[SMM Chrome Weekly Review: Transactions Softened, Ferrochrome Temporarily Stable, Futures Raised and Chrome Ore Remained Firm] March 27, 2026: Ferrochrome and chrome ore prices saw no adjustments for the time being...

Rising diesel and gasoline prices in Chile are increasing operating costs for copper mining, particularly in transport and heavy equipment usage. Higher fuel costs are putting pressure on margins and project viability.

Combined for January and February 2026, China’s cumulative chrome ore imports reached 4.0144 million tons, up 13.2% year-on-year. Breakdown by origin: imports from South Africa were 3.2422 million tons (up 6.2% year-on-year), imports from Turkey were 184,700 tons (up 55.8% year-on-year), and imports from Zimbabwe were 400,000 tons (up 70.3% year-on-year).

Iran’s threat to drive oil prices up to $200 a barrel may sound like hyperbole, but as the energy crisis persisted, that outcome already looked more likely than US President Trump’s prediction that oil prices would soon pull back to pre-war levels… The conflict involving Israel and the US against Iran entered its third week — and escalated into one spanning the entire Middle East — yet the global oil benchmark’s response so far was surprisingly “mediocre.” Brent crude oil was currently trading near $100 a barrel, up about 65 from the start of the year. Although that level would have been unimaginable just a few weeks ago, it still remained below last Monday’s brief peak of nearly $120. Given that since the conflict began, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz had trapped about one-fifth of global oil supply — roughly 20 million barrels a day — crude oil prices should, in theory, have been much higher. That seemed to suggest investors still retained a degree of trust in Trump , betting that the crisis would be resolved quickly and that the Strait of Hormuz would soon reopen — whether it was called the “Trump put,” the “TACO trade,” or “buy Trump,” many oil traders appeared to be wagering that the president would ultimately be able to limit the market damage. “When this is over, oil prices will come down very, very quickly,” Trump said on Monday this week. Yet that optimism looked increasingly difficult to reconcile with realities on the ground — whether on a battlefield where the conflict was intensifying, or in the physical oil market, where supply bottlenecks were steadily spreading. Signals Being Overlooked In fact, the physical crude oil market was sending an increasing number of stress signals, even though the international benchmark “paper oil” market had so far largely ignored them. Although trade had stalled under the impact of the Iran conflict, Middle Eastern crude benchmarks still surged to record highs, making them the most expensive crude in the world. The spike in these benchmark indicators, which are used to price millions of barrels of Middle Eastern crude sold to Asia, was raising costs for Asian refiners and forcing them to seek alternatives or make further production cuts in the coming months. S&P Global Platts said Dubai spot crude assessments for May-loading cargoes hit a record $157.66 a barrel on Tuesday, surpassing the previous all-time high of $147.5 set by Brent crude oil futures in 2008. That left Dubai crude’s premium to swaps at $60.82 a barrel, compared with an average premium of just 90¢ in February. Meanwhile, Oman crude oil futures hit a record high of $152.58 per barrel on Tuesday, with its premium to the Dubai swap set at $55.74 per barrel, versus an average premium of just 75¢ in February. Oman crude oil is exported from a terminal outside the Strait of Hormuz. This surge reflected massive uncertainty over actually available supply in the Middle East after Iran repeatedly attacked Oman's oil terminal and the UAE's major oil export terminal of Fujairah outside the Strait of Hormuz. Are Brent and WTI Failing to Reflect the "True Severity" of the Oil Market? As JPMorgan's head of commodities, Natasha Kaneva, pointed out in her latest research note on Tuesday , there was a clear mismatch between international benchmark crude pricing and the Middle Eastern geography of the supply disruptions. The core issue was that Brent and WTI are benchmark indicators at opposite ends of the Atlantic basin, while the current shock is concentrated in the Middle East. As a result, these benchmark crude prices were particularly influenced by relatively loose regional fundamentals—commercial oil inventory in both the US and Europe were ample in early 2026, and supply across the Atlantic basin was also relatively abundant in the short term. In addition, expectations for a release from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)—as well as a partial release that will soon materialize—further eased prompt tightness in Brent- and WTI-linked markets. By contrast, Middle Eastern crude benchmarks such as Dubai and Oman more accurately reflected the current dislocation in the physical market. Dubai and Oman spot prices were both trading above $150 per barrel, underscoring the severity of crude oil shortages originating in the Gulf region. These Middle Eastern oil prices were directly affected by export disruptions and therefore more effectively reflected marginal supply deficits than Atlantic-linked