Against the backdrop of the United States accelerating the build-out of its domestic battery supply chain while continuing to depend on foreign sources for critical minerals, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule on August 5, 2026, imposing export controls on certain recycled battery materials. The most impactful measure is a temporary export restriction on black mass — an intermediate product of lithium battery recycling.

A four-tier minimum import price regime, downstream tariffs and onshoring incentives will take effect on December 4, 2026, widening the gap between US and Asian solar prices. On August 6, US President Donald Trump signed a proclamation setting out import adjustment measures following the Section 232 investigation into polysilicon and its derivatives. The measures will take effect at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on December 4, 2026, and cover polysilicon, silicon ingots and wafers, solar cells and modules. Unlike a conventional tariff increase, the new framework combines minimum import prices, or MIPs, with additional tariffs on downstream products and incentives for domestic investment. SMM believes the policy should not be read as a blanket 15% tariff on every product in the polysilicon value chain. Its central objective is to rebuild the US solar pricing system through a combination of price floors, cumulative tariffs and conditional relief. Low-priced imports will face a substantially greater constraint than products already trading at higher prices. The impact is also expected to move progressively through the supply chain, from polysilicon and wafers to cells and finished modules. Four price floors introduced; the 15% tariff mainly applies downstream According to the White House proclamation and its annexes, the United States has established minimum import prices of $21/kg for polysilicon, $100/kg for silicon ingots and wafers, $0.22/W for solar cells and $0.38/W for solar modules. An important distinction applies to raw polysilicon. The material is covered by the MIP program, but the 15% additional ad valorem duty set out in paragraph 4 of the proclamation applies to silicon ingots, wafers and downstream derivatives. It would therefore be inaccurate to state that every product across the polysilicon value chain is subject to a uniform additional 15% tariff. Rates also vary by origin. For products from European Union member states, Japan, South Korea, Chinese Taipei, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the combined Column 1 general duty and Section 232 duty is set at 15%. Products from the United Kingdom are subject to a 10% Section 232 additional duty. Other origins are generally subject to a 15% additional duty, which may be applied alongside anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and other applicable charges unless otherwise specified. The measures establish a new import-protection framework following the expiry of the Section 201 safeguard in February 2026. Compared with the previous safeguard, the Section 232 regime has a much broader reach. It places silicon ingots and wafers within the additional tariff framework and introduces price floors at four stages from raw material to finished module. Customs enforcement turns the MIP into a binding threshold The MIP is not simply a reference quotation. When entering goods, importers may submit documentation showing that the first arm's-length transaction price in the United States is no lower than the prescribed threshold. They may also document that the transaction is being executed under a fixed-term contract with fixed terms signed before August 6, 2026. If documentation is submitted but the entered value remains below the MIP, US Customs and Border Protection may impose a specific duty equal to the gap between the declared price and the price floor. If the required documentation is not submitted, the importer may face a specific duty equal to the full MIP. For silicon ingots, wafers, cells and modules, the relevant ad valorem tariff may then be added on top of that amount. The effective barrier could therefore be considerably higher than the headline 15%. For a module from a generally applicable origin, a first arm's-length US transaction price of $0.38/W would still need to absorb the 15% additional tariff and any other applicable duties. If the transaction price is below $0.38/W, the importer could also face a specific duty that fills the gap to the MIP. For suppliers that previously competed primarily on price, the MIP may have a greater commercial effect than the ad valorem tariff itself. The proclamation also provides for strict enforcement. Materially false supporting documents could result in the importer and its affiliates being permanently barred from importing covered products. The Department of Commerce will monitor abnormal stockpiling before December 4 and may coordinate with Customs to restrict subsequent imports where companies are found to have accelerated shipments or built excessive inventories. The nearly four-month transition period should therefore not be interpreted as an unrestricted stockbuilding window. US price floors sit far above current Asian supply-chain prices As of August 6, SMM assessed average prices for n-type recycled feedstock and n-type dense