The Full End of the Philippines' Rainy Season, Coupled With the Fuel Emergency, May Put Downward Pressure on Nickel Ore Prices The Full End of the Philippines' Rainy Season, Coupled With the Fuel Emergency, May Put Downward Pressure on Nickel Ore Prices This week, Philippine nickel ore prices edged down. In terms of prices, Philippine nickel ore CIF China quotations were $64-67/wmt for Ni 1.3% grade, $71-74/wmt for Ni 1.4% grade, and $78-81/wmt for Ni 1.5% grade. The average CIF price from the Philippines to Indonesia was $65.5/wmt for 1.3% grade and $72.5/wmt for 1.4% grade. Weather side, weather conditions in the Philippines improved significantly this week WoW. Rainfall in major mining areas such as Surigao, Homonhon, and Tawi-Tawi trended lower, while Zambales and Palawan remained relatively dry. This shift indicated that major mining areas had gradually entered the mining season, releasing room for nickel ore supply. Demand side, despite elevated freight costs, several Chinese smelters had already started procurement. As of Friday, March 27, nickel ore inventory at Chinese ports stood at 4.63 million mt, down 190,000 mt WoW. Current total port inventory was equivalent to about 36,400 mt Ni in metal content. Demand side, domestic NPI prices were basically flat this week, while spot transaction prices fell by about 1,083.5 yuan per nickel unit. Smelters' acceptance of high-priced raw materials had peaked, which may prompt slight concessions in CIF prices, and nickel ore FOB and CIF prices are expected to be more likely to fall than rise in the short term. Indonesia Market: Delayed RKAB Approval Progress, Coupled With Expectations for Policy Transition, Is Expected to Further Lift the Price Center of Nickel Ore This week, prices of Indonesia's local nickel ore rose. Indonesia's nickel ore benchmark price (HPM) for the second half of March was set at $17,329/dmt, up 1.32% MoM. According to SMM's Indonesia nickel ore premium data, average premiums for 1.4%, 1.5%, and 1.6% grade laterite nickel ore were quoted at $36, $40, and $40.5/wmt, respectively. Among them, the domestic-trade port-arrival price for 1.6% grade was $67.6-74.6/wmt. The simultaneous strengthening of both premiums this month reflected the release of smelters' restocking demand and pessimistic expectations over RKAB quota cuts, while the delivered price of 1.2% grade limonite ore also edged up in tandem to $25-27/wmt. From supply and demand fundamentals, as of March 27, 2026, weather conditions across Indonesia's nickel mining areas were as follows: Morowali was expected to see cumulative rainfall of 0.065-0.08 this week, and strong thunderstorms would severely affect open-pit mining and ore transportation; Konawe had scattered showers, with rainfall of about 0.03-0.045 this week; Halmahera was the most stable, mainly cloudy with light rain. The market is currently facing a clear trend of declining grades. Although some NPI smelters had begun accepting nickel ore with grades of 1.45% and below, saprolite ore remained tight in March. At present, as of mid-March, ESDM had approved about 100 million mt of RKAB nickel ore quotas, and the remaining 160 million-170 million mt is expected to complete approval before month-end. However, due to the Eid al-Fitr holiday from March 18 to 24, approval progress may be delayed, making it difficult for the tight supply situation to ease in the short term. Demand side, as some Indonesian smelters faced resource uncertainty and had difficulty obtaining high-grade nickel ore, prices remained strong. To secure raw material supply, some smelters even raised trading bonuses. In addition, some transactions of low-grade humic soil ore also emerged in the market, with fixed prices relatively lower than those of high-grade ore. Limonite ore prices remained at low levels, mainly due to the tailings dam landslide accident at an MHP project in a certain industrial park, which kept related production lines running at low operating rates and hindered the rebound in demand. However, considering RKAB uncertainty, stockpiling demand from new projects, and growing demand from outer islands, limonite ore prices are expected to stay high later by following saprolite ore. Policy side, although rumors about the implementation and delayed release of the new tax regime continued, the specific implementation rules were still under internal review by relevant ministries. Although execution details for specific products such as NPI and MHP still awaited finalisation across ministries, current policy signals may indicate that the era of tax-free exports for Indonesia's nickel intermediate products is about to come to an end. Looking ahead, Indonesia's continued policy tightening is expected to open upside room for nickel ore prices and have a profound impact on the cost structure of the global nickel supply chain.