crude prices. Crucially, trade geography intensified this dynamic. Most of the crude transported via the Strait of Hormuz goes to Asia—before the outbreak of the Middle East conflict, about 11.2 million barrels of crude and 1.4 million barrels of refined products flowed through the strait to Asia each day. As a result, the direct physical shortage—and the surge in oil prices—was concentrated in Asian markets most dependent on Gulf crude. In fact, early signs of demand destruction had already emerged in Asia as product prices surged and spot crude became prohibitively expensive. JPMorgan noted that timing effects further reinforced this divergence. A typical voyage from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to Asia takes about 10 to 15 days, while cargoes bound for Europe via the Suez Canal require nearly 25 to 30 days, or 35 to 45 days if rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope. Therefore, the impact of disrupted Gulf flows would hit Asian markets sooner and more severely, while Atlantic Basin benchmarks such as Brent and WTI would enjoy a longer buffer because of surplus inventory and slower supply adjustments. The US, with crude oil production exceeding 13 million barrels per day, would be affected the least. JPMorgan believed that, in this context, the apparent price stability shown by Brent and WTI should not be taken as evidence of adequate global supply. It reflected a temporary buffer created by regional surplus inventory, benchmark composition, and policy intervention. In fact, for refiners, especially those in Asia, the current crude oil shortage had already become a serious problem. About 60% of the region’s crude oil imports depended on the Middle East, and the difficulty of finding alternative, timely supplies was rapidly becoming acute. The pressure had already forced many countries into painful adjustments. Refiners across Asia had begun cutting run rates to conserve dwindling inventory. Some countries had banned exports of refined products, a defensive move that could further tighten the global market. As the crude oil shortage worsened, refined product prices surged. Asian jet fuel prices were approaching $200 a barrel, near the record high of about $220 reached earlier this month. The Crisis Could Spread Further Ultimately, this crisis was expected to extend beyond Asia. Data from analytics firm Kpler showed that Europe accounted for about three-quarters of Middle Eastern jet fuel exports shipped through the Strait of Hormuz last year—about 379,000 barrels per day—but since the conflict began, no such cargoes had passed through the strait. Unsurprisingly, jet fuel barge prices in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp refining hub had surged to a record $190 a barrel, exceeding the previous peak set after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022. The comparison with the Russia-Ukraine crisis may be even more compelling. Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Russia supplied about 30% of Europe’s crude oil imports and one-third of its refined product imports. As traders feared Europe would lose supplies from one of the world’s largest oil producers, Brent crude rose to $130 a barrel after the Russia-Ukraine conflict—even though that worst-case scenario never fully materialized in the end. By contrast, according to Morgan Stanley, the physical disruption caused by the Iran conflict had already exceeded that level of concern by more than threefold. Even if the Strait of Hormuz were to reopen immediately, it would not bring immediate relief. According to the International Energy Agency, about 10 million barrels per day of production in the Middle East has been shut in since the conflict began. Restoring these flows will take weeks, if not months. To be sure, the oil market entered the Iran conflict in a relatively loose state, and the International Energy Agency had projected that global supply would exceed demand by about 3.7 million barrels per day. But that surplus has now been erased by the current turmoil. Last week, the International Energy Agency announced plans to release a record 400 million barrels from member countries' strategic petroleum reserves, which will help cushion the initial shock. But drawing down inventories cannot substitute for deliveries of new oil. In other words, the supply shock to the oil market is real and may persist. Once the Strait of Hormuz finally reopens, oil prices could initially plunge in a relief rebound, but given the harsh realities of the physical market, traders may need to think twice before betting that the return to normalcy promised by Trump is about to arrive…

