Iran’s threat to drive oil prices up to $200 a barrel may sound like hyperbole, but as the energy crisis persisted, that outcome already looked more likely than US President Trump’s prediction that oil prices would soon pull back to pre-war levels… The conflict involving Israel and the US against Iran entered its third week — and escalated into one spanning the entire Middle East — yet the global oil benchmark’s response so far was surprisingly “mediocre.” Brent crude oil was currently trading near $100 a barrel, up about 65 from the start of the year. Although that level would have been unimaginable just a few weeks ago, it still remained below last Monday’s brief peak of nearly $120. Given that since the conflict began, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz had trapped about one-fifth of global oil supply — roughly 20 million barrels a day — crude oil prices should, in theory, have been much higher. That seemed to suggest investors still retained a degree of trust in Trump , betting that the crisis would be resolved quickly and that the Strait of Hormuz would soon reopen — whether it was called the “Trump put,” the “TACO trade,” or “buy Trump,” many oil traders appeared to be wagering that the president would ultimately be able to limit the market damage. “When this is over, oil prices will come down very, very quickly,” Trump said on Monday this week. Yet that optimism looked increasingly difficult to reconcile with realities on the ground — whether on a battlefield where the conflict was intensifying, or in the physical oil market, where supply bottlenecks were steadily spreading. Signals Being Overlooked In fact, the physical crude oil market was sending an increasing number of stress signals, even though the international benchmark “paper oil” market had so far largely ignored them. Although trade had stalled under the impact of the Iran conflict, Middle Eastern crude benchmarks still surged to record highs, making them the most expensive crude in the world. The spike in these benchmark indicators, which are used to price millions of barrels of Middle Eastern crude sold to Asia, was raising costs for Asian refiners and forcing them to seek alternatives or make further production cuts in the coming months. S&P Global Platts said Dubai spot crude assessments for May-loading cargoes hit a record $157.66 a barrel on Tuesday, surpassing the previous all-time high of $147.5 set by Brent crude oil futures in 2008. That left Dubai crude’s premium to swaps at $60.82 a barrel, compared with an average premium of just 90¢ in February. Meanwhile, Oman crude oil futures hit a record high of $152.58 per barrel on Tuesday, with its premium to the Dubai swap set at $55.74 per barrel, versus an average premium of just 75¢ in February. Oman crude oil is exported from a terminal outside the Strait of Hormuz. This surge reflected massive uncertainty over actually available supply in the Middle East after Iran repeatedly attacked Oman's oil terminal and the UAE's major oil export terminal of Fujairah outside the Strait of Hormuz. Are Brent and WTI Failing to Reflect the "True Severity" of the Oil Market? As JPMorgan's head of commodities, Natasha Kaneva, pointed out in her latest research note on Tuesday , there was a clear mismatch between international benchmark crude pricing and the Middle Eastern geography of the supply disruptions. The core issue was that Brent and WTI are benchmark indicators at opposite ends of the Atlantic basin, while the current shock is concentrated in the Middle East. As a result, these benchmark crude prices were particularly influenced by relatively loose regional fundamentals—commercial oil inventory in both the US and Europe were ample in early 2026, and supply across the Atlantic basin was also relatively abundant in the short term. In addition, expectations for a release from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)—as well as a partial release that will soon materialize—further eased prompt tightness in Brent- and WTI-linked markets. By contrast, Middle Eastern crude benchmarks such as Dubai and Oman more accurately reflected the current dislocation in the physical market. Dubai and Oman spot prices were both trading above $150 per barrel, underscoring the severity of crude oil shortages originating in the Gulf region. These Middle Eastern oil prices were directly affected by export disruptions and therefore more effectively reflected marginal supply deficits than Atlantic-linked crude prices. Crucially, trade geography intensified this dynamic. Most of the crude transported via the Strait of Hormuz goes to Asia—before the outbreak of the Middle East conflict, about 11.2 million barrels of crude and 1.4 million barrels of refined products flowed through the strait to Asia each day. As a result, the direct physical shortage—and the surge in oil prices—was concentrated in Asian markets most dependent on Gulf crude. In fact, early signs of demand destruction had already emerged in Asia as product prices surged and spot crude became prohibitively expensive. JPMorgan noted that timing effects further reinforced this divergence. A typical voyage