Amid sustained demand growth, India plans to build a strategic reserve of critical minerals including lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper and rare earths. The stockpile will be sized to cover six months of domestic consumption, aiming to guard against risks of global supply disruptions and sharp raw material price volatility. Led by India’s Ministry of Mines and Ministry of Heavy Industries, the reserve covers key raw materials essential for new energy vehicles, energy storage and the electronics sector, fields where India currently relies heavily on imports. At present, the United States, China, South Korea and other countries have already established strategic reserve systems for critical minerals.

According to Hydro's official website, Hydro's adjusted EBITDA for the first quarter of 2026 was NOK 8.668 billion, lower than NOK 9.516 billion in the same period last year. This was mainly due to lower raw material costs, higher metal prices, and increased sales of alumina and metals, but this was partially offset by lower alumina prices, a stronger NOK, and lower electricity generation. Hydro's profitability was strong this quarter, with adjusted earnings per share increasing to NOK 2.07 in the first quarter of 2026, compared to NOK 1.63 in the first quarter of 2025. The upstream business segment continued to operate strongly in the first quarter.

According to customs data, China imported 6,835 tonnes of lithium hydroxide in March 2026, up 66% month-on-month and double year-on-year. Of this, 2,927 tonnes came from Indonesia, accounting for about 48% of total imports, while approximately another 40% came from Australia and South Korea. During the same period, China exported 3,143 tonnes of lithium hydroxide, up 20% month-on-month but down 26% year-on-year. In terms of exports, 2,059 tonnes went to South Korea and 278 tonnes to Japan. Since 2025, the combined effect of diverging domestic and overseas demand and continued overseas supply of lithium salts has caused excess lithium hydroxide to flow one‑directionally into the Chinese market. From the fourth quarter of 2025, domestic imports of lithium hydroxide remained at persistently high levels, while exports continued to weaken. Entering the first quarter of 2026, total imports exceeded 16,000 tonnes, while total exports were less than 8,000 tonnes, resulting in net imports of more than 8,000 tonnes — a complete reversal of the trade pattern characterised by "shrinking exports and surging imports". In terms of major import sources, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia accounted for a significant share. The key reason is that both domestic demand and prices are more favourable than overseas markets: In the third quarter of 2025, driven by expectations of subsidy policy reduction in 2026 and bullish sentiment on raw material prices, demand for ternary cathode materials remained strong in the fourth quarter. While overseas lithium hydroxide production lines maintained relatively stable output, downstream demand fell short of expectations, leading to rising inventory pressure among overseas holders – who had a strong incentive to destock towards the end of the year. Price increases for lithium hydroxide overseas lagged behind those in China, creating a profitable import arbitrage window. Coupled with the anticipated launch of lithium hydroxide futures in 2026, the number of trading participants involved in lithium hydroxide imports increased significantly. Given the long negotiation cycles and relatively stable supply channels with overseas suppliers, lithium hydroxide from Japan, South Korea and Australia has continued to flow into China. However, it is worth noting that although the continuous increase in import volumes has made lithium hydroxide more readily available for trading in China from Q4 2025 to Q1 2026, the quality of the lithium hydroxide flowing into the country is uneven due to the relatively customized production requirements of ternary cathode materials. As a result, there is a certain lag before it actually reaches material manufacturers. Looking ahead, as long‑term orders are steadily delivered, import volumes are expected to remain relatively high, while the potential for export growth is likely to remain limited.

