Over the next decade (2026-2035), the combined market share of the three traditional major lithium producers Australia, China and Chile is expected to keep declining as emerging suppliers scale up, with Zimbabwe and Argentina identified as the key sources of new supply. Zimbabwe, in particular, is likely to lead a new round of African lithium expansion, according to a latest research report. Strong H1 momentum, supported by storage demand. China's battery-grade lithium carbonate spot price stood at around 153,950 yuan/mt (approx. USD 21,500/mt) on August 17, after a rally of more than 130% from the June 2025 low of 58,400 yuan/mt. The 2026 forecast for China lithium carbonate has been revised up to USD 20,100/t and lithium hydroxide monohydrate to USD 19,600/t, reflecting that H1 momentum. Prices are expected to ease in H2 as smelter maintenance ends and supply returns, but storage demand is limiting the downside market balances now point to month-on-month destocking through H2 2026, with some analysts projecting the year's price peak in late Q3/early Q4. From ore exporter to processor enforced by policy. Zimbabwe’s rise is no longer just a forecast. On February 25, 2026, Zimbabwe's mining ministry banned all exports of lithium raw ore and concentrates with immediate effect, forcing miners to build local processing capacity. Zimbabwe's output was expected to reach ~200,000 t LCE in 2026 (up over 15% year on year), equal to ~10% of global primary lithium supply and ~17% of global spodumene supply before the ban; the restriction is estimated to affect around 12,000 t LCE of monthly supply. Key projects include: 1) Huayou Cobalt's Arcadia ~70,000-80,000 t LCE of mine output expected in 2026, with its 50,000 t/yr lithium sulphate plant commissioned in Q1 2026 and now ramping up; 2) Sinomine's Bikita ~60,000-70,000 t LCE expected in 2026, with a 30,000 t/yr lithium sulphate plant slated for 2027; 3) Chengxin's Sabi Star (~35,000 t LCE) and Yahua's Kamativi (~50,000 t LCE) rounding out a Chinese-invested project portfolio totaling roughly 230,000 t LCE. 4) In 2025, Zimbabwe shipped over 1.2 million tonnes of spodumene to China about 15% of China's total imports making it a supply source Beijing's supply chain cannot easily replace. 2026 is the last investment peak of this cycle global lithium supply is projected to rise ~30% year on year to over 2.1 million t LCE in 2026, concentrated in China and Africa (Africa alone adding ~140,000 t to reach ~380,000 t LCE). Chinese output hit 970,000 t of lithium carbonate in 2025, with new additions this year from Qinghai/Tibet salt lakes, Sichuan spodumene and Jianxiawo's expected restart in H2. Australia shipped 158,000 t of spodumene to China in the week of August 10-16 alone. But few new projects are lined up beyond 2027 a key reason sentiment has flipped from glut to deficit: Morgan Stanley now forecasts an 80,000 t LCE global deficit for 2026, UBS sees a 22,000 t shortfall, versus a 61,000 t surplus in 2025. EVs slow, storage takes the wheel. Global lithium demand growth is expected to slow to 5.8% in 2026 (from 18.5% in 2025), with passenger EV sales growth falling to 3.9% (vs 22.8% in 2025 and 24% in 2024) as China's trade-in subsidies end and the US IRA rollback bites. Energy storage is now the core demand pillar: storage-sector lithium demand is forecast to jump ~55-74% in 2026, lifting its share of total lithium demand from 23% to ~31%. LFP batteries account for over 90% of battery storage applications and more than half of global EV battery installations; China's LFP cell makers reported hot August orders with output up ~5% month on month. China's NEV penetration hit 58.5% in June above 50% for the third straight month. Battery manufacturing investment in China grew 23% in January-July 2026. Risks. Lithium remains in a "tug-of-war" between supply-release concerns and storage-driven demand support, with risks skewed to the downside: a sustained price recovery could trigger rapid restarts (curtailed capacity covering 750,000+ t of concentrate sits near a ~USD 1,200/t restart cost line), sodium-ion substitution becomes economic if cell prices stay above ~0.4 yuan/Wh, and rising energy costs plus a potential sulfur shortage could squeeze miners' margins. Longer term, battery chemistry innovation and recycling could cut lithium intensity and expand secondary supply reshaping the opportunity window for emerging producers like Zimbabwe. SMM View: Zimbabwe's February export ban has turned the "move down the value