On 29 July, Australian lithium producer Liontown released its quarterly report for the period ended 30 June 2026. The Kathleen Valley lithium project produced 103.1 kdmt of spodumene concentrate during the June quarter, up 7% QoQ, while sales increased 29.3% QoQ to 108.5 kdmt. Average shipped grade was 5.0% Li₂O, while the average realised price was US$1,880/dmt on an SC6e, CIF basis. For FY26, Kathleen Valley produced 392.0 kdmt of spodumene concentrate, within the company’s previous guidance range of 365–450 kdmt. Liontown issued a clarification on the same day to amend the units of reference used in its FY26 results and FY27 guidance, removing the previous references to SC6 from concentrate production and cost metrics. Accordingly, concentrate production is reported on an actual dry metric tonne basis, unit operating costs are calculated per dry metric tonne sold, while average realised prices continue to be reported on an SC6-equivalent basis. Kathleen Valley has gradually moved beyond the initial question of whether it can achieve stable production and is now entering the underground mining ramp-up phase. More importantly for the lithium market, however, the key signal from this quarter is not the amount of additional concentrate Liontown will produce in FY27. Rather, the previous recovery in lithium prices has strengthened Liontown’s cash flow and balance sheet sufficiently to support renewed investment in underground development and expansion. Supply elasticity is therefore showing up first in capital expenditure rather than in near-term tonnes. US$1,880/dmt Marks a Quarterly High for Liontown, but Remains Below the 2026 Market Average Liontown achieved an average realised price of US$1,880/dmt on an SC6e, CIF basis during the June quarter, only 1.9% higher than US$1,845/dmt in the previous quarter. From Liontown’s own pricing history, this represented the highest quarterly realised price in FY26. Kathleen Valley’s average realised prices across the four quarters of FY26 were US$691/dmt, US$985/dmt, US$1,845/dmt and US$1,880/dmt, respectively, with a full-year average of US$1,379/dmt. However, viewed against the broader spodumene market in 2026, US$1,880/dmt is not particularly high. Compared with SMM’s year-to-date average for SC6 CIF China, Liontown’s realised price during the quarter remained at a discount to the broader market average. This suggests that Liontown has not fully captured the magnitude of the increase previously seen in spot spodumene prices. Table 1. Kathleen Valley FY26 Production, Sales and Pricing Metric Q1 FY26 Q2 FY26 Q3 FY26 Q4 FY26 Spodumene concentrate production (dmt) 87,172 105,342 96,367 103,111 Spodumene concentrate sales (dmt) 77,474 112,122 83,912 108,489 Average shipped grade 5.00% 5.10% 5.10% 5.00% Average realised price (US$/dmt, SC6e) 691 985 1,845 1,880 Source: Liontown. One important explanation lies in the pricing mechanism of Liontown’s offtake agreements. The company stated that customer receipts during the quarter benefited from stronger lithium indices and offtake agreements with lagged quotation periods, meaning that some contract prices are determined using benchmark prices from earlier periods. Liontown’s realised price therefore does not immediately track the contemporaneous spot market. Instead, benchmark prices are transmitted into realised prices with a time lag through contractual pricing formulas. During a rising market, this mechanism can leave realised prices below spot prices. Conversely, when spot prices fall, the same lag can temporarily support realised prices above prevailing market levels. For earnings analysis, US$1,880/dmt should therefore not simply be interpreted as Liontown’s current market selling price. The more relevant indicator is the evolution of Liontown’s realised-price discount or premium relative to the SMM SC6 CIF China benchmark. In other words, Liontown generated the current improvement in cash flow even though its realised price remained below the 2026 market average. This suggests that Kathleen Valley has already developed relatively strong cash-generation capability under the current pricing environment. Prices Have Moved Through the Income Statement and Are Now Feeding into Capex Liontown generated A$235 million in revenue during the June quarter, with operating cash flow reaching A$180 million. Net cash increased by A$137 million during the quarter, taking the company’s cash balance from A$424 million at the end of March to A$561 million at the end of June. At the end of FY25, Liontown