This week, the weekly operating rate of leading downstream aluminum processing enterprises in China rebounded 1.1 percentage points MoM to 64%.

Concluding our series, we shift focus to 2026's emerging NdFeB growth drivers: robotics, low-altitude economy, and electric two-wheelers. While viewed as the "second growth curve," we analyze their actual demand support amidst current macro and industry cycles to determine if they can offset traditional sector slowdowns.

Recent volatility in the Indonesian commodities sector has been driven by mixed signals regarding new fiscal policies. Market participants are currently evaluating the implications of two distinct regulatory mechanisms: a broader windfall tax on bulk commodities like coal, nickel, and a targeted export duty. The conflation of these two policies has generated significant market uncertainty, culminating in a sharp spike in global nickel prices this week. To understand the current market anxiety, which culminated in a sharp spike in global nickel prices this week, it is essential to unpack the timeline of these policy discussions, differentiate the fiscal mechanisms at play, and assess the likelihood of their implementation. Background: From Broad Windfall Deliberations to Targeted Export Tariffs The narrative surrounding new commodity taxes in Indonesia did not emerge overnight; rather, it has evolved through distinct phases of policy signaling. The current policy discourse has evolved in phases. Initial discussions, highlighted by statements from Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto on Mar 13, 2026, focused on the potential implementation of a windfall tax. This broader fiscal measure was aimed at capturing excess margins from exporters of coal, palm oil, and base metals, such as nickel, gold, and copper during periods of elevated global prices, functioning primarily as a macroeconomic revenue-generation tool. However, the conversation shifted dramatically on March 25, 2026. According to Bloomberg, news broke that Indonesia’s President had officially approved an export tax specifically targeting coal and nickel. This headline acted as an immediate catalyst, sending LME and SHFE nickel prices spiking. The confusion currently gripping the market stems from the conflation of these two distinct policy trajectories: the older, revenue-focused windfall tax concept championed by economic ministers, and the newly approved, strategically focused nickel export tax aimed at forcing further downstream industrialization. Analysis & Understanding: The Precedent of the "Windfall Tax" To accurately gauge the impact of these rumors, it is critical to understand that the concept of a "windfall tax" is not entirely unprecedented in Indonesia's regulatory framework, particularly for bulk commodities. There has actually been a windfall tax structure in place previously, though often masked under the nomenclature of progressive royalties and non-tax state revenues (PNBP). For the coal sector, the government already utilizes a tiered royalty system pegged to the Harga Batubara Acuan (HBA) benchmark. As coal prices escalate into higher brackets, the royalty percentage automatically increases, effectively acting as a windfall capture mechanism. Similarly before, the nickel sector utilizes the Domestic Benchmark Price (HPM) and associated royalty structures to adjust to global price rallies. It is crucial to note that the government has previously experimented with specific windfall profit provisions for downstream products, though the regulatory stance has recently hardened. For instance, under Government Regulation (GR) No. 26/2022, a unique windfall profit incentive was applied to nickel matte: when prices exceeded $21,000 per ton, the royalty rate was actually reduced from the standard 2% to 1%. (Old Version) However, this accommodating policy was explicitly abolished under the recent GR No. 19/2025. The removal of this incentive underscores a definitive shift toward more aggressive state revenue capture. Consequently, the recent "windfall tax" rumors primarily concern further tightening these existing brackets or introducing a supplementary surcharge on operating margins above a specific baseline. (New Version) Conversely, the newly approved nickel export tax serves a different primary function. Therefore, it is completely different than the concept of windfall tax. Rather than merely earning from peak profits, an export duty on semi-processed nickel (like NPI, MHP, FeNi, and Nickel Matte) is a structural tool designed to penalize the export of lower-value products. It is the natural continuation of Indonesia’s downstreaming ( hilirisasi ) agenda, intended to force producers to build stainless steel and EV battery precursor