◼ At the beginning of 2026, Musk’s SpaceX plan for 100 GW of annual space PV capacity ignited the A-share market, with multiple concept stocks rising by more than 30 in a single month. At the same time, however, earnings previews from leading PV companies generally showed losses for 2025, and industry fundamentals remained in a deep winter. Behind the stark divergence between the speculative frenzy around the Musk-SpaceX concept and the earnings trough, is the market overly expecting a “second growth curve,” or is this a genuine signal of industrial transformation? ◼ As the global PV industry moves from rapid expansion into a new stage of rational development, its value has gone beyond that of clean energy alone: Against the backdrop of explosive growth in AI computing power driving massive electricity demand, compounded by energy security anxiety triggered by geopolitical conflict in the Middle East, developing PV may become a core strategic choice for countries to achieve their “dual-carbon” goals, build autonomous and controllable energy systems, and reduce electricity costs for end-users. ◼ Since the escalation of the U.S.-Iran conflict at the end of February, the world’s four major benchmark crude oil prices have entered a rapid upward trajectory. Before the outbreak of the conflict, oil prices had remained broadly stable; however, starting on March 2, as the fighting expanded and spread to the Persian Gulf, oil prices immediately entered a sharp uptrend. Note: Shanghai crude oil prices are converted based on the settlement-date exchange rate of 1:0.15. Source: Public information, SMM. ◼ Although the impact borne by different regions varies due to differences in energy mix, geopolitical location, and policy response, the surge in imported crude oil costs driving a broad rise in energy prices has become a common challenge facing all countries. Europe is a case in point. Although Europe’s direct dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil was not high, at only about 5 according to data from energy market intelligence firm Kpler, it remained highly dependent on the region for refined products such as diesel and aviation kerosene, as well as liquefied natural gas. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz caused by the conflict directly pushed up Europe’s terminal energy prices—fuel prices at gas stations across the region surged, and natural gas prices broke above EUR 60 per megawatt hour on the 9th, reaching a new high since 2022. The continued rise in energy prices is bound to transmit into broader areas of the economy, increasing overall inflationary pressure and once again underscoring the importance of building secure and controllable energy systems. Accelerating the Clean Transition of the Global Energy Mix, the PV Industry Advances Toward High-Quality Development ◼ The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that, despite economic pressure, global electricity demand momentum remains strong in 2025, with growth rates in 2025 and 2026 expected to be 3.3% and 3.7%, respectively. Data from 2020 to 2025 showed that the global power market followed a trajectory of continued overall growth alongside structural transition toward cleaner energy , with the share of renewable energy sources such as solar rising significantly, although fossil fuels still accounted for the dominant share. ◼ According to the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions Scenario, solar power’s share in the energy mix is expected to rise from less than 2% at present to 12% in 2035 and 28% in 2050. This means PV installations are still far from reaching their ceiling, with substantial room for future growth. ◼ The past five years marked a critical period in which the global PV market shifted from rapid expansion toward rational development. The IEA forecasts that total global new PV installations over the next five years will reach about 3.68 TW, accounting for nearly 80% of new renewable energy additions over the same period, and are expected to become the world’s largest renewable energy source by the end of 2030. This is mainly due to its widening economic advantages—by 2024, the cost of solar PV power generation had already fallen 41% below the cheapest fossil fuel alternative, and these cost advantages are driving rapid growth in both PV installations and power generation share. Source: IEA, public information, SMM. ◼ As a key carrier of PV installations, especially the backbone of utility-scale power plants, solar panel mounting bracket installations are expected to maintain annual average growth of 5%-6% alongside installation growth. Specifically, to achieve annual average new PV installations of 500-600 GW, corresponding module demand is estimated at about 550-700 GW based on the capacity ratio. Assuming a conventional 1:1 module-to-bracket configuration, the annual average installation scale of brackets required for utility-scale PV plants alone would reach at least 250-300 GW. Source: public information, SMM. Escalating Challenges Reshape the Development Logic of the Global PV Market ◼ The PV industry is undergoing resonating internal and external pressures. Internally, the global economic slowdown has become intertwined with social issues, while the industry itself has entered a rational development stage after rapid expansion, making slower installation growth a certain trend. Externally, global trade frictions continue to intensify, with the US, Europe, and other regions erecting nearly insurmountable cost gaps through barriers such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties as well as local content requirements. Challenge 1: Global Trade Frictions and Escalating Trade Barriers ◼ In recent years, countries have introduced a series of policies to build PV trade barriers and reshape the global competitive landscape of the industry. The US imposed “double anti-” duties of as much