held only A$156 million in cash. Its cash balance has therefore increased by more than threefold over FY26. Management has also explicitly changed the language around capital allocation. Six months ago, the company’s capital discipline was primarily focused on strengthening the balance sheet. It has now shifted towards pursuing value-accretive growth. This represents the key capital-cycle signal in the quarterly report: Higher lithium prices → improved realised prices → stronger cash flow → balance-sheet repair → renewed underground development and expansion capex. Liontown has now moved into the latter part of this transmission chain. FY27 Production Increases by Only ~23 kt, While Capex Rises to Nearly Three Times FY26 Levels Based on Liontown’s clarified reporting basis, the company produced 392 kdmt of spodumene concentrate in FY26, with FOB unit operating costs of A$987/dmt sold, AISC of A$1,233/dmt, and total capital expenditure of A$114 million. For FY27, Liontown is guiding to spodumene concentrate production of 390–440 kdmt, FOB unit operating costs of A$1,050–1,250/dmt sold, and total capital expenditure of A$320–370 million. Table 2. Liontown FY26 Actuals vs FY27 Guidance Metric FY26 Actual FY27 Guidance Change at Midpoint Spodumene concentrate production (kdmt) 392 390–440 0.059 FOB unit operating cost (A$/dmt sold) 987 1,050–1,250 0.165 AISC (A$/dmt) 1,233 — — Total capital expenditure (A$m) 114 320–370 ~+203% Source: Liontown clarification dated 29 July. At the midpoint of FY27 production guidance, Kathleen Valley would produce approximately 415 kdmt, only around 23 kdmt more than FY26, representing growth of roughly 5.9%. By contrast, the midpoint of FY27 capex guidance is A$345 million, approximately three times FY26 expenditure. FY27 should therefore not simply be characterised as a year of production growth. A more accurate interpretation is: FY27 is a transition year in which production growth remains limited while substantial capital is deployed ahead of future capacity growth. This also illustrates the time lag between the recovery in lithium prices and the eventual supply response. Investment is responding first; additional physical tonnes will follow later. Why Are Unit Costs Rising from A$987/dmt to A$1,050–1,250/dmt? The increase in FY27 cost guidance is another important variable in the report. FY26 FOB unit operating costs averaged A$987/dmt sold, while FY27 guidance rises to A$1,050–1,250/dmt sold. At the midpoint of A$1,150/dmt, this represents an increase of approximately 16.5%. This should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that underground mining is structurally more expensive. Liontown has not provided a quantitative breakdown of the factors driving the FY27 unit-cost increase, but the report identifies several relevant factors. First, logistics costs have increased. June-quarter unit operating costs rose from A$981/dmt sold to A$995/dmt sold, with Liontown attributing the increase primarily to higher diesel prices resulting from conflict in the Middle East, which increased transportation costs. Second, underground mine development expenditure is increasing. Q4 FY26 AISC rose from A$1,251/dmt sold to A$1,314/dmt sold, mainly because underground mine development costs began to be recognised as sustaining capital following the declaration of commercial production. Third, FY27 production guidance incorporates both scheduled maintenance and additional downtime required to connect expansion infrastructure with the existing processing system. This downtime has an important secondary effect: even if absolute fixed costs remain unchanged, lower saleable volumes mechanically increase costs on an A$/dmt sold basis. The increase in FY27 costs therefore appears to reflect a combination of: higher energy and logistics costs + increased underground development expenditure + fixed-cost dilution associated with planned downtime. These drivers have different degrees of persistence. If underground operations stabilise, recoveries improve and expansion-related downtime declines, some of the FY27 cost pressure could unwind. However, if underground mining itself carries materially higher unit mining costs, Kathleen Valley’s long-term cost base could shift structurally higher. Further FY27 operating data will be required to distinguish between these two outcomes. At this stage, there is insufficient evidence to treat the A$1,050–1,250/dmt FY27 range as Kathleen Valley’s new long-term normalised cost level. Underground Ore Mined Falls 12%, While