from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to Asia takes about 10 to 15 days, while cargoes bound for Europe via the Suez Canal require nearly 25 to 30 days, or 35 to 45 days if rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope. Therefore, the impact of disrupted Gulf flows would hit Asian markets sooner and more severely, while Atlantic Basin benchmarks such as Brent and WTI would enjoy a longer buffer because of surplus inventory and slower supply adjustments. The US, with crude oil production exceeding 13 million barrels per day, would be affected the least. JPMorgan believed that, in this context, the apparent price stability shown by Brent and WTI should not be taken as evidence of adequate global supply. It reflected a temporary buffer created by regional surplus inventory, benchmark composition, and policy intervention. In fact, for refiners, especially those in Asia, the current crude oil shortage had already become a serious problem. About 60% of the region’s crude oil imports depended on the Middle East, and the difficulty of finding alternative, timely supplies was rapidly becoming acute. The pressure had already forced many countries into painful adjustments. Refiners across Asia had begun cutting run rates to conserve dwindling inventory. Some countries had banned exports of refined products, a defensive move that could further tighten the global market. As the crude oil shortage worsened, refined product prices surged. Asian jet fuel prices were approaching $200 a barrel, near the record high of about $220 reached earlier this month. The Crisis Could Spread Further Ultimately, this crisis was expected to extend beyond Asia. Data from analytics firm Kpler showed that Europe accounted for about three-quarters of Middle Eastern jet fuel exports shipped through the Strait of Hormuz last year—about 379,000 barrels per day—but since the conflict began, no such cargoes had passed through the strait. Unsurprisingly, jet fuel barge prices in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp refining hub had surged to a record $190 a barrel, exceeding the previous peak set after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022. The comparison with the Russia-Ukraine crisis may be even more compelling. Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Russia supplied about 30% of Europe’s crude oil imports and one-third of its refined product imports. As traders feared Europe would lose supplies from one of the world’s largest oil producers, Brent crude rose to $130 a barrel after the Russia-Ukraine conflict—even though that worst-case scenario never fully materialized in the end. By contrast, according to Morgan Stanley, the physical disruption caused by the Iran conflict had already exceeded that level of concern by more than threefold. Even if the Strait of Hormuz were to reopen immediately, it would not bring immediate relief. According to the International Energy Agency, about 10 million barrels per day of production in the Middle East has been shut in since the conflict began. Restoring these flows will take weeks, if not months. To be sure, the oil market entered the Iran conflict in a relatively loose state, and the International Energy Agency had projected that global supply would exceed demand by about 3.7 million barrels per day. But that surplus has now been erased by the current turmoil. Last week, the International Energy Agency announced plans to release a record 400 million barrels from member countries' strategic petroleum reserves, which will help cushion the initial shock. But drawing down inventories cannot substitute for deliveries of new oil. In other words, the supply shock to the oil market is real and may persist. Once the Strait of Hormuz finally reopens, oil prices could initially plunge in a relief rebound, but given the harsh realities of the physical market, traders may need to think twice before betting that the return to normalcy promised by Trump is about to arrive…

I. Supply-Demand Pattern Shift Puts Iron Ore Prices on a Downtrend In 2021, driven by inflation expectations from global quantitative easing, frequent supply-side disruptions in Brazil and Australia, resilient demand in China, and strong speculative sentiment, iron ore prices hit a record high of $219.77/mt in July that year, with Platts’ annual average price as high as $160/mt ; they then entered a prolonged downtrend. In 2025, the annual average iron ore price was $102, down about 36% from the 2021 average. Source: SMM Iron ore prices have continued to fall in recent years, mainly due to the global project investment boom spurred by high prices before 2021. After 2024, multiple large iron ore projects worldwide entered a concentrated commissioning phase, and the market’s supply-demand pattern shifted from tight to loose, with the supply-demand gap widening from -12 million mt to 46 million mt. Meanwhile, China has implemented crude steel production cuts since 2022, significantly curbing iron ore demand. Coupled with persistent weakness in real estate, an overall downturn in the steel industry, and an overseas economic slowdown, among other factors, iron ore