On August 14, LG Group and NVIDIA signed a strategic cooperation memorandum of understanding in California, USA, covering three major industries: robotics, AI factories, and mobility. The two parties will jointly advance industry standards for the artificial intelligence era. In robotics, LG Group plans to launch a bipedal humanoid robot based on NVIDIA Isaac GR00T in the first quarter of 2027, powered by LG Energy Solution batteries. In AI factories, based on the NVIDIA DSX architecture, the company plans to establish an AI factory reference site in the first half of 2027, and complete an 80MW AI computing facility in Cheonan, South Chungcheong Province, South Korea, in the first half of 2028. The project will integrate LG Electronics cooling solutions and LG Energy Solution battery solutions, providing computational infrastructure for the iteration of physical AI and humanoid robot foundation models. In the mobility sector, the two parties will leverage the NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion platform to develop AI vehicle computing platforms, complemented by LG Energy Solution battery solutions.

Lithium Royalty Corp's acquisition of a 1.5% Goulamina royalty gives Western capital revenue linked exposure to Mali's flagship spodumene project without operating risk. But the royalty's 500,000-tonne annual volume cap sits almost exactly at Goulamina's current Phase I capacity, meaning any upside from Ganfeng's planned Phase II expansion largely bypasses the royalty holder. Lithium Royalty Corp (LRC) has entered into a definitive agreement to acquire a 1.5% Trailing Product Sales Fee (TPSF) royalty on Ganfeng Lithium's Goulamina project in Mali, purchased from Leo Lithium for A$40 million (approximately $27 million). The deal extends LRC's battery metals footprint beyond direct mine ownership, adding to an existing royalty on Ganfeng's Mariana brine project in Argentina within a broader 37-royalty portfolio. 1. Royalty Structure Caps Volume, Extends Duration : LRC's royalty entitles it to quarterly payments over a 20-year term, with the cashflow window running through August 2045. Early monetisation is confirmed: Leo Lithium received a first quarterly payment of $574,748 in Q3 2025. Crucially, payable volume is capped at 500,000 tonnes per year of spodumene a ceiling that limits LRC's exposure if Goulamina's output scales materially beyond current design capacity. 2. Production Volume and Ramp-Up Sit Close to the Cap: Goulamina's Phase I nameplate capacity is 506,000 tonnes per year of spodumene concentrate just above LRC's payable cap, meaning the royalty already captures close to its practical maximum at present output. Ganfeng has publicly indicated intent to pursue a Phase II expansion that would materially exceed current capacity, though a confirmed timeline and design capacity have not been disclosed. Any such expansion would leave royalty-linked cashflow structurally unchanged given the fixed cap. 3. Supply Status Remains Consistent Since First Shipment: Goulamina has shipped concentrate consistently since commencing exports in June 2025, with output sold under offtake arrangements to Chinese buyers holding controlling stakes in the project. 4. Logistics Add a Distinct Risk Layer : Concentrate is trucked approximately 1,000km from Goulamina to the port of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, the primary export corridor, with San Pedro and Dakar serving as secondary routes. This overland logistics profile differs materially from Zimbabwe's rail-based Beira and Durban corridors, introducing distinct cost and timing exposure for Mali-origin material. Corridor Mode Distance Role Goulamina → Abidjan Overland truck ≈1,000 km Primary export route Goulamina → San Pedro Overland truck Secondary corridor Alternate loading port Goulamina → Dakar Overland truck Secondary corridor Alternate loading port 5. Ownership Structure Ties Returns to Policy Environment : Ganfeng holds 65% of Goulamina, with Mali's government holding the remaining 35% following the country's revised mining code. This ownership split ties royalty performance not only to production economics but to Mali's evolving fiscal and regulatory stance toward foreign-operated mining assets. SMM View: The royalty cap sitting almost exactly at Phase I capacity is the structural detail worth flagging for African lithium coverage: LRC gains near-full exposure to current output but stands to capture little of the incremental upside if and when Phase II lifts capacity beyond current design levels. This positions the deal as a disciplined, lower-risk way to gain Mali spodumene exposure, but one whose real return profile is bounded well below the project's potential growth trajectory. For SMM's ongoing tracker, the more actionable signals are confirmation of Ganfeng's Phase II timeline and specifications, and whether Abidjan-corridor logistics face the kind of congestion already constraining Zimbabwean concentrate flows either of which could reshape the volume and margin assumptions underlying this and future royalty-style deals in the region.

With this expansion, CMR expects its recycling capacity to exceed 700,000 tonnes per year by FY27.

Valterra Platinum’s first half of 2026 was shaped more by market prices than by production growth. Earnings increased fourfold to R33.4 billion, while metal production from its mines rose only modestly. The difference was driven by stronger PGM prices and the release of previously processed metal from the company’s pipeline. Amandelbult’s recovery was a major contributor to the improvement, while China became a significantly larger market.