I. Resource Endowment: World's Second-Largest Reserves and Development Potential As a core holder of global rare earth resources, Brazil boasts proven reserves of 21-25 million tonnes, accounting for 23% of the global total—second only to China. This positions Brazil with the potential to reshape the global rare earth supply landscape. Its deposits are primarily ion-adsorption types, widely distributed across states like Minas Gerais and Goiás. Representative projects include: Colossus Mine : With reserves of 493 million tonnes and an average grade of 0.251%, it is currently Brazil's largest disclosed ion-type rare earth project. Caldeira Rare Earth Project : Holding 1.5 billion tonnes at a 0.2413% grade, it offers significant scale and commercial viability. Tiros Titanium Rare Earth Project : Though smaller in reserve size (5.5 million tonnes), it stands out with a high average grade of 0.400%, making it one of the highest-grade projects in the country. Notably, Brazilian rare earths often coexist with niobium, tantalum, and titanium. This nature adds complexity to processing but also opens avenues for comprehensive value recovery. II. Industry Status: Shifting from "Raw Material Export" to "Domestic Processing" Historically, Brazil's rare earth sector has been characterized by a "high reserves, low output" paradox. In 2024, national production was a mere 20 tonnes, a stark contrast to the global annual output of nearly 400,000 tonnes. The core bottleneck has been the lack of mid- and downstream capabilities in separation and refining. However, this is rapidly changing due to strategic national adjustments. (I) Policy Drivers: Mandating Domestic Processing for a Closed-Loop Chain The Brazilian government has designated rare earths as "strategic minerals." Under the National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals (PNMCE, Bill PL 4.443/2025), at least 80% of critical strategic minerals must be processed domestically, effectively banning raw ore exports. This policy aims to break the passive cycle of "mining-exporting raw materials-importing high-value products" and drive the construction of a full domestic value chain "from mine to magnet." (II) Project Implementation: From Lab to Industrialization In 2026, Brazil's rare earth development took a substantive leap: MagBras Initiative : Led by CIT SENAI in Minas Gerais and coordinated by FIESC in Santa Catarina, this project united 28 companies and research bodies to deliver the first 20kg of rare earth carbonate. This marked Brazil's first autonomous, full-process production from mining to chemical compound. LabFabITr Facility : Located in Lagoa Santa, Minas Gerais, this is the Southern Hemisphere's first lab-factory dedicated to rare earth magnet and alloy R&D, providing crucial technical support for local permanent magnet manufacturing. III. Capital and Geopolitics: The $2.17 Billion Investment Gamble Between 2025 and 2029, Brazil's rare earth sector is poised for $2.17 billion in investment—a 49% surge compared to the 2024-2028 forecast. This makes it the fastest-growing segment in Brazil's mining investment portfolio. This capital influx is underpinned by the geopolitical logic of global supply chain restructuring: (I) External Demand: A "Diversified Option" Amidst US-China Tensions As competition between the US and China intensifies, Brazil's strategic value as a "non-Chinese" supplier has skyrocketed. Its policy of "global openness" avoids picking sides while leveraging domestic processing mandates to attract technology transfer—requiring foreign investors to build local processing capabilities rather than just extracting ore. (II) Internal Drive: From "Resource Nationalism" to "Technological Autonomy" Brazil's strategy transcends simple resource protection; it is an upgrade centered on "technological autonomy." For instance, MagBras targets permanent magnet manufacturing—a sector currently monopolized by China, Japan, and Germany. Success would position Brazil among the few nations mastering the "ore-to-magnet" value chain, directly integrating into the core supply chains of EVs, wind energy, and industrial robotics. IV. Challenges and Outlook: Technology, Cost, and Global Competition Despite the upside, three core challenges remain: (I) Technological Barriers Rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing are high-threshold sectors. Brazil currently relies on international partnerships (e.g., European technical support for LabFabITr) to bridge this gap. (II) Cost Pressures Brazil's low-grade ion-adsorption ores entail higher beneficiation costs compared to some high-grade Chinese deposits. Additionally, the capital and operational expenditures for domestic processing could impact international price competitiveness. (III) Global Competition With Australia, the US, and various African nations also accelerating their rare earth developments, Brazil must carve out differentiated advantages in technology, cost efficiency, and policy stability to secure its market share. V. Conclusion: Leaping from "Resource Holder" to "Supply Chain Player" Brazil's rare earth transition represents a strategic leap from a "resource exporter" to a "technology-driven industrial player." While its 21 million tonnes of reserves provide the foundation, the true value lies in its policy-driven, capital-intensive push to build a complete industrial chain. If initiatives like MagBras achieve commercial success, Brazil is on track to become the "third pole" in the global rare earth supply chain by 2030, reshaping trade dynamics and offering a new paradigm for resource-based economies worldwide.

This week, ferrous metals moved sideways and upward. During the week, as US-Iran negotiations made no progress and the Strait of Hormuz remained closed, combined with declining US crude oil inventories, Brent crude oil surged sharply, driving coking coal higher. Although BHP port spot cargoes were available for purchase, which was bearish for market sentiment, futures had already priced in related expectations earlier, so iron ore pullback was limited and cost support was relatively neutral. The Politburo meeting held mid-week had low direct correlation with ferrous metals, and ferrous metals fluctuated at highs during the week. Spot market side, end-users restocked at low prices before the holiday, and as futures rose in the latter half of the week, speculative demand was also released...

[Silicon Metal Futures Center Shifted Higher with Increased Enterprise Shipments; Heavy Wait-and-See Sentiment in Polysilicon Market]: In the futures market, the most-traded contract trended stronger during the week, with the SI2609 contract center at 8700-8800 yuan/mt and the highest point touching above 8,900 yuan/mt. Driven by macro factors and news, futures rose, boosting silicon producers' shipment sentiment, and silicon enterprises' shipments to trading firms engaging in both spot and futures market increased. On the fundamentals side, silicon metal supply and demand were in tight balance in April, and the supply-demand structure is not expected to see major adjustments in May. Facing the pressure of increased supply during the rainy season in Sichuan and Yunnan from June to July, the market outlook leaned toward caution. On the cost side, raw material prices remained firm. With upside in silicon metal prices capped and downside supported by costs, the price fluctuation range was narrow.