demand declined markedly. Entering 2025, a rebound in China’s steel exports drove iron ore demand to increase slightly, while capacity in emerging steel-producing countries such as Southeast Asia was gradually released, narrowing the supply-demand gap somewhat. Over the long term, however, iron ore supply is still on a growth trend, market expectations remain bearish, and prices are pressured to set new lows repeatedly. Source: SMM (the forecast assumes an extreme balance under normal commissioning of new mines and no voluntary production cuts by mines) II. Mine Costs Form a Solid Bottom Support for Iron Ore Prices From the global iron ore cost curve, about 90% of global mine cash cost is no higher than $85/mt, and about 93.8% is no higher than $90/mt. International mining giants represented by FMG, BHP, Rio Tinto, and Vale have costs far below those in China and other non-mainstream countries, forming the main body on the left side of the cost curve in the chart—low and relatively flat—which explains their strong cost competitiveness and earnings resilience in the global market. At present, the $85-90 cost line is the lifeline for the vast majority of mines; once prices remain below this range for an extended period, high-cost capacity will be forced to exit, thereby supporting prices. China’s iron ore mines due to low raw ore grade and high underground mining costs, among other reasons, currently have a nationwide per-mt processing cost of about 595 yuan/mt, equivalent to around $85 . Its costs have long been at the high end globally, serving as the "anchor point" and "ceiling" of the cost curve. The high cost and low production of China's domestic iron ore mines have led the steel industry to heavily rely on imports for raw materials, and fluctuations in international ore prices directly impact the profit stability of the domestic steel industry. Therefore, promoting domestic resource supply, investing in low-cost overseas resources, and developing steel scrap recycling are crucial for the strategic security of China's steel industry. Data source: SMM III. The global iron ore supply has long been characterized by a landscape dominated by the "Big Four" mines, supplemented by "non-mainstream" mines. Currently, the iron ore production industry is highly concentrated, primarily following a pattern dominated by the "Big Four" mines, supplemented by "non-mainstream" mines. Australia and Brazil have long contributed over half of the global iron ore production. Australia, leveraging advantages such as high resource concentration, low mining costs, and stable supply, firmly holds its position as the world's largest producer and exporter; while Brazil is renowned for its high-grade ore and is the world's second-largest iron ore exporter. Data source: SMM The "Big Four" mines, consisting of Rio Tinto, BHP, FMG, and Vale, have long dominated global iron ore supply, accounting for approximately 70% of global production. Data source: SMM The Rise of Emerging Mines Promoting the Multipolar Development of Global Iron Ore In recent years, India has actively promoted domestic mining development, leading to a significant increase in production; since 2023, its iron ore production has surpassed that of China, and it shows a continuous expansion trend, maintaining an annual growth rate of 7%, gradually becoming a new force in regional supply growth. Emerging enterprises such as India's National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) and South Africa's Anglo American are gradually expanding capacity, enhancing their influence in the international market. Meanwhile, countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and regions in Africa are also actively developing domestic iron ore resources, seeking to increase their voice in regional markets, driving the global iron ore supply landscape from high concentration towards gradual multipolar development. Data source: SMM IV. Australia Firmly Holds the Top Spot, India Becomes a New Growth Engine From the perspective of major producing countries, Australia still firmly ranks first globally, with iron ore production of approximately 900 million mt in 2025, accounting for one-third of the global total, and maintaining a stable annual growth rate of about 2%. Brazil ranks second; after the 2019 dam collapse, production once fell sharply. Although it has recovered somewhat over the past two years, the increase has been relatively limited. China’s production scale is relatively large, but due to frequent safety incidents and the continued impact of the environmental protection-driven production restriction policy, production has not increased but instead declined in recent years. By contrast, India, as an emerging producer, has seen production rise steadily over the past decade, and is expected to post an increase of about 7% by 2030. Source: SMM V Over the next three years, the world will usher in a new peak in mine commissioning In addition to supply from existing mines, there are currently multiple large-scale iron ore projects under construction worldwide, with the number of mines expected to be commissioned in 2026 at six, mainly located in Africa and Brazil. Representative projects include Vale’s northern expansion “S11D +20mtpa,” the northern block of Guinea’s Simandou iron ore project, and the Nimba iron ore project. 