Development Metres Rise 35% Kathleen Valley’s mining data also display characteristics typical of an underground mine in ramp-up. Underground ore mined during the June quarter fell 12% QoQ to 356 kt. However, underground development increased 35% QoQ to a record 3,316 metres. This suggests that Liontown is not simply maximising near-term ore extraction. Instead, it is developing additional underground headings and mining areas to support higher future mining rates. The company plans to maintain an underground mining run rate of approximately 1.5 Mtpa in Q1 FY27, before beginning the next stage of the ramp-up in Q2 FY27, with a target of reaching a 2.8 Mtpa annualised mining run rate by the end of FY27. Processing recovery represents a second potential source of production growth. Kathleen Valley processed 647 kt of ore during the June quarter at an average feed grade of 1.3% Li₂O, while lithium recovery improved from 61% to 63%. Underground ore accounted for 55% of plant feed. Liontown stated that when the plant processes sustained campaigns of cleaner underground ore, lithium recoveries can consistently reach approximately 70%. Future concentrate production therefore depends on two separate variables: Mining rate determines how much ore is available; recovery determines how much concentrate can be produced from that ore. If underground mining rates and plant recoveries improve simultaneously, Kathleen Valley could benefit from both higher ore availability and better conversion into concentrate. Conversely, even if the 2.8 Mtpa annualised mining-rate target is achieved, sustained recovery of only around 63% would result in lower concentrate production than the theoretical mining capacity might otherwise imply. FY27 Guidance Should Not Be Treated as 100% Certain Supply For a project still ramping up underground operations, company guidance should not be treated as guaranteed supply. Based on Kathleen Valley’s current operating position, SMM applies the following scenario framework to FY27 concentrate production: Table 3. Kathleen Valley FY27 Production Scenarios Scenario Key Assumptions FY27 Concentrate Production Probability Bull Underground development progresses to plan; recovery approaches 68–70%; limited impact from planned downtime 430–440 kdmt 20% Base Underground ramp-up broadly on schedule; 2.8 Mtpa run rate reached mainly toward FY27-end; recovery at 63–66% 400–420 kdmt 60% Bear Development, equipment utilisation or recovery underperforms; downtime exceeds expectations 370–390 kdmt 20% The 20%/60%/20% probabilities represent SMM’s analytical risk-weighting assumptions based on the project’s current stage, rather than Liontown guidance or statistically derived historical probabilities. Under this framework, probability-weighted FY27 concentrate production would be approximately 410 kdmt, slightly below the 415 kdmt midpoint of company guidance. These probabilities can be updated as Liontown reports Q1 FY27 underground development, ore mined, recovery rates and actual downtime. FY27 Underground Ramp-Up and the Expansion FID Need to Be Analysed Separately One important distinction is that Liontown’s FY27 production guidance of 390–440 kdmt does not represent post-expansion production. The company has explicitly stated that its FY27 guidance assumes no final investment decision has yet been made on the Kathleen Valley Expansion. The current A$320–370 million capex guidance includes the remaining early works announced in April, but excludes additional expansion capital expenditure that would follow a positive FID. The two sources of future supply therefore require different risk adjustments: FY27: discount for underground ramp-up and operational execution risk. FY28 onward: apply additional discounts for FID, capital requirements, construction schedule, plant integration and ramp-up risk. Liontown has already commenced early works and long-lead procurement ahead of the formal FID, including the purchase of a 5.5 MW ball mill designed to increase processing capacity and improve grinding control and recovery. A formal FID is expected by the end of Q1 FY27. The expansion has therefore moved beyond the stage of being merely an announced project. However, this does not mean that the expansion’s full incremental capacity should automatically be included in the FY28 supply balance. FID does not equal on-time commissioning, and on-time commissioning does not equal immediate achievement of nameplate capacity. Kathleen Valley’s ~23 kt FY27 Increment Is Small in the Context of Australian