polysilicon in China at RMB 32.95/kg and RMB 32.15/kg, respectively. Both had fallen by approximately 12.7% and 13.1% from April 1. Using an exchange rate of RMB 6.7483 per US dollar, the two prices were equivalent to approximately $4.88/kg and $4.76/kg. They were 76.7% and 77.3% below the US polysilicon MIP of $21/kg. Put differently, the US price floor is approximately 4.3-4.4 times the current Chinese spot price for n-type polysilicon. The gap is even wider downstream. SMM assessed G12R TOPCon modules at a China port FOB average of $0.1055/W. The US module MIP of $0.38/W is about 3.6 times that level. SMM's China port FOB assessment for G12R TOPCon cells stood at $0.0395/W, making the US cell MIP of $0.22/W approximately 5.6 times the Chinese export price. These comparisons do not represent identical trade terms. China port FOB prices exclude ocean freight, insurance, customs clearance, distribution and financing costs incurred after the product leaves China, and they are not equivalent to the first arm's-length transaction price in the United States. Even so, the scale of the gap shows that the policy is not a marginal adjustment to import pricing. It is an attempt to establish a protected US price curve that is materially detached from Asian spot levels. According to SMM research, average quotations for US-made white-backsheet modules were recently around $0.31/W. Southeast Asian modules delivered duty paid to the United States were quoted at approximately $0.27/W, while Indian non-DCR modules were around $0.14/W. On a nominal-price basis, the $0.38/W module MIP is approximately 22.6% above the US-made module quotation. Once applicable Section 232 duties are added, the cost gap between imported and domestically produced modules could widen further, strengthening the relative competitiveness and pricing power of US manufacturers. US solar assets continue to expand despite lower module imports The ultimate cost impact of the new tariffs and price floors will depend on the pace and structure of US solar deployment. EIA data show that cumulative operating solar net summer capacity increased from 138.3 GW at the end of 2023 to 175.3 GW at the end of 2024 and 209.3 GW at the end of 2025. By the end of May 2026, it had reached 222.7 GW, a net increase of approximately 13.4 GW from year-end 2025. Solar generation also continued to grow. In 2025, US utility-scale solar generation reached approximately 296 TWh, up 34% year on year, while small-scale solar generation rose 11% to around 93 TWh. Combined output was approximately 389 TWh. The data indicate that the operating asset base and actual solar generation continued to expand even as finished-module imports declined. The cost effect of Section 232 therefore cannot be assessed from short-term import movements alone. If US solar capacity continues to grow while domestic wafer and cell projects ramp more slowly than module assembly, the import price thresholds will be more readily passed through to module and project costs. If construction slows because of financing, permitting or interconnection constraints, the policy may instead be reflected mainly in greater pricing power for domestic manufacturers rather than an immediate physical shortage. Module imports fell 39%, while cell imports rose 57% USITC data reveal a clear structural shift in the US solar supply chain. In 2024, the United States imported 54.3 GW of crystalline-silicon modules and 13.89 GW of crystalline-silicon cells. In 2025, module imports fell 39.2% year on year to approximately 33.0 GW. Cell imports, aggregated from country-level data, rose 57.1% to about 21.82 GW. The divergence between declining module imports and rising cell imports shows how the expansion of US module assembly is changing the import mix. A growing portion of demand is being met through imported cells assembled into modules in the United States rather than through direct imports of finished modules. This shift does not mean that the US solar manufacturing chain has achieved full localization. On the contrary, it highlights cells as the most important import-dependent link at this stage. Import volumes and newly installed capacity cannot be matched on a watt-for-watt basis because of inventory changes, manufacturing lead times and differences in statistical scope. Nonetheless, the opposite direction of cell and module imports in 2025 clearly indicates that the United States is moving from a finished-module import model toward one in which imported cells support domestic module manufacturing. The next stage of localization may extend further upstream into wafers and polysilicon. The US Department of Energy has also noted that cells, wafers and polysilicon require more capital and generally have longer design, permitting, construction and ramp-up cycles than module assembly. The rise in cell imports to 21.82 GW in 2025 provides trade-data evidence that rapid module-capacity growth has not yet reduced US reliance on foreign cells. Against this backdrop, the $0.22/W cell MIP and the additional 15% tariff will have two effects. They may protect domestic cell projects and create more room for upstream investment, but they could also raise production costs for US module plants that still depend on imported cells before domestic cell capacity is fully