August 4, 2026 The world's central banks acquired a net 288.9 tonnes of gold in the second quarter of 2026 – the highest figure ever recorded for a second quarter. What makes this remarkable is the timing: the buying took place during a quarter in which the gold price fell by around 16 per cent. Anyone reading the World Gold Council's figures closely, however, will find a second and considerably more awkward story. The "Gold Demand Trends" report published by the World Gold Council (WGC) on 30 July delivers what may be the most important message of the summer for precious metals investors. While private investors exited gold ETFs during the second quarter and jewellery demand buckled under high prices, official institutions bought with rare conviction. At a net 288.9 tonnes, purchases were roughly 62 per cent above the year-earlier figure of 177.9 tonnes. The contrast with price action could hardly be sharper. The second quarter was gold's weakest since 2013; from the record high of USD 5,598 set in January, the metal has since given up considerable ground and currently trades at around USD 4,050. Central banks evidently did not read that weakness as a warning signal, but as an opportunity. Poland and China Lead the Buyers' List The single largest buyer was the National Bank of Poland with 51 tonnes. Warsaw is thereby continuing a course that brings the country close to its self-imposed target of 700 tonnes of gold reserves. In second place comes the People's Bank of China with 33 tonnes – its largest quarterly addition since late 2023, and a signal that Beijing is accelerating its diversification strategy again after a quieter phase. Behind these two sits a broad field of smaller buyers: Uzbekistan with 16 tonnes, Kazakhstan with 15 tonnes, and the central banks of Jordan and the Czech Republic with around 6 tonnes each. This breadth matters more for interpretation than the headline figure does. A record quarter carried by a single large buyer would be fragile. When demand is spread across numerous institutions from different regions and with different motivations, that points to a structural trend rather than a one-off effect. Russia Stands on the Other Side Not every central bank was buying. The Bank of Russia was the quarter's largest seller at 22 tonnes. The reason is understood to be pressure on the federal budget – here gold simply serves as a liquidity reserve to be drawn upon to plug deficits. Türkiye was also on the selling side once again, though at just 4 tonnes it was markedly more restrained than in the first quarter. These sales are central to any sound interpretation. They show that a portion of official gold movements has nothing to do with strategic conviction and everything to do with fiscal constraints. Anyone reading central bank purchases as a blanket vote of confidence in gold is making it too easy for themselves – and the same applies to anyone reading central bank sales as a blanket loss of faith. The Awkward Part: A Revision That Changes the Half-Year Picture This is where matters become interesting for attentive investors. Alongside the record second-quarter figure, Metals Focus – the World Gold Council's data provider – has sharply revised its estimate for the first quarter downwards: from an original 244 tonnes to just 57 tonnes. That is no cosmetic adjustment but a revision of more than three quarters, and it changes the overall picture considerably. Taken together, central bank demand for the first half of 2026 amounts to roughly 345 tonnes – the weakest half-year figure since 2022. Viewed soberly, then, the record quarter was primarily a catch-up movement following an exceptionally weak start to the year. For assessment purposes this means both statements are true at the same time. The second quarter was a record. The first half-year was weak. Anyone citing only one of the two figures is telling an incomplete story – and in the coverage of recent days, usually only the first has been on offer. What the Statistics Do Not Show A further point deserves attention: a substantial share of central bank purchases is never officially reported. Since 2022 the WGC has consistently identified a high proportion of unreported buying – the gap between estimated total demand and the purchases institutions actually disclose. The reported data underlying the report were, moreover, only captured up to 24 July; later disclosures may lead to further revisions. Investors should draw the right conclusion from this. Central bank demand is real and it is significant – but the published quarterly figures are estimates carrying a considerable margin of error, not exact measurements. An investment decision built on a single quarterly number rests on shifting ground. The Outlook Remains Constructive For all these caveats, the structural direction is unambiguous. The WGC's own survey of reserve managers shows that a large majority of the institutions polled expect global gold reserves to rise over the coming twelve months. Around three quarters also anticipate that their dollar holdings will decline over the next five years. This is where the real substance of the story lies. Central banks do not operate in quarters but in decades. Their gold purchases are not a timing signal for short-term price movements – anyone who bought in April on the basis of central bank demand is sitting on losses today. They are, however, an indicator of how institutional actors assess the long-term role of the US dollar and the case for hedging against geopolitical risk. For the 2026 full year, the World Gold Council expects another strong year of official demand, albeit below the 2025 level. Supply should grow only modestly: high prices and healthy producer margins support mine output, but operational constraints and long project lead times limit the pace. What the gold market did in the first half of 2026 was, above all, to change its buyer. Investors taking a long-term view in this phase will find remarkably patient company in the world's central banks. Source： https://goldinvest.de/en/central-banks-buy-record-amount-of-gold-in-the-very-quarter-prices-fell

European hot-rolled coil supply is set to tighten as revised EU import quotas and CBAM-related costs reduce the availability of imported material, while improving mill order books encourage domestic producers to restart idled capacity, ArcelorMittal said in its second-quarter 2026 results.