Spodumene Supply At the midpoint of guidance, Kathleen Valley would add only around 23 kt of spodumene concentrate in FY27 compared with FY26. Using standard industry SC6 conversion assumptions, this represents only several thousand tonnes of LCE, making it a marginal addition to a global lithium market measured in millions of tonnes of LCE. The scale becomes clearer when compared with other established Australian assets. Following completion of P1000, PLS’s Pilgangoora operation has reached nominal spodumene concentrate capacity of approximately 1 Mtpa. PLS has also approved the restart of the approximately 200 ktpa Ngungaju processing plant in 2026. Meanwhile, Wesfarmers and SQM have recently approved A$1.45 billion of investment to expand Mt Holland, targeting an increase in spodumene concentrate capacity from approximately 380 ktpa to 760 ktpa, although first incremental production is not expected until around 2030. Liontown’s quarterly report therefore does not materially change the FY27 global spodumene supply balance. Its broader significance lies elsewhere: Kathleen Valley provides a clear example of how improving lithium economics are beginning to reactivate capital expenditure across established Australian assets. What the market is currently seeing is therefore a leading indicator of future supply elasticity, rather than the supply itself. SMM View: Liontown Is Signalling That Capital Is Returning Before Supply Does Liontown’s quarterly report has limited direct implications for the near-term spodumene supply-demand balance. The midpoint of FY27 concentrate production guidance is only around 23 kt above FY26 actual production. Even if fully achieved, this would not represent a material addition to global lithium supply. The more significant change is in capital deployment. Liontown ended FY26 with A$561 million of cash, while FY27 capital expenditure guidance has increased from A$114 million in FY26 to A$320–370 million. The company is increasing underground development, procuring expansion equipment ahead of FID and targeting an Expansion FID around the end of September. Kathleen Valley therefore illustrates a four-stage supply response: Higher prices → stronger cash flow → capex recovery → incremental production. Liontown is currently moving from the second stage into the third. The quarterly report therefore cannot be reduced to a simple narrative of “higher lithium prices → Liontown increases production → supply pressure rises.” The actual FY27 volume increase is limited, while the supply associated with today’s capital expenditure will predominantly emerge from FY28 onward. For the global lithium market, the more important question is whether the same pattern is beginning to emerge simultaneously across high-quality Australian brownfield assets. Pilgangoora has completed P1000 and is restarting Ngungaju; Mt Holland has approved A$1.45 billion of expansion investment; and other Australian assets, including Mt Marion, are also seeing renewed capital deployment. If improving lithium economics continue to reactivate expansion spending across existing mines, medium-term supply elasticity could prove materially greater than suggested by looking only at incremental production over the next 12 months. For Liontown itself, the next event that matters more than another ordinary quarterly production number will be the Kathleen Valley Expansion FID expected around the end of September. At that point, the key variables for the supply model will not simply be whether the project is expanded, but the targeted capacity, capital intensity, construction schedule and ramp-up timeline. Those four variables will ultimately determine when the capital being deployed today becomes physical spodumene concentrate entering the market. SMM New Energy Analyst Lesley Yang yangle@smm.cn

On 22 July 2026, Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) — a subsidiary of Coal India Limited and a "Miniratna" state enterprise — released unaudited results for the first quarter of fiscal 2026-27 (ended 30 June 2026). The company swung from a year-ago profit to a net loss, marking its first quarterly loss since its stock-market debut in January this year. According to the company's regulatory filing and consistent reporting across Indian financial media, raw coal production fell to 6.56 million tonnes in the quarter, down roughly 27.4% from 9.04 Mt a year earlier. Coal offtake declined in parallel to 7.72 Mt, down about 14% (from 8.98 Mt a year ago). The fact that offtake fell less than