available. Whether companies can obtain relief under the onshoring program, and whether US cell projects begin production and ramp on schedule, will determine whether the measure functions primarily as protection for domestic manufacturing or becomes an upstream cost squeeze on downstream module producers. Import origins have shifted, but Section 232 narrows the scope for rerouting Indonesia supplied 13.34 GW, or 40.4%, of US crystalline-silicon module imports in 2025. Laos supplied 5.48 GW, or 16.6%. Together, the two countries accounted for 57.0% of the total. Imports from Vietnam, India, Thailand and Malaysia reached approximately 3.39 GW, 3.08 GW, 2.88 GW and 2.17 GW, respectively. Cell imports were even more concentrated. In 2025, the United States imported approximately 6.47 GW of cells from Indonesia, 4.53 GW from Laos, 3.65 GW from Malaysia, 3.30 GW from South Korea and 3.02 GW from Thailand. The five largest origins accounted for 96.1% of the total, while Indonesia and Laos together represented around 50.5%. Country-level data show that US module sourcing has moved beyond the four Southeast Asian countries traditionally targeted by trade cases and has diversified toward Indonesia, Laos, India, Ethiopia and the Philippines. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations focused on named countries, the Section 232 MIPs cover products from a broad range of origins. This will substantially reduce the ability of suppliers to preserve low-cost access to the US market simply by changing the location of module assembly or cell exports. US solar manufacturing stocks rose, but the benefit differs by company US-listed solar manufacturing stocks responded quickly after the policy announcement. Public market data show that First Solar rose as much as approximately 8% in after-hours trading, while T1 Energy gained as much as 6.3%. The reaction reflects investor expectations that the domestic manufacturing premium will widen. First Solar uses cadmium telluride thin-film technology and does not rely on the crystalline-silicon polysilicon chain. Its main benefit would come from improved relative competitiveness if imported crystalline-silicon modules become more expensive. However, the cell and module tariff lines listed in the annex cover both crystalline-silicon products and other photovoltaic products. Whether imported thin-film modules fall within the final measures will depend on customs classification and implementation guidance. First Solar's share-price response is therefore better understood as a revaluation of its US manufacturing advantage rather than a direct benefit from lower polysilicon costs. T1 Energy operates module manufacturing capacity in the United States and is developing domestic cell capacity. Its US manufacturing position stands to benefit from a higher import threshold for finished modules. Before its domestic cell lines are fully ramped, however, the cell MIP could also raise input costs. The company's net benefit will depend on the pace of its US cell buildout and whether it can secure Section 232 relief for qualifying equipment and covered products under an approved onshoring plan. For domestic polysilicon producers such as Hemlock Semiconductor and Wacker's US operations, the $21/kg MIP offers more direct price protection. For integrated manufacturers such as Qcells, which is building wafer, cell and module capacity in the United States, the framework could narrow the cost gap between domestic production and Asian imports. US manufacturers gain protection, but project costs face upward pressure In the short term, some existing contracts and in-transit orders may retain transitional treatment before December 4, and US importers may accelerate the delivery of compliant orders. The anti-stockpiling provisions will limit excessive front-loading, however, creating a distinction between the earlier delivery of normal orders and restricted abnormal inventory accumulation. Over the medium term, the $0.38/W module MIP, together with additional tariffs, will significantly narrow the low-cost advantage of imported crystalline-silicon modules. US module manufacturers should gain greater pricing flexibility and improved order visibility, while developers face higher capital expenditure and levelized electricity costs. Projects already under pressure from the phase-down of federal incentives, interconnection queues or financing costs may need to recalculate returns or delay procurement. The scale of the impact will also depend on the structure of US demand. If solar deployment maintains its current growth trend and domestic capacity can cover the required power classes and delivery specifications, lower imports may be partly replaced by domestic supply and inventories. If demand from data centers and utility-scale projects shifts more rapidly toward higher-power and higher-efficiency products while US wafer and cell capacity ramps more slowly than expected, the supply gap could amplify price increases and project-delay risks. Direct exports from China may face limited incremental impact, but third-country supply chains face greater pressure Chinese solar products already face US anti-dumping and countervailing duties, forced-labor enforcement, country-of-origin scrutiny and other trade restrictions. The incremental effect