2026 will be the year with the most concentrated new supply over the next three years. With the northern block of Simandou officially commencing production, the overall capacity ceiling of the mining area will, with capacity ramp-up, rise to 120 million mt, becoming the core incremental source of global iron ore supply over the next five years. From 2027 to 2028, projects expected to commence production will mainly come from China, including the Xi’an Mountain iron ore mine and the Honggenan iron ore mine, adding about 25 million mt of iron ore supply to the domestic market. Overall, as emerging producers continue to release capacity, and traditional suppliers such as Australia and Brazil consolidate their export advantages through expansion projects, the global iron ore supply structure will become more diversified. A new cycle of capacity release has gradually begun, and the loose supply landscape is expected to continue deepening over the next several years. Source: SMM Simandou Project Commissioning Reshaping the Global Iron Ore Supply Landscape Among the many new projects, Africa’s Simandou iron ore is particularly noteworthy. The mine is expected to reach annual capacity of 120 million mt, and the ore’s average grade exceeds 65%, providing the market with a high-grade, high-quality option beyond Australia and Brazil, and becoming an important variable in the recent contest over the global iron ore supply landscape. In terms of project progress, the Simandou iron ore project has entered a substantive shipment phase; as logistics corridors are gradually opened up, the mining area’s substantive impact on global supply will gradually become evident. Source: SMM Nearly 400 million mt of Capacity Release by 2030, Global Iron Ore Market Faces Impact With the entry of emerging producers, iron ore supply is beginning to diversify. Projects led by Simandou iron ore are breaking the industry landscape and taking the iron ore market into a new stage. Looking ahead to the next five years, global iron ore capacity is expected to see a wave of concentrated releases, with incremental supply mainly coming from two major regions: Africa and Australia . Leveraging the development of new high-grade mines such as Simandou, Africa is reshaping the global supply landscape; meanwhile, Australia, relying on its existing capacity base and ongoing expansion projects, is further consolidating its export-dominant position. Overall, the global iron ore supply landscape is evolving toward greater diversification and a looser market. Source: SMM VI Simandou High-Quality Iron Ore Enters the Market; Global Iron Ore Enters an Era of “Quality Upgrading” As some older mines gradually enter a period of resource depletion , coupled with the fact that many newly commissioned projects are dominated by mid- to low-grade ore, the average global iron ore grade shows a downward trend from 2025 to 2026 . However, as high-grade mines such as Simandou are commissioned one after another, the share of high-grade ore supply is expected to increase, and is projected to drive a rebound in the overall global iron ore grade in 2027. Source: SMM VII “Green Steel” Reshapes the Global Crude Steel Production Landscape From a policy perspective, the low-carbon transition represented by “green steel” is profoundly reshaping the global crude steel production landscape . Whether in China or Europe, carbon neutrality has become the core theme for the future development of the steel industry. Therefore, whether it is China’s ongoing capacity replacement policy or the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) that is about to be fully implemented , both clearly indicate that the global steel industry is accelerating its transition toward low-carbon and green development. Achieving carbon neutrality across the entire industry chain is no longer an isolated task for a single link, but must rely on close upstream-downstream coordination and deep integration of technological pathways. Source: SMM Technology Reshaping: Green Iron Supply + Green Production Demand Against the broader backdrop of carbon neutrality, merely maintaining the current supply-demand structure dominated by iron ore can no longer meet future low-carbon requirements. The deeper need of industry transformation lies in reconstructing metallurgical processes: resource-rich countries—such as Australia and Brazil, traditional major iron ore exporters—need to fully leverage their renewable energy endowments and mineral advantages, shifting from simply exporting iron ore to producing high-grade, low-carbon-footprint direct reduced iron (DRI) or hot briquetted iron (HBI) and other high value-added intermediate products. By shipping this clean-energy-driven “green DRI” to steel consumption hubs and integrating it with local green electric arc furnace (EAF) processes, it can effectively replace the traditional “blast furnace–converter” long process, thereby substantially reducing carbon emissions