SMM July 31: This week, scrap battery market showed mixed performance. EV battery prices were mainly down, while prices for other categories remained largely stable. Only a few producers raised flooded battery prices during the week. Smelters' losses-driven push for lower prices and suppliers' holding back from selling formed a stalemate. Even when lead prices rebounded, it was difficult to transmit to the raw material side. Currently, battery enterprises showed weak purchasing enthusiasm. Secondary lead finished product inventories rose while operating rates declined, leading to limited demand for scrap batteries; It is expected that next week, waste lead-acid battery prices will continue to consolidate on a subdued note, with a possibility of lower buying prices. Tight supply will limit the decline. Keep monitoring lead prices and end-use consumption in August.

HRC prices weakened from the previous week, and overall transactions declined WoW. Supply side, the impact from rolling line maintenance decreased WoW, lifting overall HRC production. Demand side, apparent demand dropped WoW. Inventory side, total HRC inventory rose by 77,500 mt WoW, while mill inventory fell by 6,200 mt WoW. Social inventory, SMM statistics of 86 warehouses nationwide (large sample) showed HRC social inventory at 4.4773 million mt, up 83,700 mt WoW (+1.90% WoW) and up 40.27 mt YoY on a calendar basis. By region, except the northeast that saw slight destocking, all other markets experienced inventory buildup, with east China showing relatively large fluctuations. Cost side, the second round of coke price cuts was implemented, weakening cost support. Looking ahead, SMM expects hot metal production to bottom out and rebound, and with the US-Iran conflict pushing up ocean freight rates, iron ore prices may see a slight rebound. Meanwhile, a third round of coke price cuts still lingers, leaving overall cost support moderate. From a fundamental perspective, the HRC supply-demand imbalance continues to build, and combined with the PBoC Politburo meeting expectations falling short, there is no clear upward price catalyst. However, given that prices are already at relatively low levels, downside room is limited. HRC prices are expected to move sideways at the bottom next week, with the most-traded HRC contract trading in the 3,200-3,390 range.

Australian tin miner Metals X Limited (ASX: MLX) released its Q2 2026 operational report. The report showed that the company’s Renison tin mine produced 2,809 tonnes of tin metal in tin concentrates in Q2, down approximately 2.7% QoQ from 2,887 tonnes in Q1. On the production side, ore mined totaled 200,300 tonnes in Q2, down 6.11% QoQ, mainly due to limited availability of loaders, trucks, and hoists, along with stope sequencing delays. The ore grade mined was 1.58% Sn, slightly lower than the 1.63% in Q1. Ore milled reached 183,800 tonnes, up 14.60% QoQ, with mill head grade declining to 1.95% Sn (Q1: 2.24% Sn), and the processing recovery rate was 78.55% (Q1: 80.35%). For the Renison mineral resource update, total resources increased to 21.8 million tonnes at a grade of 1.38% tin, containing 300,300 tonnes of tin. Measured and Indicated tin content rose 7% to 264,100 tonnes. The mine life plan and ore reserve update are expected to be completed in Q3.