of the new Section 232 measures on direct exports from China may therefore be smaller than the size of the MIPs alone suggests. The new measures are broad in both tariff classification and origin, however. Producing wafers, cells or modules in Southeast Asia, India or other third countries will no longer provide the same scope to secure US market access through low prices alone. Companies that rely on imported cells for US module assembly, or that plan to expand in third countries to serve the US market, will face higher costs and compliance pressure. As the US price threshold rises, some modules originally intended for the United States may be redirected to Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and other Asia-Pacific markets, intensifying competition for orders in those regions. Chinese companies will need to go beyond changing export destinations. They should reassess US investment, supply-chain traceability, tariff classification, related-party pricing and contract structures with local customers. Onshoring relief creates an investment route, but the threshold is high The proclamation authorizes the Department of Commerce to establish an onshoring incentive program. Companies that commit to building, refurbishing or expanding US capacity for polysilicon, silicon ingots, wafers or cells, and begin construction by January 20, 2029, may submit a company-level onshoring plan. During construction, approved companies may import necessary production equipment and covered products at a volume linked by Commerce to the scale of the new investment without paying the applicable Section 232 duties. The framework does not close the US market entirely. Instead, it seeks to tie import relief to domestic capital expenditure. The policy may accelerate investment decisions in US wafer and cell production, but effective supply will still depend on construction schedules, equipment delivery, skilled labor, energy costs and downstream orders. If a company fails to meet its commitments, the relief may be withdrawn. Fraud or misrepresentation could also result in retroactive revocation. Outlook: trade protection will interact with the expiry of project tax credits SMM believes the Section 232 measures upgrade US solar trade protection from country-specific anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions into a price-management system spanning the value chain and multiple origins. The central constraint is not the nominal 15% rate alone, but the combined barrier created by MIPs, additional duties, existing trade remedies and strict certification and enforcement. In the short term, the US market may see faster delivery under existing contracts, higher domestic module quotations and contract renegotiations by developers. The medium-term impact will depend on three variables: how the Department of Commerce defines eligibility and relief volumes under the onshoring program; whether US wafer and cell capacity comes online on schedule; and whether trading partners such as the EU, Japan and South Korea adopt MIP systems that the United States regards as substantially equivalent, potentially triggering tariff adjustments. The Section 232 measures must also be considered alongside the termination schedule for US clean electricity tax credits. Under the current rules, solar projects that begin construction after July 4, 2026 and enter service after December 31, 2027 will generally no longer qualify for the Section 45Y clean electricity production tax credit or the Section 48E clean electricity investment tax credit. Projects that satisfied the applicable construction-start requirements before July 5, 2026 may still seek transitional eligibility under the physical-work and continuity rules. The entire US solar market will not lose tax credits at the end of 2027; the deadline primarily constrains new projects that did not begin construction within the transition window. This schedule could bring demand forward. From the second half of 2026 through 2027, some developers may accelerate equipment orders, construction and grid connection to complete projects before the tax-credit deadline. If the Section 232 MIPs take effect at the same time, concentrated procurement and higher import costs could reinforce each other, lifting domestic module quotations and equipment budgets. From 2028, project performance is likely to diverge more sharply. Projects with transitional eligibility, long-term power purchase agreements or demand support from high-load customers such as data centers may continue. Projects that cannot claim the 45Y or 48E credits and are highly sensitive to equipment costs may renegotiate contracts, reduce scale or delay development. If the imported-module MIP remains at $0.38/W while domestic production costs have not fallen materially, the loss of project-side tax credits and elevated equipment prices will create a double squeeze on project economics. Section 45X should be distinguished from Section 48E. The Section 45X advanced manufacturing production credit does not end in 2028. Under current IRS rules, qualifying modules, cells, wafers and polysilicon remain eligible for the full manufacturing credit through the end of 2029. The credit then falls to 75% in 2030, 50% in 2031 and 25% in 2032 before ending after December 31, 2032 