at the source. This multinational collaborative model of “high-quality resources + green energy + short-process” is not only a critical measure to address trade barriers such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, but also an essential pathway to build a new global green steel supply chain and drive deep decarbonization across the industry. Data source: SMM Rising Share of Electric-Furnace Steelmaking, Stronger Substitutability of Steel Scrap, Squeezing Iron Ore Demand Driven by carbon-neutrality targets, the steel industry, as a major source of carbon emissions in the industrial sector, has drawn close attention for its emissions-reduction pathway. Among these, the traditional long-process route centered on “blast furnace–converter,” due to its heavy reliance on coke and iron ore, is regarded as a primary source of carbon emissions and has therefore become a key focus of regulation and retrofitting in various countries. By contrast, the short-process route represented by “steel scrap–electric furnace,” with a significantly lower carbon-emissions intensity, is being favoured by an increasing number of countries. This structural shift has driven the share of electric-furnace steelmaking in global crude steel production to continue rising. Data source: SMM From an economic perspective, the substitution relationship between steel scrap and pig iron is typically measured by the price spread. Generally, after factoring in steelmaking costs and losses, pig iron costs should be about 100-150 yuan/mt higher than steel scrap prices ; this range is viewed as the cost-performance equilibrium band: if steel scrap prices are lower than pig iron costs by more than this threshold, steel scrap is more economical; otherwise, pig iron has a more pronounced advantage. In 2025, the average price spread between pig iron and steel scrap was 122 yuan/mt, lower than the 2024 average of 211.8 yuan/mt, and also largely within the cost-performance equilibrium band. By contrast, the 2024 spread was significantly above the upper limit of the equilibrium band, indicating that steel scrap offered a more prominent cost-performance advantage at that time. After the spread narrowed in 2025, the economic advantage of steel scrap weakened somewhat. As a result, in the short term, there is limited room for China to increase the share of electric-furnace steelmaking; overall, it remains at a relatively low level and still lags far behind the global average. This also reflects that, at the current stage, cost factors still impose a substantive constraint on the choice of smelting process routes. Data source: SMM Taken together, the blast furnace–converter long-process route will remain the dominant model for global steel production over the next five years, but the shares of electric furnaces and steel scrap usage will increase year by year; in the long run, this trend will suppress iron ore demand, causing it to weaken gradually. Data source: SMM VIII Global Total Iron Ore Demand in 2030 to Be About 2.4 Billion mt, with Gradual Shifts in Global Flows As China began encouraging domestic steel mills to develop overseas markets while adjusting the domestic industry chain’s transformation toward producing high value-added products needed by the manufacturing sector, global crude steel production began to rebound gradually. Data Source: SMM From the perspective of the global demand structure, although crude steel production outside China is entering a new round of development, with capacity expansion particularly notable in regions such as India and Southeast Asia, a considerable portion of the incremental increase comes from electric furnace processes, providing limited substantive boost to iron ore demand. Meanwhile, as the world’s largest iron ore consumer, China’s crude steel production has entered a downward trajectory, constituting the primary source of demand-side reductions. Overall, overseas increments are unlikely to fully offset China’s reductions. It is expected that by 2030, total global iron ore demand will be approximately 2.4 billion mt, with overall growth trending toward a slowdown. Compared with the mild growth on the demand side, the supply side remains in a phase of continuous expansion. The oversupply landscape will become an important factor that suppresses ore prices over the long term. Data Source: SMM SMM will continue to track the impact of changes in iron ore supply and demand on prices. Comments are welcome—scan the code to follow us! Data Source Statement: Except for publicly available information, all other data are processed and derived by SMM based on publicly available information, market communication, and SMM’s internal database models, for reference only and not constituting decision-making advice. Scan the code to access information for free

The pressure to decarbonize the aviation industry continues to escalate, with sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) emerging as a core solution. This article analyzes the current market situation, core challenges, and key growth points of SAF based on data from the SMM industry database and global authoritative institutions.