July 31, 2026 Whenever economic growth begins to weaken, many investors instinctively turn their attention to gold and silver as traditional safe-haven assets. Yet reality is more complex than the familiar "safe haven" narrative. While both precious metals tend to benefit from periods of economic uncertainty over the long term, they often follow very different patterns during recessions. Investors who understand these differences can position their portfolios more effectively. Paradoxically, the prices of both gold—and especially silver—often decline during the initial stages of a severe crisis. This is not because investors suddenly lose confidence in precious metals, but because individuals and institutions urgently need liquidity. In times of market stress, investors frequently sell their most liquid assets, including gold and silver, to meet margin calls or raise cash. History Shows That Liquidity Comes First During the Initial Phase of a Crisis The global financial crisis of 2008 provides a clear example. As the crisis intensified, the gold price fell from nearly US$1,000 to around US$700 per ounce before recovering by year-end and eventually reaching new all-time highs. Silver suffered a much sharper decline, dropping from approximately US$21 to below US$9 per ounce, a decline of more than 50%, while gold lost only about 12% during the same period. A similar pattern emerged during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. Both precious metals initially declined sharply, but silver once again proved considerably more volatile, falling from around US$18 to US$12 per ounce within just a few weeks. Gold also weakened but experienced a much more moderate correction. History repeatedly demonstrates that the urgent need for liquidity can temporarily drive down the prices of both gold and silver. Yet it also shows that investors who panic and sell during these periods often miss the powerful recovery that typically follows. Once the Recovery Begins, Silver Historically Outperforms Gold This is where the second—and perhaps most important—historical pattern emerges. During the recovery phase following a recession, silver has historically outperformed gold by a considerable margin. Following the 2008 financial crisis, silver gained approximately 400% from its lows, while gold appreciated by roughly 170%. This outperformance generally begins once the urgent need for liquidity subsides and investors return to risk assets. The same phenomenon occurred after the initial COVID-19 market shock. During 2020, silver advanced by nearly 48%, while gold gained approximately 25%. One of the primary reasons for silver's stronger performance is its dual role. Gold functions primarily as a monetary asset and store of value. Silver, by contrast, combines monetary demand with substantial industrial demand. As economic conditions improve, both sources of demand recover simultaneously, providing additional support for silver prices. Why Gold Performs Well During Recessions Gold benefits from several supportive factors during economic downturns. Central banks typically lower interest rates in an effort to stimulate economic activity, reducing the opportunity cost of holding a non-yielding asset such as gold. At the same time, demand increases for assets without counterparty risk, particularly as confidence in equities, bonds, and sometimes even financial institutions begins to deteriorate. A review of six major U.S. recessions shows that gold prices increased during five of those downturns, declining only modestly during the 1990–1991 recession. There is, however, an important exception. If central banks aggressively raise interest rates to combat inflation—as they did in the early 1980s, when U.S. interest rates reached nearly 20%—gold can come under pressure even while the broader economy is contracting. The Great Depression: An Extreme Case A depression differs from a normal recession in both its severity and duration and is often accompanied by deflation. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the official U.S. gold price remained fixed at US$20.67 per ounce under the gold standard. Gold's ability to preserve wealth therefore appeared not through price appreciation but through its purchasing power. As consumer prices fell by approximately 24%, gold maintained its nominal value, resulting in a significant increase in real purchasing power. In 1934, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt raised the official gold price to US$35 per ounce, effectively increasing its value by approximately 69% overnight. This change resulted from government policy rather than market forces. At roughly the same time, the U.S. government issued Executive Order 6102, requiring private citizens to surrender much of their gold holdings. This historical episode illustrates that during severe depressions characterized by fixed exchange rates or a gold standard, government policy may exert greater influence over precious metals than normal market supply and demand. Similar developments occurred in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, when Austria, following its defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz, devalued its currency by roughly 80% against gold. What This Means for Investors Several practical lessons emerge from history. First, short-term declines in gold—and particularly in silver—during the early stages of a crisis should not be interpreted as evidence that precious metals have failed. Rather, they reflect the market's temporary scramble for liquidity. Second, investors who maintain long-term holdings of physical gold and silver in the form of coins or bullion have historically benefited disproportionately from the subsequent recovery, with silver generally delivering the stronger rebound. Third, stagflationary environments—where weak economic growth coincides with persistent inflation, as experienced during the 1970s—have historically been particularly favorable for silver because both its monetary and industrial demand tend to strengthen simultaneously. For investors seeking to protect their wealth against the uncertainties of a recession—or even a full-scale depression—gold and silver should therefore be viewed not as short-term speculative trades, but as long-term components of a well-diversified investment portfolio. Source： https://goldinvest.de/en/gold-and-silver-during-a-recession-how-do-precious-metals-really-perform

Rebar prices drifted lower this week, with the nationwide average price at 3,052 yuan/mt, down 40 yuan/mt WoW from last Friday. Supply side, although raw material prices have recently eased, most steel mills are still loss-making and production enthusiasm has weakened. Moreover, mills in central and north China are under cash flow loss pressure and have short-term maintenance plans, which will further ease production pressure. In addition, electric furnace mills are facing deepening losses, coupled with difficulties in scrap collection during the summer. Some producers have further reduced operating hours, with a few planning to halt production next week. The electric furnace operating rate is expected to continue its downtrend. Demand side, the falling price trend combined with the off-season led to overall moderate trading. Additionally, some regions affected by rain saw limited project construction and a slowdown in downstream procurement pace. Inventory side, mill inventories fell while social inventories rose, keeping total inventories in an accumulation phase. Off-season inventory pressure is gradually emerging. It is understood that mill profitability diverged by region. East China mills maintained relatively good performance, with some still generating gross profits. However, mills in north and northwest China suffered heavier losses, and with higher inventory pressure, they are about to face cash flow losses. Looking ahead, the second round of coke price cuts has been implemented, pushing the cost side lower and weakening support for the price floor. Returning to rebar fundamentals, the supply-demand imbalance is accumulating, and weak demand offers little catalyst. Spot prices are expected to face downside risks next week. In the later period, attention should be paid to market capital flows and steel mill maintenance and production cuts.

SMM, July 31: Views in the secondary refined lead market diverged further. Upstream suppliers held prices firm aggressively, while downstream enterprises called for price cuts and waited to purchase at lower levels. The price spread between secondary refined lead and primary lead narrowed, highlighting the purchasing advantage of primary lead. Price expectations between buyers and sellers differed widely, spot negotiations were at a stalemate, and overall market transactions remained sluggish. This week, mainstream transaction prices for secondary refined lead were at a discount of 75-0 yuan/mt against the SMM #1 lead average price. Meanwhile, scrap battery prices fell only slightly, widening the loss range for enterprises. As of July 31, 2026, the comprehensive theoretical profit/loss for large-scale secondary lead enterprises was -623 yuan/mt, while that for small and medium-sized secondary lead enterprises was -801 yuan/mt. If lead prices remain in the doldrums next week, the premium quotation range for spot orders of secondary refined lead against the SMM #1 lead average price will expand, and shipment volumes will continue to decline.