Saudi Finance Minister, Mohammed Al-Jadaan, has cautioned that recent global supply chain disruptions are now exceeding the impact seen after the COVID-19 pandemic. He noted that ongoing geopolitical tensions could have wider economic consequences if they continue for an extended period of time. He pointed out that while oil markets often draw the most attention, the pressure is becoming more visible across key industrial sectors such as refined products, fertilisers, steel, aluminium and petrochemicals.

Silver's performance over the past year has been nothing short of spectacular.

At the 2025 SMM (2nd) Global Renewable Metal Industry Chain Summit - Main Forum hosted by SMM Information & Technology Co., Ltd., Allen Cui, Director of SMM Nonferrous Consulting, shared insights on the topic of "Prospects for the Development of the Global Secondary Metal Industry."

Recently, silver prices have embarked on an upward trend, attracting market attention.

The Trump administration was ambitious in its energy policies. US Treasury Secretary Bentsen once publicly introduced his "3-3-3 Plan," which aimed to increase the real GDP growth rate to 3%, reduce the annual budget deficit from 7% of GDP to 3%, and boost US domestic oil production by 3 million barrels per day (bpd). However, economists and energy experts have warned that Bentsen's goals have little basis in reality. Despite the Trump administration's policies favoring fossil fuels, US oil production is likely to remain flat or decline, as low oil prices make it unprofitable for oil companies. Commodity experts at Standard Chartered Bank predict that US crude oil supply may decline by 158,000 bpd in 2025 and by 183,000 bpd in 2026, ending the growth momentum of the past four years under the Biden administration. Previously, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas noted in a survey that the breakeven point for US shale oil producers is a WTI crude oil price of $65 per barrel. Over the past month, WTI prices have mostly remained below this breakeven point, partly due to the OPEC+ alliance's decision to increase production. What do the data reveal? Standard Chartered Bank analyzed four reasons for its pessimism about US oil production growth from four data dimensions. First, according to the revised monthly data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), US crude oil production reached a record high of 13.488 million bpd in March. However, the average daily increase over these three months was only 30,000 bpd, compared to a growth of 270,000 bpd in 2024. The EIA, which is usually seen as optimistic about production growth, also predicts that US crude oil production will increase slightly from 13.2 million bpd in 2024 to 14 million bpd in 2027, an increase that is only about a quarter of what Bentsen promised. Secondly, according to data from energy company Baker Hughes, the number of US oil rigs has decreased by 41 this year and by 50 on a YoY basis. Part of the decline is due to improvements in drilling technology and processes, but Standard Chartered warns that this downward trend has persisted for 30 months. In addition, the number of frac crews has also plummeted to 186, a significant decline from the 300 crews during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the number of drilled but uncompleted (DUC) wells has also halved from the pandemic peak in June 2020, reaching a low of 4,494 in February this year before stabilizing. The number of frac crews can serve as a supplementary indicator for measuring US shale oil and gas production, while the DUC well count may be a leading indicator of any shifts in completion activity. A decline in the DUC well count suggests that drilling activity is weakening. From a data perspective, it is evident that US energy companies have significantly reduced their investments in drilling to preserve profits and remain accountable to shareholders. The immediate impact of this decision may be a stabilization or decline in US energy production, thereby exerting upward pressure on oil prices.