for the relevant components. The result could be a policy mismatch in 2028-2029: some demand-side projects will lose federal tax credits while manufacturers retain the full production incentive. The Section 232 MIPs may therefore serve not only as trade protection, but also as a mechanism supporting domestic manufacturing margins before and during the Section 45X phase-down. If domestic capacity comes online rapidly with 45X support while project deployment slows following the termination of 45Y and 48E eligibility, US manufacturing capacity could grow faster than project demand. Conversely, if data-center load growth, power shortages and state procurement programs continue to support installations, the Section 232 price threshold may help domestic producers maintain higher selling prices as 45X support declines. The central tension in the US solar market will consequently shift from competition between imports and domestic manufacturing toward whether the pace of manufacturing expansion can match installation demand without federal project-level tax credits. For the global solar market, the United States is likely to develop an increasingly distinct domestic price system that is further decoupled from the low-cost Asian supply chain. US manufacturers will receive greater protection, but project development costs and supply-chain complexity will also increase. Competition will increasingly center on domestic capacity, technology, supply-chain traceability and policy eligibility rather than module price alone. SMM will continue to track implementation guidance from the US Department of Commerce and Customs and Border Protection, adjustments to the minimum import prices, approvals under the onshoring program, and the subsequent impact on polysilicon, wafer, cell and module prices and company shipments. Written by: Ryan Tey Tze Yang | SMM PV Analyst +60 127179370 | ryan.tey@metal.com

SMM August 7 News: Metal Markets: Overnight, base metals on the domestic market broadly rose. SHFE copper edged up 0.1%. SHFE aluminum gained 0.38%. SHFE lead edged up 0.1%. SHFE zinc rose 1.11%, while SHFE tin fell 0.98%. SHFE nickel dropped 1.22%. Additionally, the most-traded alumina futures contract edged up 0.09%, while the most-traded foundry aluminum contract fell 0.52%. Overnight, ferrous metals all rose. Stainless steel edged up, iron ore gained 0.35%, and rebar rose 0.17%. Hot-rolled coil (HRC) increased 0.59%. For coking coal and coke: the most-traded coking coal futures contract rose 1.54%, and the most-traded coke contract gained 2.48%. Overnight, on the overseas market, LME base metals mostly fell. LME copper shot up to an intraday high of $14,369.5/mt, a level not seen since January 29, before eventually closing with a 0.4% decline. LME aluminum gained 0.65%. LME lead fell 0.29%. LME zinc rose 0.64%. LME tin dropped 1.43%. LME nickel fell 2.45%. Overnight Precious Metals : COMEX gold fell 0.15%, and COMEX silver dropped 0.81%. Overnight, the most-traded SHFE gold futures contract fell 0.01%, and the most-traded SHFE silver contract declined 0.93%. Closing prices as of 7:03 AM, August 7: Macro Front Domestic (China) News: [Guangdong: Promote the Integration of Futures and Spot Markets for Key Commodities like Iron Ore, Crude Oil, and Rubber to Enhance Pricing Influence on Bulk Commodities] The "15th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone (Draft for Comments)" was released for public comment. It mentioned plans to expand financial opening-up in an orderly manner. International financial institutions will be encouraged to set up headquarters in the zone, promoting the development of cross-border finance, innovative finance, venture capital and investment, wealth management, futures trading, asset management, specialty finance, and offshore services. The Plan aims to accelerate the implementation of projects like the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area International Commercial Bank and the GBA Insurance Service Center. It supports expanding the scale of commodity trading and promoting the integration of futures and spot markets for key commodities like iron ore, crude oil, and rubber to enhance their pricing influence. The Plan will promote the quality improvement and upgrade of fintech regulatory pilots and expand digital yuan application scenarios. It supports pilot programs for cross-border financial innovations such as offshore finance and green finance, and will promote the expansion of pilot programs like cross-border Wealth Management Connect and digital yuan cross-border payments. Institutions within the zone will be supported in developing specialty products like cross-border supply chain finance and intellectual property-pledged financing, and market entities will be guided to develop composite financial products. Pilots for cross-border credit asset transfers and multi-currency integrated accounts will be deepened to promote wider mutual recognition and connectivity of cross-border financial products. (Guangdong Department of Commerce) [CAAM: June Auto Commodity Import and Export Value Hits $31.82 Billion, Up 35.5% YoY] According to data from the General Administration of Customs compiled by the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), the total import and export value of auto