plants domestically in Indonesia, rather than shipping intermediate goods to other countries. While a windfall tax fluctuates with market prices, an export tax acts as a permanent structural cost added to the global supply chain. Conclusion: Imminent Implementation Amidst Ongoing Deliberations Despite definitive headlines regarding executive approval and the targeted April 1, 2026 implementation date, the exact implementation details are currently under review by the relevant ministries. Currently, specific details, including exactly how the proposed 5%, 8%, and 11% tiers might translate from coal to specific nickel material classifications (e.g., NPI, MHP, and high-grade matte), must be urgently finalized ahead of the April deadline. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), the Ministry of Finance, and the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment Affairs are working to balance state revenue optimization with the need to maintain the global cost-competitiveness of domestic smelters. This deliberative phase should not be interpreted as a policy reversal. According to SMM's understanding and industry checks, the implementation of these fiscal measures is highly probable. While the exact rollout of tariffs may be structured to mitigate immediate operational shocks to the domestic smelting sector, the fundamental policy direction indicates that the era of tariff-free exports for intermediate nickel products might decisively coming to an end.

New figures from Austria's energy regulator, 'E-Control', reveal the country installed 1,634 MW of new 'PV' capacity in 2025, a 22% decline from 2024, bringing its cumulative capacity to 9.9 GW. 'PV Austria' warned that annual additions must consistently hit 2 GW to reach the nation's 100% renewable electricity goal by 2030. Industry experts blame the slowdown on the government's early abolition of the 'VAT' exemption for small rooftop systems, 'stop-and-go' funding policies, and grid expansion delays. To revive the market, installers are urgently calling for streamlined storage regulations, proportionate fire safety rules, and dynamic grid fees to support a combined solar-plus-storage approach.

【SMM Scrap Aluminium Market Analysis】Navigating the Choke Point: How Middle Eastern Geopolitics are Rewiring Global Aluminum Scrap Flows I. Introduction: The Macroeconomic Catalyst The global secondary aluminum market is currently navigating a severe logistical gauntlet. While physical smelting and processing facilities across the Middle East are facing their own localized pressures, the maritime arteries connecting the region to the rest of the world are fundamentally compromised. With vessel traffic heavily restricted through traditional waterways like the Red Sea, carriers are executing widespread, mandatory rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. T his geographical detour has introduced hard, quantifiable friction into global trade flows. Transit times from Europe and the Middle East to major Asian main ports have stretched by an additional 12 to 14 days. Consequently, freight costs per container have also reported increases by up to 60-70%. Beyond the immediate ticket price of shipping, this delay translates to millions of dollars in working capital abruptly tied up in floating inventory, severely squeezing liquidity for global traders. To understand the future of secondary aluminum pricing and availability, the market must look at how this disruption cascades across the supply chain. The logistical fallout has created a massive supply shock that is permanently altering working capital dynamics and regional pricing. This structural shift can be traced from Western supply hubs, through the starved processing centers in Southeast Asia, and ultimately to the end-user markets in China and Other Asia, where tightened margins are reshaping the landscape of global scrap procurement. II. The Middle East: The Epicenter of the Bottleneck The Middle East serves as a critical reservoir of scrap aluminum, and current export metrics underscore the massive scale of the material caught in this logistical bottleneck. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia stand as the undisputed dominant suppliers in the region. Recent mirrored customs data shows the UAE exporting upwards of 309,000 metric tons (MT) in 2025, while Saudi Arabia commands a similar volume, exporting over 277,000 MT in 2024 and up to 260,000 MT by October 2025. Historically, a massive majority of this tonnage has been earmarked for Asian buyers, flowing seamlessly through previously unencumbered maritime routes. India and Korea respectively have been the top 2 export destinations for both the UAE and Saudi Arabia since 2020, with both Asian destinations encompassing a total of 81% for Saudi Arabia’s (2020-2024) and 74% for the UAE’s (2020-2025) total exports of scrap aluminum. Mid-tier exporters further supplement this outward flow. Nations such as Israel (exporting roughly 88,000 to 95,000 MT annually) and Kuwait (over 41,000 to 44,000 MT), alongside consistent volumes from Jordan, Bahrain, and Iran, collectively push significant supplementary tonnage into the global market. Similar to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s situation, South Asia and South Korea remains the most affected: between the years 2020 to 2025, India, Pakistan and South Korea import 60% of the Middle Eastern mid-tier exporters’ scrap aluminum. However, getting this material onto the water, especially through the Strait of Hormuz has become increasingly complex, expensive and operationally untenable. In response to the waterway risks, localized workarounds are emerging: suppliers are increasingly bypassing traditional choke points by trucking upstream material overland to alternative, safer ports before loading it onto eastbound vessels. Meanwhile, traditional transit bridges are feeling the strain. Typical scrap flows rely on the Red Sea in the Middle East to ship scrap between Europe and Asia, and this traditional trade route is feeling the strain from the current war in the Middle East. Although the Houthis in Yemen have not enforced shipment closures through the Red Sea, the threat of them doing so in extension of Iran’s closure of the Straits of Hormuz is enough to force certain companies and insurance policies off of Middle Eastern shipment routes, and to reroute around Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. This leads to partial extensions of freight times for up to 12-14 days, and some 60% to 70% surge in per container shipment costs between Europe and Asia. The extended transit time is not just a scheduling issue; it translates to millions of dollars in working capital abruptly tied up in floating inventory. As outward flows from the Middle East and Europe slow down under these compounding pressures, the knock-on effect creates an immediate feedstock starvation for the processing hubs waiting further East. III. Asia: The Primary Impact Zone While the logistical friction originates in the West, the financial and operational shockwaves are most acutely felt in the "Other Asia" region, specifically within the Indian and South Korean markets. These nations serve as the primary off-takers for Middle Eastern scrap, and the sudden disruption to their traditional supply lines has triggered a rapid repricing of the market. India: Demand Absorbing the Freight Shock India represents the most immediate example of a market forced to reconcile surging logistics costs with robust domestic demand. As a direct result of the freight spike and logistical difficulties, CIF India prices for key imported grades from Europe like Tense and Taint/Tabor have seen approximately $50 USD per metric ton price hikes over the past week. Critically, this cost burden is not being borne by the sellers alone. Analysis of the current buyer/seller split suggests that recent increases in Indian domestic demand for scrap are providing significant upward pressure on prices. This has allowed a portion of the inflated freight costs to be absorbed by Indian buyers who are prioritizing material security over margin preservation. However, this absorption is not infinite; the $50 USD spike is beginning to significantly tighten margins for local secondary producers, raising concerns about how long this price elasticity can be maintained if transit delays persist. Korea and Japan: Strategic Stockpiling and Regional Procurement In East Asia, the response to the Middle Eastern bottleneck has been characterized by strategic stockpiling and a pivot toward Southeast Asian (SEA) supply. As both Japan and South Korea commonly purchase scrap and secondary products (like ADC12) from the Middle Eastern region, there is a sudden need to replace material sources that have been disrupted directly by the US/Israel-Iran conflict. Primary market intelligence from Southeast and East Asia has seen Japanese (and to a smaller extent, Korean and Indian) players engaging in large-scale procurement of secondary products from Southeast Asia at significant prices. SMM’s data reveals that over the first and second weeks of the Middle Eastern conflict, ADC12 CIF Japan prices have seen significant rises, reaching highs at 3350-60 USD/mt between the 11 th to 17 th of March 2026. This coincides with large amounts of stock clearance and/or signing of procurement deals that extend up till mid-April to early-May. These purchases are occurring at high price points, driven by robust Japanese demand