chain" story from intention into policy reality Chinese invested projects at Arcadia and Bikita are now the country's only guaranteed export channels via lithium sulphate, and the roughly 12,000 t LCE/month of disrupted supply was a direct catalyst in this year's price rally above 150,000 yuan/mt. The report's core thesis a declining share for Australia, China and Chile, with Africa gaining is being validated in real time, Africa adds ~140,000 t LCE of supply in 2026, the largest increment after China. But Zimbabwe's ramp-up pace, its ability to keep sulphate exports flowing, and downstream pricing power remain the key variables determining whether it can fully deliver on its market-share ambitions

Sinomine Resource Group's Zimbabwe unit, Masingo Lithium Technology, has obtained EIA approval for its 100,000 t/y lithium sulfate plant at Bikita, moving the project into full construction with contractors China Railway No. 9 Group and Shandong Dadi now on site. Completion is targeted for mid-2027. The clearance formalizes a plan first disclosed in September 2024 and reaffirmed via Sinomine's RMB 5.2 billion ($764 million) fundraising in May 2026, rather than signaling new capital commitment. Bikita becomes Zimbabwe's third Chinese-backed lithium sulfate project, joining Huayou's 50,000 t/y Arcadia plant commissioned July 2026, running near 60% of capacity as of late July and Yahua's Kamativi facility construction started February 2026, capacity undisclosed. Combined announced capacity across all three approaches 200,000+ t/y once complete, ahead of Zimbabwe's January 2027 concentrate export ban. SMM View: Arcadia's slower than nameplate ramp is the key benchmark here if Bikita follows a similar curve at double the capacity, full-rate output likely slips into 2028 despite a mid-2027 completion date. With all three plants now past groundbreaking, Zimbabwe's beneficiation push has shifted from policy to physical build out, the next signal to watch is how strictly the export ban is enforced against each plant's actual commissioning timeline, not just its announced one.

Zimbabwe exported US$782 million worth of lithium products in the first half of 2026, representing a 230% year on year increase from US$237 million in H1 2025, according to Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube during the country's mid-year budget review. Lithium accounted for approximately 12% of Zimbabwe's total mineral export revenue, ranking behind only gold and platinum group metals (PGMs), further strengthening its position as one of the country's key export commodities. The government expects lithium's contribution to increase further following the April 2026 commissioning of Zimbabwe's first lithium sulphate plant, marking a significant step in the country's strategy to move up the battery materials value chain. Zimbabwe continues to require foreign investors, particularly Chinese mining companies, to expand downstream processing capacity within the country. As part of its beneficiation policy, Zimbabwe plans to ban lithium concentrate exports from January 2027, encouraging producers to export higher-value processed lithium products instead. According to the Ministry of Finance, 2026 lithium production is forecast at 2.14 million metric tons, slightly below the 2.2 million metric tons produced in 2025. Earlier this year, Zimbabwe temporarily suspended lithium concentrate exports in February, citing irregularities and leakages in export activities. Official data also showed Zimbabwe exported 1.13 million metric tons of lithium products in 2025, suggesting inventories have accumulated at several mining operations as export restrictions and processing capacity continue to evolve. Zimbabwe's lithium sector remains dominated by major Chinese investors, including Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Sinomine Resource Group, Chengxin Lithium Group, Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group, and Tsingshan Holding Group, all of which have invested heavily in Zimbabwe's mining and downstream lithium processing projects. SMM Analysis: Zimbabwe is accelerating its transition from a lithium concentrate exporter to a battery materials producer through export restrictions and mandatory local beneficiation. While near-term concentrate exports may remain constrained, expanding domestic conversion capacity is expected to increase exports of higher-value lithium chemicals, reinforcing Zimbabwe's strategic role in the global EV battery supply chain.