production suggests the company drew on inventory to sustain dispatches. Revenue from operations was ₹3,587.27 crore, down about 3.6% year-on-year, though still ~9.3% higher than the ₹3,282.95 crore recorded at the end of March 2026. The quarterly loss stemmed from three forces working together — lower volumes, higher unit costs, and rising fixed expenses. On the production side, early and heavy monsoon rainfall, reduced overburden removal, and logistics bottlenecks directly curtailed run-of-mine output. On the cost side, diesel prices climbed sharply at the start of the fiscal year — by some third-party accounts on the order of ₹7.5–8 per litre — pushing up the mining and haulage bills of a largely contractor-operated cost base. The shift in the expense structure is the key story. Total expenses rose about 4.7% to ₹3,826.31 crore from ₹3,654.39 crore a year earlier. Even as employee-benefit expenses (₹1,553.80 crore) and contractual costs (₹917.57 crore) declined year-on-year, other expenses rose about 10.4%, finance costs surged roughly 84%, and depreciation increased about 26.7% — the principal drags on profitability. In other words, with revenue only marginally lower, it was the climb in rigid costs such as finance and depreciation, compounded by weaker fixed-cost absorption from lower volumes, that pushed the company below breakeven. Despite the operational strain this quarter, BCCL continued advancing several projects aimed at medium- and long-term capacity, producing a clear contrast between the weak current-quarter numbers and the longer-term build-out. On product upgrading, the company's newly built Bhojudih washery entered commercial operation on 26 May 2026. With annual throughput of 2 million tonnes and technologies including spiral concentrators, heavy-media cyclones and froth flotation to produce medium-grade washed coking coal, its start-up lifts BCCL's total washing capacity to about 17.35 Mt (including 1.70 Mt operated by Tata Steel). On mining-model innovation, the ASGKCC mine in the Katras area — developed under a Mine Developer and Operator (MDO) revenue-sharing model , began producing during the quarter, with Q1 FY27 output of 11,980 tonnes; BCCL receives 9% of the mine's revenue under the arrangement. The company also completed the surface-compatibility test for longwall mining equipment at Moonidih Colliery, a key milestone ahead of commercial deployment of that mechanised project. On asset optimization, BCCL handed over its older Dugda washery to JSW Steel on 17 June as part of a plan to monetise legacy asset s — none of which is reflected in this quarter's financials. This combination of near-term strain and longer-term capacity accumulation is characteristic of a state-owned coal producer in a capacity-upgrade cycle: mechanisation and beneficiation investments raise depreciation and finance costs up front, with their benefits realised only after volumes ramp. The market's subsequent focus will be on whether output can return to a run-rate above 8 million tonnes per quarter, and whether input costs such as diesel stabilise. Industry Implications: India's Coking-Coal Gap BCCL is India's largest coking-coal producer, and its output swings carry read-through for the domestic steel value chain. Coking coal is an irreplaceable reductant and fuel in the blast-furnace–basic-oxygen-furnace (BF-BOF) route, and India is among the major economies most dependent on imported coking coal. Per government and industry disclosures, roughly 95% of the steel sector's coking-coal requirement is met through imports, which rose from about 51.20 Mt in FY21 to about 57.58 Mt in FY25. In January 2026, India classified coking coal as a "critical and strategic mineral" to accelerate domestic mining, attract private investment, and curb import dependence. Against this backdrop, BCCL's quarterly shortfall is a short-term disruption, but its signal value should not be dismissed: the vulnerability of India's domestic coking-coal supply to monsoon, logistics and cost shocks has resurfaced. Should supply from leading domestic miners remain unsteady, steelmakers will lean more heavily on imported premium hard coking coal from Australia, the US and elsewhere — widening cost-volatility exposure and creating tension with India's "Atmanirbhar" (self-reliance) coal strategy. As producers such as JSW and Tata pursue expansion toward 300 Mt of crude-steel capacity by 2030, India's 2026 coking-coal imports at around 81.6 Mt, every incremental tonne of domestic supply becomes more consequential.