commodities in June 2026 was $31.82 billion, up 8.0% MoM and up 35.5% YoY. The import value was $3.39 billion, down 6.1% MoM and down 18.7% YoY; the export value was $28.43 billion, up 10.0% MoM and up 47.2% YoY. From January to June 2026, the cumulative import and export value of national auto commodities totaled $164.74 billion, up 25.5% YoY. The import value was $19.25 billion, down 11.8% YoY; the export value was $145.49 billion, up 33.0% YoY. (Jin10 Data APP) US Dollar: Overnight, the US dollar index rose 0.26% to 99.95. Escalating geopolitical tensions weighed on both US stocks and bonds, causing them to fall. Oil prices jumped, reigniting inflation concerns ahead of the key US employment report. Market focus now turns to Friday's US employment report for new clues on the Federal Reserve's policy path. Stronger-than-expected jobs data could reinforce the case for higher-for-longer interest rates, while any escalation of tensions in the Middle East could push up energy prices and intensify market fluctuations. UBS analyst Ulrike Hoffmann noted: "Short-term risks remain, especially if US data remains firm, oil prices continue to fuel inflation concerns, or the market continues pricing in a more hawkish Fed rate path." Interactive Brokers Senior Economist José Torres stated: "Wall Street reversed again from recent strong gains as the lack of clarity concerning the Strait of Hormuz led investors to question whether the robust rally early this week was justified." (Jin10 Data APP) According to the CME "FedWatch" tool: The probability of the US Fed keeping rates unchanged by September is 45%, while the probability of a cumulative 25 basis point hike is 55%. The probability of the Fed keeping rates unchanged through October is 31%, while the probability of a cumulative 25 basis point hike is 51.9%, and a cumulative 50 basis point hike is 17.1%. (Jin10 Data APP) According to a report by the UK's Financial Times, even after a decision not to reveal too many details on rate strategy triggered a sharp sell-off in government bonds, Fed Chairman Warsh is sticking with his usual concise communication style. People close to Warsh say he acknowledges making some mistakes during his first 10 weeks at the helm of the world's most important central bank, including failing to reinforce his key message on price stability and creating confusion over whether his long-term plan to reform the Fed could influence near-term policy decisions. However, they insisted those mistakes were not enough to derail Warsh's reform plans for the Fed. People familiar with the matter also revealed that Warsh is prepared to raise interest rates at the September meeting if upcoming inflation data proves strong and market expectations for higher borrowing costs rise accordingly. The sources added that while the Fed Chairman raised the possibility of shrinking the central bank's $6.7 trillion balance sheet to tighten monetary policy, interest rates remain the primary tool for now and will be used at upcoming meetings if necessary. (Jin10 Data APP) Macro Events: Data releases today include France's Q2 ILO unemployment rate, Germany's June seasonally adjusted industrial output MoM, Germany's June seasonally adjusted trade balance, the UK's July Halifax seasonally adjusted house price index MoM, France's June trade balance, Switzerland's July consumer confidence index, Canada's July employment change, the US July unemployment rate, US July seasonally adjusted non-farm payrolls, US July average hourly earnings YoY, US July average hourly earnings MoM, US July New York Fed 1-year inflation expectations, China's July US dollar-denominated trade balance, China's July foreign exchange reserves, and China's July trade balance data. Watches: 2028 FOMC voter and St. Louis Fed President Musalem speaks on the US economy and monetary policy; 2027 FOMC voter and Richmond Fed President Barkin delivers remarks. Crude Oil: Overnight, both oil futures rose, with US oil gaining 4% and Brent oil surging 4.57%. Geopolitical risks rekindled, causing oil prices to spike sharply. Wall Street CN mentioned that the new navigation agreement for the Strait of Hormuz, proposed to be signed by Iran and Oman, revealed significant details again, indicating Iran's bid to control the strait. Furthermore, Iran has taken action, striking "enemy targets" near the strait. Iran's Fars News Agency (FARS) reported on Thursday, August 6, local time, that Iran's parliament is reviewing this agreement. Under the agreement, US and Israeli vessels will be barred from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and nations that have "caused harm to Iran" will also be denied passage permits. Following this news, concerns over risks to global energy transportation rapidly intensified in the market. (Wall Street CN) Saudi Arabia cut its main crude oil price for Asia as negotiations proceed on an agreement aimed at easing shipping pressure in the Strait of Hormuz. The price cut came despite Houthi threats jeopardizing the alternative eastbound crude route via the Red Sea. According to a price list, state oil company Saudi Aramco reduced the price of its Arab Light crude for delivery to Asian clients next month by $0.50 per barrel, setting it at a $2/bbl discount to the regional benchmark. A prior survey showed traders