as 3,403.96% on PV products from four Southeast Asian countries, South Africa raised module tariffs to 10%, and Brazil increased out-of-quota tariffs sharply from 9.6% to 25% through a quota system. Market access requirements for PV in India and Türkiye have also become increasingly stringent. Meanwhile, new supply chain control rules represented by the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) have extended trade barriers deeper into the industry chain. By setting red lines on “third-country dependence,” they have established quantitative standards for supply chain restructuring. This series of changes has reshaped the competitive dimensions of the international PV industry and significantly raised the threshold for PV product imports and exports. Source: public information, SMM. Challenge 2: New Dynamics in the PV Market, with Incentive and Restrictive Policies Coexisting Source: public information, SMM. Outside China Enterprises Pursue Multi-Dimensional Breakthroughs Through Internal and External Efforts ◼ The practices of solar panel mounting bracket enterprises in the US, India, and other countries show that the key to coping with policy shifts overseas lies in combining “service-oriented” and “high-value” strategies. First, vertically extending from single-equipment sales to a service ecosystem covering the entire life cycle. Second, deepening horizontally by continuously optimizing business structure and extracting value from higher value-added segments. Solution 1: Launch Dedicated Plans Closely Aligned with Government Policies and Local Demand ◼ The global PV industry has now entered a new stage deeply reshaped by both market forces and policy. The growth logic of enterprises is shifting from the past single dimension of relying on technology iteration and cost declines to multi-dimensional competition closely integrating complex policy environments with localized demand. Against this backdrop, the key to corporate success lies in accurately interpreting policy intentions and launching development plans aligned with both market and policy. Tata Power Renewable Energy Limited (TPREL) precisely aligned with India’s “PM Surya Ghar: Muft Bijli Yojana” and launched the dedicated “solar for every home” plan while continuing to provide customized PV solutions. In Q1 FY2026, it added 220 MW of new rooftop PV installations, surging 416% YoY. TPREL also actively responded to local manufacturing policies by establishing 4.3 GW of solar cell and module capacity, ensuring supply while avoiding import tariffs. Through the synergy of “policy response + local capacity + customized services,” TPREL has effectively translated policy dividends into market competitiveness and steadily consolidated its leading position in India’s PV market. Solution 2: Use Acquisitions as a Link to Integrate Resources and Extend from Single Products to the Entire Industry Chain ◼ Competition in the global PV industry has fully escalated into a contest of entire industry chain system integration capabilities, and enterprises’ growth engines are shifting from past reliance on advantages in a single segment to a new model of providing integrated solutions through resource integration. In 2025, Nextracker used acquisitions as the core to integrate resources across the full chain, successively acquiring foundation engineering firms such as Solar Pile International and Ojjo, module supporting firms such as Origami Solar, and electrical system firms such as Bentek, thereby building a full-chain product matrix spanning structural, electrical, and digital solutions. Its performance continued to surge, with revenue rising from $1.9 billion in FY2023 to $3.4 billion in the trailing twelve months ended September 2025. It ultimately announced its transformation into a comprehensive energy solutions provider by renaming itself Nextpower, targeting revenue of more than $5.6 billion in FY2030. This strategy enabled its successful transformation from a single-product supplier into an entire industry chain service provider, solidifying its leading position in the global market. Solution 3: Optimize Business Structure ◼ Trade protectionism in the current PV market continues to intensify, with various trade barriers being layered on one after another. In response to this challenge, PV enterprises can achieve the dual objectives of “compliant operations” and “market retention” through business structure optimization. To avoid the equity constraints on FEOC under the US OBBB Act, Canadian Solar Inc. initiated a US business restructuring with its controlling shareholder CSIQ: it established two new joint ventures to separately manage PV and energy storage businesses, with its own stake set at 24.9% to precisely meet compliance requirements. At the same time, it transferred out 75.1% equity in three overseas plants supplying the US market, receiving a one-off consideration of 352 million yuan. This move enabled Canadian Solar Inc. to retain earnings from the US market through dividends and rental income. In the first three quarters of 2025, it achieved net profit of 990 million yuan, while large-scale energy storage shipments rose 32% YoY. After the adjustment, it focused on strengthening its advantages in non-US markets and successfully stabilized