The first half of 2026 is already in the past. At the start of H2, industry chain enterprises have begun to release their H1 2026 performance forecasts collectively. Notably, against the backdrop of a significantly higher YoY lithium price center, stable demand in the NEV industry, and a continuously booming energy storage sector, most enterprises in the lithium industry chain expect varying degrees of performance improvement. SMM has compiled the performance forecast situations of some enterprises in the industry chain, as follows:

On 22 July 2026, Zimbabwe’s state-owned Mutapa Energy Resources released the JORC-compliant resource estimate for the Sandawana lithium project: Block A totals 39.9 million tonnes at 1.39% Li₂O, with an exceptional 72% classified as Measured. Block A accounts for only 30% of the lease area; the remaining 70% remains unexplored, and the company targets upgrading the total resource to 90 million tonnes. The Zimbabwean government has banned concentrate exports effective 1 January 2027 with no extension granted, forcing miners to accelerate local processing. Sandawana’s processing plan is still at the feasibility stage, lagging behind peers such as Huayou Cobalt (already in production), Sinomine and Yahua (under construction). Chinese capital is deeply involved: Huayou and Tsingshan are building a US$270 million concentrator under a BOT model, while Mutapa has secured an additional US$300 million in funding (including Chinese investors). SMM believes the high Measured proportion gives the project strong “bankability”, but the mismatch between resources and processing capacity, combined with the export ban countdown, makes the next six months decisive for the project’s success. I. JORC Resource: Nearly 40 Mt with 72% Measured On 22 July 2026, Zimbabwe’s state-owned lithium enterprise, Mutapa Energy Resources (MER), officially released the JORC (Joint Ore Reserves Committee)-compliant resource estimate for the Sandawana lithium mine. The report shows that Block A contains a total mineral resource of 39.9 million tonnes at an average grade of 1.39% Li₂O – of which Measured Resource is approximately 28.6 million tonnes, accounting for 72% ; Indicated Resource is 2.7 million tonnes (6.8%); and Inferred Resource is 8.5 million tonnes (21.3%). This proportion of Measured Resource is extremely rare in Zimbabwe’s mining industry. At the Harare press conference, Mutapa Energy CEO Innocent Rukweza stated: “To our knowledge, we are the first mine in Zimbabwe with a Measured Resource representing 72% of the total resource. Most mines are far below this level, while we have exceeded 50%, which makes the resource ‘bankable’.” Even more noteworthy is that this 39.9 million tonnes resource is derived only from Block A, which covers just 30% of the entire 3,800-hectare mining lease. Blocks B and C – together accounting for 70% of the lease area – remain largely unexplored. Rukweza made it clear that the company aims to increase the total resource from the current nearly 40 million tonnes to 90 million tonnes . To achieve the above exploration results, Mutapa Energy completed 103,000 metres of drilling and collected and tested 33,000 samples over the past 11 months, at a total cost of US$24 million . The company has already mined approximately 2 million tonnes of ore from Sandawana and is constructing a concentrator with an annual processing capacity of 3 million tonnes . II. From Abandoned Emerald Mine to National Lithium Strategic Pillar Sandawana is not a greenfield project. Its mining history dates back to 1955 , when it was renowned for high-quality emerald (green beryl) production and operated for about 40 years. In 2010, operations were suspended due to working capital shortages and depletion of emerald resources. The mine’s “second life” began with Zimbabwe’s national strategic shift. As the global energy transition accelerated, lithium rose from a niche mineral to “white petroleum”. The Zimbabwean government incorporated lithium development into its national strategy, and Sandawana was repositioned as a lithium and tantalum project, placed under Mutapa Energy Resources, which is owned by the Mutapa Investment Fund. In 2025 , the former operating entity Kuvimba Mining House announced a US$270 million investment to build a lithium concentrator at Sandawana, with construction planned to start in the third quarter of 2025 and commissioning targeted for early 2027. In February 2026 , the Mutapa Investment Fund restructured Kuvimba into several specialised entities, and Mutapa Energy Minerals formally took over Sandawana, with Innocent Rukweza appointed as CEO. This restructuring marked Sandawana’s upgrade from a “legacy asset” to a flagship project of Zimbabwe’s national lithium strategy. III. Lithium Sulphate Strategy: A Chaser under Policy Pressure Sandawana’s processing roadmap is clear and urgent: concentrate → lithium sulphate → lithium carbonate . Zimbabwe’s government has progressively tightened lithium controls: in 2022 it banned unprocessed raw ore exports; in June 2025 it announced a ban on lithium concentrate exports effective 1 January 2027 ; in February 2026 it temporarily suspended all concentrate exports, later granting conditional soft relief via quotas while imposing an additional 10%–16% tax on concentrate exports and requiring written commitments from companies to build lithium sulphate plants before 2027. The government has explicitly ruled