expected Saudi Aramco to keep its flagship crude price unchanged. Global benchmark Brent crude prices fell sharply this week and are now trading near $80/bbl. (Jin10 Data APP) Over the past two months, the UAE has transported more crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz than any other producer, providing a critical supply buffer to a global market suffering from a historic energy crisis. According to energy data firm Kpler, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) loaded with Emirati cargo appeared in the Gulf of Oman on Tuesday after turning off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) signal at the end of July. The tanker carries crude from the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. This is just one of dozens of similar tankers that have departed the Persian Gulf since the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) began implementing a new sales strategy. According to trading sources familiar with the matter, since early June, ADNOC has sold over 130 million barrels of crude oil through seven unprecedented tenders. (Jin10 Data APP)

SMM August 6 News: Germanium ingot in the spot market, driven by tight raw material supply, saw its price edge up slightly; leading tungsten enterprises slightly raised their long-term contract quotations. Meanwhile, the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on August 6, 2026, formally published in the Federal Register the interim final rule "Allocation Order and Additional Requirements for Recyclable Critical Minerals and Materials," under the Defense Production Act (DPA) and a presidential determination on July 30, 2026, imposing mandatory domestic sales controls on two types of critical recycled minerals: shredded tungsten scrap and lithium battery black mass. The rule will take effect on August 27, 2026, and remain valid until August 27, 2027, intensifying concerns about tight tungsten raw material supply outside China. As of now, activity in domestic spot tungsten transactions has shown some rebound, and the transaction center for spot tungsten ore orders has edged up slightly. Secondary market sentiment heating up boosted the minor metal sector, which collectively strengthened. As of the close on August 6, the minor metals sector rose by 2.08%. In terms of individual stocks: Yunnan Germanium surged over 8%, while China Tungsten High-Tech, Xianglu Tungsten, Xiamen Tungsten, Haotong Technology, and Orient Tantalum led the gains. Spot Market Germanium Order to View SMM Historical Metal Spot Prices Germanium is a strategic rare metal with a highly concentrated global supply structure. The ongoing implementation of domestic resource controls and frequent geopolitical disruptions outside China, combined with the normal enforcement of export control policies, have collectively reinforced supply tightening expectations. Currently, low-priced supply in the market is scarce, and downstream just-in-time procurement must accept high-priced materials, causing germanium ingot prices to edge up on August 6. Meanwhile, overall stable demand from end-use industries has provided support for the continuous rise in germanium prices this year. Tungsten Order to View SMM Historical Metal Spot Price Trends Currently, the tungsten ore market is operating steadily. A large tungsten enterprise slightly raised its long-term contract quotation, providing some support to market confidence. Meanwhile, the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on August 6, 2026, formally published in the Federal Register the interim final rule "Allocation Order and Additional Requirements for Recyclable Critical Minerals and Materials," under the Defense Production Act (DPA) and a presidential determination on July 30, 2026, imposing mandatory domestic sales controls on two types of critical recycled minerals: shredded tungsten scrap and lithium battery black mass. The rule will take effect on August 27, 2026, and remain valid until August 27, 2027, which has escalated market concerns about tight tungsten raw material supply outside China. As of now, activity in domestic spot tungsten transactions has shown some rebound, and the transaction center for spot tungsten ore orders has edged up slightly. On the domestic front, the market is reassessing the impact of the "Opinions of the National Mine Safety Administration on Standardizing Construction Teams for Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Mining (Stripping)" on the non-coal mining industry. The document requires that by May 1, 2027, for underground mines and by May 1, 2028, for open-pit mines, one of two options must be chosen: ① establish an in-house mining team; ② engage in compliant integrated contracting; fragmentary subcontracting and layered transfers are prohibited, and labor dispatch is strictly banned. Mines failing to complete rectification by the deadline will be ordered to suspend production for rectification. Domestic tungsten mines are primarily underground, with the vast majority of wolframite extracted through underground mining, and some scheelite extracted through both open-pit and underground methods. In tungsten-rich regions such as Jiangxi and Hunan, a large number of small and medium tungsten mines have long been highly dependent on external contracted mining