[SMM Hot Topic: Summary of Q1 Reports from 44 Steel Enterprises: Nearly 70% Achieved YoY Net Profit Growth] In Q1, the supply-demand imbalance in China's domestic steel market remained prominent. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), in Q1 2025, China's crude steel production reached 259 million mt, up 0.6% YoY. The domestic steel price index in Q1 decreased by 9.9% YoY, while the Platts 62% iron ore index increased by 1.0% YoY, and the price of coking coal in Lvliang, Shanxi, decreased by 36.1% YoY. Although the cost of raw materials and fuels for steel enterprises improved somewhat, the profit margins in the steel industry remained limited due to weak demand in the steel market, and operational pressures persisted.

Summary of the Mining Services Contract for the Extension Iron Ore Project Awarded to ASX-Listed Small Iron Ore Company Macro Metals 1. Project Overview • Location and Scale ◦ The project is located in the East Pilbara region of Western Australia, just 2 km from BHP's Yandi Iron Ore operations and 20 km from Rio Tinto's Yandicoogina mine. ◦ It comprises three mining leases with a total area of 27.6 square kilometers, located 270 km from the Port Hedland port, accessible by truck to the Utah Point bulk terminal. • Resource Estimate ◦ The resource estimate completed in 2019 shows that the project has 16.1 million mt of indicated resources with an iron grade of 54.2% (roasted iron 60.49%), SiO₂ 5.7%, Al₂O₃ 5.6%, phosphorus 0.046%, and loss on ignition (LOI) 10.4% (using a 53% iron grade cutoff). ◦ After removing <1mm particles through dry screening, the resource was upgraded to 11.29 million mt, with the iron grade increasing to 57.16% (roasted iron 63.84%), SiO₂ reduced to 3.6%, Al₂O₃ 4.63%, and phosphorus 0.05%. 2. Core Contract Terms • Scope of Services and Partners ◦ Exclusive technical services: MMS is responsible for exploration, permit applications, and technical verification, using a cost-plus 15% billing model. ◦ Joint mining operations: MMS and strategic partner RE:GROUP jointly undertake mine construction, drilling and blasting, mining, loading, and transportation services (cost-plus 15%). ◦ Exclusive processing services: MMS provides crushing and screening services under a "Build-Own-Operate" (BOO) model, charged at market terms. • Economic Terms ◦ The total contract value will be announced after MMS completes the project development plan and technical verification. ◦ Equity option: Macro Metals is granted an option to acquire 27.3% equity in the project (subject to shareholder approval), exercisable before project commissioning, with the consideration being the issuance of 175 million company shares. 3. Technical Verification and Advantages • Metallurgical Test Verification ◦ Verification of historical test results: The iron grade increased to 57.16% after screening, with low phosphorus content (0.05%), suitable for blending with high-phosphorus iron ore for export. ◦ Logistics advantage: Utilizing a logistics center 28 km from the port (including accommodation and raw material storage), providing stockyard and blending opportunities, reducing transportation costs. • Resource Expansion Potential ◦ Plans to explore unexplored mineralized outcrops to extend mine life. ◦ Aims to apply for an annual export quota of 1.5-2 million mt, subject to negotiation with the Pilbara Ports Authority (PPA). 4. Management Team and Strategic Significance • Management Statements ◦ Chairman Tolga Kumova: Emphasized that the contract reflects MMS's professional capabilities, with technical services generating immediate cash flow, and the project's location and low-phosphorus characteristics provide advantages for blended products. ◦ Managing Director Simon Rushton: The partnership with RE:GROUP is solid, and future collaborations will focus on developing more bulk commodity projects; MMS has participated in bids across multiple mining areas in Western Australia with positive feedback. • Business Expansion ◦ MMS recently completed its first revenue-generating project (repairing a client's crushing plant), demonstrating its technical capabilities. ◦ The company is positioned as a diversified mining services provider, covering the entire chain from mining, processing, transportation to shipping. 