its global business layout with a compliant structure, providing a typical model for the industry in addressing trade barriers. ◼ For Chinese enterprises, in the face of trade frictions and overseas capacity gaps, they need to break through via three paths—“building plants near core markets, reducing costs and improving efficiency through technological innovation, and coordinating both within and outside the industry chain”— by pursuing localized deployment in Southeast Asia, Mexico, and other regions to avoid frequent trade frictions; promoting standardized production and high-end product R&D to enhance competitiveness; and building a “China + overseas” dual-circulation supply chain to stabilize costs. However, overseas expansion still faces challenges such as land and environmental protection costs, talent shortages, and supply chain fluctuations, requiring enterprises to conduct sound risk assessments, leverage policy support, and improve overseas investment service systems. Only by deeply integrating scientific capacity deployment, technological innovation, and industry chain coordination can the mounting bracket industry upgrade from “Made in China” to “Globally Intelligent Manufacturing” and achieve long-term development under the “dual carbon” goals. New Requirements Under the 15th Five-Year Plan, New Topics for PV Enterprises ◼ In a global market full of uncertainties, the consistency and strength of domestic policy have provided fertile ground for the growth of China’s solar panel mounting bracket enterprises. The newly released 15th Five-Year Plan further clarified China’s path for energy and industrial development. On the one hand, the construction of a new-type power system centered on consumption capacity has been listed as a priority task, and green manufacturing and full life cycle management have been formally incorporated into the assessment system. On the other hand, technological self-reliance and self-strengthening together with new quality productive forces have replaced scale competition as the main line of the new development stage. This series of changes signals that the country is driving a profound shift from “competing on capacity” to “competing on system value,” with the core goal of achieving autonomous and controllable energy structure. It is estimated that after the Two Sessions, various departments will successively roll out detailed plans to promote the full implementation of the blueprint. ◼ Key implementation measures include: 1) establishing a “dual controls” system for total carbon emissions and carbon intensity, while improving incentive and restraint mechanisms; 2) vigorously developing non-fossil energy and promoting the efficient use of fossil energy, while strengthening the construction of a new-type power system to ensure stable supply of green electricity; 3) applying both “addition and subtraction” by fostering green and low-carbon industries and promoting energy conservation and carbon reduction in key industry; 4) in addition, accelerating the green transformation of production and lifestyles to consolidate the foundation for green development. ◼ From the perspective of regional development layout, during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, China’s PV industry will show characteristics of regional coordination: north-west China will become the strategic focus by virtue of its natural endowments, exporting electricity through cross-provincial green electricity trading and other means to achieve two-way matching between energy resources and power load; eastern regions, by contrast, will focus on local consumption by high-energy-consuming industries and zero-carbon industrial parks. Source: public information, SMM. ◼ SMM forecasts that China’s new PV installations are expected to reach 208 GW in 2025 and continue growing at an annual average rate of 9% over the next five years, exceeding 292 GW by the end of the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Utility-scale PV will remain dominant, with its installation share staying above 50%. Based on the same logic, we estimate that China’s PV installation market will maintain annual incremental growth of at least 100-120 GW. Source: public information, SMM. ◼ Focusing on China’s steel consumption market for solar panel mounting brackets, SMM estimates that annual steel consumption in China’s PV mounting bracket sector will average about 4-4.5 million mt from 2026 to 2030, accounting for about 30% of total steel consumption in the PV industry over the same period (based on 2026 data). Note: only installation demand for utility-scale PV mounting brackets is included, excluding distributed steel structures, replacement from existing asset depreciation, and exports. Source: public information, SMM. SMM Ferrous Consulting Based on its understanding of the global steel industry chain and regional markets, as well as its strong industry database and network resources, SMM is committed to providing clients with consulting services across the upstream, midstream, and downstream industry chain. Services include market supply and demand research and forecasts, market entry strategies, competitor cost research, and more, covering end-use industry from iron ore, coal, coke, and steel. SMM Ferrous has successfully