On July 22, 2026, Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL), a Mini Ratna public sector undertaking and subsidiary of Coal India, reported unaudited results for Q1 FY2026-27 (ending June 30, 2026). The company swung from a net profit a year ago to a net loss – its first quarterly loss since listing in January this year. According to the company’s regulatory filings and multiple Indian financial media reports, raw coal production fell to 6.56 million mt in the quarter, down about 27.4% YoY from 9.04 million mt a year earlier. Coal sales (offtake) also pulled back to 7.72 million mt, a decline of about 14% YoY (8.98 million mt a year ago). The smaller drop in sales than in output suggests the company drew down inventory to some extent to maintain deliveries. Revenue from operations stood at Rs 35.87 billion, down about 3.6% YoY but still about 9.3% higher QoQ from Rs 32.83 billion at end-March 2026. The production contraction was not accompanied by weak pricing – the realized price per mt of coal rose about 12% YoY to Rs 4,647 per mt. However, the price improvement was not enough to offset the twin drag from lower output and higher costs: EBITDA plunged about 81% YoY from Rs 3.733 billion to Rs 715 million, with the EBITDA margin narrowing from 5.26% to 1.92%. Profit before tax swung from a profit of Rs 2.474 billion to a loss of Rs 1.031 billion, resulting in a net loss of Rs 681 million, compared with a net profit of Rs 1.769 billion a year earlier. Performance also deteriorated markedly against the previous quarter (Q4 FY26), which recorded a net profit of Rs 273 million. The quarterly loss was the combined result of production, production costs, and finance costs. On the output side, heavy rainfall from an early monsoon, lower overburden removal, and logistics bottlenecks directly squeezed actual mine output. On the cost side, diesel prices rose sharply in early fiscal 2026. SMM noted that early gains were in the range of Rs 7.5–8 per liter, directly inflating contract-based mining and transportation expenses. The shift in the expense structure was particularly critical. Total expenses rose to Rs 38.263 billion from Rs 36.544 billion a year earlier, an increase of about 4.7%. Within this, although employee benefits (Rs 15.538 billion) and contract expenses (Rs 9.176 billion) were lower YoY, other expenses rose about 10.4% YoY, finance costs jumped about 84% YoY, and depreciation increased about 26.7% YoY – the main drivers weighing on profits. In other words, the revenue side was relatively stable; what truly breached the break-even point was the rise in rigid costs such as finance and depreciation, combined with the adverse impact of lower sales on fixed-cost absorption. Despite operational pressure in the quarter, BCCL pushed forward with multiple strategic projects focused on medium and long-term capacity, highlighting a clear divergence between near-term financials and long-term positioning. On product mix upgrading, the new Bhojudih coal washery started commercial operations on May 26, 2026, with an annual processing capacity of 2 million mt. Using spiral separation, dense medium cyclone, and flotation processes to produce medium-grade washed coking coal, its commissioning raised BCCL’s total washing capacity to about 17.35 million mt (including 1.7 million mt operated by Tata Steel). On mining model innovation, the ASGKCC mine in the Katras area, developed under a Mine Developer and Operator (MDO) revenue-sharing model, started producing coal this quarter, with Q1 FY27 production of 11,980 mt, and BCCL receiving 9% of the mine’s revenue as per agreement. In addition, the company completed surface compatibility testing of longwall mining equipment at the Moonidih mine, clearing a key step toward commercial deployment of this mechanized project. On asset optimization, the company handed over the old Dugda washery to JSW Steel on June 17 as part of a plan to revitalize existing assets—though none of these moves were reflected in the quarter’s financials. India’s Coking Coal Self-Sufficiency Weakness BCCL is India’s largest coking coal producer, and its production fluctuations hold indicator significance for the domestic steel industry chain. Coking coal is an irreplaceable reducing agent and energy source for the blast furnace–converter (BF-BOF) route, and India happens to be one of the major economies most reliant on coking coal imports globally. According to Indian government and industry bodies, about 95% of India’s steelmaking coking coal relies on imports, with imports rising from around 51.2 million mt in FY2020-21 to about 57.58 million mt in FY2024-25. In January 2026, India listed coking coal as a critical and strategic mineral to accelerate domestic mining, attract private investment, and reduce import dependency. Against this backdrop, BCCL’s quarterly production cut, while a short-term disruption, when viewed nationally, once again exposed the vulnerability of India’s domestic coking coal supply to monsoon, logistics, and cost shocks. If supply from major domestic miners remains unstable, steel mills will have to rely more on imported premium hard coking coal from places like Australia and the US, increasing their exposure to cost fluctuations and creating tension with India’s Atmanirbhar coal strategy. As steelmakers like JSW and Tata pursue an expansion target of 300 million mt of crude steel capacity by 2030, India's coking coal imports in 2026 are expected to be around 81.6 million mt, making every incremental increase in domestic supply increasingly critical.