5. Project Execution Plan • Short-Term Actions ◦ Assess existing permit status, accelerate final approvals, and push for commercial production. ◦ Apply for bulk sample transportation permits for trial exports. ◦ Optimize the Port Hedland transport corridor and jointly develop a transportation plan with RE:GROUP. ◦ Develop a mine development plan, mining timetable, and execution plan. 6. Equity Structure and Compliance • Project Ownership ◦ The project is held by private company Project Rusty Pty Ltd, with Macro's two directors (Simon Rushton and Rob Jewson) each holding 27.3% equity. ◦ Subject to shareholder approval under ASX Listing Rules 10.1 (related party transactions) and 10.11 (option exercise). 7. Resource Estimate Technical Details (JORC Standard) • Data Basis ◦ Drilling data: Includes 333 reverse circulation drill holes (3,992 meters) and 56 diamond drill holes (501 meters), with sampling intervals of 0.25-2 meters. ◦ Analytical methods: X-ray fluorescence (XRF) for major elements and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) for LOI. • Modeling and Classification ◦ Inverse distance cubed (ID3) interpolation was used, with block sizes of 1.25m×1.25m and search radii of 125-250 meters. ◦ Resources classified as indicated, based on geological continuity, data quality (100×100 meter infill drilling), and consistency in modeling methods. 8. Market Positioning and Competitive Analysis • Product Benchmarking ◦ The screened iron ore quality benchmarks against Rio Tinto's Robe River Fines, FMG's blended fines, and other Platts 58% index benchmark products. ◦ Similar to the operational models of nearby small trucking projects such as Mineral Resources' Wonmunna and Iron Valley. 9. Risks and Compliance Statements • Compliance Statements ◦ The resource estimate was completed by Widenbar and Associates, compliant with the JORC 2012 standard, with data verification including duplicate samples and standard sample analysis. ◦ Independent geologists Lynn Widenbar and Robert Jewson (company director) signed the report as Competent Persons. 10. Company Background • Macro Metals Limited ◦ ASX-listed under code M4M, with business covering mineral exploration, development, and mining services. ◦ Subsidiary MMS provides end-to-end services (mining, crushing, transportation, shipping) and holds a portfolio of iron ore and manganese assets. Summary The contract secures long-term revenue for Macro Metals through a dual profit model of technical services and mining operations (cost-plus + market rates), combined with the advantages of low-phosphorus ore blending and port logistics, giving it strong market competitiveness. The project has clear resource potential and a well-defined execution plan, and if approved and expanded successfully, it is expected to become a core growth driver for the company.

【Will Rio Tinto's Main Product PB Face a Grade Reduction?】Recent market rumors indicate that the quality of Rio Tinto's flagship product PB (including PB fines and PB lumps) has declined by at least one grade. Specifically, the iron grade of PB fines has dropped from the typical value of 61.6% to 60.8%, and the iron grade of PB lumps has also decreased from the typical value of 62.2% to 61.6%. According to the online rumors, the iron grades of PB fines and lumps will be implemented in H2 2025. Based on the quality changes, there are also market rumors about the pricing model for the "new PB mixed ore product," which is said to be set as "Platts 62% index + discount." Additionally, Rio Tinto's mine will conduct price discovery monthly by selling spot cargo in US dollars and determine the discount. It is rumored that the adjusted PB products will almost certainly be priced at a reduced rate.