According to Wells Fargo's mid-2025 outlook report, precious metals will continue to benefit from geopolitical conflicts and economic uncertainties, with gold prices expected to hit a record high of $3,600 per ounce in 2026. Analysts noted in the report that the significant correction in commodity prices presents attractive opportunities later this year and into 2026. Additionally, they anticipate that improvements in the US economic conditions later in 2025 will drive growth in commodity demand. Wells Fargo recommends that investors pivot to sectors that may benefit from an improving macro environment, such as energy or precious metals, and adjust their portfolios to hedge against policy and geopolitical uncertainties. Exercise patience Wells Fargo emphasized in the report that rapid changes in economic policies over the past few months have disrupted investors and capital markets. Since the 2024 US elections, uncertainty surrounding US economic policies has continued to escalate, primarily due to tariff volatility, with recent uncertainties surpassing those during the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysts highlighted that these uncertainties are expected to continue driving gold prices higher over the next two years, as private investors and global central banks will continue to purchase gold. By 2026, central banks alone are expected to account for 21% of global gold demand. Meanwhile, US short-term interest rates are expected to decline in 2026, and the US dollar is also expected to rebound mildly, which will further strengthen the upward trend in precious metal prices. However, analysts also caution that investor optimism about precious metals' rise has reached levels historically preceding significant corrections, leading them to prefer exercising patience and waiting for price dips before buying. The bank expects gold prices to pull back slightly to a range of $3,000 to $3,200 by the end of this year, with the outlook for gold prices rising to $3,600 per ounce by the end of 2026. Analysts also recommend that investors focus on quality factors rather than speculative assets and diversify their portfolios through commodities like precious metals, which may outperform broader market indices. Chantelle Schieven, Managing Director of Capitalight Research, also believes that due to the resilience of the US economy and labour market, gold prices may stagnate throughout the summer but will oscillate near high levels. However, considering the inflationary impact of tariffs, she expects the US to face stagflation risks over the next two years, which will support gold prices.

Precious metal traders at top-tier banks, including JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley, have just achieved their best performance in five years in the first quarter, partly due to arbitrage opportunities that triggered a significant influx of gold bars into the US. According to data compiled by Crisil Coalition Greenwich, 12 major banks in the industry collectively generated $500 million in revenue from precious metals businesses in Q1 2025, the second-highest figure in a decade. The market intelligence firm stated that this figure is roughly double the average quarterly earnings over the past decade. Part of this windfall came from the high premium on gold in the US market during Q1, as concerns about potential US tariffs on precious metals led traders to rush large quantities of gold and silver into the US in advance. As previously reported by Caixin, in Q1, the prices of gold and silver futures on the New York Mercantile Exchange (Comex) surged to levels significantly higher than those of London gold, the international benchmark. This meant that traders could purchase gold bars in trading centers such as London, Switzerland, or Hong Kong, China, and then ship them to the US to profit before tariffs took effect. This even led to weeks-long queues for gold bar withdrawals from the Bank of England's vaults. Officials overseeing the London gold market received anxious calls from many bankers and traders, urging for streamlined processes. A similar situation occurred in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic grounded commercial flights, creating sustained arbitrage opportunities for banks seeking ways to transport gold bars to New York. According to exchange data, Morgan Stanley delivered more gold than any other bank when settling its proprietary Comex positions, delivering a total of 67 mt of gold. At current market prices, this batch of precious metals is valued at approximately $7 billion. In addition, JPMorgan Chase, as a major trader of precious metals, once delivered gold worth over $4 billion to settle gold futures contracts in February, marking the largest single-day delivery notice in Comex history. Arbitrage trading only came to an abrupt halt in April after gold was excluded from Trump's reciprocal tariff plan. Many banks engaged in gold and silver trading—particularly JPMorgan Chase—have historically excelled at profiting from transatlantic price dislocations. Five years ago, unprecedented arbitrage opportunities helped JPMorgan's metals trading division achieve record revenues of $1 billion in 2020. Angad Chhatwal, Head of Fixed Income, Currencies, and Commodities (FICC) at Coalition, stated that the volatility triggered by Trump's tariff plan also generated revenue for these 12 major banks. In recent years, amid the astonishing surge in gold prices, which have doubled since the end of 2022, trading volumes in the London market have also been growing.