South32 reported payable copper production of 16,000 tonnes from its 45% interest in the Sierra Gorda mine in Chile for the quarter ended June 30, down 9.6% year-on-year and below market expectations of 17,500 tonnes. Mining operations at the project continued to be affected by heavy rainfall, which had previously disrupted access to mining areas and temporarily suspended processing operations. The company also expects Sierra Gorda's FY2027 operating unit costs to be about 10% higher than FY2026 guidance due to a previously announced one-off workforce payment and higher diesel prices. In addition, the joint venture recently approved a fourth grinding line expansion, with approximately US$725 million of growth capital expenditure planned between 2027 and 2030 to increase processing capacity by around 25%.

July 15, global mining giant Rio Tinto officially released its production and operating report for Q2 and H1 2026: In the core Pilbara region of Australia, production: H1 total Pilbara production was 162.3 million mt, marking the best half-year performance since the record year of 2018. The ongoing rollout of equipment efficiency improvements and logistics optimization plans across all mines helped offset short-term disruptions from cyclones and maintenance. Shipments: Q2 global iron ore sales totaled 88.8 million mt, up 5% YoY; quarterly Pilbara sales were 85.3 million mt, surging 7% YoY and up 18% QoQ, setting a peak for quarterly shipments since 2020. Cost side: The surge in diesel prices pushed up unit cash costs. It is estimated that for every $10/barrel increase in crude oil, Pilbara ore cash cost per mt rises by $0.15. The full-year Pilbara FOB cash cost guidance remains unchanged at $23.5–25/wmt. The full-year sales volume target remains unchanged: global iron ore of 343–366 million mt, Pilbara at 323–338 million mt. At the IOC iron ore operation in Canada, affected by pit modifications and replacement of train unloading equipment, Q2 production and sales fell 31% YoY. The full-year sales guidance of 15–18 million mt remains unchanged, with Canadian wildfires continuing to be a short-term variable of disruption. Major breakthrough at Simandou (Guinea) Construction completion of the SimFer mine and port infrastructure at Simandou exceeded 75%, and the full railway line completed commissioning for train operations in Q1. Raw ore production at the mine steadily resumed in Q2, with total H1 shipments of 4.2 million mt, all sent to China. Key industry characteristic: Simandou ore requires three-stage crushing in China, creating a 2–3 month lag from mine output to actual sales. As of month-end June, raw ore stockpiles awaiting crushing at the mine site stood at 7.6 million mt, with total system inventory at 9.6 million mt. The concentrated release of this growth in H2 will significantly increase global supply of low-alumina, high-grade iron ore.

Australian iron ore producer Fenix Resources reported record quarterly shipments of 1.299 million wet metric tonnes (wmt) from its Iron Ridge and Beebyn operations in Western Australia for the June quarter of 2026, up 33% on the March quarter and 70.9% year-on-year. The company loaded 21 vessels during the quarter, compared with 16 in the prior quarter and 13 a year earlier. Total FY26 iron ore sales reached 4.4 million wmt, meeting the company's revised guidance range of 4.2–4.8 million wmt, which had itself been raised from an original 4.0–4.4 million wmt target set in July 2025. Fenix is targeting FY27 sales of 4.7–5.3 million wmt, representing a roughly 14% increase at the midpoint. The company credited the results to the scalability of its integrated pit-to-port logistics model and resilience to diesel price and freight rate volatility