second train was suspended, and IGO made clear that it would prioritize mining. These developments reinforce Australia’s role as a supplier of spodumene concentrate rather than a major lithium chemical conversion hub. As a result, the relationship between SC6 prices and Chinese lithium chemical prices is likely to remain strong. However, the speed and magnitude of transmission will continue to depend on inventories, contract formulas, shipping cycles and converter operating rates. One of the most useful indicators is the implied conversion margin between SC6 concentrate and lithium chemical spot prices. When the implied conversion margin turns negative, Chinese converters purchasing third-party concentrate are effectively losing cash on incremental production. The market then needs to rebalance through at least one of three channels: Spodumene concentrate prices decline; Lithium chemical prices rise; Converters reduce operating rates. This indicator provides a useful way to judge whether bargaining power currently sits with the mining segment or the conversion segment. Australian Mine Restarts: Lithium Prices Develop an Upper Constraint The key theme for Australian lithium mines during 2024 and 2025 was supply-side clearing. In 2026, the theme has shifted toward reactivation. As lithium prices recovered during the first half of the year and futures briefly exceeded RMB 200,000 per tonne, a series of restart decisions emerged across May and June. Project Action Timing Key Point Bald Hill, Mineral Resources Restart after approximately 18 months of suspension Restart announced in May; first concentrate expected in July Restart cost of around A$20 million Ngungaju, PLS Processing plant restart Planned for July Approximately 200,000 tonnes per year of restored output Finniss, Core Lithium Final investment decision approved; financing secured Targeting first ore in the third quarter Financing package of approximately US$205 million Kathleen Valley, Liontown Expansion under assessment Ongoing Further details pending Mt Cattlin, Rio Tinto Remains suspended Suspended since March 2025 Restart conditions remain unclear Taken together, these cases show that the true threshold for mine restart is more complex than a simple comparison between lithium prices and cash costs. Bald Hill moved from restart announcement to expected first concentrate production in around two months. The mine had remained in a production-ready care-and-maintenance state, and Mineral Resources has its own mining-services platform, allowing it to mobilize mining, crushing and haulage internally without relying heavily on external contractors. This type of asset represents the fastest-reacting segment of supply when prices recover. Finniss is a different case. The project first monetized inventories through Glencore to improve liquidity, then assembled a financing package involving convertible debt, additional borrowings and equity issuance before reaching a final investment decision. For miners with weaker balance sheets, a restart is not simply an operational decision. It is a financing event. A low-price cycle does not eliminate the resource base. It eliminates the ability to finance production. The market impact of the restart wave is already visible. Lithium carbonate futures reached a two-year high of RMB 200,500 per tonne on May 13 before retreating to around RMB 160,000–170,000 per tonne in June. One reason for the pullback is that the market has begun to price in the return of idle supply. The mechanism is straightforward: Prices rise → Idle capacity restarts → Expected supply increases → Prices come under pressure The list of suspended Australian mines, once ranked by restart economics and response time, effectively becomes an upside supply curve for lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and the restart wave represent two sides of the same market. At the low-cost end of the curve, incremental Greenbushes supply has experienced an operational disruption, creating a bullish signal. At the higher-cost end, idle assets are returning to production, creating a bearish signal. From a resource perspective, lithium prices in 2026 are searching for equilibrium between these two forces. Lithium Prices in 2026 May Become More Volatile, but One-Way Trends Could Be Shorter Once prices rise, the factor that ultimately limits the upside is the speed at which idle capacity returns to the market. Bald Hill, Finniss and Ngungaju represent a broader pool of suspended or standby assets that can respond when lithium prices move sufficiently above their cash-cost thresholds and remain there for long enough. However, restart supply is not instantaneous. From the moment a restart is announced, companies need to remobilize personnel, inspect equipment, resume mining and processing, build concentrate inventories and arrange shipments. Depending on the asset, concentrate may enter the market within two months or only after several quarters. This delay creates a window during which supply disruptions can push prices higher. The suspension of the Jianxiawo mine and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes matter not because global lithium resources have suddenly become scarce, but because short-term freely available supply has tightened while idle capacity has not yet fully returned. Compared with the previous cycle, this risk-premium window appears to be shortening. An increasing number of mines are being placed on care and maintenance rather than permanently closed. Mining-services companies, traders and