out any extension and will enforce the ban as scheduled. This policy imposes enormous time pressure on all lithium miners in Zimbabwe. In June 2026 , Rukweza, in his capacity as chairman of the Zimbabwe Lithium Producers’ Association, submitted an appeal to the government on behalf of the industry, requesting a postponement of the ban to March or June 2027 . In his remarks, he stated candidly: “We are not trying to avoid our beneficiation obligations; we are sincerely asking for time to complete the projects we have already started.” He revealed that among the seven major lithium producers, only Huayou Cobalt’s lithium sulphate plant has been completed, commissioned and has achieved product shipments ; Sinomine’s Bikita Minerals and Yahua’s Kamativi lithium mine are still under construction. Sandawana’s processing scheme, by contrast, remains at the feasibility study stage . In other words, Sandawana is far ahead on resources but a chaser on processing. The company has committed approximately US$1.45 billion to local processing facilities, but the time window is narrowing. IV. Chinese Capital: Deep Integration from Financing to Construction Long before the investment landed, Chinese companies were already deeply embedded in Sandawana’s development chain. In September 2024 , Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan Holding Group reached a cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe’s state-owned Kuvimba Mining House (the predecessor of Mutapa Energy Resources). Under the agreement, the Chinese partners do not hold direct equity in Sandawana, but participate under a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model – the partners will operate the processing plant for at least 5 years after commissioning, during which they will recover construction costs and earn operating profits, after which all assets and titles will be transferred to the Zimbabwean state free of charge . In February 2026 , Mutapa Energy Resources CEO Rukweza officially confirmed that the Sandawana concentrator would be built in cooperation with Huayou Cobalt and Tsingshan under this BOT framework. The facility involves an investment of US$270 million , with an annual processing capacity of 600,000 tonnes of ore, targeting commissioning in early 2027. Dinson Holdings , as Tsingshan’s core investment platform in Zimbabwe, though not directly involved in the Sandawana project cooperation, operates an ore processing facility with an annual capacity of 1 million tonnes through its subsidiary Gwanda Lithium . Before Sandawana’s own concentrator is completed, some ore from Sandawana has been shipped to Gwanda for processing. Dinson has accumulated total investments of approximately US$900 million in Zimbabwe, covering ferrochrome smelting, coke, steel and lithium processing, forming a critical pillar for Tsingshan’s lithium operations in the country. In addition, Sinomine Resource Group, Chengxin Lithium Group and Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group are among the Chinese companies that have invested in Zimbabwe’s lithium sector. Chinese capital’s presence in Zimbabwe’s lithium industry has extended from pure investment to full-chain cooperation covering technology, engineering, construction and off-take agreements. SMM Perspectives The release of Sandawana’s JORC resource has landmark significance on three levels: First, the “certainty” value of resource quality. A Measured Resource proportion of 72% is exceptionally rare in African mining projects. This means geological risk has been substantially compressed, giving the project clear “bankability”. Against the backdrop of global lithium prices falling from their 2022 peak of approximately US$86,000/tonne to the current level of about US$14,000/tonne, capital is placing a higher premium on “certainty” – Sandawana’s high Measured proportion precisely meets that demand. Second, the urgency of the time window. The 1 January 2027 concentrate export ban is now on a countdown. Sandawana’s resource is “in place”, but its processing capacity remains at the “feasibility study” stage. Huayou Cobalt is already in production, while Sinomine and Yahua are under construction – Sandawana clearly lags behind its peers on the processing front. Whether the US$300 million funding can translate into rapid processing facility construction will determine whether this “Zimbabwe’s largest undeveloped lithium asset” can complete its value realisation before the ban takes effect. Third, the game of Zimbabwe’s “resource nationalism”. From the 2022 raw ore ban to the 2027 concentrate ban, Zimbabwe is advancing along a clear path: “ban raw ore → restrict concentrate → mandate lithium sulphate”. The objective is clear: to keep higher value-added links of the lithium value chain within the country. But for Sandawana, this means a stark choice between “selling concentrate” and “building a lithium sulphate plant” – and time is not on its side. Sandawana possesses Zimbabwe’s highest-quality lithium resource endowment and carries the nation’s ambition to transform from a resource exporter into a battery materials producer. But whether the “quality” of its resources can translate into the “quantity” of processing capacity depends on a three-way race among capital, technology and policy. The US$300 million has arrived, the US$270 million concentrator is under construction, but the feasibility study for the lithium sulphate plant has only just begun. When the clock strikes January 2027, will Sandawana be an “exemption” or a “restricted party” under the concentrate export ban? The answer will be revealed in the next six months. Sources: Mutapa Energy Resources, SMM, publicly available information