Last Friday, Eastern Time, the latest non-farm payrolls report released by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics brought relief to Wall Street. The report showed that the seasonally adjusted non-farm payrolls in the US in May reached 139,000. Although this marked the lowest level since February, it was still higher than the market expectation of 130,000. Meanwhile, the US unemployment rate remained at 4.2% for the third consecutive month, which also eased concerns that the labour market was beginning to slow down significantly. However, US economists warned that the impact of Trump's tariffs on US employment may not truly manifest until July or August. Therefore, it may be too early for Wall Street and the US Fed to let their guard down. It's too early to relax now. As early as last Thursday, Eastern Time, Joe Brusuelas, chief economist at RSM, wrote in his report: "We believe it is too early for the (May non-farm) employment report to reflect the negative impact of trade policies. This impact will only be fully reflected in the employment reports for July and August ." Although US President Trump announced global tariff policies as early as on "Liberation Day" (April 2), due to the frequent changes in Trump's trade policies and the delays caused by economic transmission, the far-reaching impact of tariffs on the US economy and job market may not be fully felt until midsummer. Joe Brusuelas also stated that the current US job market has already shown an overall cooling trend, initially reflecting the impact of tariffs. US business owners may be waiting and seeing. In fact, "resilience" was once a key word for the US economy during the COVID-19 pandemic. This characteristic also applies in the current phase of trade conflicts. Similar to the COVID-19 period, the current US economy shows a trend of maintaining low layoff rates and stable business activity. However, with the implementation of tariffs, economic data for May has already begun to show signs of a slowdown in US hiring and manufacturing output data. Although Wall Street analysts expect the US labour market not to collapse, the labour market may also increasingly exhibit a state of "hesitation" and "stagnation" —because business employers are increasingly realizing that the best strategy in this period of uncertainty is to wait and see—that is, neither to lay off employees on a large scale nor to increase hiring. This trend has also been clearly reflected in the non-farm payrolls data: although the unemployment rate has not surged significantly, the growth in non-farm payrolls has declined month by month. This is actually not good news for the US economy—although the labour market will not collapse, the prolonged hiring freeze by companies will also have a negative impact on the economy. "We are approaching an inflection point, and concerns about stagflation may penetrate into a broader market level," said Chris Zaccarelli, Chief Investment Officer of Northlight Asset Management. "We are seeing a decline in productivity, a slowdown in economic growth, and at the same time, signs of rising (or sticky) inflation."