downstream customers are also becoming more involved in restart financing and offtake arrangements. Once prices move back above the relevant breakeven levels, some idle assets can return more quickly. This does not necessarily mean lithium prices will become more stable. Supply disruptions can still trigger rapid price increases. However, the duration and magnitude of one-way rallies are likely to face stronger constraints from restart expectations. Prices may become more volatile in the short term, but sustained unilateral trends could become shorter. Conclusion Australian lithium mines influence lithium prices through several distinct channels. Greenbushes provides a structural reference point at the bottom of the hard-rock lithium cost curve. However, because most of its output is absorbed through shareholder offtake arrangements, it does not directly determine short-term spot pricing. Spot-market tightness is more directly influenced by marginal saleable supply: Australian mines, African resources and trader-held inventories that are available for negotiation and immediate transaction. Once lithium prices rise, the speed at which suspended assets restart becomes the key constraint on the duration of the rally. The framework can therefore be summarized in three lines: Low-cost mines provide a structural reference point for the bottom of the cycle. Freely traded supply determines short-term spot-market tightness. The speed of mine restarts determines how long an upside cycle can last. The CGP3 fire and the restart wave sit at opposite ends of this framework. One represents a disruption to low-cost incremental supply. The other represents the return of higher-cost idle capacity. Lithium prices in 2026 will continue to seek equilibrium between these two forces. Lesley Yang Senior New Energy Analyst, SMM yangle@smm.cn

On June 9, a fire broke out at Greenbushes Chemical-Grade Beneficiation Plant 3 (CGP3). The fire was quickly extinguished with no casualties, CGP1 and CGP2 continued normal operations, and IGO confirmed the next day that its FY2026 concentrate guidance of 1.375 million to 1.425 million mt remained unchanged. CGP4 is planned to commence in 2027. Judging solely by the announcement, this was a well-handled operational incident. However, the location of the fire warrants closer attention: CGP3 is not existing capacity but incremental capacity being ramped up at the far left of the global cost curve – with a total investment of about AUD 880 million, designed to add approximately 500,000 mt/year of concentrate capacity, and which only achieved first feed in December 2025 and was originally expected to reach full production by mid-this year. The damage assessment is still ongoing, repair costs and timetable are yet to be quantified, and the so-called "guidance maintained" is based only on information from the initial stage of the incident. What merits tracking going forward is not the guidance itself, but whether the timing of reaching full production will be delayed. At the world's lowest-cost mine, a new production line has had a minor incident – should the market be concerned? Today, I aim to break down and clarify this mechanism by analyzing the role of Australian ore in the lithium price formation. Note: Clarification on the timeline for CGP3 reaching full production. At its FY26 Q2 results briefing in late January 2026, IGO stated that CGP3 achieved first feed in December 2025 and that ramp-up to nominal capacity would take approximately five months. Some English transcripts recorded management's remarks as "completing ramp-up before the end of the calendar year" (end of the calendar year). However, based on the timing of first feed, five months corresponds to mid-2026, i.e., before the end of the Australian financial year (FY26), which is consistent with the company's previously disclosed guidance of "reaching full production in mid-2026." The transcript likely mistook "end of the financial year" for "end of the calendar year." This article adopts the "mid-2026 full production" timeline. This timing implies that the June 9 CGP3 fire occurred a few weeks before the originally scheduled full production, and the actual impact will be confirmed in IGO's Q4 report (expected in late July). Greenbushes: A Benchmark at the Bottom of the Cost Curve Greenbushes' most fundamental advantage lies first in its ore grade. It is one of the world's largest and highest-grade hard-rock lithium mines in production, with raw ore grade roughly double the industry average. For spodumene mines, grade directly determines mining and processing efficiency. To produce one tonne of SC6 concentrates, Greenbushes needs to process significantly less raw ore than typical mines, giving it natural cost advantages in mining, beneficiation, energy consumption, and tailings management. Building on its high-grade ore, Greenbushes also benefits from economies of scale. The mine site now hosts multiple beneficiation plants with a combined nominal processing capacity of approximately 6.5 million mt/year, supporting a maximum lithium concentrate capacity of up to 1.5 million mt; once CGP3 has fully ramped up, it will add roughly 500,000 mt of additional concentrate capacity. With the mine life further extended to 2045, Greenbushes not only possesses low-cost advantages but also strong long-term supply capability. This is why Greenbushes has demonstrated significant resilience during the lithium price downturn. From 2024 to 2025, as lithium prices continued to pull back, many high-cost Australian mines