teams. The implementation of the new regulation will impose tangible constraints on tungsten ore supply, production costs, and the operations of small and medium mines. Recently, the spot tungsten ore market has started to become more active, with traders actively entering the market, while downstream smelters continue to maintain a wait-and-see sentiment. Overall, market sentiment has eased amid frequent mining policies and intensive safety inspections in Yunnan, Jiangxi, and Henan. Supply-side disruptions have increased, and if demand shows mild entry, the tungsten market is expected to see a turnaround. Institutional Voices Guojin Securities research report believes: Tantalum: Global tantalum resource supply is highly concentrated and frequently disrupted, while development of AI servers and advanced semiconductor manufacturing is expected to continue driving demand growth in tantalum capacitors, tantalum targets, and other areas. Against the backdrop of ongoing supply constraints and gradual demand release, the tantalum market is expected to shift from supply-driven to supply-demand resonance, pushing the tantalum price center further upward. Related equities: Oriental Tantalum, Guotai Group, Ximei Resources, Xinjinlu, Jiangwu Equipment. Minmetals Securities research report points out: Germanium accounts for 60% of applications in optical communications and satellite photovoltaics, making it an "AI computing power + space energy" metal. With its excellent refractive index control capability and radiation resistance, germanium has become a critical material for AI data center optical interconnects and low-earth orbit satellite photovoltaic systems. Looking at changes in demand structure, from 2020 to 2026, downstream germanium consumption grew from 160 mt to 240 mt, with optical communications' share rising to 40% and satellite photovoltaics' share to 20%, together accounting for 60% of total downstream demand. It is expected that 90% of demand growth contributions in 2027 will come from two high-boom sectors: AI hardware and satellite photovoltaics. Caitong Securities research report shows: With the explosive demand for AI computing power, the market size of indium phosphide, used as a chip substrate material, will continue to expand. Indium resources are scarce and subject to policy restrictions, and product prices have entered an upward channel. High-purity red phosphorus is a critically important semiconductor base material with high purification technology barriers. Against the backdrop of accelerated AI application deployment driving related infrastructure construction, the indium phosphide substrate industry chain is expected to see dual opportunities from demand growth and domestic substitution. Investors are advised to follow related enterprises with resource and technology advantages in indium phosphide, indium, and high-purity red phosphorus. Datong Securities research report shows that minor metals have embarked on an independent upward trend, with supply tightening and strategic attributes driving a valuation re-rating. The rare earth sector is front-running expectations of new regulations, with Myanmar ore imports disrupted and Pr-Nd oxide seeing tight spot supply and soaring prices. In tungsten and antimony, declining ore grades combined with environmental protection-driven production restrictions have widened supply gaps, while demand from photovoltaics and cemented carbides remains firm even in the off-season, with inventories at low levels. AI computing power and the communications industry are driving demand for gallium and germanium, and coupled with export control policies, overseas stockpiling has widened price spreads between Chinese and overseas markets. Scarce resources and financial attributes resonate, and the sector continues to attract capital favor.

Against the backdrop of the US accelerating the build-out of its domestic battery supply chain while facing persistent reliance on foreign sources for critical minerals, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the US Department of Commerce issued an interim final rule on August 5, 2026, imposing export controls on certain recycled battery materials. The most impactful measure is the temporary export restriction on black mass, an intermediate material from lithium battery recycling. Rather than a complete cutoff of lithium battery-related material exports, this move precisely targets recycled stage products rich in lithium, cobalt, and nickel, aiming to intercept at the source the rapidly growing domestic pool of retired battery resources.

【U.S. Issues Black Mass Export Rule, Restrictions Effective Aug 27】 The U.S. Department of Commerce on August 5 published the Interim Final Rule implementing export restrictions on black mass and tungsten scrap, following President Trump's Executive Order signed on July 30. The rule will take effect on August 27, 2026, and remain in force until August 27, 2027. During this period, exports of the covered materials will be subject to new U.S. export control requirements, with certain exports requiring authorization or meeting specified conditions. The U.S. government said the measure aims to strengthen domestic critical mineral supply and support the country's battery recycling and critical minerals industries.