served more than 300 Fortune Global 500 companies, China Top 500 companies, central state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises, publicly listed firms, and start-ups. Data Source Statement: Except for public information, all other data are processed and derived by SMM based on public information, market communication, and SMM’s internal database models, and are for reference only and do not constitute decision-making advice. *This report is an original work and/or compilation work exclusively created by SMM Information & Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “SMM”), over which SMM lawfully enjoys copyright, protected by the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China and other applicable laws, regulations, and international treaties. Without written permission, it may not be reproduced, modified, sold, transferred, displayed, translated, compiled, disseminated, or otherwise disclosed to any third party or licensed to any third party for use in any form. Otherwise, upon discovery, SMM will pursue legal liability for infringement by legal means, including but not limited to claims for breach of contract liability, disgorgement of unjust enrichment, and compensation for direct and indirect economic losses. All content contained in this report, including but not limited to news, articles, data, charts, images, audio, video, logos, advertisements, trademarks, trade names, domain names, layout designs, and any or all other information, is protected by the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, and other relevant laws and regulations, as well as applicable international treaties relating to copyright, trademark rights, domain name rights, proprietary rights in commercial data and information, and other rights, and is owned or held by SMM and its relevant rights holders. Without prior written permission, no organization or individual may reproduce, modify, use, sell, transfer, display, translate, compile, disseminate, or otherwise disclose the above content to any third party or permit any third party to use it in any form whatsoever. Otherwise, upon discovery, SMM will pursue legal action to hold the infringing party liable, including but not limited to requiring the assumption of liability for breach of contract, disgorgement of unjust enrichment, and compensation for direct and indirect economic losses. The English translation of the above text is:

[SMM Hot Topic] Estimated “Cliff-Like” Drop in China’s Steel Exports—A Ramadan Pattern or a War Shock? As mentioned above, [Persian Gulf Shutdown? The Impact of the U.S.-Iran Conflict on Global Steel Trade] amid the US–Iran conflict, global steel trade was shaken and reshaped. Another topic that has recently been widely discussed in the market is: what impact will this war have on China’s total export volume? Before going into detail, it is important to remind everyone that the current focus has largely remained on geopolitical conflict, while often overlooking that this period coincides with Ramadan, a seasonal trough. Therefore, to quantify the war’s actual impact more accurately, SMM conducted corresponding “dehydration” adjustments based on ferrous panoramic shipping data. Most Direct Impact: A Deep Shortfall on the Shipping Side Data Source:SMM Ferrous Metal Shipping According to the table above, in the absence of war, during Ramadan 2025, China’s average weekly shipments to Gulf countries were about 327,000 mt, while the average weekly shipments in the month after Ramadan ended were 450,400 mt. Therefore, keeping average weekly shipments at around 300,000 mt during Ramadan is considered a “normal contraction” level. By further comparing the same-period data for 2026 and 2025, we can precisely calculate the quantified impact caused by the war. As of the latest date, in the first 20 days of Ramadan, China exported and shipped only 5,000 mt, with a weekly average of only 1,750 mt. Estimation logic: If there were no war, based on a neutral assessment using the 2025 Ramadan benchmark, total shipments in the first 20 days should have been about 930,000 mt; therefore, the war resulted in shipment losses of about 925,000 mt. Therefore, we can conclude that the more than 99% plunge on the shipping side was most likely caused by the war (route blockades, shipowners’ risk aversion), and the Ramadan factor is almost negligible in the face of such a massive decline. Delayed Effects on the Arrival Side Data Source: SMM Ferrous Metal Shipping In addition to the impact on the shipping side, SMM ’s ferrous panoramic shipping data also showed that after operations were suspended at multiple ports, a combination of factors—such as vessels being unable to berth and unload—led to a decline in the total volume of steel arriving at ports. As of the latest date, average weekly arrivals were about 220,200 mt, down by roughly 82,000 mt/week from 302,200 mt over the same period last year. Estimation logic: assuming no war impact and using a neutral assessment based on the 2025 Ramadan benchmark, cumulative arrivals in the first 20 days should have been about 863,400 mt, implying a cumulative shortfall of about 234,000 mt. Cause breakdown: it is expected that the decline on the arrivals side was not as pronounced as that on