and Chinese lepidolite projects faced pressure to suspend or cut production, yet Greenbushes maintained relatively sound profitability and continued to advance the CGP3 expansion. It represents not the industry's average cost, but the most competitive end of the global hard-rock lithium ore cost curve. Therefore, Greenbushes serves as a useful benchmark for observing the industry bottom. When lithium prices fall, high-cost capacity exits first, while low-cost capacity continues to produce. The closer prices move to Greenbushes' cost range, the fewer marginal units of capacity can sustain normal operations in the market, and the nearer supply exits are to completion. Greenbushes Has the Largest Production, but Limited Free-Float Volume Although Greenbushes has a very large production scale, relatively little of its concentrates can enter the spot market directly. Greenbushes is operated by Talison Lithium, whose shareholders include TLEA and Albemarle, with TLEA jointly held by Tianqi Lithium and IGO. The spodumene concentrates produced at the mine are primarily allocated under shareholder offtake arrangements, flowing to lithium chemical production lines within the shareholder systems of Tianqi, Albemarle, and others, and are not normally offered for direct sale to the market. Viewed through the framework of [Resources – Designed Capacity – Actual Production – Saleable Volume – Available Spot Volume], Greenbushes is a very typical case. Its actual production ranks among the world's largest, but since most of its concentrates are locked up within its shareholder system, the volume truly available for market-based transactions is relatively limited. This also means Greenbushes' influence on market prices is mostly indirect. On one hand, it defines the scale of global low-cost lithium resource supply, which has an important impact on the lithium chemical cost curve; on the other, its operating costs, offtake pricing, and expansion pace also serve as key references for long-term lithium ore contract negotiations and price assessments. By contrast, what really influences spot lithium ore prices in the short term are typically the marginal resources not fully locked up by shareholder offtake agreements and needing to find buyers on the market. These include some Australian mines, African lithium ore, and saleable cargo held by traders. Therefore, while the addition of approximately 500,000 mt of concentrate capacity at Greenbushes will alter medium and long-term supply-demand expectations, its short-term impact on the spot market may not be particularly pronounced. In contrast, the suspension or resumption of a marginal mine with an annual output of over 100,000 mt that primarily sells on the open market could rapidly influence spot quotes and market sentiment. It is well known that short-term prices are not entirely determined by total output; rather, they depend more on the volume of material freely available for trading in the market. For example, lithium carbonate's price elasticity hinges more on the current available volume in the market. The mine with the largest output does not necessarily hold the most direct pricing power in the spot market; what truly dictates short-term marginal prices are typically resources that are available, negotiable, and require immediate transaction. However, shareholder offtake does not mean such concentrates are completely isolated from the market. When smelters within the frameworks of shareholders like Tianqi and Albemarle reduce their operating rates, or when some smelting lines operate erratically, concentrates originally intended for internal consumption may indirectly enter the market through toll processing, resales, or inventory adjustments. These cargoes are usually not publicly tallied but affect the actual circulating volume in the lithium ore market. Their tracking requires assessment by combining shareholder smelter operating rates, concentrate inventory, toll processing arrangements, and import flows. In analyzing Australian ore supply, such shadow spot cargoes are often harder to observe than a mine's nominal production, yet can significantly influence the market during specific phases. SC6 and Lithium Chemicals: Transmission Direction Reversed Once Within a Year The price transmission relationship between Australian ore concentrates (SC6, CIF China) and China's lithium chemicals has completed a full round trip over the past year. In H1 2025, ore prices followed the downtrend. In Q1, Australian mines aggressively cut costs but did not reduce production, showing a strong willingness to sell. SC6 fell all the way to around $620/mt, and the lower concentrate prices, in turn, pressured lithium chemicals downward, forming a spiral. The market's concern at the time was: When would mines finally be willing to cut? The situation reversed starting at the end of Q3. The announcement of Yichun's plan to cancel 27 mining rights, along with the suspension at Jianxiawo, tightened expectations for domestic resource supply. Lithium chemical prices moved first, and SC6 followed with an uptrend that proved even more elastic—by December, the average price had already returned to around $1,300/mt. Formula pricing, linked to lithium chemical prices, allowed the mining side to capture the bulk of the upside gains, while the tolling margins of Chinese smelters were instead compressed. Meanwhile, the impairment and expansion adjustments at the Kwinana project reflect that lithium chemical conversion in Australia continues to face high hurdles in terms of