At the 2025 Indonesia Mining Conference & Critical Metals Conference - Tin Session , Chen Peng, Senior Tin Analyst at SMM, discussed the theme of changes in the global tin industry chain landscape and future development trends. 1. Global Tin Resource Distribution and Supply Landscape Intensified Resource Scarcity: Static Mining Lifespan Less Than 15 Years China accounts for 22% of global tin ore reserves but contributes 45% of global production, with resource development intensity exceeding critical thresholds. • Global tin resources are highly concentrated, with China, Indonesia, and Myanmar collectively accounting for over 50%. China, as the largest producer (45% of production), and Indonesia form a dual-core driving force, yet with significant differences in resource endowments. Tin Ore Segment: Global tin ore production is also primarily concentrated in countries with high reserves • Global tin ore production is mainly concentrated in countries such as China, Indonesia, Myanmar, and the DRC. • Except during the COVID-19 pandemic period, global tin ore production has consistently remained at the level of 300,000 mt in metal content annually. Tin Ore Segment: Tin ore imports continued to decline in 2025, with cumulative YoY imports for January-April 2025 at -47.98%. The contraction of tin ore supply from Myanmar has become a long-term trend. • The market generally expects that Wa State may resume production by mid-2025, but the initial increase will not exceed 10,000 mt in metal content, and it will require a 2-3 month transmission period. The progress of production resumption will be constrained by Sino-Myanmar mining trade negotiations and the centralization process in Wa State. Tin Ore Segment: Myanmar's Dominance Weakens, Diversified Landscape Accelerates • Before 2023: Myanmar once accounted for 72%-85% of China's tin ore imports. However, after the implementation of the mining ban policy in Wa State in August 2023, its supply volume plummeted. By 2024, Myanmar's import share dropped to 48.1%, and further declined to 24%-30% in 2025. The core mining area, Mansang (accounting for 80% of Myanmar's supply), remains in a state of suspension. • Emergence of Alternative Sources: Imports from Africa (DRC, Nigeria), South America (Peru, Bolivia), and Australia have increased significantly. For example, in 2025, the import share from the DRC rose to 28%, Nigeria's import share reached 11%, and Australia's imports surged by 101% YoY. The 20-day moving average of recent tin ore import profit margins has remained stable. ►Risk Point Reminder: African Supply Chain Stability to Be Verified: Operational risks at Alphamin mine in the DRC (short-term suspension in April 2025). Global Refined Tin Landscape Features "Asia-Dominated, South America-Supported, Africa-Supplemented" • In the global tin industry chain, most smelting and refining activities are concentrated near tin ore production sites. Countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Thailand, the DRC, Bolivia, and Brazil all have smelters of a certain scale, with China and Indonesia accounting for a relatively high proportion. The production resumption process in the Wa region of Myanmar has commenced, but due to the impact of earthquakes and rising policy implementation costs, the actual increase may fall short of expectations. The core contradiction in the tin ore event chain in the DRC lies in the game between geopolitical conflicts and resource dependence. Risk Points: Stability of the African supply chain to be verified: As the largest importer, China's refined tin industry chain is significantly affected by disruptions in the DRC, while the growth in demand for AI, new energy, etc., further exacerbates the supply-demand imbalance. 2. Global Tin Consumption Structure and Demand Evolution Terminal Segment: Tin Consumption Structure • In the global tin consumption structure, tin solder accounts for 48%, tin chemicals 16%, lead-acid batteries 7%, and tin alloys 7%. • In China's tin consumption structure, tin solder accounts for 67%, tin chemicals 12%, lead-acid batteries 7%, and tinplate 6%. Terminal Segment: The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index (SOX) shows a significant negative correlation with the real yield of 10-year US Treasuries. AI demand has driven the capacity utilisation rate of semiconductor companies to record highs. • In the past two years, the SOX has shown a significant negative correlation with the real yield of 10-year US Treasuries, primarily driven by liquidity expectations and valuation pressures. • In 2024, the capacity utilisation rate of the US computer and semiconductor industry remained stable at 76.53%-78.44%, close to the average over the past 10 years (76.72%). In specific segments, the semiconductor capacity utilisation rate reached 95% in Q1 2025, a record high, reflecting the supply-demand tension driven by AI demand. Terminal Segment: The cumulative YoY growth rate of PVC resin production has dropped back slightly, while key enterprises producing tinplate have operated smoothly throughout the year. • The construction of commercial housing is not an isolated process; it is usually accompanied by an increase in demand for building materials. Despite two consecutive years of decline in the sales area of commercial housing, completion demand and policy support (such as ensuring timely delivery of housing projects and infrastructure investment) have driven PVC consumption growth, with a "weak positive correlation" maintained between the two in the past two years. • In the past two years, the tinplate industry has exhibited a differentiated pattern of "shortage in the high-end segment and surplus in the low-end segment". Leading enterprises have consolidated their advantages through technological upgrades and export markets, while small and medium-sized enterprises face integration pressures. However, overall production has remained at a relatively stable level and is expected to maintain its current magnitude in the future. 3. Inventory Cycle and Supply Chain Resilience Building Inventory Link: China's tin ingot social inventory exhibits significant cyclical characteristics •From February to March 2025, inventory showed an alternating pattern of "increase-decrease", mainly due to the release of downstream restocking demand coupled with fluctuations in SHFE tin prices. •Inventory changes in tin ingots are highly correlated with prices, seasonal demand (e.g., the "September-October peak season"), and policy adjustments (e.g., production restrictions in smelting), exhibiting a cyclical pattern of "inventory buildup in H1 and destocking in H2". It also elaborated on the inventory levels within China's tin industry chain. 4. Changes in the Global Tin Industry Chain Landscape and Future Development Trends In 2024, the global tin market was characterized by "regional shortages and a slight global deficit" The tin market achieved a tight balance amid supply disruptions and demand differentiation in 2024, and is expected to shift towards a slight surplus in 2025. However, structural contradictions (uneven regional supply recovery, emerging demand growth) will dominate price fluctuations. The market should closely monitor the pace of production resumptions in Myanmar, Indonesia's exports, and the semiconductor industry's recovery, while guarding against unexpected shocks from macro policies and geopolitical risks. ►SMM Outlook •In 2024, the global tin ingot market was characterized by concurrent supply contraction and weak demand recovery. Affected by factors such as the suspension of mining operations in Myanmar's Wa region and delayed approval of Indonesia's export quotas, global tin ore production declined YoY. However, the release of unreported inventory and the supplementation of recycled tin alleviated supply pressures, leading to a slight increase in annual refined tin production to approximately 374,000 mt. On the demand side, weak recovery in the semiconductor industry and a slowdown in PV growth dragged down global consumption to around 373,000 mt, resulting in a supply-demand gap of approximately 11,000 mt. •In 2025, expectations for production resumptions in Myanmar (with potential output increases in H2) and full production at new projects in the DRC and China will drive supply growth. On the demand side, the upward trend in the semiconductor cycle, coupled with the application of AI technology and growth in NEVs, may increase global consumption to 375,000 mt. However, growth in traditional sectors (e.g., tinplate, home appliance exports) will slow down to 2.1%-3.5% due to trade frictions. The annual supply-demand gap may narrow to 5,100 mt, but geopolitical risks (Myanmar's political situation, Indonesia's exports) may exacerbate volatility. 》Click to view the special report on the 2025 Indonesia Mining Conference & Critical Metals Conference