Price Trends In the first half of 2026, domestic lithium hydroxide prices followed a trajectory of "surge – high-level volatility – softening decline," with the price center first rising and then falling amid the interplay of multiple factors. January: Prices surged sharply. Concentrated maintenance shutdowns at major lithium salt producers tightened spot supply. Combined with persistently rising costs of lithium carbonate and lithium ore, lithium salt producers held firm on pricing, pushing the monthly average price up by 65% month-on-month. Although ternary material manufacturers maintained just-in-time procurement and remained cautious on spot orders, and some import flows returned due to domestic-international price spreads, the phase of supply shortages and cost support still drove prices to a high level. February: Prices fluctuated at high levels with thinning trading. Macro sentiment drove overall lithium prices downward, but producers' firm pricing stance persisted. Downstream ternary manufacturers, having ample inventories and some entering maintenance, saw eased raw material shortages, with procurement mostly based on monthly average prices. During the Chinese New Year holiday, transportation of lithium hydroxide, classified as hazardous chemicals, stalled, leading to a seasonal quiet period; post-holiday restocking demand was tepid, limiting upside momentum, and prices oscillated widely throughout the month. March: Gains narrowed notably. Cell manufacturers' offtake fell short of expectations, and new orders for ternary materials were limited. Additionally, increased customer-supplied materials in mid-month sharply reduced spot demand, leading to subdued trading and an upward price channel that stalled. The monthly average price rose only 3.4% month-on-month. April: First down then up. In the first half, limited new ternary orders and scarce spot demand put mild pressure on prices; in the second half, pre-holiday stocking and new orders drove increased inquiries from ternary producers, while sharp rises in lithium carbonate and ore prices pulled lithium hydroxide higher. The monthly average price rose 2.73% month-on-month. May: Rose then fell. In the first half, positive demand expectations and supply-side disruptions lifted lithium carbonate and ore prices, pulling lithium hydroxide higher in tandem; in the second half, sentiment turned weaker, with more trades settled via negotiation between traders and material mills. As ternary demand trends became clearer, upstream producers softened their price support, prompting a modest pullback. The monthly average price reached RMB 174,000/ton, up 13.6% month-on-month. June: Prices fell notably, with range-bound volatility intensifying. Frequent supply disruptions on the lithium resource side amplified market volatility significantly, prompting holders to adopt a cautious stance and quote prices in line with market conditions. Upstream producers adjusted prices flexibly, while traders maintained a high discount (over RMB 15,000/ton against the lithium carbonate futures main contract). On the demand side, total ternary material demand remained weak month-on-month, but within the RMB 135,000–145,000/ton range, downstream buyers showed strong willingness to stockpile on dips, providing some bottom support and exacerbating range-bound fluctuations. The monthly average price fell 11.52% month-on-month. Looking at the price trends, the correlation between lithium hydroxide prices and lithium carbonate futures prices has strengthened over the past six months. This is partly because upstream producers use a "lithium carbonate price × discount factor" formula as a floor price in their pricing. On the other hand, traders capitalize on the price spreads between domestic and overseas lithium hydroxide and between hydroxide and carbonate, by importing lithium hydroxide and pricing their sales with reference to lithium carbonate futures, further reinforcing this price linkage. Production In the first half of 2026, domestic total lithium hydroxide output reached 172,000 tons, up 21% year-on-year, driven by relatively robust downstream demand, with notable incremental growth. By output structure, the refining segment contributed the most, accounting for about 88%. Within this, the gradual ramp-up of new production lines at leading companies added some volume, while other enterprises maintained steady output backed by downstream orders, resulting in an 18% year-on-year increase for the overall refining segment. For the causticization segment, most active producers sustained stable operations, and the industry CR5 reached 72% in the first half, indicating a persistently high market concentration. From the capacity utilization perspective, although some capacity has been switched to lithium carbonate production, the operating rate for the lithium hydroxide industry has consistently lingered below 50% over the past six months, reflecting an ongoing overcapacity trend. Costs and margins: For the refining segment, lithium ore feedstock remained relatively tight in the first half of 2026, with ore prices staying elevated and closely correlated with lithium carbonate prices, providing