the shipments side, because among these 12 arriving vessels, most carried orders that had already been dispatched before the full outbreak of the war or in the early stage of the situation (Jan 25–Feb 25). Therefore, this 234,000 mt gap was mainly due to war-driven route detours (delays) and partial port shutdowns. Data Source: SMM Ferrous Metal Shipping In summary, based on the data, we can conclude that Ramadan was merely the “backdrop,” while the war was the “main cause.” If the impact were only from Ramadan, we should still have had about 300,000 mt of steel shipped to the Gulf each week. The reality, however, is that since Feb 18, our average weekly shipments have plunged to less than 2,000 mt. This means that, within the currently observed gap, shipment losses of more than 900,000 mt were entirely caused by war-related order stagnation or shipping lane disruptions. The 27% decline currently seen on the arrivals side is only the beginning; the real “vacuum period” will fully emerge in late March, during the latter part of Ramadan. At present, a phased contraction in China’s total steel exports to the Middle East has become a foregone conclusion. Does this mean the strong momentum of China’s full-year exports will come to a halt here? According to SMM steel export take-order data, last week, the total orders taken by 31 exporters were about 765,000 mt, up 20.76% MoM. Among them, export orders for long products were about 437,000 mt, up 56.07% MoM; export orders for sheets & plates were about 328,000 mt, down 7.21% MoM. Against the backdrop of rising export prices, this growth did not stem from a broad-based global economic recovery, but from forced shifts in trade flows driven by geopolitical conflicts. On the one hand, instability in Iran diverted Southeast Asian orders to China, driving a boom in steel billet exports; on the other hand, conflict in the Middle East pushed up shipping costs, and the surge in fuel prices directly caused physical disruptions along the trade chain. Even if there is overseas demand, the sharp rise in freight rates also weakened the pricing advantage of Chinese steel products. SMM Steel Export Orders Taken - 31 Companies (10kt) Data Source:SMM Weekly Steel Export Report Therefore, although the reduction in exports to the Middle East has already been confirmed by the data, assessing its impact on China’s total exports for the full year still needs to be based on a “global rebalancing” perspective: is the “gap” created after demand in Gulf countries is constrained being converted into “incremental volume” in other markets? What is the actual absorption capacity of these emerging incremental markets? Can they offset the monthly shipping loss of 900,000 mt from the Middle East? Please continue to follow SMM Steel Industry Research; we will regularly update global shipping developments… Copyright and Intellectual Property Statement: This report is independently created or compiled by SMM Information & Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "SMM"), and SMM legally enjoys complete copyright and related intellectual property rights. The copyright, trademark rights, domain name rights, commercial data information property rights, and other related intellectual property rights of all content contained in this report (including but not limited to information, articles, data, charts, pictures, audio, video, logos, advertisements, trademarks, trade names, domain names, layout designs, etc.) are owned or held by SMM or its related right holders. The above rights are strictly protected by relevant laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China, such as the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China, the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, as well as applicable international treaties. Without prior written authorization from SMM, no institution or individual may: 1. Use all or part of this report in any form (including but not limited to reprinting, modifying, selling, transferring, displaying, translating, compiling, disseminating); 2. Disclose the content of this report to any third party; 3. License or authorize any third party to use the content of this report; 4. For any unauthorized use, SMM will legally pursue the legal responsibilities of the infringer, demanding that they bear legal responsibilities including but not limited to contractual breach liability, returning unjust enrichment, and compensating for direct and indirect economic losses. Data Source Statement: (Except for publicly available information, other data in this report are derived from publicly available information (including but not limited to industry news, seminars, exhibitions, corporate financial reports, brokerage reports, data from the National Bureau of Statistics, customs import and export data, various data published by major associations and institutions, etc.), market exchanges, and comprehensive analysis and reasonable inferences made by the research team based on SMM's internal database models. This information is for reference only and does not constitute decision-making advice. SMM reserves the final interpretation right of the terms in this statement and the right to adjust and modify the content of the statement according to actual circumstances.