that is effectively outbidding local processors. This "procurement blitz" is rapidly depleting regional liquidity, leaving Southeast Asian hubs starved of the very feedstock they traditionally rely on to serve their own domestic industries. Thailand local ADC12 prices have been observed to be lagging behind FOB prices by 100-200USD/mt, creating a supply starvation for local downstream needs. As of the 26 th of March, market intelligence has revealed a possible second wave of procurement from East Asian nations in Southeast Asia due to increasing worries over the extended war. Prices for ADC12 FOB Thailand and Malaysia deals have been stabilizing around the 3200-3230 USD/t mark as demand slowly creeps back up for both local and foreign demands. Thailand local and FOB ADC12 prices have just closed the gap to be roughly equal, and deals can be observed both within Thailand and exporting towards East and South Asian markets. IV. China: The Regional Exception While the rest of Asia grapples with supply starvation and skyrocketing premiums, China remains a notable outlier in the current crisis. Historically, China’s secondary aluminum sector has maintained a lower direct reliance on Middle Eastern scrap compared to its neighbors in South and East Asia, providing an initial layer of insulation. However, the primary reason for China’s relative stability is internal: a combination of sluggish domestic demand and historically high inventory levels. As of late March 2026, China’s social aluminum inventories have reached a five-year high, effectively acting as a massive buffer against global supply shocks. Furthermore, the LME-SHFE arbitrage window has remained largely unfavorable for primary imports, keeping Chinese buyers on the sidelines. On the secondary side, the lack of specificity and details regarding the reverse invoicing policy have generally led to the secondary aluminum market shifting towards a more passive stance. Downstream demand for secondary aluminum has pivoted towards immediate and small amounts of material to reduce risks associated with reverse invoicing, leading to weak demand within China. While higher global freight costs have increased the baseline cost for any incoming material, the lack of domestic "buy-side" pressure means that China has avoided the aggressive price spikes seen in India, Southeast Asia and Japan. For now, the Chinese market is a spectator to the volatility, characterized more by weak spot fundamentals and unclear policy than by the procurement panic gripping the rest of the continent. V. Strategic Outlook: The New Reality of Trade The current landscape suggests that the global aluminum scrap market is moving toward a "new normal" characterized by higher logistical floors and reduced liquidity. Increasing political and institutional instability in Iran and the wider Middle East creates ever-increasing tension and uncertainty for global trade through the Middle East. The transition from the Middle East to the Cape of Good Hope could possibly no longer be a temporary detour but a structural shift that traders must eventually consider as a safer alternative. In extension to the Middle Eastern conflict, the endurance of the "procurement blitz" in East Asia will serve as a bellwether for the long-term stability of scrap flows in Asia. If the inventory buffer in Southeast Asia remains depleted by aggressive Japanese and Korean bidding, the upward price pressure on Indian buyers will likely move from a temporary spike to a permanent baseline. Local downstream industries from Thailand and Malaysia might also find it hard in the medium-long term to cope with constantly spiking ADC12 prices and competition from East and South Asia. Ultimately, the traditional metrics of secondary aluminum pricing, such as the LME-SHFE spread or local collection rates, are being overshadowed by the premium on logistical certainty. As available aluminum scrap becomes increasingly scarce due to supply disruptions in the Middle East and increased costs for material from Europe, this creates price-side pressure for both producers and downstream industries across Asia. This leads to a zero-sum environment in which increasing costs are either burdened by buyers through increasing prices, heightened competition and larger local-export arbitrages that put pressure on local downstream industries, or burdened by producers and traders through shrinking margins and intense inter-producer competition. As the market adapts to this fragmented landscape, the value proposition of a successful trader is fundamentally shifting: it is no longer defined solely by the ability to source metal, but by the ability to guarantee its arrival through an increasingly volatile and high-risk global supply chain.