Data released by Eurostat on Tuesday showed that the eurozone's inflation rate fell more than expected to 1.9% in May , below the European Central Bank's (ECB) policy target of 2%. Economists surveyed beforehand had expected a rate of 2%, following April's rate of 2.2%. (Source: Eurostat) The statistics also revealed that core inflation, excluding energy, food, tobacco, and alcohol, dropped to 2.3% in May from 2.7% in April. The closely watched services inflation also cooled significantly, falling to 3.2% from 4% the previous month. Unlike the brief dip below 2% in the eurozone's inflation rate in September last year, economists generally expect Europe's inflation rate to stabilize near the target level. In the face of tariff conflicts, the bigger question is even whether inflation will fall significantly below 2% in the future. (Eurozone inflation rate, Source: tradingeconomics) The ECB is set to release its latest interest rate decision in two days, with market expectations pointing to the eighth interest rate cut since June last year. Simultaneously updated economic forecasts are also likely to revise down inflation expectations and economic growth outlook . In March this year, the ECB had expected inflation to hover above the 2% target this year, only falling to 1.9% next year. Currently, the eurozone's deposit facility rate, main refinancing rate, and marginal lending rate stand at 2.25%, 2.40%, and 2.65%, respectively. All three rates may be further cut by 25 basis points on Thursday . The market is also referring to this week's meeting as the "last easy rate cut," implying that future decision-making will become increasingly challenging. Currently, most EU goods face a 10% US tariff, which could surge to 50% by July. Contrary to the concerns of US Fed officials about "Trump tariffs" driving up prices, ECB officials are focused on the impact of trade wars in suppressing inflation. Potential reasons for the continued decline in European inflation include tariff-induced suppression of European goods exports, along with the appreciation of the euro (against the US dollar) and weakening oil prices due to a slowdown in global economic growth. Given the uncertainties surrounding trade developments, the ECB will also provide scenario analysis when releasing its quarterly forecasts on Thursday. Meanwhile, European policymakers are also monitoring the inflationary effects of Germany's large-scale stimulus policy. Katharine Neiss, Europe's chief economist at PGIM Fixed Income, pointed out that the ECB is transitioning from addressing high inflation to a new phase filled with uncertainties comparable to those during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. This means that central banks must be vigilant about the dual risks of inflation fluctuating around the 2% target. Philip Lane, the chief economist of the European Central Bank, recently stated that if the institution is within its "normal central bank policy range," it is unlikely that the key policy interest rate will fall below 1.5%, as there would be no need to prevent inflation from staying persistently below the 2% target by stimulating economic growth. He also said, "Further interest rate cuts would only be appropriate if there were more severe downside risks to inflation or a more significant slowdown in the economy."