strong cost support for lithium hydroxide. As a result, non‑integrated producers faced notable pressure on the sales side, and their product discount prices did not decline further, which in turn provided marginal support for profit margins at current price levels. For the causticization segment, the supply of salt‑lake‑based lithium salts has increased over the past six months, making causticization feedstock relatively ample. The linkage between actual procurement costs and industrial‑grade carbonate quotes has weakened, which has alleviated cost pressures for enterprises that purchase lithium carbonate externally, leading to actual profitability in the causticization segment being better than theoretical estimates. Import and Export The import‑export landscape has seen a notable reversal. On the export front, since the second half of 2025, some overseas ternary material producers have shifted to entrusting domestic tolling processors, resulting in products that would have been exported being delivered domestically instead, effectively suppressing export volumes. At the same time, overseas demand for ternary materials has remained persistently weak, reducing foreign buyers' appetite for Chinese lithium hydroxide. This, combined with the gradual ramp‑up of overseas local production lines, has collectively kept export volumes at low levels over the past six months. On the import side, weak overseas demand, high accumulated inventories, and arbitrage opportunities have driven import volumes to remain relatively elevated, further reinforcing the net import trend. Supply‑Demand Balance and Inventory The surge in import data made most months in the first half of the year oversupplied. However, from the perspective of directly usable lithium hydroxide products, the market as a whole remained in a relatively tight balance, providing effective support for upstream price control. As for inventory, current lithium hydroxide stock levels have improved significantly compared with the same period last year. This is mainly attributable to two factors: first, part of the inventory has been absorbed into the market by being converted into lithium carbonate; second, active producers have flexibly adjusted their output pace, keeping current inventory days at around one month. Future Outlook Looking ahead, although the LFP route continues to squeeze the ternary route, ternary materials currently have no rival in the high‑nickel segment. In addition, the cost advantages of 6‑series materials offer more possibilities for the ternary route. Based on end‑user production schedules, ternary power demand in the second half of 2026 is expected to maintain a sound performance, growing by approximately 36% compared with the first half. This will drive a roughly 7% sequential increase in ternary material output in the second half. As ternary materials continue to move toward higher nickel content, this brings an incremental demand trend for lithium hydroxide. Meanwhile, considering that most lithium hydroxide production lines have flexible switching or carbonation purification capabilities, lithium hydroxide output is projected to grow by about 6% sequentially. Coupled with a modest recovery in overseas ternary demand, the supply‑demand balance for lithium hydroxide is expected to remain tight through 2026–2027. In terms of price, under a market structure with highly concentrated supply, lithium hydroxide prices are primarily determined by the supply‑demand dynamics of its own industrial chain and closely track lithium ore and lithium salt price trends. Prices are currently oscillating in a range above RMB 150,000/ton. Futures Developments As for lithium hydroxide futures, there has been a flurry of related developments in the second quarter. The Guangzhou Futures Exchange (GFEX) and the Lithium Branch of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association have both explicitly stated that they will continue to strengthen cooperation and jointly advance the listing of lithium hydroxide and other lithium‑chain futures products. The征求意见稿 of Guangzhou's "15th Five‑Year Plan" for finance also clearly supports GFEX in listing new‑energy futures such as lithium hydroxide. On the industrial side, companies have moved swiftly to follow up. In June, Yahua Group, Shengxin Lithium Energy, and Tianqi Lithium all announced their intention to apply to GFEX for designated delivery factory warehouse status for lithium hydroxide. In addition, Milkyway's shareholders' meeting approved a proposal for its subsidiary to apply to become a designated delivery warehouse for battery‑grade lithium hydroxide at GFEX. According to media reports, lithium salt producers (Ganfeng Lithium, Tianqi Lithium, Yahua Group, etc.) have already positioned themselves in the factory‑warehouse system. However, due to the high‑risk storage requirements of lithium hydroxide—such as strong corrosiveness, exothermic reaction with water, and the need for inert gas protection—no logistics‑focused player had previously entered this category. On the market front, some traders have already made early arrangements in anticipation of futures listing, and the number of merchants participating in lithium hydroxide import trade has noticeably increased. In summary, preparations for the listing of lithium hydroxide futures are progressing in an orderly manner, with positive official signals and accelerating industrial infrastructure development.