cost control, production ramp-up, and operational stability. TLEA's Kwinana lithium hydroxide plant was fully impaired in mid-2025, with the second-phase construction halted, and IGO has clearly shifted its priority to mining. The role of Australian ore in the industry chain has been refixed as a supplier of concentrates, and the linkage between SC6 and Chinese lithium chemical prices will only tighten going forward, not decouple. The implied smelting margin—calculated by multiplying SC6 by the processing coefficient and comparing it to spot lithium chemical prices—has turned negative, meaning Chinese smelters using externally purchased ore are losing cash. Either ore prices must pull back or lithium chemical prices must rise; one of the two is inevitable. This indicator is the most powerful gauge of whether mines or lithium chemicals hold more pricing power. Australian Mine Production Resumptions: Price Breaks Through the Ceiling The key words for Australian ore in 2024-2025 were market exits, while in 2026 they have become revivals. Lithium prices have been climbing steadily since the beginning of the year, with futures prices once surpassing 200,000 yuan/mt, triggering a series of production resumptions in May and June: Project Action Timing Notes Bald Hill (MinRes) Resumed production after an 18-month shutdown Announced in May, first concentrates expected in Jul Restart cost approximately A$20 million Ngungaju Plant (PLS) Restart Planned for Jul Resuming roughly 200,000 mt/year Finniss (Core Lithium) FID approved, financing secured Targeting first ore in Q3 Financing approximately $205 million Kathleen Valley (Liontown) Evaluating expansion In progress — Mt Cattlin (Rio Tinto) Remains shut down From Mar 2025 to present Restart conditions not yet clarified Looking at these cases together, the real threshold for resuming production is more complex than simply having prices exceed cash costs. Bald Hill took only about two months from announcement to first ore because it had maintained a production-ready state throughout the shutdown, and MinRes's own mining services division could internally mobilize all operations—mining, crushing, and transport—without needing to wait for external contractors. Assets of this type are the quickest-responding supply when prices rise. Finniss, by contrast, was an entirely different situation: it first sold inventory to Glencore in exchange for liquidity, then cobbled together three financing instruments—convertible bonds, debt, and a share placement—before reaching FID. For mines with fragile balance sheets, resuming production is not an operational decision but a financing event; what low-price cycles destroy is not resources, but financing capacity. The market consequences of the resumption wave are already visible. Lithium carbonate hit a two-year high of 200,500 yuan/mt on May 13, then pulled back to the 160,000–170,000 yuan range in June, partly because the market saw resumption supply coming back. The logic is straightforward: when prices rise, idle capacity resumes production, supply expectations increase, and prices pull back. That list of idle capacity in Australia, when sorted, essentially forms the supply curve above lithium prices. The CGP3 fire and this wave of production resumptions are actually two sides of the same market: disruption to the incremental supply at the far left of the cost curve is bullish, while idle capacity at the right end accelerating its return is bearish. Looking at lithium prices this year from the resource perspective, equilibrium is being sought between these two forces. Lithium prices in 2026 are expected to fluctuate more frequently, but one-sided market moves will be shorter. After prices rise, what truly caps the height of the rally is the speed at which idle capacity re-enters the market. Projects under care and maintenance or on standby, such as Bald Hill, Finniss, and Ngungaju, essentially constitute elastic supply above lithium prices. When lithium prices return above the cash costs of these projects and stay there long enough, mines have the incentive to resume production. But production resumptions do not happen instantly. From the announcement of a restart to the rehiring of personnel, equipment maintenance, resumption of mining and processing, inventory buildup, and finally, the entry of concentrates into the market, it typically takes from two months to several quarters. This time lag is the window during which supply disruptions can drive prices higher. The suspension at Jianxiawo and the CGP3 fire at Greenbushes were able to affect market sentiment not because of a sudden global shortage of lithium resources, but because of a reduction in short-term available supply while idle capacity had yet to return. Compared to the previous cycle, it is worth noting that the window for risk premiums arising from resource-side disruptions is shortening. A growing number of mines are opting for care and maintenance rather than permanent closure; mining service companies, traders, and downstream enterprises are also participating in restart financing and offtake arrangements. As long as prices return above the break-even line, some idle capacity can resume more quickly. This means that in the future, lithium prices may still rise rapidly following supply disruptions, but the duration and height of one-sided market moves will be more easily constrained by production resumption expectations. Prices may not necessarily become more stable, but supply feedback could be faster. SMM New Energy Analyst Yang Le